remarks
regarding
"
what
could
still
be
attempted
to
meet
the
impending
danger " were omitted.
4 Mensdorff to Berchtold, 24 July (8.48 p.m.), O.A., ii., No. 15.
5 Lichnowsky to Berlin, 24 July, D.D., i., No. 157. On this William II's
marginal note is; " Much to be desired. It is not a state in the European sense,
but a band of robbers."
230
mediation à quatre between Vienna and St. Petersburg.1
In further telegrams of the following day Lichnowsky
reported the prevalent view in London that such a Note
was " inconceivable " without " German encourage-
ment,"" and for that very reason earnestly begged Berlin
not to reject Grey's proposal for postponement.1 Lich-
nowsky, in contrast to the heads of his own Foreign
Office, understood the Southern Slav Question in its
main bearings, and had not hesitated to warn them
against Vienna's " adventurous " policy, as unlikely
to lead " either to a radical solution of the question or to
a
destruction
of
the
Panserb
movement."4
But
he
failed
to
convince
either
Jagow
or
Zimmermann,
although he warned them in ample time* that British
opinion would be hostile to the coercion of Serbia. When
the Note appeared, the latter assured Lichnowsky that
Berlin had not seen it beforehand, but added: " Now,
however, that Austria-Hungary, on her own initiative,
has decided on sharp language, it is a matter of course
that
we
cannot
advise
Vienna
to
yield.
Austria-
Hungary's prestige at home and abroad would be finally
destroyed if she yielded."·
The publication at a late period in the war of Prince
Lichnowsky's famous Memorandum revealed him as one
of the few Germans in authority who, recognising the
awful dangers involved, directed his whole efforts to-
wards a peaceful solution. His dispatches from London
published since the war showed that he also formed a
clear estimate of the issues involved between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia, the secret aims and motives of
Berchtold, and the probable reaction of British opinion
to the general situation.
1 Here William's comment is categorical; "I won't take any part (Ich tue
nicht mit) unless Austria expressly asks me, which is not probable." D.D., i.,
No. 157, p. 171.
2 25 July, ibid., No. 163.
3 ibid., No. 165.
4 16 July, ibid., No. 62. He had warned Grey as early as 6 July of the dangers
of an Austro-Serb conflict (with a view to giving him time to act at St. Petersburg
in a moderating sense.) 5 ibid., No. 20.
6 14 July, ibid., No. 43.
7 24 July, ibid., No. 153·
231
Lichnowsky's attitude contrasts very markedly with
that
of
the
Austro-Hungarian
Embassy
in
London,
members of which, he reports to Berlin on 28 July, " have
in their conversations with me and my staff never made
the slightest attempt to conceal that Austria aims solely
at the overthrow of Serbia and that the Note was inten-
tionally framed so as to be unacceptable."1 Next day
we find the German Chancellor telling his Ambassador
in Vienna that " in London, Count Mensdorff presents
portions of Serbia to Bulgaria and Albania and runs
counter
to
Vienna's
solemn
declarations
at
St.
Petersburg."·
Beyond this point it is unnecessary for us to pursue
the course of events in London, which now became one
of the central points in that vast diplomatic game com-
monly referred to as " The Twelve Days." Sir Edward
Grey's gallant struggle for peace has been known in its
main outline ever since his epoch-making publication
of the British Diplomatic Correspondence in August 1914;
and the German and Austrian documents issued since
the war have only served to confirm their accuracy and
utterly to dissipate the calumnies so long directed against
him from Berlin.' It is my object to disentangle the
specifically Austro-Serbian dispute from the far wider
issues to which it gave rise; and as the rôle of Serbia,
after her answer was delivered on 25 July, became very
largely negative in the European crisis, it will suffice
to restrict our enquiry to points in which she was directly
concerned. This is all the more possible because the
central thesis of these pages is that the peace of Europe
had been deliberately and irremediably undermined by
Austro-Hungarian and German action before 25 July,
and therefore that during the period of twelve days upon
1 D.D., ii., No. 301. Lichnowsky to Berlin.
2 i.e. against the territorial curtailment of Serbia, D.D., ii., No. 361; Bethmann
Hollweg to Tschirschky, 29 July.
3 It is, of course, but right to add that to-day no serious German historian
adheres to the view of Grey generally accepted in 1915-16, just as on the Entente
side the Crown Council of Potsdam has been abandoned as a myth.
232
which attention has hitherto mainly been concentrated,
nothing short of a miracle, which did not occur, could
have averted disaster.
BERCHTOLD AND ROME
Most remarkable of all, however, was Berchtold's
treatment of his Italian ally. It will be remembered
that as early as 6 July, at the interview of Count Szögyény
with the German Chancellor, it was agreed that the wisest
course would be not to inform either Italy or Roumania
beforehand as to the action contemplated by Vienna.1
To this line Berchtold consistently adhered; but he
could not fail to realise the bad effect which his silence
was likely to produce upon an already restive and highly
sensitive ally, and already on 12 July we find him con-
sulting his Ambassador to the Quirinal, Mr. de Mérey,
as to whether it would be safe to inform the Marquis San
Giuliano of the demarche on the previous day, or perhaps
a
few
hours
beforehand.2
Mérey replied that San
Giuliano must be given previous notice, if Berchtold did
not wish him to feel " a very grave personal affront." 3
Berchtold then agreed that Rome should be informed
of the démarche one day in advance, promising to notify
Mérey later on as to the exact details.4
As time passed, it became increasingly apparent that
Rome was scarcely less dangerous than St. Petersburg,
/> as an obstacle to Berchtold's designs; and we see him
torn in two between the fear lest Rome might again
intervene in favour of peace with the same success as
in August 1913, and that other fear — still more present
to the German Government — lest failure to let Italy
into the secret might be taken to absolve her from her
obligations in case of war. His embarrassment was
increased both by San Giuliano's sceptical attitude and
1 supra, p. 176; also Gooss, op. cit., p. 34, and D.A., i., No. 7, p. 24.
2 Gooss, op. cit., p. 76; O.A., i., No. 16.
3 14 July, D.A., i., No. 20.
4 15 July, D.A., i., No. 22.
233
by the consideration which Berlin from the first showed
for the Italian point of view.
The German Ambassador in Rome, Baron Flotow,
who was on friendly terms with the Foreign Secretary,
as early as 16 July1 describes San Giuliano as highly
alarmed at what he could conjecture of Vienna's inten-
tions, his pessimism being increased by the illness which
was ere long to prove fatal.» He regarded strong
action against Serbia as foredoomed to failure, and
drawing a close analogy between the Serbian situation
of to-day and that of Italy in the Risorgimento, ascribed,
with considerable justice, Berchtold's ineffective Balkan
policy to that typical " police " mentality which had
brought disaster upon Austria in the 'fifties and 'sixties.3
Impressed by San Giuliano's language, Flotow addressed
to Berlin the clear warning that compensation must be
found for Italy, or she would attack Austria-Hungary
in the back.1
Even without these warnings Jagow had been led by
his personal acquaintance with the Italian situation to
anticipate Rome's hostility to any intervention of Vienna
in the Balkans and even a claim for compensation. He
therefore instructs Tschirschky on 15 July6 to raise the
question with Berchtold, on the ground that Italy's
attitude towards the conflict would have a decisive effect
upon
Russia
and,
of
course,
intimately
concerned
Germany in the event of a general war. For Tschirschky's
own information, Jagow added his opinion that Valona
being inadmissible, the Trentino must be regarded as
" the sole adequate (vollwertige) compensation." It might
be distasteful to the Emperor and to public opinion, but
the real question was, " what value Italy's attitude has
for Austrian policy." Three days later, Jagow returns
to the charge, and begs Berchtold to consider whether,
by allowing Italy to involve herself at Valona, he would
1 Flotow to Berlin, D.D., i„ No. 73.
2 Flotow to Berlin, D.D., i., No. 75.
3 ibid., No. 73.
4 16 July, ibid., No. 75.
5 D.D., i., No. 46.
234
not be greatly easing the Serbian situation for himself.
Vienna must be under no illusions; an attack on Serbia
will not only be most unfavourably received in Italy,
" but will in all probability meet with direct opposition."1
The moral which Jagow then drew was that " a timely
agreement between Vienna and Rome " was urgently
needed.
But Berchtold was not to be moved by this sensible
advice from Berlin. On 17 July, in conversation with
Tschirschky's deputy, Prince Stolberg, he had expressed
his intention of placing Italy before a fait accompli.* In
this he was doubtless confirmed by Mérey's warning
that San Giuliano had probably got wind of Vienna's
plans through an indiscretion of the German Ambassador,
Baron Flotow »; nor, he significantly added, would it
be the first time that such a thing had occurred. This
warning Berchtold appears to have verified from other
secret information; for on 20 July he is able to inform
Mérey that San Giuliano had not merely learnt something
from Flotow, but had pressed the Russian and Roumanian
Governments to make " threatening representations "
in Berlin and Vienna, with a view to preventing the
latter's action.4 When, then, at their next conversation
Tschirschky
again
brought up Jagow's and
Flotow's
alarm at the attitude of San Giuliano, Berchtold tried
to reduce the Ambassador to silence by regretting the
leakage and broadly hinting that he knew all about it,
since it could not be in Vienna, where the Duke of Avarna
was kept entirely in the dark.5 He then added that in
view of Italy's evident desire to thwart his whole action,
he could not begin any discussion with her, and would there-
fore only give San Giuliano a day's previous notice, which
1 Jagow to Tschirschky, 18 July, D.D., i., No. 68.
2 Stolberg to Jagow, D.D., i., No. 87.
3 D.A., i., No. 24.
4 Berchtold to Mérey, 20 July; D.A., i., No. 33. Presumably the word
" threatening " is Berchtold's version of what can scarcely have been stronger
than " urgent " in San Giuliano's instructions to Carlotti and his colleague in
Bucarest.
5 Tagesbericht of Berchtold, 20 July, D.A., L, No. 35.
235
seemed to him " sufficient as an act of courtesy towards
an unreliable ally."1 He refused to be intimidated by
the news from Rome, and flatly denied that Italy had
any claim to compensation, in view of Austria-Hungary's
decision against annexation. That he took such a line
towards his friend Tschirschky, whom he must have
known to be fully informed as to his own " reservations "
and
ulterior
designs,2 throws
a
curious
light
upon
Berchtold's mental processes.
Meanwhile, to make it more difficult for Berlin to
renew its pressure, Berchtold instructed Szögyény to
inform Jagow that he objected at the present juncture
to any discussion of the question of compensation with
Rome.1
Acting then in accordance with this non possumus
attitude, he transmitted to Mérey on 20 July a full state-
ment of Austro-Hungarian policy towards Italy,4 instruc-
tions for the Ambassador's forthcoming interview with
San Giuliano/ and on the same day the Note to Serbia
and the covering Note to the Powers, for communication
on the morning of the 24th.· Italy's claim to possible
compensation rested on Article VII of the Triple Alliance,
which aimed at " the maintenance of the status quo in
the Balkans " (dans les régions des Balkans), and which
debarred either Austria-Hungary or Italy from altering
this " by temporary or permanent occupation," save
" after a previous agreement between the two Powers
. . . on the basis of mutual compensation." Berchtold
now argued that the words " dans les regions des Balkans "
only applied to Turkish territory, and not to that of the
Balkan states, and that consequ
ently this clause could
not be invoked in respect of action directed against
Serbia. Mérey was to take this line if the subject of
compensation was raised by San Giuliano, but was to
1 ibid., p. 102.
2 see supra, pp. 187, 191, 201, 213.
3 Gooss, op. cit., p. 121; D.A., i., No. 32 (2).
4 Rotbuch {Italian), No. 2; D.A., i., No. 32 (x).
5 Rotbuch {Italien), No. 1; D.A., i., No. 34.
6 Ό.Α„ i., No. 30 (a).
236
" avoid further discussion." In order to allay the
Foreign Minister's alarm, he was to state that Vienna
" had no thought of a campaign of conquest or an incor-
poration of Serbian territories," or again of seizing
Lovcen, as rumoured in the Temps.1 He was also to
make the deliberately misleading statement that he had
as yet " no precise information regarding the Sarajevo
enquiry," but that though " serious language " would
be necessary in Belgrade, yet Vienna regarded " a
peaceful issue as thoroughly possible."
The interview duly took place on 21 July.» San
Giuliano showed himself
"
much preoccupied," and
insisted that the quarrel with Serbia could only be solved
by " conciliation," not by " humiliation and force."
While reaffirming his desire for "a strong Austria-
Hungary ' ' (Mérey had reminded him of his assurances
in this sense to Berchtold at their meeting at Abbázia
in April 1914), he made it clear that any extension of
territory
by
Austria-Hungary
would
be
regarded
as
contrary to Italian interests. He would support any
such demands upon Serbia as could be " legitimately "
fulfilled, but could not go further without antagonising
the whole of national and irredentist opinion in Italy.
Mérey's own impression, as reported to Vienna, was that
San Giuliano was full of " mental reserves," but as yet
considered that war would be averted by the Powers
bringing pressure to bear in Belgrade.
It is obvious that Mérey did not succeed in allaying
San Giuliano's alarm, for next day, and again on 22 July,
he told the German Ambassador that he regarded the
situation as " extremely critical,"* announced his inten-
tion of discussing it with the Premier, Signor Salandra,
and then suggested that the three of them should meet
on the 24th for a kind of German-Italian " Aussprache."5
1 D.A., i., No. 42.
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