intervention — had now been reached.
On the morning of 24 July the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassadors in the capitals of the five Great Powers
and in Constantinople, acting on Berchtold's instruc-
tions of four days earlier, presented copies of the Note
to Serbia, and with it a covering Note to the Powers.1
This latter, in the main, reiterates in other language the
accusations of the Note itself, and draws a contrast
between Serbia's criminal agitation on the one hand,
and Austria-Hungary's longanimity, and especially her
benevolent
attitude
towards
Serbian
expansion
in
1912-13, on the other. By laying stress upon Serbia's
breach of the pledge of 1909, as involving her " in conflict
with the will of Europe," it seemed to be inviting some
definite expression of approval, and this
impression
was increased by the concluding appeal for the sympathy
"
of
all
civilised
nations,"
with
Austria-Hungary's
endeavour to prevent immunity for " regicide as a political
weapon," and to eliminate Belgrade's continued menace
to the peace of Europe. Berchtold had either not
thought out the possible effects of such an appeal or
had rashly assumed that the foulness of the crime of
Sarajevo
had
permanently
blunted
Europe's
critical
sense. In any case, no sooner did any suggestion of
modification reach him than he made it quite clear that
the covering Note was not intended to elicit replies from
the Powers, but merely as an act of international
courtesy.» When, too, Sazonov skilfully treated the
appeal to the Note of 1909 as a proof that the quarrel
was a concern of all Europe, and entitled Europe to
examine
into
the
charges
against
Serbia,
Berchtold
insisted more rigidly than ever — and in this he had the
1 D.A ., i., No. 29.
2 This view was first expressed by Baron Macchio in his interview with Prince
Kudashev (see above, p. 212); but it was promptly and emphatically endorsed
by Berchtold himself (D.A., ii., Nos. 29 and 30).
253
fullest possible backing from Germany — that the quarrel
was
the
exclusive
concern
of
Austria-Hungary
and
Serbia.
The general impression which the Note to Serbia
produced in Europe may fairly be epitomised in the
remark of Sir Edward Grey to Count Mensdorff that he
" had never before seen one State address to another
independent
State
a
document
of
so
formidable
a
character." Not unnaturally, the very brief time-limit
caused the most unfavourable comment of all, since it
was so obviously intended to render impossible any kind
of mediation from the outside. It seems probable that
the curious mentality of the Ballplatz was swayed in
this by historical analogies. Prince Felix Schwarzenberg,
by his rigid attitude at Olmütz in 1850, had forced
Prussia to capitulate within a space of two days, while
the ultimatum which Austria presented to Sardinia in
April 1859 contained a time-limit of only three days.
And, to turn to a much more recent period, there is not
much doubt that Italy's failure to give previous warning
to Vienna of her impending Tripolitan War was con-
sidered a good reason for not informing Rome as to the
Dual Monarchy's designs against Serbia.
Far more significant, however, than any comments
of the foreign Press was the German Government's
reception of the Note. Tschirschky had informed them
at every stage of its main tenor, but, as the decisive day
drew
near,
they
not
unnaturally
became
impatient,
being torn between the desire to know its exact text
and the desire to be able to assure Rome of their
ignorance.
Berchtold
distinctly
promised
Tschirschky
to show him the text before it was finally submitted to
Francis Joseph,l but did not keep his word; and on 21
July he telegraphed from Ischl to Macchio, at the Bau-
platz, informing him that the Note could not be given
to Tschirschky till the next morning, " as there were
1 D.D., i., No. 50 — Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg (last sentence).
254
still some corrections to be made."1 Macchio's colleague,
Forgách, however, yielding to Tschirschky's insistence,
presented him with a copy on that very day (21 July),
with the result that it reached the Wilhelmstrasse on the
22nd more or less simultaneously from Tschirschky and
from Szögyény. Jagow, according to his own account,
when he received the Note, at once expressed the view
that it was " sharp enough " (reichlich scharf), and
" overshot the mark."1 He also complained at its being
submitted to him "at so late a stage as to prevent all
possibility of expressing any opinion upon it " (dazu
Stellung zu nehmen).* According to another source,4
Jagow went much further, and told Szögyény that " the
Note had the fault that it broke down all bridges,"
adding that " however sharp a Note might be, it must
ahvays leave an exit open, for the event of the other
party being ready to give way." This is a valuable
admission that the impression conveyed to Berlin, as
to the rest of Europe, was a deliberate advancement of
impossible demands.'
Jagow's chief, the German Chancellor, also expressed
his regret at the Note's sharpness,« though in his Memoirs
he has attempted to argue that Austria-Hungary, if she
had used " velvet gloves," would only have aggravated
the Panserb danger, and that therefore sharp methods
offered the best hope for a lasting peace.7
Very valuable evidence of the German attitude is
provided by two despatches and a telegram sent by the
British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold,
1 D.A., i., No. 46.
2Jagow, Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges, p. no.
3 It is curious that he should have used this of all phrases; for William II
and the Wilhelmstrasse had from the first made a special point of refusing all
idea of " Stellungnehmen " towards Vienna's demands.
4 Wedel to Bussche, 5 September, 1917; D.D., iv., Anhang ix., p. 172.
5 Jagow also confessed to Sir Horace Rumbold on 25 July that the Note " left
much to be desired as a diplomatic document " (British Diplomatic Correspond-
ence, No. 18). Tschirschky, on the other hand, told his c
olleague, Sir M. de
Bunsen, that " he endorses every line of it." See telegram of Bunsen to Grey,
despatched and received 30 July.
6 Bethmann Hollweg, Betrachtungen sum Weltkriege, i., p. 139.
7 ibid., p. 140.
255
to Sir Edward Grey during this critical period, but not
published in the original British White Paper of August
1914. Of these, the first in time,1 describes a conversa-
tion between Rumbold and Jagow, who took his favourite
line that the quarrel concerned no one save Austria-
Hungary and Serbia, and that this precluded Berlin
from " making any remarks " to Vienna. Jagow " did
not accuse the Serbian Government of direct complicity,"
but " considered that by doing nothing to check the
unbridled utterances of a portion of the Serbian Press "
they " were partly responsible for the creation of a
situation which made that crime possible." He had
told the Serbian representative " over and over again
that it was very desirable that Serbia should put her
relations with Austria-Hungary on a proper footing, and
should take steps to control the Serbian Press," but
received the answer that the Serbian Press was free, and
that no Government could interfere with it. He gave
it as his opinion that Austria-Hungary had shown " great
forbearance," and left on Rumbold the definite impression
that he " would approve prompt and vigorous action,"
and was " aware of the general character " of the im-
pending démarche.
In a telegram of 24 July1 Rumbold reports a conversa-
tion which the French Ambassador, M. Jules Cambon,
had had that afternoon with Herr von Jagow. Cambon
bluntly described as an untenable " fiction " the German
theory that " the question at issue between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia was an internal one, and could be
localised." To this Jagow simply rejoined that " Serbia
would doubtless give way." When asked by Cambon
whether he seriously considered it possible for Serbia
to accept certain of the demands, Jagow argued that it
was " for the Entente to advise moderation at Belgrade."
Cambon took advantage of this opening, and asked
1 Rumbold to Grey, sent 22, received 27 July.
2 Rumbold to Grey, sent and received 24 July.
256
whether Germany " would not also enjoin moderation
on their ally." To this Jagow, " after some reflection,
said ' that would depend on circumstances.1 " He again
denied previous knowledge of the Note, but admitted
that it was too stiff. Cambon expressed to Rumbold the
view that Austria-Hungary and Germany " are playing
a dangerous game of bluff, and think that they can carry
matters through with a high hand."
THE SERBIAN ANSWER
To the Serbian Government, absorbed in an acrimonious
electoral campaign and deluded into a false sense of
security by Vienna's long silence, the Austro-Hungarian
Note came almost as a bolt from the blue, and caused
corresponding consternation. It is true that prolonged
Press polemics between Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade
had kept public opinion in an excited state, and, again,
that the Government had received clear warning from
its Minister in Vienna, Mr. Jovan M. Jovanovic, against
optimistic views.1 But, though he added that Austria
was probably preparing for war with Serbia, regarded
her as exhausted after the two Balkan Wars, and counted
upon overcoming her resistance " before Europe could
intervene," it does not appear that the Pasic Cabinet
took any precautionary measures at this stage, or realised
the full gravity of the situation. Perhaps the most
striking proof of this attitude is the fact that it allowed
the
Serbian
Commander-in-Chief,
Voivode
Putnik,
to
pursue his cure at an Austrian watering-place, with the
result that the outbreak of war found him still upon
enemy territory, and that only the special intervention
of Francis Joseph made his return to Serbia possible.
After reading the Note, Mr. Pacu hurriedly summoned
the Premier, Mr. Pasic, back to Belgrade, and during
the next two days feverish discussions were held between
1 7 (20), July, Serbian Blue Book, No. 31.
257
the Cabinet and the Prince Regent. On 24 July Prince
Alexander addressed to the Tsar a long appeal for help,
reaffirming Serbia's readiness to open an enquiry into
complicity in " the horrible crime " of Sarajevo, and to
accept all such demands as " are compatible with the
position of an independent State, as well as those to
which your Majesty may advise us to agree," * but
pointing out the impossibility of carrying out certain
of the demands without new legislation, which was, of
course, ruled out by the time-limit. Fearing an immediate
attack from the Austro-Hungarian armies concentrating
on the frontier, the Prince appealed to the Tsar's " noble
Slav heart " for speedy Russian aid and renewed interest
in Serbia's fate. Save for this telegram and the Tsar's
answer three days later, * the messages exchanged between
St. Petersburg and Belgrade have not been made public.
There is a certain amount of indirect evidence to show
that great pressure was brought to bear by the Russian
upon the Serbian Government, to ensure a maximum of
concessions to Austria-Hungary's demands. For instance,
this impression, formed by Sir Edward Grey in conversa-
tion with the Serbian Minister in London, Mr. Boskovic,
is transmitted with approval by the German Ambassador
to Berlin.* But, in point of fact, the first telegram from
St. Petersburg on the subject reached Belgrade a few
hours after the departure of Giesl. It is true that it
urged caution and concession, but it could have no
influence upon the tenor of the Serbian Answer, which
was the unaided work of the Belgrade Government.4
The anxiety with which they awaited an answer can
1 Russian Orange Book, No. 6.
2 ibid, No. 40.
3 27 July; D.D., i.. No. 258. Here Serbia's Nachgiebigkeit is ascribed " solely
to pressure from St. Petersburg."
4 This I learnt on first-hand authority at Belgrade itself. It appears, however,
that Sazonov urged upon the Serbian Minister in St. Petersburg the need for
going to the utmost limit of concession, and that on 24 July he wired to the
Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Belgiade, that " it would perhaps be better, in
the event of an invasion by Austria, for the Serbs to make no attempt whatever
to offer resistance, but to retire, allow the enemy to occupy their territory with-
out fighting, and appeal to the Powers " (see How the War Began — Russian
Foreign Ojfice Diary, p. 86). Thus once more Sazonov appears in a pacific light.
258
well be imagined. When it did at last arrive, Pasic
crossed himself and exclaimed: " The Tsar is great and<
br />
merciful! " He then embraced the Russian Chargé
d'Affaires and " was overcome with emotion.1
Certainly the answer presented by Serbia2 is moderate
and conciliatory in the face of grave provocation. It
begins by expressing the desire to " remove any misunder-
standing which may threaten to impair good neighbourly
relations with Austria-Hungary." After affirming Serbia's
" pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis,"
and disclaiming responsibility for " manifestations of a
private character," it expresses " pain and surprise " at
the charges levelled against the Serbian Government,
which had " expected to be invited to collaborate in an
investigation of all that concerns this crime, and was
ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of its
attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning
whom representations were made to it."
It then announced its readiness " to hand over any
Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank,
of whose complicity proofs are forthcoming," and to
publish
the
declaration
demanded
by
the
Austro-
Hungarian Note, both in the Official Gazette and as an
Army Order. Of the ten specific demands put forward,
it accepted seven unreservedly,3 thereby undertaking to
dissolve
the
Narodna
Odbrana
and
similar
societies
(though taking care to point out that no proof of their
guilt is supplied by the Note nor possessed by the Govern-
ment), to suppress educational propaganda, to remove
all officers or officials implicated, to arrest Tankosic and
Ciganovic, to enforce frontier control, and to apologise
for any offensive utterances brought home to Serbian
officials.
On three of the ten demands Serbia made certain
1 Strandtman to Sazonov, 29 July; Russian Orange Book, No. 57.
2 For full text see British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 39.
3 Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
259
reserves, which it is impossible to describe as unreason-
able. 1. It pointed out that the immediate suppression
of a newspaper could not be effected without a violation
of Article 22 of the existing Serbian Constitution, which
guaranteed Press freedom in the most explicit manner.
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