was it for any Government to alienate those wide circles
to which Panslav sentiment made a living and passionate
appeal. Thus that dual motive which has underlain
Russian policy in the Near East for two centuries past —
on the one hand, dynastic and imperialistic ambition,
seeking to increase its own prestige and power by
redressing
the
handicap
imposed
upon
Russia
by
geography, on the other hand the traditional ties of
1e.g. Pourtalès to Bethmann Hollweg, 24 July. (D.D., i., No. 203.)
216
race, religion and custom which so long prompted the
Balkan Christians to regard Russia as an elder brother
and liberator, and which were genuinely and keenly felt
as an obligation of honour by the upper and middle
classes of the old Russia — all this combined to force the
Russian Government to risk everything for Serbia. The
very fact that it had surrendered in 1909 to the menace
of Berlin rendered a second surrender all the more
impossible; and the tactless manner in which Russia's
diplomatic defeat had been paraded before Europe by
William II increased the anxiety of St. Petersburg lest
the Central Powers might again publicly proclaim the
powerlessness of Russia to save her friends. Even if
the diplomatic evidence be laid entirely on one side, it
is impossible for anyone who looks below the surface
to deny that the elimination of Russian influence from
the Near East was in fact the foremost aim of Berlin and
Vienna, and that the murder of Sarajevo was being used
as an effective instrument for that end. Just as the
Serbian victories of 1912 had been countered by the
creation of Albania, the defeat of Bulgaria by Germany's
support for King Constantine and King Charles at the
Treaty of Bucarest, the Russian rapprochement with
Roumania by the establishment of Liman von Sanders at
Constantinople, so now the apparent check at Sarajevo
was seen to offer a new opening in the " grand game,"
and was to be met by a series of rapid counter-moves
which would not merely isolate Serbia, but leave Russia
without a single pawn. The two allies desired peace
with Russia, but at the expense of a fresh surrender,
which this time might have been final.
As we shall see, even after the diplomatic rupture a
last desperate effort at conciliation was made by Sazonov
which, with a little good will in Berlin and Vienna, would
almost certainly have averted war. But the perfidious
and
secret
attitude
of
Berchtold,
the
negative
and
impatient attitude of Berlin, persisted to the last, and
217
the action of the soldiers in St. Petersburg and Berlin
— due in part to panic, in part to unscrupulous ambition
— merely precipitated a disaster which the diplomatists
had foreseen and deliberately risked.
It is quite evident from the above survey that a vital
factor in the calculations of Germany1 was the assump-
tion that Russia was not ready, and would therefore
make diplomatic protests, but would not go to war.
This was the Emperor William's belief, and in it he was
strengthened
by
secret
military
information,
by
the
reports of Count Pourtalès, by what Bucarest reported
of Sazonov's alarms, by the views expressed by Dumaine
in Vienna, and — perhaps most decisive of all — by the
outbreak of a strike movement of almost revolutionary
dimensions, at the very moment of the French visit.
Prince Henry of Prussia, who had come for a flying
visit to England, had gone so far as to maintain
that " if Russia moved," there would be an internal
revolution
and
the
dynasty
would
fall.'
William,
then, hoped to bully the Tsar and manœuvre his
Government into the same kind of surrender as had
terminated the Bosnian crisis of 1909, and argued that,
if after all Russia should accept the challenge, the summer
of 1914 was a better moment for the great struggle than
some later date. In the words of Count Moltke, the
German Chief of Staff, " every delay means a diminution
of our chances."
Though
it
is
notorious
that
the
assumption
of
Russian unreadiness for war was a decisive factor at
Berlin and Vienna, it is none the less very frequently
argued that Russia was preparing for war upon the
Central Powers and had actually fixed upon the summer
of 1914 for the execution of her design. A few wild
1 Not so much of Austria-Hungary, who deliberately took the risk of war
írom the outset.
2 Sir Arthur Nicolson reports this to Sir Edward Grey on 26 July, by telegram
and letter to Itchen Abbas.
3 Conrad, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, iii., p. 670.
218
pamphleteers have even gone so far as to suggest official
Russian complicity in the Archduke's murder — a charge
altogether
too
frivolous
to
require
refutation.
The
best proof that Russia had no intention of attacking
Germany in 1914 is provided by what actually happened
in the autumn of that year. For the plan of the Russian
General Staff rested on the assumption that the whole
Polish salient, including even Warsaw itself, was incapable
of defence against the German offensive, and would
have to be abandoned. It was only in response to the
military dangers of the Western front that Russia made
a superhuman effort in East Prussia which created a
valuable diversion but ended in disaster to herself.
Indeed, it was not till late in the autumn that the final
decision to hold Warsaw was made, and the Siberian
Corps was rushed into the city at the last moment and
for the time being arrested the German advance. This
illustrates how little the idea of an offensive figured in
the Russian plans.
It should be unnecessary to add — what is common
knowledge to every student of military history — that
Russia's lack of strategic railways placed her at the
greatest disadvantage against Germany, whose strategic
system was almost as perfect on the East as on the West.
The fact that Russia was trying to perfect her system —
obviously with a view to war, like all military measures
in all countries — was one of the very strongest reasons
urged by German military circles for forcing an issue
in 1914. That official Russia was torn between a war
party with Panslav leanings and a Germano
phil party
which distrusted the democratic West, cannot be denied;
but that the former pressed for war, in expectation of an
early offensive and easy victory, is hardly credible. It
would be more correct to say that when it saw that the
statesmen could no longer control the political situation,
it insisted upon forcing the pace by measures of military
urgency. Some people may argue that these were
219
dictated by panic, but it would be fairer to speak of well-
informed alarm at the immense superiority of the German
military machine.
A systematic attempt has been made to throw upon
Russia the chief blame for war by insisting upon the
criminal deception played upon the Tsar by his Minister
of War in ordering a general mobilisation against his
orders. But the attentive reader will, I hope, ere this
have reached a conclusion which seems to be inevitable
— namely, that the real responsibility for war lies in the
period preceding the ultimatum of 23 July, and that
those Powers who till then deliberately worked to deceive
Europe and render intervention impossible must bear
the
responsibility
for
what
ensued.
Recent
publica-
tions1 have tended to invalidate Suhomlinov's assertions
and to exculpate Russia. But in any case, if we regard
matters in their proper perspective, we must surely
admit that by 31 July, when General Suhomlinov took
the alleged action, the military groups were already
forcing the politicians into the background in all the
Continental capitals, and peace was at the mercy of any
measure of panic or provocation. And this risk both
Berlin and Vienna took with their eyes open.
What really made a rupture inevitable was the con-
tention of the Central Powers that the fate of Serbia
was no concern of Russia, and might be decided solely
by Vienna. This was the real meaning of the word
" localisation," and from the very first everyone knew
that Russia never could or would accept a view which
would have been equivalent to abdicating for ever her
position in the Slavonic world. Here lies the kernel of
the whole matter, and only the sophist or the pedant
Will deny it.
1
See
especially General
S. Dobrorolski, Die
Mobilmachung der russischen
Armee, 1922.
220
NOTE ON RUSSIA'S ALLEGED WAR DESIGNS
A few indications from private sources may be added
here, to which an exaggerated value must not be assigned,
but which may serve as straws showing the direction of
the wind.
At least a year before the war Mr. Zvegintsev, then
reporter in the Duma Committee on Imperial Defence,
informed Sir Bernard Pares that as a result of the military
reorganisation which was then being undertaken, the
real danger for Russia would come in July and the
following months of 1914, when the transition from old
to new would be at its height. From this Zvegintsev
drew the conclusion that if, as he believed, Germany
intended to attack Russia, she was likely to select that
moment.
The state of uncertainty in which Russia lived in the
years preceding the war is illustrated by a statement
made to Sir Bernard Pares in 1916 by General Alexeyev
(then Chief of Staff and really Commander-in-Chief, in
succession to the Grand Duke Nicholas), to the effect
that from 1909 to 1914 he, as chief of staff in the Kiev
military district, had had permanent orders to be ready
for the repelling of invasion at any time at forty-eight
hours' notice.
These two anecdotes show pretty clearly how unready
Russia was for military aggression. Let me add three
brief incidents on the political side.
In the spring of 1914 Dr. Scheiner, President of the
Czech Sokol Organisation, paid a visit to Russia and
saw Mr. Sazonov, who reproached him for the lack of
interest in Russia displayed by the Czechs. They could
not, he added, count upon Russia, for her army was
not ready for a decisive war. In January 1914 Sazonov
expressed himself in very much the same way to another
important Czech, Dr. Klofác, and insisted that the Great
Powers did not want a war. (See President Masaryk's
221
Memoirs, Die Weltrevolution, p. 14.) Again, Mr. Pasic,
on his return from St. Petersburg early in 1914, informed
Mr. Mestrovic, the sculptor, that Russia was anxious to
avoid any warlike complications and would not be
ready for at least two or three years.
BERCHTOLD AND PARIS
Count
Berchtold's
attitude
towards
France
was
simplicity itself. Count Szécsen was privately informed
by Count Forgách as early as 8 July, with regard to
Austria-Hungary's
intentions
and
solidarity,1
and
his
function consisted in observing the strictest secrecy and
lulling to sleep all anxiety on the part of the Quai d'Orsay
or the Paris press.
President
Poincaré, accompanied by the Premier,
Mr. Viviani, and the Russian Ambassador in Paris, Mr.
Izvolsky, left for St. Petersburg on 15 July and set out
on their return voyage late at night on 23 July.1 We
have already seen that one of Berchtold's main objects
was to prevent the Russian and French statesmen from
realising the full gravity of the Balkan and European
situation before they had parted company, and also to
reduce to a minimum the danger of French intervention
before the expiry of the ultimatum. For this purpose
nothing could be more effective than the fact that during
this brief period the President and his Prime Minister
were on board a battleship in the Baltic, and hence
fatally handicapped for delicate diplomatic negotiations.
On 20 July, Szécsen, like his colleagues in the five
other principal capitals, received the Note to Serbia,
the covering Note to the Powers, and instructions to
deliver them at the Quai d'Orsay on the morning of the
24th. His verbal comments were to be confined to a
1 Gooss, op. cit., p. 20.
2 It should be noted that the visit to Russia had been arranged as long ago
as January 1914, and was to be followed by state visits to Stockholm, Christiania
and
Copenhagen.
There
was
thus
nothing
even
remotely
provocative
in
it,
as is sometimes suggested.
222
polite recognition of French efforts during recent crises
" to bridge the difference between the two groups of
Powers." Szécsen at once warned Berchtold that to
>
select the very moment of Poincaré's departure from
Russia for the delivery of the Note would be regarded
in Paris as an attempt to take the French unawares
(Ueberrumpelung), 1 and would probably have a " bad
press.
"
The
arguments
provided
by
Berchtold'
to
meet such an attitude on the part of the French were,
firstly, that the demarche in Belgrade had to be held up
until the Sarajevo enquiry had been completed — an
argument which he himself of course knew to be im-
material and insincere — and secondly, that it would have
been " far less polite still to have disturbed the festivities
in St. Petersburg by earlier action," while (and this was
the real point, which could not be pressed in Paris) " it
would not have suited Vienna at all " to act while the
Tsar and his Ministers were exposed to the influence of
the two " agitators," Poincaré and Izvolsky.
Meanwhile, M. Dumaine, the French Ambassador in
Vienna, called on Berchtold and emphasised the dangers
of a " racial war " between Austria-Hungary and Serbia,
but blunted any possible effect of his remarks by express-
ing the belief that Russia " would not. intervene actively,
but would far rather aim at localising the war." 3 This
was at once reported by Tschirschky to Berlin.4
On the very eve of the ultimatum, Mr. Dumaine,
acting on instructions, warned the Ballplatz of " the
anxiety aroused in Europe," but was assured by Baron
Macchio that " the tone of the Note and the demands
which would be formulated in it allow us to count on a
peaceful result,4 since it contained nothing with which
1 22 July, D.A., i., No. 51.
2 Berchtold to Szécsen, 23 July, O.A., i., No. 57.
3 Tagesbericht of Berchtold, 22 July, D.A., i., No. 53.
3 23 July, D.D., i., No. 131.
4 French Yellow Book, No. 20 (23 July).
223
a self-respecting state need hesitate to comply.1 Here
again, then, we find the Ballplatz deliberately duping
the representative of a Power whom he wished to place
before an accomplished fact. Indeed, as Prince Kudashev
points
out
in
a
subsequent
despatch
to
Petrograd,
Macchio's evasive answer — to the effect that action would
probably be taken at Belgrade next day — was actually
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