Sarajevo

by R W Seaton-Watson

  moment of this interview, is supplied by the " reassur-

  ing explanations " which the Ballplatz had given to the

  Russian Ambassador in Vienna on 21 July, with the

  result that he had thought it safe to take some days'

  leave of absence in the country.1 As it was, Sazonov, as

  reported by Szápáry himself,2 not unnaturally assumed

  from the first that Austria-Hungary desired war and

  was using the murder as a pretext. (" Vous mettez le feu

  à l'Europe.") Serbia could never accept such demands;

  for if, for example, Austro-Hungarian officials obtained

  the right of interference in Serbia itself, " you will then

  always be wanting to interfere, and what a life Europe

  will lead then!" To Szápáry's phrases about monarchical

  solidarity

  Sazonov

  replied

  with

  the

  abrupt

  phrase,

  ' L'idée monarchique na rien à faire avec cela." The

  1 French Yellow Book, No. i8 (Dumaine to Bienvenu-Martin, 22 July); No.

  20 (Bienvenu-Martin quoting Dumaine). cf. Poincarè, Origines, p. 233.

  2 Szápáry to Berchtold, 24 July, D.A., ii., Nos. l6, 17, 18.

  210

  diplomatic dossier, he added, had no real point after

  such an ultimatum: " c'est que vous voulez la guerre, et

  vous avez brûlé vos ponts." Nor were matters improved

  when the Minister laid a large measure of the blame for

  this policy upon Forgách, and when the Ambassador

  countered by defending " the conciliatory rôle " played

  by that diplomatist as Austro-Hungarian Minister in

  Belgrade! As Forgách's chief rôle in Belgrade had

  been to supervise the forgery of anti-Serb diplomatic

  documents in his own Legation,1 this reference only

  served to irritate Sazonov still further, and though he

  retained a " relative calm," his general attitude was

  " thoroughly hostile " (durchaus ablehnend und gegnerisch).

  Following

  upon

  this

  conversation,

  Sazonov

  held

  a

  Cabinet Council of five hours, and then saw the German

  Ambassador. Their talk at first took a stormy course,

  but ended with a friendly appeal of Sazonov in favour

  of Russo-German co-operation for the maintenance of

  peace. His main argument was that the Austro-Serbian

  quarrel concerned not merely the two states but all

  Europe, all the more so since the present Note to Serbia

  took as its point of departure Serbia's own Note of

  April 1909, disclaiming all interest in Bosnia, and since

  this Note was produced under the auspices of all the

  Powers. Russia, he warned Pourtalès, would demand

  an " international enquiry " into the dossier supplied

  by Vienna. To this the German replied that Austria-

  Hungary would not accept interference in her quarrel

  with Serbia, and that Germany " could not accept any

  suggestion conflicting with her ally's dignity as a Great

  Power."2 Sazonov insisted that Russia could not be

  indifferent to Austria-Hungary's intention of " swallow-

  ing Serbia," to which Pourtalès retorted that her inten-

  tion was not this, " but to inflict a justly-merited

  punishment." Sazonov's appeal for peaceful co-operation

  was met by the assurance that Germany " had no wish to

  1 See supra, p. 33.

  2 Szâpâry to Berchtold, 24 July, D.A., ii., No. 19.

  211

  unchain a war, but of course fully supports the interests

  of her ally."1 It is of some importance to note that

  Pourtalès's own report to Berlin of this conversation

  confirms

  the

  accuracy

  of

  Szápáry's summary, but

  strangely omits all reference to Sazonov's conciliatory

  appeal!2

  These

  telegrams

  of

  Pourtalès and Szápáry

  to Berlin and Vienna respectively prove conclusively

  that the Central Powers had ample warning of Russia's

  attitude

  and

  deliberately

  disregarded

  the

  imminent

  danger of war which their policy involved.

  Meanwhile, on the same day (24 July), Count Berch-

  told received the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna,

  Prince Kudashev,3 and assured him of his special desire

  to inform Russia at as early a date as possible of the

  steps taken in Belgrade. The very fact that it was

  Kudashev, and not his chief, Mr. Shebeko, whom Berch-

  told received, was due to an added perfidy,, for the

  Ambassador had left for the country two days earlier,

  " in consequence of reassuring explanations " at the

  Ballplatz.4

  Such an assurance as Berchtold's, given when one-

  third of the brief time-limit had already elapsed, must have

  sounded sufficiently thin to Kudashev himself, but its

  utter insincerity is still more obvious to us, who know

  from the Minutes of the Council of Ministers and the

  correspondence with Berlin that the main aim of Berch-

  told's tactics was, on the contrary, to conceal his action

  from St. Petersburg just as long as possible, and that the

  shortness of the time-limit was above all intended to

  paralyse Russian action in Belgrade.

  1 ibid., p. 20. *

  2 Pourtalès to Bethmann Hollweg, 25 July, D.D., i., No. 204, p. 210.

  3 'Tagesbericht of Berchtold, 24 July, D.A., ii., No. 23.

  4 French Yellow Book, No. 18. cf. Sir Maurice de Bunsen's despatch of

  I September, 1914 {British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 161). "So little had

  the Russian

  Ambassador been

  made aware

  of

  what

  was

  preparing,

  that he

  actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about 20 July." This may

  not be very creditable to Shebeko's foresight, but it supplements the evidence

  against any aggressive designs on the part of Russia. According to Tschirschky

  (23 July, to Berlin, D.D., i., No. 131), Shebeko saw Berchtold before leaving,

  but Serbia was not mentioned.

  212

  Kudashev expressed anxiety at demands so drastic,

  and hinted that they seemed to him impossible of accept-

  ance. His warning that Russia could not be indifferent

  to a " humiliation of Serbia/' was met by Berchtold's

  assurance that " nothing lay farther from him than to

  humiliate Serbia," and that this was not in Austria-

  Hungary's

  interest. The peculiar perfidy of such a

  remark is best illustrated from the minutes of the Council

  of 7 July, at which Berchtold induced all his colleagues,

  save Tisza, to agree that success, " even if it should end

  with a striking humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless,"1

  in

  other

  words,

  that

  something

  even

  worse

  than

  " humiliation " was intended.» Equally false was his

  assurance
<
br />   that

  Austria-Hungary

  desired

  no

  territorial

  changes, in view of his insistence, at the Council of

  19 July/ upon the need of partition and even the possi-

  bility of annexation!

  Kudashev also expressed much alarm at the shortness

  of the time-limit, and on learning how Giesl had been

  instructed to proceed at Belgrade, he remarked, " alors

  c'est la guerre."4· Next day, in the name of his Govern-

  ment, he wired to Berchtold,6 who had in the meantime

  left for Ischl, urging an extension of the time, and also

  pressed this view verbally upon the permanent secretary,

  Baron Macchio. The latter made it clear that such a

  1 See supra, p. 187. {D.A., i., No. 8, pp. 35 and 38.)

  2 That Berchtold should have calmly placed this on record in his Tagesbericht —

  which is indeed our chief source for the incident- — speaks volumes for his own

  mentality

  and

  that

  of

  the

  Ballplatz.

  It

  should

  be

  compared

  with

  another

  illuminating incident revealed in the Minutes of the Joint Council of 19 July

  {D.A., i., No. 26, p. 66). Berchtold, it will be remembered, contested Tisza's

  proposal for an explicit pledge against all annexation of Serbian territory on

  the ground that the war might alter conditions so much that annexation might

  become^ inevitable. To this Tisza replied by reminding him that Russia would

  resist " à outrance " rather than tolerate Serbia's destruction, and that his

  proposed

  pledge

  was

  necessary

  "

  in

  order

  to

  improve

  "

  Austria-Hungary's

  "

  international

  situation."

  Berchtold

  hereupon

  declared

  that

  he

  had

  "in

  any

  case the intention of giving this declaration in Rome! " Surely perfidy cannot

  go much further than this.

  3 See supra, p. 200. (D.A., i., No. 26, pp. 65-6.)

  4 All this Berchtold appears to have dictated in cold blood, for he is our

  authority. {D.A., ii., No. 23, p. 24.)

  5 D.A., ii., No. 28.

  213

  proposal would not be acted upon, and added that the

  Note addressed to the Powers was not intended to lead

  to answers on their part, but was merely " an act of

  international

  courtesy."1

  Berchtold

  not

  only

  tele-

  graphed

  special

  approval

  of

  this

  uncompromising

  attitude,· but went still further in his reply to Kudashev,

  curtly reminding him that " even after the rupture of

  diplomatic

  relations''

  [which,

  then,

  Berchtold

  already

  took for granted], " Serbia could bring about a peaceful

  settlement by unreserved acceptance of our demands,

  but that in that case we should be compelled to demand

  from Serbia the reimbursement of all costs and losses

  due to our military measures."* What conclusion can

  reasonably be drawn from all this, save that Berchtold

  adhered to his old view that a peaceful settlement would

  be "highly unsympathetic,"4 nay more, that he added

  as an after-thought a yet more impossible demand, such

  as must greatly reduce the prospects of Russia influencing

  Belgrade in a peaceful sense?

  While, however, refusing Sazonov's appeal for a delay,

  Berchtold on the same day sent instructions to his

  Ambassador in St. Petersburg4 which show that he was

  at least anxious to hold back Russia from action, though

  seeing but little chance of convincing Sazonov. Szápáry

  is to describe the Monarchy as " territorially saturated,"·

  and to lay stress on the defensive character of its action,

  its unexampled forbearance towards a small neighbour,

  its lack of all hostility to the Balkan Christians or to the

  Orthodox faith, and the essentially Conservative nature

  of

  Austro-Hungarian

  policy.

  The

  arguments

  adduced

  are conventional and unconvincing, save for the interest-

  ing suggestion that Turkey's expulsion from Europe

  had " removed all possibility of conflict " between

  Austria-Hungary and Russia. For his own information

  1 D.A., ii., No. 29. (Macchio to Berchtold).

  2 D.A., ii., No. 30.

  3 D.A., ii., No. 27.

  4 supra, p. 191.

  5 25 July, D.A., ii., No. 42.

  6 Α phrase coined by Aehrenthal in 1908

  214

  Szápáry is informed that Russia must no longer be

  allowed to secure immunity for Serbia's policy of menace

  to the Monarchy. If indeed Russia intends to use the

  occasion " for the final reckoning with the Central

  Powers," then of course, Berchtold quite rightly remarks,

  all such instructions are superfluous. But it may be

  that she is embarrassed and " not so eager for attack or

  ready for war " as the jingo press would suggest or "as

  Poincaré and Izvolsky might perhaps wish."1

  In this phrase may probably be traced one of the chief

  factors which determined Berchtold's action and eventu-

  ally plunged Europe into war. There can be very little

  doubt that Berchtold shared the view of William II »

  that Russia was as yet quite unprepared for war, and

  would therefore rest content with diplomatic protests

  and shrink from the final arbitrament of the sword. In

  short, he calculated upon a repetition of the crisis of

  1909, when Berlin, standing " in shining armour " at

  the side of Vienna, forced St. Petersburg to renounce

  its backing of Belgrade. In this view Berchtold was

  confirmed

  by

  the

  highest

  military

  opinion

  of

  the

  Monarchy, Baron Conrad considering that Russia would

  not be ready for war on a grand scale until 1916, and

  that this interval afforded the last respite within which a

  forcible settlement of the Serbian question might be

  attempted.3

  But quite apart from military reasons, the statesmen

  1ibid., p. 38.

  2 See supra, p. 175.

  3 This view was constantly preached by Pourtalès (cf. p. 208). On 25

  July Szögyény transmits to

  Vienna a

  summary

  of

  Pourtalès's interview with

  Sazonov

  (shown

  to

  him

  at

  the

  Wilhelmstrasse),

  and

  concludes

  from

  certain

  phrases used by Sazonov that " Russia will not for the presen
t undertake any

  warlike measures " {D.A., ii., No. 34). On 28 July Szögyény assured Goschen

  that " Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war " — " an opinion,"

  adds Goschen, " shared by many people " in Berlin (B.D.C., No. 71, Goschen

  to Grey). M. Paléologue (La Russie des Tsars, i., p. 33) records having informed

  Sazonov on 27 July that Pourtalès had expressed to the Ministers of Holland

  and Belgium his conviction that Russia would capitulate. Again the Bavarian

  Charge d'Affaires, Herr von Schoen,

  writing to Munich

  on 18 July, quotes

  Zimmermann as arguing that " Bluff is one of the favourite requisites of Russian

  policy,"

  and

  that

  "

  Russia

  likes

  threatening

  with

  the

  sword,

  but

  at

  the

  decisive moment does not like drawing it for others." (D.D., IV., Anhang iv.,

  No. 2, p. 128.)

  215

  of Vienna and Berlin were further encouraged by the

  precarious internal conditions of Russia. The gigantic

  workmen's strikes organised in St. Petersburg and other

  cities at the time of the French visit were interpreted

  (and certainly not without foundation) as symptoms of

  revolution sufficiently grave to deter the Tsar and his

  advisers

  from

  all

  foreign

  adventures.

  The

  German

  Ambassador, in his reports to Berlin, lays great stress

  upon the coldness and indifference of the Russian public

  towards the representatives of their French ally.1

  It is scarcely open to doubt that Russian official circles

  viewed war with apprehension, though the view that it

  would serve as a diversion from internal troubles no

  doubt competed with the saner opinion that even if not

  unduly prolonged it would accentuate those troubles

  tenfold. But the decisive factor was that a knowledge

  of the abandonment of Serbia would not merely under-

  mine Russian influence in the Balkans, but almost

  automatically force all the states of the Peninsula,

  including even Roumania and Turkey, into the orbit

  of the Central Powers and thus alter, very greatly to

  Russia's disadvantage, the whole distribution of forces

  in Eastern Europe. We are to-day justly suspicious

  of that conception of " prestige," which exercised so

  great a sway upon pre-war diplomacy, but this was clearly

  a case in which prestige was bound to play a vital part;

  and the greater the danger from revolutionary and

  subversive elements inside Russia, the more impossible