added, " to fulfil our duty as an ally, but must decline
to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into a world
war frivolously and without regard for our advice. In
the Italian question also, Vienna seems to disdain our
advice." All this Berchtold was to be told " at once
with all emphasis and very seriously."1
Berchtold could not resist language of this kind, and
so gave instructions to Count Szápáry " to begin con-
versations with Sazonov."2 But the conditions to which
he still obstinately adhered — that Austro-Hungarian
military operations against Serbia must be allowed to pro-
ceed unchecked, while Russia on the other hand must
arrest her mobilisation — completely deprived it of any
value, and indeed it is difficult to believe that it was ever
meant seriously by Vienna. On the morning of 31 July,
Berchtold was clearly in a state of desperation, but
determined to force matters to an issue, for he invited
1 D.D., ii.. No. 396. Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirschky, 30 July.
2 D.D., No. 433, Tschirschky to Berlin, 30 July. Professor Erich Branden-
burg's narrative (op. cit., p. 424) — otherwise so fair and accurate, though not
always complete — does not seem at this point to conform with the printed
documents.
281
Conrad and Krobatin to his office at the Ballplatz, where
they found Tisza, Stürgkh and Burián waiting. He
then assured them that his object in summoning them
was to announce his belief that " Germany was drawing
back."1
But something had happened in the interval which
finally put all doubts at rest and brought the crisis rapidly
to a head. At 7.45 on the morning of the 31st Conrad
had received a brief wire from Moltke, telling Austria-
Hungary to " mobilise at once against Russia," and
stating quite explicitly that Germany was about to
mobilise.3
At
the
same
time
the
Austro-Hungarian
Military Attache in Berlin telegraphed Moltke's view
that the situation would be critical unless Austria-
Hungary at once mobilised, that this would involve the
casus foederis for Germany, and that the new British
peace
proposals
must
be
rejected.
"
For
Austria-
Hungary's
preservation,"
he
added,
"to
go
through
with European war is the last chance (das letzte Mittel).
Germany goes with her unreservedly." When Conrad
read out these messages, Berchtold exclaimed, " First
rate! (das ist gelungen!) Who rules — Moltke or Beth-
mann? " That indeed was the whole issue. Berchtold
in his turn read out a telegram of William II to Francis
Joseph, intimating that he had not felt it possible to
reject the personal appeal of the Tsar, and therefore
transmitted it to Vienna. It was that Austria-Hungary
should occupy " Belgrade or other towns " and then
" notify her terms." But it is clear that even so far-
reaching a concession as this scarcely interested the
little group of men in Berchtold's room, with whom the
fate of Europe now rested. Moltke's pledge was all
that mattered, for it could be used to force the hands of
everyone else. " I called you here," said Berchtold,
"because I had the impression that Germany was yielding
1 Conrad, op. cit., iv., p. 153.
2 ibid., p. 152.
282
But now I have the most reassuring statement from the
decisive military quarter."1 All idea of mediation was
simply swept aside, and it was at once decided to request
Francis
Joseph's
signature
for
an
order
of
general
mobilisation. Not a moment was wasted, for by half-
past twelve that same afternoon the order reached the
Ministry of War.1
Francis
Joseph then replied to William, notifying
the step which he had taken and adding the uncom-
promising phrase: " The action in which my army is
at this moment involved against Serbia cannot be inter-
rupted
by
the
threatening
and
insolent
attitude
of
Russia."» In this telegram the Grey proposals for
mediation are carefully evaded.
It is important to add that this decision was in no way
based upon the Russian order for a general mobilisation,
which had been given about 4 p.m. on the previous day,4
and became public in St. Petersburg on the morning of
the 31st, but which was not known to the authorities
in Vienna until after they had ordered general mobilisa-
tion in their own country. Nor does the Russian decision
appear to have been known to Moltke when he sent his
message to Conrad, though the news reached Berlin
sooner
than
any
other
capital.
Indeed,
Bethmann's
brief effort at a compromise had already failed, and the
" civilian Chancellor " had already ceased to control the
situation in Berlin, before the military asserted their
control in St. Petersburg also.
The essential facts are that Moltke's advice was given
to Conrad before Berlin knew of the Russian order of
mobilisation (for it reached Vienna at 7.45 a.m. on
31 July,5 whereas the news only reached Berlin at
11.40 a.m. on the same day6), and that Austria-Hungary
ordered its general mobilisation before it knew of Russia's
1 ibid., p. 153.
2 ibid., p. 155.
3 31 July, D.A., iii, No. 49 (B)·
4 For a critical analysis of the dispute as to the exact date, see Renouvin,
Les Causes Immédiates de la Guerre, pp. 143-55.
5 Conrad, op. cit., iv., p. 152.
6 D.D., ii., No. 473·
283
decision. In view of this, the discussion as to the exact
hour when the Tsar gave his consent1 becomes almost as
unimportant as the bogus story of a German mobilisation
published by the Lokalanzeiger. 2 Much capital was made
out of the latter by Entente war propaganda, and is still
made of the former by German post-war propaganda, but
both may be dismissed as red herrings. In a word, both
Berlin and Vienna acted on their own initiative in
mobilising. It is not true that their hands were forced by
Russia, but far rather that they were forestalling Russia.
At 4.45 p.m. on 31 July the German Military
Attaché informed Conrad that Germany had ordered
" imminent state of war " against Russia. At 7.15 p.m.
Conrad received a wire from Moltke, based on a misunder-
standing, limited to the abrupt phrase, " Does Austria
want to leave Germany in t
he lurch? " (" Will Œsterreich
Deutschland im Stiche lassen? ") Conrad instantly replied
that " Austria-Hungary has demonstrated her will to
war by general mobilisation and by ordering troops to be
massed in Galícia."' This final incident sets a fitting
crown upon the whole narrative.
When once the military chiefs had taken the bit
between their teeth in the three Imperial capitals, it is
very
difficult
to
see
what
could
have
averted
a
catastrophe.
Various
desperate
expedients
were
still
put forward by this or that statesman, but in his heart
everyone of them knew that by this time it was too late
to arrest the machinery set in motion. Hence, while a
minute and detailed examination of the earlier diplomatic
negotiations was an essential part of my task, it may, I
think, be logically maintained that to submit to the same
detailed analysis the diplomatic documents of the last
five or six days before the war became general, would
1 Some say ι p.m., some say 4 p.m. on 30 July. See Renouvin, op. cit.,
pp. 144-6.
2 Count Montgelas (op. cit., pp. 178-80) has shown clearly (1) That the story
was untrue; and (2) That it reached St. Petersburg some hours after mobilisa-
tion was ordered there, and therefore had no influence upon the decision.
3 Conrad, op. cit., iv., p. 155.
284
only serve to obscure the grim realities of the situation.
From 29 July onwards (if not before) every General Staff
is playing for time against its rivals, and the actual hours
of mobilisation become an entirely subordinate issue.
Those who treat the final act of mobilisation, whether by
Russia or by any other Power, as a decisive factor in the
apportionment of war guilt, show a lack of perspective
and judgment that is pedantic in the highest degree.
The die was cast, and Berchtold, having by the action
just described made a peaceful solution impossible, found
it convenient for tactical reasons to continue conversa-
tions with the Russian Ambassador. Indeed, on 1 August
the curious anomaly had arisen that Russia was at war
with Germany, but not with Austria-Hungary. Berchtold
assured Shebeko — as wre know, very disingenuously —
that Austria-Hungary did not want any territory from
Serbia and did not wish to humiliate her. But when the
Ambassador reminded him that Russia was still ready
to revoke her military preparations if Austria-Hungary
would only withdraw such demands as infringed Serbia's
sovereignty,
Berchtold
simply
replied
that
this
was
impossible after the declaration of war. Shebeko was
left with the impression that Berchtold would still agree,
if only he could extricate himself from the situation
without loss of prestige.1 But no further conversation
took place, and on 3 August Shebeko wired to St.
Petersburg the obvious explanation of Vienna's delay
in declaring war — namely, that it wished to gain time
for completing its military preparations.2
One last detail deserves to be mentioned. On 31 July
the Serbian Minister in Paris, Mr. Vesnic, informed his
Government at Nis that his Austro-Hungarian colleague,
1 Stieve, Iswolski im Weltkriege, No. 12; Shebeko to Sazonov, 1 August:
cf. Berchtold's report of 1 August, in D.A., iii., No. 99.
2 Stieve, op. cit., No. 20.
285
Count Szécsen, had told him that " Serbia, if she would
invite the mediation of one of the Powers friendly to her,
might still prevent a further development of the conflict."
It may well be that Count Szécsen, in the electric
atmosphere of Paris on the last day of July, was
personally anxious and conciliatory, but he was of course
ignorant of the fatal decisions which were then being
taken in Vienna by the civil and military authorities.
It is hardly surprising that the Quai d'Orsay, when
Vésnie reported this overture to them, dismissed it as
altogether outstripped by events,1 for France was herself
" in hourly expectation of an ultimatum "
With the declaration of war on 28 July, Austro-Serbian
relations entered upon an entirely new and decisive
phase. The Southern Slav Question had become one
of the prime causes of the greatest conflagration in history,
and the manner of its solution was now dependent upon
still greater European and world issues. It was already
obvious that
if the
Central Powers should emerge
victorious, the two Serb Kingdoms would sink from
independence to vassalage, whereas in the opposite event
Serbia might easily achieve a position analogous to
Piedmont and unite the whole Jugoslav race under her
banner.
1 Stieve, op. cit., No. 15. Strandtmann (Russian Chargé in Nis) to Izvolsky
(Russian Ambassador in Paris), 1 August.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
THE foregoing narrative is an attempt to analyse, with
due attention to detail, all relevant evidence relating to
the crime of Sarajevo and the diplomatic dispute which
followed from it. It is for the reader to judge whether
the facts have been fairly selected, and how far they
support the
deductions
drawn
from
them.
It
may,
however, facilitate the reader's verdict in one sense or
another if the concluding pages are devoted to a brief
summary of the main conclusions which the author
claims to have reached. This method should make it
easier to distinguish the wood from the trees — in other
words, should throw into stronger relief either the strength
or the weakness of my arguments, and so bring us nearer
to the truth of the matter.
My conclusions, then, fall under the following heads:
1. The
occupation
of
Bosnia-Herzegovina
in
1878
created a permanent conflict of interests between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia, which remained latent under the
incompetent
but
Austrophil
Obrenovic1
dynasty,
but
flared up after the national revival which followed King
Peter's accession in 1903 and the simultaneous change of
regime in Croatia and Bosnia. This conflict was rendered
still more acute by the annexation of Bosnia in 1908,
by the misgovernment of Croatia by Hungary, and above
all by Serbia's double victory in the Balkan Wars and
the
ferment
thus
produced
throughout
the
Jugoslav
provinces.<
br />
2. Austria-Hungary in 1908 planned a war of aggression
287
upon Serbia, which was only averted by Russia sub-
mitting to an ultimatum from Berlin and by the Entente
advising submission. Again in 1912 and 1913 Austria-
Hungary planned attacks upon Serbia, which were only
frustrated by the disapproval of her German and Italian
allies. In the winter of 1913 she again tried to pick a
quarrel with Serbia over the Albanian question, which
was averted by complete Serbian submission. She had
already resumed her plans of aggression against Serbia
before the murder took place and was trying (as Berch-
told's memorandum of June 1914 shows) to win over
Germany to a revision of Balkan policy such as involved
the isolation and overthrow of Serbia.
3. The murder of the Archduke was only the culminat-
ing incident in a series of terrorist acts perpetrated against
prominent representatives of the Austro-Hungarian régime
in Croatia and Bosnia by Jugoslavs who were natives
of the Habsburg Monarchy and acted on their own
initiative.
The
nationalistic
movement
had
in
the
seven years previous to the war gained firm hold upon the
whole rising generation of Jugoslavs and assumed an
increasingly revolutionary tinge.
4. The theory of Austro-Hungarian official complicity
in the crime of Sarajevo must be rejected as fantastic.
The facts upon which such a theory was based are fully
explained by the acute conflict between the civil and
military authority in Bosnia itself and in the ministries
at Vienna, though both military and police must also
stand convicted of criminal negligence.
5. The theory of Serbian official complicity in the
crime is equally untenable. Such help as came to the
assassins from Serbia was the work of three individual
terrorists, members of a secret society called the Black
Hand, which was at the time in the acutest possible
conflict with the Government of Belgrade and on which
that Government some years later took a terrible revenge.
The only point still left in doubt is whether the Serbian
i
288
Government through its agents obtained some knowledge
of the plot and failed to give due warning to Vienna.
This, if finally proved, would obviously reflect grave
discredit upon Mr. Pasic, Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic and their
colleagues of that time, but could not in any way alter
the verdict as to initiative and direct responsibility for
Sarajevo Page 40