the crime.
6. An important contrast deserves to be drawn between
the attitude of Serbia, who thrice (March and December
1909, and July 1914) offered to refer the whole dispute
to international arbitration at the Hague, and that of
Austria-Hungary, who each time rejected any such idea.
7. Count Berchtold from the first treated the murder
as a pretext for war, admirably calculated to win public
opinion to his side. His original design was a surprise
attack
upon
Serbia,
without
previous
declaration
of
war, and in this he had the support of all his colleagues,
political and military, with the signal exception of Count
Tisza.
8. Only Tisza and Francis Joseph himself showed
sanity and foresight, but their hesitation was, above all,
due to uncertainty as to German support. When once
this support was unreservedly guaranteed, their scruples
against war vanished.
9. The
enquiry
at
Sarajevo
was
an
after-thought,
designed to impress Europe, and when Wiesner entirely
failed to prove the official thesis the results were suppressed
but the thesis none the less upheld as a basis for war.
10. Berchtold did all in his power to conceal his inten-
tions from Europe, to lull friend and foe into a false
security, to confront them with accomplished facts and
to make intervention impossible and war with Serbia
inevitable. He did this of course with the desire for
" localising " the conflict, but in full consciousness of the
risk of European complications.
11. Berlin, so far from restraining, encouraged Vienna
step by step, repeatedly urged the need for precipitating
289
hostilities, blocked the way for intervention until peace
hung by a thread, approved Vienna's refusal of arbitra-
tion at the Hague, and all this once more with a clear
consciousness of the appalling risks.
12. In a word, it is not too much to assert that by
deliberate action, often thought out to the smallest
details, Vienna and Berlin had by 23 July created a
diplomatic situation from which nothing short of a
miracle could have saved Europe, and that the main
responsibility for the outbreak of war must therefore
rest upon their shoulders.
It would not, however, be just to conclude upon this
note. The question of responsibility falls into two por-
tions, and even though these are far too closely inter-
woven to be disentangled altogether from each other,
yet it is essential that we should distinguish between the
two sets of threads which make up the pattern. The
first problem is to decide which Governments and
individuals frustrated the efforts made for peace during
July 1914, and thereby precipitated the Great War, and
what were the motives which prompted them. But
behind this there is the much bigger problem, how Europe
was steered, or allowed to drift, into a situation of such
extraordinary danger as that of 1914; and how far that
situation was the result of conscious effort and design on
the part of Governments, of public opinion, of individual
statesmen, diplomatists, and writers. While an exami-
nation of the immediate causes will almost inevitably
lead to a condemnation of the Central Powers as the
aggressors, even the most cursory survey of the broader
issue will make it clear that the ultimate causes are
infinitely complex; that every nation must bear some
share of the blame for what occurred, that it is
extremely difficult to arrive at an exact apportionment
of blame, and that even where guilt seems obvious,
it may sometimes be possible to plead extenuating
circumstances.
290
There are some people who, having reached this stand-
point, have drawn from it the hasty conclusion that all
were more or less to blame, that there is very little to
choose between them, that in any case it cannot be
estimated exactly, and that therefore the whole question
had
better
be
dismissed
as
equally
insoluble
and
unprofitable. From this view I dissent most strongly.
In effect, it amounts to an assertion of the double
claim, that historical truth is unattainable, and that
since peoples never learn from history, each generation
must repeat the old blunders of its predecessors and so
learn from bitter experience. Accept the first, and we
must
reject
a
limine
all
historical
investigation
as
worthless.
Accept
the
second,
and
we
soon
find
ourselves committed to the pagan view that human
nature is irremediable.
In point of fact, if ever it was worth trying to elucidate
the causes of any historical event, surely it is so in the
case of the Great War, which has affected the fortunes of
Europe and the world no less profoundly than even the
Reformation or the French Revolution. And at the
same time there never was any upheaval since the world
began, concerning which so much first-hand material
of the very first importance has become generally avail-
able at so early a date, and of which we therefore have so
reasonable a prospect of forming a just estimate.
Finally, quite apart from all abstract questions of
historical truth, there is a highly practical reason why the
closest possible attention should be paid to the problem
of responsibility. In Germany — side by side with the
many serious scholars who regard a full exposure of the
truth as essential to the political convalescence of their
country — powerful propagandist agencies have been
created for the express purpose of demonstrating the
preponderating guilt of the Allies, and thereby rehabilitat-
ing the old dynastic and militarist regime in Germany.
Thus all who have at heart the extension of the League
291
principles of international co-operation and consolidation
are directly and vitally interested in a full, speedy, and
unsparing investigation of the causes of the war. Such
an enquiry is equally desirable on the moral and on the
political side.
The present volume, though in the main restricted to
the field of immediate responsibility, will also, it may be
hoped, throw new light upon an important aspect of the
wider problem, which has hitherto not received sufficient
attention in the West.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CHAPTER S I AND II
THE most convenient surveys of Austrian foreign policy
will be found in
R. Charmatz, Geschichte der auswärtigen Politik Oesterrei
chs, 2 vols.
(Goeschen series); in the final chapter of H. W. Steed's The Hapsburg
Monarchy (for the p
eriod 1903-12); and in Professor A. F. Pribram's
Austrian Foreign Policy (for 1908-18), which is very fair in its written
estimates, but also very remarkable for its omissions. See also Adolf
Beer, Die oriental ische Politik Oesterreichs (ending in 1878); Theodor von
Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns, 2 vols, (dealing with
the years 1878-1914); and H. Friedjung, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus,
3 vols. The latter has a very obvious anti-Serb bias, as was only to be
expected from Aehrenthal's dupe at the famous trial which f ollowed the
Bosnian an ne
xat
i on.
The chief collection of documents is Professor A. F. Pribram's Die
politischen Geheimverträge Oesterreich-Ungarns, 1879-1914, vol. i. (English
edition in two volumes published at Harvar d, U.S.A., with certain addi-
tional
documents).
The
monumental
collection
of
German
diplomatic
documents
— Die Grosse Politik der europäische
n Kabinette, 1871-1914
—
contains
much
scattered
material
relating
to
Austro-Serbian relations.
Bishop Fraknói's Kritische St
udien zur Geschichte des Dreibundvertrages
is valuable as embodying the Hungarian standpoint.
More detailed studies are Profe
ssor E. von Wertheimer's monumental
biography of Count Andrássy, 3 vols. (1910); Dr. Friedjung's essay on
Kálnoky in the Deutsche Allgemeine Biograph
ie; and Mold en's Alois Graf
Aehrenthal (an uncritical eulogy).
On the Bosnian annexation the best study is Professor August Fournier's
Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen (1909); but S. Goryainov's Le Bosphore et les
Dardanelles (1910), and G. Hanotaux's Histoire de la France Contemporaine,
vol. iv... should be consulted for the Russian side.
For the Austro-Serbian quarrel and the Jugoslav moveme nt see my
book on The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy (prefer-
ably the Germ
an edition, which contains a long addendum
reaching till
April, 1913)·
The Serbian attitude in the Bosnian question may best be obt
a ined
from four pamphlets published at the time of the annexation: M. Spalaj-
kovié, La Bosnie et l'Herzégovine (1899); Jovan Cvijic, L'annexion de
la
B
osnie (1908); Bo2o Markovió, Die Serbische Auffassung der bosnischen
Frage (1909); Viadan Gjorgjevic, Die serbische Frage (1909)· The attitude
of the Ballplatz is revealed by the pamphlets of Leopold Mandl
—
Oesterreich-Ungarn und Serbien (1911), Oesterreich und Serbien nach dem
Balkanhriege (1912), and Die Habsburger und die serbische Frage (1918)
—
294
which, despite their virulence and patent exaggeration, were widely-
accepted as reliable, notably by German official circles (as may be seen
from the memoirs of Bethmann Hollweg and Jagow and their statements
before the Reichstag Committee of Enquiry).
Modern Serbian history is still virtually unwritten, though Professor
Slobodan Jovanovic (author of two classic volumes on the reigns of
Alexander Karagjorgjevic and Michael Obrenovic) is now not far from
completing his study of the reign of King Milan. Mr. Z Zivanovic's
recently published four volumes on Serbian history from 1858 to 1903
are full of interesting material, but very uneven and not very critical.
Reference may also be made to the diplomatic memoirs of Jovan Ristic
(covering the period 1858-78 in five small volumes) and to Dr. Vladan
Gjorgjevic, La Serbie au Congrès de Berlin.
On Serbia's rôle in the Balkan Wars The Aspirations of Bulgaria, by
Balkanicus (Stojan Protié) (1916), may be usefully consulted, but should
be checked by comparison with Mr. Ivan Gesov's The Balkan League (1915),
and Mr. Radoslavov's Bulgarien und der Weltkrieg. See also the memoirs of
Mr. Neklyudov, who was Russian Minister in Sofia during the critical period.
A special place must be reserved for Field-Marshal Conrad von Hötzen-
dorf's memoirs, Aus meiner Dienstzeit. These four ponderous volumes,
which only reach to the autumn of 1914, are a veritable gold-mine for the
historian, who must, however, follow the same tiresome process as the
gold-digger, who has to throw away masses of dross before he can reach
a nugget. The book is utterly undigested and out of proportion, and
there is much that could have been omitted without any loss to the reader.
But it will always remain a monument of Austrian pre-war mentality
and of the danger from soldiers who meddle in politics.
Fairly full bibliographies will be found appended to my own The Rise
of Nationality in the Balkans (1917) and to my articles on " Serbia " and
" Yugoslavia " in the post-war supplementary volumes to the Encyclopedia
Britannica (1923).
The best general diplomatic history is Dr. G. P. Gooch's Modern Europe
(1878-1919). For the moment, however, the only book based upon full
and detailed use of the German official documents (accessible to him before
publication) is Erich Brandenburg's Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege (1924),
though Veit Valentin's Deutschlands Aussenpolitik 1890-1918 (1920) is
also valuable.
CHAPTER III
In the nature of things there could be no pre-war literature relating to
the
Jugoslav
revolutionary
movement.
Of
post-war
publications
much
the most important are Borivoje Jevtic, Sarajevski Atentat (1924), which
may be taken as interpreting the youth of Bosnia in those days, and
Spomenica Vlad. Gacinovica (1921) — a collection of the scanty writings
of one of the arch-conspirators and of essays to his memory. Volumes
xi. and xii. of the Zagreb tri-monthly review, Nova Europa (1925), contain
a series of valuable articles and documents relating to the plot and its
origins. Distinctly useful, though written to prove a more than doubtful
thesis, is the pamphlet of Niko Bartulovié, Od Revolucionarne Omladine
do Orjune (Split, 1925).
295
The psychology of the more moderate pre-war Jugoslav intellectuals
may best be studied in J. Skerlic, Eseji ο Srpsko-Hrvatskom Pitanju
(Zagreb, 1918), and Milan Marjanovic, Hrvatski Pokret, 2 vols. 1908) and
Savremena Hrvatska (1913). The aims of the various student groups must
be studied in their own short-lived newspapers.
CHAPTER IV
The conventional facts regarding the Archduke's career may be found
in a special biographical pamphlet entitled Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand,
issued by the Οesterreichische Rundschau in 1910. (See also my article on
him
in the Contemporary Review for August 1914.) But the material from
which a serious estimate of his character and aims may be gathered has
for the most part not yet been published, and it is necessary to glean
fragments from many different quarters, written and oral. Of special
interest are the essay on the Archduke in the memorial volume entitled
Heinrich Lammasch (1920) and Count Czernin's secret memoranda on his
audiences with the Archduke, published in the first number of Nase
Revoluce (an important Czech quarterly review). The memoirs of Field-
Marshal Conrad, General Auffenberg, and Baron Szilassy, Mr. Steed's
Through Thirty Years, and Baron Margutti's illuminating study of Francis
Joseph [Vom Alten Kaiser), contain much valuable information scattered
through them.
CHAPTER V
The account of the murder given in the text is based upon contemporary
official and newspaper reports, checked by information obtained orally in
Sarajevo and elsewhere. The memoirs of Conrad and Bilinski contain
some valuable details not to be found elsewhere — notably as to the quarrel
between Bilinski and Potiorek.
The best clue to the motives of the assassins is provided by the reports
of their trial in October 1914; but these are only available in two very
incomplete and unreliable versions published by the Austro-Hungarian
Government during the war — one at Berlin in 1917, Der Prozess gegen
die Attentäter von Sarajevo, by Professor " Pharos," and one in Switzerland
during the same year. The full report is now being prepared for publica-
tion at Sarajevo.
Interesting side-lights are also to be obtained from a strange book
entitled Tajna Prevratna Organizacija (A Secret Pre-war Organisation),
Salonica, 1918 (638 pp.), which contains the reports of the notorious
Salonica Trial. This was published officially, and widely distributed by
the Serbian Government in 1918, but afterwards was withdrawn from
publication and is now difficult to obtain. It must be used with great
caution, as there is good ground for believing that essential parts of the
evidence have been withheld; but it is a first-hand document of the first
importance, especially as regards the alleged connection between the
Sarajevo murder and the bogus Salonica conspiracy.
296
CHAPTER VI
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