It undertook, however, to introduce into Parliament,
as soon as it next met, legislation which would in future
render Press attacks upon " the territorial integrity of
Austria-Hungary " a criminal offence, and to introduce
" at the impending revision of the Constitution " a clause
which would make confiscation possible in such cases.
In treating this reply as inadequate, Austria-Hungary
placed herself upon very weak ground, since she showed
herself to be insisting upon something which no Serbian
Government could fulfil without violating one of the
most jealously guarded constitutional rights of Serbia.
2. To
the
demand
that
Austro-Hungarian
officials
should take part in the criminal investigation on Serbian
soil Serbia only consented " in so far as such co-operation
coincides with the principles of international law and
criminal
procedure,
and
also
of
good
neighbourly
relations." With a little goodwill on the part of Vienna
this reservation need not have proved an obstacle to
agreement; but it was bluntly dismissed by Berchtold
on the inexplicable ground that the enquiry demanded
had nothing to do either with international law or
criminal procedure!1
3. Only on one point did Serbia give a definite
refusal. It pledged itself to open a judicial enquiry
against persons implicated in the murder, but declined
to allow Austro-Hungarian delegates any share in this —
and this on the ground that it would be " a violation of
the constitution and of the penal code1 This answer
Vienna treated as a deliberate misunderstanding on the
part of the Serbian Government, arguing that what was
demanded was not a share in the " enquête judiciaire. "
1 D.A., ii., No. 96, Beilage, p. 180-1.
260
itself, but only in the preliminary " recherches." Here
again it is obvious that if Vienna, instead of merely
treating it as a proof of bad faith, had pointed out
this discrepancy, and insisted, however stiffly, upon
its
elucidation,
a
modus
vivendi
could
have
been
reached.
In conclusion, however, Serbia was careful to guard
itself against a possible charge of definite rejection, and
therefore declared its readiness " to accept a pacific
agreement " by referring points still at issue to the
arbitration either of the Hague Tribunal or of those
Powers whose mediation had induced Serbia to sign the
Note of March 1909, now cited by Vienna as the point of
departure for her present action. Serbia thus adroitly
placed herself on very strong ground before Europe, and
the strength of her position was increased by the fact
that she had already twice offered to submit her dispute
with Austria-Hungary to arbitration — first during the
Bosnian crisis of 1908, and secondly at the Friedjung
Trial in December 1909 — and that now for the third time
she had been met with a categorical refusal from Vienna.
The natural inference was that the Government of
Belgrade was not afraid of the light of publicity being
thrown
upon
its
nationalistic
activities,
whereas
the
Ballplatz, with its record of forged documents and
trumped-up treason charges, could not face an impartial
tribunal.
Curiously enough, the Pasic Government made no
attempt to exploit its own favourable tactical position,
and Western Europe was virtually allowed to forget this
triple offer of arbitration.
Meanwhile public opinion throughout Europe, even
where most unfavourable to the Serbs, could not fail to
be struck by the contrast between the extraordinary
severity of the demands and the sweet reasonableness
of the Serbian answer, and this contrast was only
heightened by the violent commentary upon that answer,
261
which Vienna circulated to the Powers,1 and still more by
the abrupt action by which it rendered further discussion
impossible.
Mr. Pasic had himself delivered the Serbian Answer to
Baron Giesl at the Legation at a few minutes before six
o'clock; yet, though the Legation is not less than a
quarter of an hour distant from the station, the Minister
and his staff were actually in the train on their way to
the frontier by 6.30. Giesl can hardly have had the
physical time to read through the Note, much less to
digest it. It is true that he must have been aware that
Serbia had at four o'clock issued orders for a general
mobilisation, and he doubtless assumed that the answer
could not therefore be a complete surrender. On the
other hand, the attempt to represent this mobilisation as
a bellicose act is disingenuous in the extreme. When it
is remembered that the Serbian capital was then only
separated by the river from the enemy's territory, and
was already under the guns of a flotilla of monitors, it
will be admitted that mobilisation and the withdrawal
of court, government, gold reserve, and archives were
the barest acts of precaution, and could not safely have
been postponed more than an hour or two.
WILLIAM IPS COMMENTS
Most significant of all was the impression which it
made upon the German Government itself. William II,
who, ever since the crime, had expressed himself with
regard to Serbia in the most violent and unrestrained
terms, now wrote upon his copy of the Serbian Answer
the following commentary: " A brilliant performance for
a period of forty-eight hours; that is more than one
could expect. A great moral success for Vienna, but by
it every reason for war is removed, and Giesl ought to have
1 D.A., ii., No. 96 (Beilage). Even Berchtold, in reporting to Francis Joseph,
grudgingly
admits
that
the
Answer
is
"very
skiliully
composed"
{D.A.,
ii.,
No. 78).
262
stayed quietly in Belgrade. After such a thing I should
never have ordered mobilisation."1 He then proceeded
to write a full letter of instructions to the Chancellor,·
starting from " the conviction that on the whole the
wishes of the Dual Monarchy had been met," and that
" the few reservations . . . can in my opinion be cleared
up by negotiation. But the capitulation has been pro-
claimed urbi et orbi, and puts an end to every reason for
war." As, however, the Serbs " are Orientals, and
hence lying, false, and masters in delay," and as " the
Austrian army, which has been thrice mobilised to no
purpose," needs some " external satisfaction d'honneur,"
it will be necessary, "in order that these fine promises
may become truth and fact," to " exercise a douce
violence," and to seize a solid pledge {Faustpfand) of
fulfilment. He therefore suggests " the temporary occupa-
tion of part of Serbia, just as we kept troops in France in
1871 till the milliards were paid." " On this basis," he
added, " I am ready to mediate peace with Austria."
That Bethmann Hollweg was in the first instance no
less impressed than his master is shown by the con-
fidential instructions which he sent to Tschirschky on
27 July, and in which he describes Germany's situation as
" all the more difficult because Serbia has gone very far."*
But the Emperor's pacific mood did not last very
long, while the chief aim of his advisers seems at this
time to have been to precipitate matters. On 25 July
Count Szögyény reports the Wilhelmstrasse as taking
it for granted that Serbia's rejection of the Note would
be followed by an immediate declaration of war by
Austria-Hungary, " combined with warlike operations."4
" Berlin," he added, " sees in every delay in starting
operations great danger of interference by other Powers,"
and " urgently warns us to act at once., and place the
world before a fait accompli." This view Szögyény
1 D.D., i., No. 271, note, p. 264.
2 Gooss, op. cit., pp. 170-1, note.
3 D.D., i., No. 277.
3 Szögyény to Berchtold, 25 July; D.A., ii., No. 32.
263
himself
fully
endorsed,
and
in
Vienna
Tschirschky
"warmly supported" it with Berchtold,1 who brought
Field-Marshal
Conrad
into
the
discussion.
It
then
transpired that the Austro-Hungarian mobilisation could
not be completed till 12 August, and that Berchtold was
therefore regretfully " obliged to delay military opera-
tions yet awhile."2
" ULTIMATUM " AND " INVASION "
That the slow working of the military machine had
been a constant source of anxiety to Berchtold is clearly
shown by a conversation between him and Conrad in
the autumn of 1913, when the possibility of mobilisation
against Serbia was under discussion. " The dreadful
thing," exclaimed Berchtold, " is those three weeks from
the commencement of mobilisation to actual hostilities
(bis zum Losschlagen). If only one could have it,
' ultimatum ' and ' invasion '! " 3
On the present occasion the same difficulty, of course,
cropped up, and all that Berchtold could do to allay
Szögyény's very evident dismay was to telegraph on
27 July4 that war will be declared " in the next few
days," but that it is necessary to wait till concentration
can be completed, so that the blow, when it comes, may
be decisive. The disgust of Berlin at this delay is further
commented
upon
by
the
Bavarian
Minister,
Count
Lerchenfeld, in his report to Munich.5
From all this it will be seen that Berchtold was once
more quite insincere when he assured Grey on 25 July
that it was Austria-Hungary's intention to begin "military
preparations, not operations."6
1 D.D., i., No. 213.
2 ibid, and also Szögyény to Berchtold, 27 July; D.A., ii., No. 67.
3 Conrad, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, iii., pp. 443-4.
5 D.A., ii.. No. 69.
4 28 July; D.D., iv., Anhang iv., No. 12.
7 Grey to Bertie and Buchanan, 25 July; British Diplomatic Correspondence,
No. 14.
264
AN AUSTRIAN LEGAL OPINION
From the documents already quoted it is abundantly
clear that Berchtold was resolved to make Serbia's
surrender as difficult as possible, and desired a definite
rupture. Indeed, up to the very last moment his chief
anxiety is not lest war should result, but lest Serbia
should, after all, swallow his impossible terms, or lest
some other unforeseen incident should deprive him of
all pretext for aggression. That this was his mood is
shown by a hitherto unpublished document which has
been recently placed at my disposal by a diplomatic
friend.1 On the very day on which the ultimatum was
to expire, the Legal Adviser of the Ballplatz, Professor
Hold, handed in a memorandum specially devoted to
the consideration of possible loopholes in the Serbian
answer. If, he advises, Serbia should qualify her accept-
ance by any kind of protest (unter Formulirung irgend
eines Protestes), it should be rejected as inadequate
(nicht befriedigend), and war should be declared. He
adduces four reasons for such an attitude, the weightiest
being that Serbia, by protesting, would ipso facto be
abandoning the basis of the Note of March 1909, whose
acceptance alone saved her from war with Austria-
Hungary in that year, and on which her relations with
Vienna had since rested.
If,
however,
Professor
Hold
continues,
"
Serbia
announces her acceptance of our demands en gros, with-
out any protest, we can still object that she did not
within the prescribed time provide proofs that she carried
out those provisions which had to be executed2 at
once ' or ' with all speed1 and whose execution she had
to notify to us ' without delay.2 "' In a word, the Legal
1 I am not at liberty to quote his name or the manner in which he obtained
a copy of the original, but I can vouch absolutely for its authenticity.
2 He is, of course, quoting from the Note of 23 July. His concluding para-
graph deserves quotation in the original: " Wenn Serbien unsere Forderungen
ohne jeden Protest pauschaliter anzunehmen erklärt, können wir gleichwohl ein-
wenden, dass es innerhalb der Frist sich nicht darüber ausgewiesen hat, dass es jene
265
Adviser, at his chief's orders, is engaged upon a desperate
search for even the tiniest peg or hook upon which to
hang the final rejection of Serbian concessions. Nothing
reveals more clearly the mentality of the Ballplatz on
the eve of the " punitive expedition."
The evidence marshalled above shows clearly that
after the rupture he was simply playing for time, and
that his main object was to prevent intervention from
any quarter, and to attack Serbia before Russia could
move. General Auffenberg tells us in his Memoirs1
that even at that time it struck him " as quite incompre-
hensible that anyone should doubt that it would come
to universal war " when once the Serbian Answer had
been rejected. But another prominent General, Count
Uxküll, expressed to him in conversation the view that
Russian intervention w
as out of the question, and might
be
dismissed
as
mere
bluff.
Berchtold
doubtless
alternated between these two opinions, but in any case
he took the risk of the former.
GREY'S EFFORTS AT MEDIATION
That Berchtold persisted to the very end in devious
and insincere methods is clearly shown by his attitude
towards Sir Edward Grey's mediation, by his recep-
tion
of
Sazonov's
pacific,
overtures,
and
by
the
misrepresentations
through
which
he
secured
the
Emperor's consent for war. Hence it is still necessary
to deal briefly with these three points in so far as they
bear directly upon Serbia's position.
1. Grey had already tried to secure an extension of
the time-limit, and had proposed mediation between
Austria-Hungary and Russia, but in both cases had met
Verfügungen durchgeführt hat, die es ' sofort ' oder ' mit aller Beschleunigung ' zu
treffen hatte und von deren Durchführung es uns ' ohne Verzug ' zu verständigen hatte
(Z. B. Auflösung der Narodna Odbrana) — siehe auch vorletzen Absatz unserer Note."
1 Aus Oesteneichs Höhe und Niedergang, p. 262.
266
with refusal. Nothing daunted, however, on 26 July1 he
put forward a formal proposal for a Conference à quatre
in London (Germany, Italy, France, and Britain) " for
the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent
complications."2 We know now, though the fact was
withheld at the time, that this proposal was the result
of exceedingly anxious consultations between Sir Edward
Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson, and that the latter already
regarded it as " the only hope of avoiding a general
conflict " — " I admit, a very poor chance, but in any
case we shall have done our utmost/'3 Jagow objected
that this " would practically amount to a court of arbitra-
tion,"4 but Grey at once explained that his intention was
not " arbitration, but a private and informal discussion." 5
Lichnowsky had just reported Grey as " annoyed," and
as declaring that " if Austria-Hungary were not satisfied
with this unheard-of humiliation of Serbia, that would
prove it to be a mere pretext, aimed at the destruction
both of Serbia and of Russian influence."·
An Austro-Hungarian occupation of Belgrade, he said,
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