uttered at the very moment when Giesl was presenting
the ultimatum! Dishonesty could hardly go further.2
When on 24 July Szécsen communicated the two
Notes to the Quai d'Orsay, it was in the absence of all
the principals, and the conversation was merely formal.
On the same day, his German colleague, Baron Schoen,
informed the French that Berlin regarded the controversy
as one "to be settled exclusively between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia," and " urgently desired the localisa-
tion of the dispute, because every interference of another
Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be
followed by
incalculable consequences."3 This thinly-
veiled menace first revealed to the Quai dOrsay the
imminence of the danger to European peace.
So far, then, as France was concerned, Berchtold may
be said to have been completely successful, and it was
not until the President's hurried return on 29 July4 that
Paris really began to make itself felt in the European
crisis. The fact of M. Poincaré's elimination at the
most critical period is conveniently slurred over by many
1 These assurances were given in two long interviews between Dumaine and
Macchio on 22 and 23 July (see de Bunsen's despatch of 1 September, British
Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 161). At the second of these " he was not even
informed
"
that
the
Note
was
at
that
very
moment
being
presented
at
Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning."
2 Kudashev to Sazonov, 26 July (How the War Began — Russian Foreign Office
Diary, p. 39).
3 Bienvenu Martin to Poincaré, 24 July, French Yellow Book, No. 28. Szécsen,
wiring to Berchtold on the same day, (D.A., ii., No. 10) quotes Schoen as also
Saying that if a third state should interfere, " Germany would be found loyally
on the side " of Austria-Hungary. In the French document no such phrase
occurs, but the implication is of course the same. See also Schoen to Berlin,
24 July, D.D., i., No. 154.
4 He was not due back till the 31st, but in view of the alarming news, abandoned
«le Danish and Norwegian parts of his programme at the last moment.
224
of those who denounce him as one of the foremost war
criminals.
BERCHTOLD AND LONDON
Towards London Berchtold showed the same attitude
of resolute silence, and gave no indication whatever of his
intentions, either to Sir Edward Grey through Count
Mensdorff, or to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British
Ambassador in Vienna. Indeed the latter complains,
in his report of 5 July, that both he and his Russian
colleague, Mr. Shebeko, " find a difficulty in extracting
from Berchtold . . . anything like an explicit statement
of his views on international affairs/'1
The first inkling of trouble appears to have come to
Sir Edward Grey in a conversation on 6 July with Prince
Lichnowsky, who " knew for a fact," though he could
give no details, " that the Austrians intended to do some-
thing and that it was not impossible that they would
take military action against Serbia." * This, and perhaps
other information of which we have no record, led him on
8 July to express to the French Ambassador, M. Paul
Cambon, his " apprehension " at the possibility of an
Austro-Hungarian demarche, and both agreed that France
and Britain must unite in " encouraging patience in
St. Petersburg."» He spoke in the same sense to the
Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, and made him
promise to write to Sazonov.4 Next day a despatch of
Bunsen reached him, quoting the outspoken remarks of
Herr
von
Tschirschky,
the
German
Ambassador
in
Vienna.
Austro-Serbian
relations,
the
latter
argued,
" must be bad, and nothing could mend them "; he had
" tried in vain to convince Berlin of this fundamental
truth."* Whether this influenced Sir Edward Grey or
1 Bunsen to Grey, 5 July (received 9 July).
2 Grey to Rumbold, 6 July.
3 Grey to Bertie, 8 July.
4 Grey to Buchanan, 8 July. 5 Bunsen to Grey, 5 July.
225
not, whether he was alarmed by Tschirschky's violent
views or encouraged by the scepticism which they seemed
to encounter at Berlin, he at any rate had a further con-
versation with Prince Lichnowsky on 9 July, in which he
was frank and conciliatory to the verge of indiscretion.
In it, referring to recent rumours of a Russo-British naval
convention, he freely admitted that military and naval
conversations had taken place with both France and
Russia since 1906, but renewed the assurance that no
secret
agreement
existed
with
either
country.
He
followed this up by promising " to continue the same
policy as I had pursued through the Balkan crisis, and
do my utmost to prevent the outbreak of war between the
Great Powers. The greater the risk of war the more
closely would I adhere to that policy."1 Language of
this kind was as striking a proof of sincerity as could well
be given, for on the one side it served as a warning that
the Entente had a serious background such as Berlin
could appreciate, while on the other it revealed the
obvious desire of the British Foreign Secretary to avoid
war at all costs. Indeed, it is simply incredible that he
could have spoken thus on any other hypothesis. Follow-
ing upon the two agreements with Germany on the
Portuguese Colonies and the Bagdad Railway — by then
ready for final signature — and upon the no less frank
assurances given to Lichnowsky a few weeks earlier,2
they ought to have completely reassured Berlin, if it,
on its side, had been equally pacific.
Sir Maurice de Bunsen learnt nothing whatever of
what took place at the eventful Council of Ministers of
7 July,3 and reports that even his Serbian colleague, Mr.
J. M. Jovanovic, " has no reason to expect that any
threatening communication will be addressed " to Serbia.
On 16 July, however, he was able to report to London
I Grey to Rumbold, 9 July.
2 Despatch of Grey to Goschen, 24 June, published in Grey's Twenty-five Years,
Vo1. 1.. pp. 303-6.
3 Bunsen to Grey, 12 July.
226
the language used by Berchtold to a mutual friend on
the previous day. This friend, whose name does not
occur in the despatch, but who actually was Count Henry
Lützow, former Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the
Quirinal, reported that the situation was " regarded in
a serious light " at the Ballplatz, tha
t " a kind of indict-
ment " was " being prepared against the Serbian Govern-
ment for alleged complicity in the conspiracy," and that
" immediate unconditional compliance " would be de-
manded, " failing which, force will be used." Moreover,
Germany was " said to be in complete agreement with
this procedure." » We know now that Lützow's informa-
tion was the result of Tisza's conversion to a policy of
aggression on 14 July, thanks to Berlin's explicit pledge
of support, and thus the Bunsen despatch is the first
real clue to the Central Powers' intentions that became
available in London during the war.« But it was not
worded in such a way as to cause acute alarm at the
moment, and it was only later that its full significance
became apparent.
As late as 20 July, Sir Edward Grey, in conversation
with Prince Lichnowsky, had no definite information
regarding the Austro-Serbian dispute, but heard of the
assurance given by Berchtold to the Duke of Avarna,
denying the gravity of the situation and merely urging
the need for clearing it up. Lichnowsky was convinced
that " Austria was certainly going to take some step,"
and " regarded the situation as very uncomfortable."3
He agreed with Grey that the idea of any of the Great
Powers " being dragged into a war by Serbia " was
" detestable." « At the same time Grey took it for
granted that Vienna " would not do anything until they
had first disclosed to the public their case against Serbia,
1 Bunsen to Grey, 16 July.
2 Though first referred to in print in Mr. Steed's Through Thirty Years, vol. i·»
p. 404 (1924), it was already known in 1914 to a limited number of people, in-
cluding the present writer.
3 Grey to Rumbold, 20 July.
4 British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 1.
227
founded presumably upon what they had discovered at
the trial."
The first direct conversation on the subject of Serbia
between Sir Edward Grey and Count Mensdorff took
place on 23 July. The reasons for this were that the
latter had every interest in avoiding a discussion which
might have given some insight into his chief's plans,
whereas
the
former
had
deliberately
refrained
from
raising a question which he knew that Austria-Hungary
regarded as the exclusive concern of Vienna and Belgrade
— all the more so because he did not know what evidence
Vienna possessed of Serbian complicity. l
On 20 July Mensdorff received instructions2 to com-
municate the two Notes on the morning of the 24th,
adding verbal comments on the " converging tendencies "
of British and Austro-Hungarian policy in the Near East,
and a reminder of the British attitude towards the
murder of 1903, which should make it easier for London
to understand the public demand for " atonement " of
this new outrage. While, however, Mensdorff pursued
the
passive
rôle which these instructions involved,
alarming rumours circulated in the London diplomatic
corps, though the general public remained almost without
a suspicion of the approaching storm. On 22 July, then,
Grey asked Mensdorff to visit him on the following
afternoon, and the Ambassador, realising that absolute
secrecy would produce a disastrous effect, appealed, to
Berchtold* for permission to announce the iftipending
demarche.
This
authorisation
he
duly
obtained/
but
contented himself with summarising the contents of the
Note to Serbia, instead of showing the full text. Grey
at once fastened upon the time-limit, " which was in
effect akin to an ultimatum/' and expressed his strong
regret. It was then that he uttered his memorable
1 Mensdorff himself, in his telegram of 23 July to Berchtold (D.A., i., No. 59),
deports Grey as speaking in this sense, and there is every reason for regarding
as quite accurate.
2 D. A., No. (430).
3 D.A., i., No. 54.
4 D.A., l, No. 58.
228
warning as to " the awful consequences involved in the
situation "; general war would, he feared, lead to " a
complete
collapse
of
European
credit
and
industry,
and quite irrespective of who were victors, many things
might be completely swept away." l To-day the Foreign
Secretary's words have a strongly prophetic ring, for
foremost among the many things which the great flood
has since swept away are the Habsburg dynasty and
state.
Mensdorff reported Grey to be " very anxious " as to
the consequences of the demarche, and already in
favour of " a direct exchange of ideas " between
Vienna and St. Petersburg; he also held out the pros-
pect of unfavourable criticism in London. Doubtless
prompted by this warning, Berchtold sent his Ambassador
two
further
telegrams
of
instruction.
He
was
to
emphasise
Serbia's
responsibility
in
not
taking
any
spontaneous action towards punishing the criminals2 and
to explain the need for a short time-limit by Vienna's
" long years of experience of Serbian dilatory tactics."·
Next day he told Mensdorff to assure Grey that the
démarche was not a formal ultimatum, since it would
only involve a rupture of diplomatic relations in the
first instance, and not actual war. This was, to say the
least, disingenuous, in view of Berchtold's real inten-
tions and Berlin's insistence upon haste as essential to
avert interference. In any case he promptly destroyed
such effect as the argument was likely to have by adding
that if it should come to war he would hold Serbia liable
for Austria-Hungary's military outlay, since this would
be the third mobilisation which she rendered necessary
within six years.4
1 British Diplomatic Correspondence,
No.
3.
The
essential
phrases
are
correctly quoted in Mensdorfl's report to Berchtold. (D. Α., i., No. 59.)
2 This point is dealt with on p. 134. Berchtold, however, presumably assumed
Grey to be ignorant of the Serbian démarche in Berlin on 20 July, in this very
sense. (See p. 135.)
3 22 July, Austro-Hungarian Rotbuch, No. 9; D.A., I., No. 61.
4 24 July, D.A., ii., No. 13.
229
Meanwhile Grey, forewarned by Bunsen " that a serious
crisis may be at hand,"1 had discussed with Mensdorff
the actual text of the Note to Serbia, and gave classical
expression to the general view in Western Europe, by
remarking that he " had never before seen one state
address to another independent state a document of so
formidable a character."* The fifth demand, for in-
stance, seemed to him as " equivalent to the end of
Serbia's
state
independence."3
He
expressed
"
great
apprehension " as to the peace of Europe, and in con-
versation with Prince Lichnowksy, showed himself " very
perplexed and uneasy."4 " Never
before," he said,
" had such a tone been employed towards an independent
state," and he criticised the form of the Note even more
than its contents, pointing out that the time-limit " made
any action (Einwirkung) impossible."
To Lichnowsky Grey spoke even more frankly, declar-
ing that a state which accepted such demands " would
really cease to count as an independent state,"6 while an
Austrian
invasion
of
Serbia
would
mean
imminent
danger of an European War. He therefore put forward
a double proposal — (1) a joint German-British request
to Vienna for an extension of the time-limit, and (2)
1 This fear Sir Maurice based on a conversation with Count Forgách.
(Bunsen to Grey, 23 July.)
2 Grey to de Bunsen, 24 July. British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 5.
3 Mensdorff to Berchtold, 24 July (2.50 p.m.), O.A.., ii., No. 14. This telegram
is the same as was published as No. 10 in the original A.H. Red Book. It is,
however, of some importance to compare the two versions, as showing the extent
to which the Ballplatz " doctored " its documents before publication. In its
ungarbled form it not only confirms in every detail Sir Edward Grey's own version
of what occurred (as given in the British Diplomatic Correspondence), but also
shows him as from the first desperately anxious to preserve peace. But the
Austro-Hungarian Red Book appeared at a time
when
Sir Edward
was
the
chief
diplomatic
scapegoat
selected
for
abuse
by
the
German
and
Austrian
Governments, and therefore facts which revealed him in his true light as would-
be peacemaker had to be suppressed or distorted. Thus in this case both his
reference to the "
formidable character " of
the Note and his concluding
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