Sarajevo

by R W Seaton-Watson

  added, " to fulfil our duty as an ally, but must decline

  to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into a world

  war frivolously and without regard for our advice. In

  the Italian question also, Vienna seems to disdain our

  advice." All this Berchtold was to be told " at once

  with all emphasis and very seriously."1

  Berchtold could not resist language of this kind, and

  so gave instructions to Count Szápáry " to begin con-

  versations with Sazonov."2 But the conditions to which

  he still obstinately adhered — that Austro-Hungarian

  military operations against Serbia must be allowed to pro-

  ceed unchecked, while Russia on the other hand must

  arrest her mobilisation — completely deprived it of any

  value, and indeed it is difficult to believe that it was ever

  meant seriously by Vienna. On the morning of 31 July,

  Berchtold was clearly in a state of desperation, but

  determined to force matters to an issue, for he invited

  1 D.D., ii.. No. 396. Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky, 30 July.

  2 D.D., No. 433, Tschirschky to Berlin, 30 July. Professor Erich Branden-

  burg's narrative (op. cit., p. 424) — otherwise so fair and accurate, though not

  always complete — does not seem at this point to conform with the printed

  documents.

  281

  Conrad and Krobatin to his office at the Ballplatz, where

  they found Tisza, Stürgkh and Burián waiting. He

  then assured them that his object in summoning them

  was to announce his belief that " Germany was drawing

  back."1

  But something had happened in the interval which

  finally put all doubts at rest and brought the crisis rapidly

  to a head. At 7.45 on the morning of the 31st Conrad

  had received a brief wire from Moltke, telling Austria-

  Hungary to " mobilise at once against Russia," and

  stating quite explicitly that Germany was about to

  mobilise.3

  At

  the

  same

  time

  the

  Austro-Hungarian

  Military Attache in Berlin telegraphed Moltke's view

  that the situation would be critical unless Austria-

  Hungary at once mobilised, that this would involve the

  casus foederis for Germany, and that the new British

  peace

  proposals

  must

  be

  rejected.

  "

  For

  Austria-

  Hungary's

  preservation,"

  he

  added,

  "to

  go

  through

  with European war is the last chance (das letzte Mittel).

  Germany goes with her unreservedly." When Conrad

  read out these messages, Berchtold exclaimed, " First

  rate! (das ist gelungen!) Who rules — Moltke or Beth-

  mann? " That indeed was the whole issue. Berchtold

  in his turn read out a telegram of William II to Francis

  Joseph, intimating that he had not felt it possible to

  reject the personal appeal of the Tsar, and therefore

  transmitted it to Vienna. It was that Austria-Hungary

  should occupy " Belgrade or other towns " and then

  " notify her terms." But it is clear that even so far-

  reaching a concession as this scarcely interested the

  little group of men in Berchtold's room, with whom the

  fate of Europe now rested. Moltke's pledge was all

  that mattered, for it could be used to force the hands of

  everyone else. " I called you here," said Berchtold,

  "because I had the impression that Germany was yielding

  1 Conrad, op. cit., iv., p. 153.

  2 ibid., p. 152.

  282

  But now I have the most reassuring statement from the

  decisive military quarter."1 All idea of mediation was

  simply swept aside, and it was at once decided to request

  Francis

  Joseph's

  signature

  for

  an

  order

  of

  general

  mobilisation. Not a moment was wasted, for by half-

  past twelve that same afternoon the order reached the

  Ministry of War.1

  Francis

  Joseph then replied to William, notifying

  the step which he had taken and adding the uncom-

  promising phrase: " The action in which my army is

  at this moment involved against Serbia cannot be inter-

  rupted

  by

  the

  threatening

  and

  insolent

  attitude

  of

  Russia."» In this telegram the Grey proposals for

  mediation are carefully evaded.

  It is important to add that this decision was in no way

  based upon the Russian order for a general mobilisation,

  which had been given about 4 p.m. on the previous day,4

  and became public in St. Petersburg on the morning of

  the 31st, but which was not known to the authorities

  in Vienna until after they had ordered general mobilisa-

  tion in their own country. Nor does the Russian decision

  appear to have been known to Moltke when he sent his

  message to Conrad, though the news reached Berlin

  sooner

  than

  any

  other

  capital.

  Indeed,

  Bethmann's

  brief effort at a compromise had already failed, and the

  " civilian Chancellor " had already ceased to control the

  situation in Berlin, before the military asserted their

  control in St. Petersburg also.

  The essential facts are that Moltke's advice was given

  to Conrad before Berlin knew of the Russian order of

  mobilisation (for it reached Vienna at 7.45 a.m. on

  31 July,5 whereas the news only reached Berlin at

  11.40 a.m. on the same day6), and that Austria-Hungary

  ordered its general mobilisation before it knew of Russia's

  1 ibid., p. 153.

  2 ibid., p. 155.

  3 31 July, D.A., iii, No. 49 (B)·

  4 For a critical analysis of the dispute as to the exact date, see Renouvin,

  Les Causes Immédiates de la Guerre, pp. 143-55.

  5 Conrad, op. cit., iv., p. 152.

  6 D.D., ii., No. 473·

  283

  decision. In view of this, the discussion as to the exact

  hour when the Tsar gave his consent1 becomes almost as

  unimportant as the bogus story of a German mobilisation

  published by the Lokalanzeiger. 2 Much capital was made

  out of the latter by Entente war propaganda, and is still

  made of the former by German post-war propaganda, but

  both may be dismissed as red herrings. In a word, both

  Berlin and Vienna acted on their own initiative in

  mobilising. It is not true that their hands were forced by

  Russia, but far rather that they were forestalling Russia.

  At 4.45 p.m. on 31 July the German Military

  Attaché informed Conrad that Germany had ordered

  " imminent state of war " against Russia. At 7.15 p.m.

  Conrad received a wire from Moltke, based on a misunder-

  standing, limited to the abrupt phrase, " Does Austria

  want to leave Germany in t
he lurch? " (" Will Œsterreich

  Deutschland im Stiche lassen? ") Conrad instantly replied

  that " Austria-Hungary has demonstrated her will to

  war by general mobilisation and by ordering troops to be

  massed in Galícia."' This final incident sets a fitting

  crown upon the whole narrative.

  When once the military chiefs had taken the bit

  between their teeth in the three Imperial capitals, it is

  very

  difficult

  to

  see

  what

  could

  have

  averted

  a

  catastrophe.

  Various

  desperate

  expedients

  were

  still

  put forward by this or that statesman, but in his heart

  everyone of them knew that by this time it was too late

  to arrest the machinery set in motion. Hence, while a

  minute and detailed examination of the earlier diplomatic

  negotiations was an essential part of my task, it may, I

  think, be logically maintained that to submit to the same

  detailed analysis the diplomatic documents of the last

  five or six days before the war became general, would

  1 Some say ι p.m., some say 4 p.m. on 30 July. See Renouvin, op. cit.,

  pp. 144-6.

  2 Count Montgelas (op. cit., pp. 178-80) has shown clearly (1) That the story

  was untrue; and (2) That it reached St. Petersburg some hours after mobilisa-

  tion was ordered there, and therefore had no influence upon the decision.

  3 Conrad, op. cit., iv., p. 155.

  284

  only serve to obscure the grim realities of the situation.

  From 29 July onwards (if not before) every General Staff

  is playing for time against its rivals, and the actual hours

  of mobilisation become an entirely subordinate issue.

  Those who treat the final act of mobilisation, whether by

  Russia or by any other Power, as a decisive factor in the

  apportionment of war guilt, show a lack of perspective

  and judgment that is pedantic in the highest degree.

  The die was cast, and Berchtold, having by the action

  just described made a peaceful solution impossible, found

  it convenient for tactical reasons to continue conversa-

  tions with the Russian Ambassador. Indeed, on 1 August

  the curious anomaly had arisen that Russia was at war

  with Germany, but not with Austria-Hungary. Berchtold

  assured Shebeko — as wre know, very disingenuously —

  that Austria-Hungary did not want any territory from

  Serbia and did not wish to humiliate her. But when the

  Ambassador reminded him that Russia was still ready

  to revoke her military preparations if Austria-Hungary

  would only withdraw such demands as infringed Serbia's

  sovereignty,

  Berchtold

  simply

  replied

  that

  this

  was

  impossible after the declaration of war. Shebeko was

  left with the impression that Berchtold would still agree,

  if only he could extricate himself from the situation

  without loss of prestige.1 But no further conversation

  took place, and on 3 August Shebeko wired to St.

  Petersburg the obvious explanation of Vienna's delay

  in declaring war — namely, that it wished to gain time

  for completing its military preparations.2

  One last detail deserves to be mentioned. On 31 July

  the Serbian Minister in Paris, Mr. Vesnic, informed his

  Government at Nis that his Austro-Hungarian colleague,

  1 Stieve, Iswolski im Weltkriege, No. 12; Shebeko to Sazonov, 1 August:

  cf. Berchtold's report of 1 August, in D.A., iii., No. 99.

  2 Stieve, op. cit., No. 20.

  285

  Count Szécsen, had told him that " Serbia, if she would

  invite the mediation of one of the Powers friendly to her,

  might still prevent a further development of the conflict."

  It may well be that Count Szécsen, in the electric

  atmosphere of Paris on the last day of July, was

  personally anxious and conciliatory, but he was of course

  ignorant of the fatal decisions which were then being

  taken in Vienna by the civil and military authorities.

  It is hardly surprising that the Quai d'Orsay, when

  Vésnie reported this overture to them, dismissed it as

  altogether outstripped by events,1 for France was herself

  " in hourly expectation of an ultimatum "

  With the declaration of war on 28 July, Austro-Serbian

  relations entered upon an entirely new and decisive

  phase. The Southern Slav Question had become one

  of the prime causes of the greatest conflagration in history,

  and the manner of its solution was now dependent upon

  still greater European and world issues. It was already

  obvious that

  if the

  Central Powers should emerge

  victorious, the two Serb Kingdoms would sink from

  independence to vassalage, whereas in the opposite event

  Serbia might easily achieve a position analogous to

  Piedmont and unite the whole Jugoslav race under her

  banner.

  1 Stieve, op. cit., No. 15. Strandtmann (Russian Chargé in Nis) to Izvolsky

  (Russian Ambassador in Paris), 1 August.

  CHAPTER X

  CONCLUSION

  THE foregoing narrative is an attempt to analyse, with

  due attention to detail, all relevant evidence relating to

  the crime of Sarajevo and the diplomatic dispute which

  followed from it. It is for the reader to judge whether

  the facts have been fairly selected, and how far they

  support the

  deductions

  drawn

  from

  them.

  It

  may,

  however, facilitate the reader's verdict in one sense or

  another if the concluding pages are devoted to a brief

  summary of the main conclusions which the author

  claims to have reached. This method should make it

  easier to distinguish the wood from the trees — in other

  words, should throw into stronger relief either the strength

  or the weakness of my arguments, and so bring us nearer

  to the truth of the matter.

  My conclusions, then, fall under the following heads:

  1. The

  occupation

  of

  Bosnia-Herzegovina

  in

  1878

  created a permanent conflict of interests between Austria-

  Hungary and Serbia, which remained latent under the

  incompetent

  but

  Austrophil

  Obrenovic1

  dynasty,

  but

  flared up after the national revival which followed King

  Peter's accession in 1903 and the simultaneous change of

  regime in Croatia and Bosnia. This conflict was rendered

  still more acute by the annexation of Bosnia in 1908,

  by the misgovernment of Croatia by Hungary, and above

  all by Serbia's double victory in the Balkan Wars and

  the

  ferment

  thus

  produced

  throughout

  the

  Jugoslav

  provinces.<
br />
  2. Austria-Hungary in 1908 planned a war of aggression

  287

  upon Serbia, which was only averted by Russia sub-

  mitting to an ultimatum from Berlin and by the Entente

  advising submission. Again in 1912 and 1913 Austria-

  Hungary planned attacks upon Serbia, which were only

  frustrated by the disapproval of her German and Italian

  allies. In the winter of 1913 she again tried to pick a

  quarrel with Serbia over the Albanian question, which

  was averted by complete Serbian submission. She had

  already resumed her plans of aggression against Serbia

  before the murder took place and was trying (as Berch-

  told's memorandum of June 1914 shows) to win over

  Germany to a revision of Balkan policy such as involved

  the isolation and overthrow of Serbia.

  3. The murder of the Archduke was only the culminat-

  ing incident in a series of terrorist acts perpetrated against

  prominent representatives of the Austro-Hungarian régime

  in Croatia and Bosnia by Jugoslavs who were natives

  of the Habsburg Monarchy and acted on their own

  initiative.

  The

  nationalistic

  movement

  had

  in

  the

  seven years previous to the war gained firm hold upon the

  whole rising generation of Jugoslavs and assumed an

  increasingly revolutionary tinge.

  4. The theory of Austro-Hungarian official complicity

  in the crime of Sarajevo must be rejected as fantastic.

  The facts upon which such a theory was based are fully

  explained by the acute conflict between the civil and

  military authority in Bosnia itself and in the ministries

  at Vienna, though both military and police must also

  stand convicted of criminal negligence.

  5. The theory of Serbian official complicity in the

  crime is equally untenable. Such help as came to the

  assassins from Serbia was the work of three individual

  terrorists, members of a secret society called the Black

  Hand, which was at the time in the acutest possible

  conflict with the Government of Belgrade and on which

  that Government some years later took a terrible revenge.

  The only point still left in doubt is whether the Serbian

  i

  288

  Government through its agents obtained some knowledge

  of the plot and failed to give due warning to Vienna.

  This, if finally proved, would obviously reflect grave

  discredit upon Mr. Pasic, Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic and their

  colleagues of that time, but could not in any way alter

  the verdict as to initiative and direct responsibility for