2 ibid., p. ioo.
3 Mérey to Berchtold, 21 July, O.A., i., No. 43.
4 Flotow to Berlin, 22 July, D.D., i., No. 109.
5 Flotow to Berlin, 23 July, D.D., i., No. 119.
237
Before this could take place, the relations of Vienna and
Rome were still further complicated by Mérey's failure
to give San Giuliano previous notice of the intended
demarche in Belgrade. Whether the blame for this
should be ascribed to contradictory instructions sent to
him by Berchtold, or to a belief that in remaining inactive
he was really interpreting Berchtold's inmost wishes,
or again simply to his own ill-health and a misunder-
standing as to the Foreign Minister's whereabouts on
the critical day,1 must remain a matter of conjecture.
Certainly his German colleague in Rome seems to have
been quite clear as to the cause, for he informs Berlin
how much his own difficulties had been increased by
Mérey's illness and the incompetence of his deputy,2
and alludes to the "complete inefficiency {gänzliches
Versagen) of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, which for
a fortnight past had been virtually without contact with
San Giuliano and had done nothing whatever in the
press.3
In
any
case
the
fact
remains
that
Rome
had
its first intimation of Austria-Hungary's action against
Serbia on the morning of 24 July, at least sixteen hours
after the Note had been delivered in Belgrade, and that
even then the Consulta only received a bare notification
of the fact, and not the actual text of the Note, and this
not from the Ambassador, who was in bed, but from his
substitute Count Ambrózy.« In other words, Italy not
merely received no previous intimation of action which
was certain to affect her own treaty obligations and
international
security,
but
was
actually
left
without
information longer than any of the Powers belonging to
either European grouping.
Under such circumstances it is not surprising that
1 Mérey's instructions and behaviour are given in detail by Gooss, op. cit.,
pp. 120-4, but these details simply tend to obscure the real cause.
2 Flotow to Berlin, 24 July, D.D., i., No. 156.
3 Flotow to Berlin, 25 July, D.D., i., No. 167.
4 Flotow to Berlin, 24 July, D.D., i., No. 136.
238
Flotow's conversation with Salandra and San Giuliano
was
somewhat
"agitated"
(erregt).1
The
two
states-
men at once made it clear that Italy regarded action
so " momentous " and " aggressive " as the Austro-
Hungarian demarche without previous warning, as con-
trary to the spirit of the Triple Alliance, and could not
therefore feel " engaged " for the future. San Giuliano
in particular insisted that there could be no casus fcederis
in a case of such obvious aggression, and raised the
question of compensation. Flotow deduces from their
attitude three main issues — fear of Italian public opinion,
a sense of Italy's military weakness, and the desire to
extract something for Italy out of the crisis — if possible
the Trentino.* He adds his own view that " the sole
possibility of keeping hold of Italy is a timely promise
of compensation." »
A day later he supplied a further motive for San
Giuliano's nervousness, namely, the fear lest Austria-
Hungary's action might create a precedent for similar
complaints
against
the
Italian
irredenta.
He
reports
San Giuliano to be unconvinced regarding Vienna's
disclaimers of annexation, and suggests that Rome would
prefer to submit the delicate question of compensation
to the mediation of Berlin, rather than treat direct with
Vienna through two Ambassadors so unsuitable for the
purpose as Mérey and Avarna.4 This suggestion Jagow
dismissed as impossible.* But he had lost no time in
trying to allay the bad effect of Berchtold's bungling in
Rome, by assuring San Giuliano7 that Germany also was
" not informed in detail about the Austrian Note, and
indeed did not want to be." This was hardly honest,
1 ibid., No. 156.
2 Flotow to Bethmann Hollweg, 25 July, D.D., i., No. 244.
3 bid., No. 168 (which is No. 156 transmitted more fully by Jagow to William
II).
4 Flotow to Berlin, 26 July, D.D., I., No. 211. As Sir Maurice de Bunsen
points
out
(British Diplomatic Correspondence,
No. 161), Avarna "
was
left
completely in the dark " by Berchtold " during this critical time."
6 Jagow to Flotow, 26 July, D.D., i., No. 239.
7 Jagow to Flotow, 24 July, D.D., i., No. 145
239
considering that Berlin, though ignorant of the actual
text of the Note to Serbia, had been repeatedly consulted
by Vienna, had been kept posted by Tschirschky as to
Berchtold's intentions, had received ample and detailed
notice of the procedure to be adopted1 and could at any
moment have imposed upon Vienna a more moderate
attitude.
Jagow was left in no doubt as to Italy's policy. Her
Ambassador in Berlin announced on 24 July that she
would adopt towards Austria-Hungary " as benevolent
and friendly an attitude as possible," but must have a
clear interpretation of Article VII of the Alliance, other-
wise she must direct her aim towards preventing the
Monarchy's territorial extension2; while in Vienna the
Duke of Avarna notified to Berchtold that Italy reserved
her right to compensation under Article VII.· The
German Government was thus in an unfortunate situa-
tion between its two allies, and while re-emphasising its
support to Vienna and even urging greater speed as the
best means of averting intervention/ informed Berchtold
quite plainly that it associated itself with the Italian
interpretation of Article VII and held compensation to
Italy to be necessary, even in the event of a temporary
occupation
of
Balkan
territory.
The
General
Staff
reminded the politicians that Germany's whole military
action would be endangered if Italy did not recognise the
casus fœderis, and both the Chancellor' and the Emperor
William himself« impressed upon Berchtold the vital
»See supra, pp. 191, 192, 194, 195, also 179; Tschirschky's despatches to
Berlin, D.D., I., Nos. 19, 29, 40, 49, 50, 65.
1 Jagow to Tschirschky, 24 July, D.D., i., No. 150.
2 Austro-Hungarian Rotbuch {Italien), No. 9.
3 Tschirschky to Berlin, 26 July, D.D., i
., No. 213; Szögyény to Berchtold,
25 July, D.A., ii., No. 32; Tagesbericht of Berchtold, 26 July, D.A., iL, No. 63.
4 Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky, 26 July, D.D., i., No. 202: " Vienna must
not
evade this (understanding)
by
doubtful
interpretations
of the Treaty,
but
must take decisions in keeping with the gravity of the situation."
5 Jagow to Tschirschky (transmitting the Emperor's orders), 27 July, D.D.,
i·, No. 267.
240
importance of a speedy agreement between Vienna and
Rome. Yet as late as 28 July Berchtold, in conversa-
tion with Avarna, was still insisting that the quarrel
concerned no one save Austria-Hungary and Serbia,
and though denying all idea of annexations, declined to
give any binding declaration to this effect.1 At last,
however, on the same day he did instruct Mérey to in-
form San Giuliano that Austria-Hungary, while " not
foreseeing or intending territorial acquisitions," would,
if compelled to resort to them, be ready to discuss with
Italy the question of compensation.* For the Ambas-
sador's own guidance he added that he had only con-
sented to " such concessions," because of the great
issues involved, which demanded the closest co-operation
between the three allies.
By this time, however, it was clear that Italy's active
assistance was out of the question and that her neutrality
was the very best that could be hoped for. Such was the
result of Berchtold's secrecy and obstinacy.
Conrad, meanwhile, was quite clear as to the need for
devising some kind of compensation for Italy; but it is
typical of his reckless outlook that on 26 July he suggested
in all seriousness to the German Ambassador that Italy
might be allowed to seize Montenegro.3 In this connec-
tion it is not uninteresting to note that both Vesnic,
the Serbian Minister in Paris, and his colleague, Tittoni,
the Italian Ambassador, had expressed to the Quai
d'Orsay their alarm lest Austria-Hungary might make a
sudden attack on Mount Lovcen, in order to prevent
Serbo-Montenegrin co-operation.4
The negotiations between Vienna and Rome may at
1 Berchtold to Mérey and Szögyény, 28 July, D.A., iL, No. 87.
2 ibid., p. 162; Gooss, op. cit., p. 192. On 27 July, however, he had authorised
Szápáry {Β.Α., iL, No. 75) to inform Carlotti and Sazonov that Austria-Hungary,
so long as war with Serbia was localised, did not intend to make any territorial
conquests.
3 D. D , iL, No. 326, Tschirschky to Jagow.
4 Bunsen to Grey, 21 July, reporting conversation with Dumaine.
241
first sight seem to lie outside the immediate scope of the
present enquiry. But the reader will, it is hoped, admit
that nothing illustrates more clearly Austria-Hungary's
" will to war " and the crooked methods employed to
attain that end, while all the evidence would seem to
suggest that Berchtold was following a sure instinct in
this policy of concealment, and that San Giuliano, if
initiated in time, would have found some means of
preventing the contemplated aggression.1
BUCAREST
Special attention deserves to be paid to the attitude of
Roumania during the weeks following the murder. As
has already been shown,* both Vienna and Berlin had for
some time been highly alarmed at the progressive aliena-
tion of Roumania from the Triple Alliance, and Count
Czernin had reported from Bucarest the fears expressed
by King Charles that in the event of war he could no
longer be sure of carrying the country with him. Both
the Ballplatz and the Wilhelmstrasse, however, were
disposed to exaggerate the King's control of foreign
policy, and the Emperor William in particular was
confident that his intervention at Bucarest would restore
the old harmony. Czernin challenged the accuracy of
this view, and adhered to his opinion after the murder.
Early in July he reported to Berchtold a conversation
in which the King expressed " great pessimism " as to
the future of Austria-Hungary, and had insisted upon
the need for drawing a distinction between the assassins
(Mordbuben)
and
official
Serbia.3
To
the
German
Chargé d'Affaires the King poured cold water on the
1 It is worth adding that Tschirschky protested very strongly to Macchio,
on 25 July, at the Ballplatz’s failure to fulfil its promise to inform San Guiliano
beforehand.
(Tschirschky
to
Berlin,
25
July.
D.D.,
1.,
No.
187.)
Macchio
shoved the blame on to Mérey.
2 supra, pp. 93~5·
3
Jagow to Waldburg (Chargé in Bucarest), 13 July, summarising Czernin's
report, as read to him by Szögyény. D.D., 1., No. 39.
242
idea of drawing Bulgaria into the Triple Alliance under
present circumstances. Bulgaria, he argued, could not
be trusted, and if Russia got wind of the negotiations
she would promptly make a revolution at Sofia, and the
existing Government could easily be swept away. He
himself was quite ready to meet the Emperor William's
wishes by " drawing back from Serbia " and trying to
restrain the anti-Austrian agitation in Roumania, but in
that case Hungary must make things easier for her
Roumanian subjects.1 In a
longer conversation with
Prince Waldburg on 10 July, King Charles spoke still
more frankly. He admitted that he had twice warned
Czernin of his inability to fulfil his treaty obligations in
the teeth of Roumanian public opinion. He recognised
that William II " had always worked in Vienna for an
understanding
with
Serbia/'
He
threw
doubts
upon
Russia's
alleged
design
to
reconstruct
the
Balkan
league with a special point against Austria-Hungary.
Above all, he re-emphasised " the hopelessness of an
alliance with Bulgaria." The Ballplatz seemed to him
to have " lost its head," and it would be well if Berlin
could dispel the lack of confidence prevailing in Vienna.
In this connection the King referred to " the political
abilities " of Count Berchtold " in not exactly flattering
terms."
By way of practical suggestion he held that Berlin
should appeal to the Russian Government to discourage
Austrophobe tendencies in Serbia, and he declared him-
self ready, if desired, to exercise similar pressure in
Belgrade and to support any action in this sense in St.
Petersburg, though he must not be revealed as the
originat
or
of
the
proposal.
From
Prince
Waldburg's
report it is evident that King Charles attached the very
greatest importance to such steps, but Berlin does not
seem to have followed the matter up.
These various communications made it clear to
1 Waldburg to Berlin, 10 July, D.D., i., No. 28.
243
Berchtold that Bucarest definitely favoured peace, and
could not be utilised for his designs. This explains why,
during the last week before the ultimatum and the eve of
actual war, Roumania is allowed by Austria-Hungary
to drop out of the picture, despite the very definite
knowledge that she was willing to play a mediatory rôle
and could have done so with perhaps greater effect than
any other Power.
CHAPTER IX
THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA
IT was necessary to describe in some detail the methods
by which Berchtold secured immunity from intervention
on the part of any of the Great Powers. The procedure
adopted towards Belgrade need not detain us long.
The discussions at the Joint Council of 7
July make it
quite clear that tactical rather than moral considerations
were the determining factor at Vienna. To the majority
present the murder provided an admirable excuse for an
already contemplated attack upon Serbia;
and, as the
latter was not to be regarded as a civ ilised nation, any
preliminary warning might be dispensed with. Even
Tisza based his criticism of the proposed policy solely on
tactical grounds, pointing out that in the Balkans it was
always easy enough to manufacture a pretext, but that
on the present occasion the ground was insufficiently
prepared.
It
is
especially
noteworthy
that
Berchtold
regarded
the
enquiry
at Sarajevo as of secondary
importance, and only ordered a high Ballplatz official,
Herr von Wiesner, to be sent there, at the instance of
Tisza, who favoured the preparation of a dossier as a
means of impressing Europe.
We have already seen that Wiesner, so far from
establishing the guilt of the Serbian Government, reached
the opposite conclusion that that guilt was not merely
i ncapable
of
proof,
but
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