Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  About noon, Admiral Foote's fleet shoved off. Foote positioned his four ironclads heading into the fort because only the bows were well armored, while the remaining three wooden ships stayed at a distance out of the immediate line of fire, but close enough to help if required.

  At 12:30 P.M. the fleet opened fire from 2000 yards. They closed to within 350 yards and quickly silenced the fort's batteries. Tilghman, realizing his situation was in jeopardy, had previously ordered all but one hundred men to the outworks surrounding the fort. Subsequent to this, he ordered his command to fall back to Fort Donelson. These operations were completed before the navy's first shot struck the fort.

  The battle was over by 2 P.M. when Tilghman surrendered the fort and fewer than one hundred men. Foote immediately dispatched two gunboats to destroy the Memphis and Ohio railway bridge downstream. This severed the connecting line between Columbus and Bowling Green. The Confederacy's impregnable line of defense was had been broken.

  Due to Tilghman's foresight, the remainder of Fort Henry's garrison escaped to Fort Donelson. The National cavalry pursued the enemy, but with the head start they were unable to overtake them. As expected, weather conditions had really hampered the Union army's efforts.

  The victory had been unexpectedly easy and totally due to the navy's efforts. Even so, one could see the development of Grant. Before Belmont, he had failed to reconnoiter the area, but at Fort Henry this deficiency was corrected. At Fort Henry, his orders not only planned for the reduction of both forts, but also considered cutting off the possibility of both escape and reinforcements for the enemy. As a commander, he was maturing rapidly.

  Grant, at once, sent a telegram to Halleck. "Fort Henry is ours. The gunboats silenced the batteries before the investment was completed. I think the garrison must have commenced the retreat last night. Our cavalry followed, finding two guns abandoned in the retreat." 30

  Later that same day, Grant sent headquarters his report of the battle.

  Headquarters, District of Cairo

  Fort Henry, February 6, 1862.

  Captain J. C. Kelton, St. Louis, Mo.:

  Enclosed I send you my orders for the attack upon Fort Henry.

  Owing to dispatches received from Major-General Halleck, and corroborating information here, to the effect that the enemy were rapidly reenforcing, I thought it imperatively necessary that the fort should be carried to-day. My forces were not up at eleven o' clock last night, when my orders were written, therefore I did not deem it practicable to set an earlier hour than eleven o' clock to-day to commence the investment. The gunboats started the same hour to commence the attack, and engaged the enemy at not over six hundred yards.

  In a little over one hour all the batteries were silenced, and the fort surrendered at discretion of Flag-Officer Foote, giving us all their guns, camp equipage, etc. The prisoners taken were General Tilghman and staff, Captain Taylor and company, and the sick. The garrison, I think, must have commenced the retreat last night, or at an early hour this morning. Had I not felt it an imperative duty to attack Fort Henry to-day, I should have made the investment complete, and delayed until to-morrow, so as to have secured the garrison. I do not now believe, however, that the result would have been any more satisfactory.

  The gunboats have proved themselves well able to resist a severe cannonading. All the iron-clads received more or less shots--the flag-ship some twenty-eight--without any serious damage to any except the Essex. This vessel received one shot in her boilers that disabled her, killing and wounding some thirty-two men, Captain Porter among the wounded.

  I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and return to Fort Henry with the forces employed, unless it looks possible to occupy the place with a small force, that could retreat easily to the main body. I shall regard it more in the light of an advanced grand guard than as a permanent post.

  For the character of the works at Fort Henry, I will refer you to reports of the engineers, which will be required.

  Owing to the intolerable state of the roads, no transportation will be taken to Fort Donelson, and but little artillery, and that with double teams.

  Hoping that what has been done will meet with the approval of the major-general commanding the department, I remain, etc.

  U. S. GRANT, Brigadier-General. 31

  Halleck only approved because it reflected favorably on him, but up north the news of Fort Henry caused a galvanic effect upon the people. Fort Henry had been won with so little cost and effort; people began to think that the Yankees possessed an irresistible weapon in the form of the new ironclads. For a time, people thought that no fort could withstand their onslaught.

  When notified of the victory, McClellan was ecstatic, requesting Halleck to, "Please thank Grant and Foote and their commands for me." 32 Alas, Halleck could not bring himself to thank Grant, only Foote.

  The reader should note how rapidly, following the victory at Fort Henry, that Grant made his report to headquarters. This is important because in the not too distant future, Halleck attempted to end his career for supposedly failing to keep his superiors informed of developments occurring. Nothing could be further from the truth as manifested by how rapidly Grant made his report of the victory at Fort Henry.

  Also notice in Grant's report to Halleck, he made a cursory reference to taking Fort Donelson on the 8th, etc. Critics presumed Grant was again disobeying his orders as they felt he had done at Belmont. General Halleck was not slow to chastise a subordinate. Not only did Halleck make no reply preventing Grant from moving, but sent a message to Buell on the 7th all but sanctioning his movement. "General Grant expects to take Fort Donelson, at Dover, to-morrow." 33 When your boss does not believe you are over stepping your authority, it becomes a mute point concerning the disobeying of orders.

  Grant’s casual comment about taking Fort Donelson on the 8th appears to be more than an innocuous boast. Little was known about Fort Donelson by either the commander in the field or at headquarters. Fort Donelson was so little known that it was often referred to by the wrong name. Grant and Halleck considered taking Fort Donelson nothing more than part of the mopping up operation against Fort Henry. Halleck, an exceedingly cautious man, treated Grant's proposed movement as a matter of fact. When he apprised McClellan of the fall of Fort Henry, he casually mentioned that Grant would move on and attack Fort Donelson.

  Grant’s proposed movement against Fort Donelson depicted two traits which appeared earlier: 1) his eternal optimism; and 2) his penchant for stretching his orders to the limit. Both characteristics are found in great men throughout history and Grant would rely on both throughout the war. He knew his cause was worth the risk.

  Unconditional Surrender

  Even Grant outdid himself when he said he would take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th. There were two insurmountable problems which forestalled his prompt movement against Fort Donelson. The first was the incredible downpour which produced a quagmire in the surrounding country. The second was that Foote had taken all but one of the gunboats back to Cairo for repairs. The gunboats would be required to reduce Fort Donelson's batteries as they had Fort Henry's.

  Grant had already corrected one of his shortcomings at Belmont when he and Foote reconnoitered Fort Henry by ship. This time he would get an up close look at what he was up against. On the 7th of February, Grant with his staff and some cavalry penetrated to within one mile of the outer works of Fort Donelson.

  The reader might consider this was a foolhardy risk for a commanding general to take, but he had an ace in the hole. He knew most of his adversaries during the war from either West Point or the Mexican War. In this instance, he had received intelligence that General Pillow was in command at Fort Donelson. In his memoirs, Grant gave his opinion of General Pillow. "I had known General Pillow in Mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter how small, I could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was given to hold." 34 Grant felt there was little risk in this case, but throughout the war he invariab
ly was willing to take the risk to get a bird's eye view of what he was facing. He was absolutely imperturbable under gunfire.

  Technically, Pillow was not in command, but Grant did not know this. General Johnston, upon hearing of the fall of Fort Henry, evacuated Bowling Green. He sent 12,000 men to reinforce Fort Donelson and retired to Nashville with the remaining 14,000. Next he placed General John B. Floyd in command at Fort Donelson. Floyd was the former Secretary of War before the Rebellion and was totally inexperienced. In short, Johnston was entirely befuddled by the ease with which the gunboats had devastated Fort Henry. In quick succession, he had made three critical errors in judgment. One; he should have retained Bowling Green until the outcome of Grant's expected attack on Fort Donelson. Two; he should have concentrated his forces at Fort Donelson where could have possibly defeated Grant. Three; he should have retained command instead of entrusting such an important command to an inexperienced commander. Johnston had a vaunted reputation, but his lack of judgment and loss of composure reflected the traits of an unskilled amateur.

  What Grant found at Fort Donelson was a far different situation than at Fort Henry. The mistakes made regarding the siting of Fort Henry had not been repeated at Fort Donelson. The fort stood on high ground, at some points, one hundred feet above the Cumberland River. The fortress covered an exceptionally large area, over one hundred acres. The fort was ideally situated to take advantage of the natural features of the surrounding landscape. The Cumberland River provided a perfect defense to the east, while to the south: a natural ravine provided a strong line of defense. On the north, the fort faced Hickman's Creek which was unnaturally swollen due to the flooding. On the west side of the fort, strong man-made entrenchments had been constructed consisting mostly of rifle-pits dug into the crest of ridges. The rifle-pits ran as far as two miles from the river. Trees had also been fallen to form an abatis along the entire front of the western fortifications.

  Inside the fort the story was much the same. Defense was the byword in these fortifications. The Confederates truly intended to block access to the Cumberland River and they had the firepower in place to do it. On the side of the hill facing the Cumberland, they had installed two batteries of twelve guns. The upper battery consisted of one, 32 pounder heavy rifled gun and two, 32 pounder carronades. The lower battery was comprised of eight, 32 pounder guns and one, 10 inch columbiad. This installation was sited thirty or forty feet above the water line.

  Grant did not know how many defenders were inside Donelson, but he did know that the main garrison had been supplemented by the retreating force from Fort Henry. He also suspected the enemy would be reinforcing the bastion as fast as possible. To quote Grant, "I felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would be more effective than 50,000 a month later." 35 Grant was one general who understood the value of time, possibly more than any general in history.

  Halleck's tacit approval of Grant's movement by his non reply to Grant's declaration has already been demonstrated. Nevertheless, Halleck continued his normal mode of operation. On the 8th, Halleck told Grant he was sending him shovels and picks to strengthen Fort Henry. Again on the 10th, Halleck mentioned picks and shovels and strengthening the land side of Fort Henry.

  Grant wanted nothing to do with picks and shovels. He had been stymied by the presence of poor weather and was now awaiting the return of Foote's gunboats from their mission of destruction upstream on the Tennessee. Grant was eager to get cracking. As he came to know more about Halleck, he could decipher "picks and shovels" as a step towards outright disapproval of the mission. As Grant said to Rawlins when they were out of sight of Cairo on their way to Fort Henry, "now we seem to be safe, beyond recall." 36 He seemed to have considered going in harm’s way safer than being under the thumb of headquarters. Since the fall of Fort Henry, Halleck had been forwarding reinforcements to Grant. By the 11th, Grant had received the first of these, some six regiments. Grant sent the six reinforcing regiments back aboard the transports to affect a landing north of Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River.

  On the 10th came news that the enemy was reinforcing Fort Donelson. Time was of the essence, forcing Grant to move with or without the gunboats. He entered into an urgent dialogue with Foote, offering any cooperation required of him to enable Foote's fleet to be hurried into position to aid in the attack.

  Wanting to act before the Confederates could reinforce Fort Donelson, Grant issued orders for the move on Fort Donelson on February 10th. On the 11th, General McClernand's division moved out on one of the two roads leading to Fort Donelson. The remainder of Grant’s army, some 15,000 in all, commenced their march early on the 12th. Smith's division moved toward Fort Donelson along one road, while McClernand's command moved along the other. Lew Wallace was left in command of Fort Henry.

  Once the troops got away from the soggy lowland surrounding Fort Henry, they encountered good roads. The weather turned warm and the men were brimming with confidence following their easy victory at Fort Henry. While they basked in the warm southern sun, the men began to discard their blankets and overcoats. They felt certain they would not need these bulky items in such a warm climate. As they marched uncontested, they thought to themselves, could victory take longer than it had at Fort Henry.

  By noon on February 12th, Grant's army reached Fort Donelson. Grant's plan of attack was similar to what he had planned at Fort Henry. He planned to surround the fort as best he could and cut off all means of escape via the Cumberland River. Then the gunboats would attack and arrest the batteries in the fort. Surely, surrender would soon follow.

  The plan was good except that it was based upon misconceptions which Grant had no way of knowing beforehand. Fort Donelson was a much stronger fortification than Fort Henry. Also, to Grant's chagrin, Johnston had greatly reinforced the fort. By the 12th of February, the garrison stood at over 18,000 soldiers. This would not be as easy a task as he had anticipated, but with his irrepressible optimism he went straight at his work. History records that Ulysses S. Grant won his battles partly because of the overwhelming numbers he had at his command. The reader will recall, at Fort Donelson, he was investing a fort which contained a force superior in size to his own. This would not be the last time he would fight a battle where he was outnumbered. All he ever wanted was to get at the enemy, but he certainly had no qualms about fighting a superior force. Evident in his actions to date and particularly in the move against Fort Donelson was his trait of celerity of action. This trait was apparent in almost all the actions he took during the Civil War because he felt the time gained by prompt movements more than offset superior numbers. Yet, history portrays Grant as a stolid individual winning through superior strength and attrition. How anyone reading about Donelson, Vicksburg or Chattanooga could come to such a conclusion is beyond comprehension.

  As Grant's army approached Donelson on the 12th, he positioned Smith's division on the northwest side of the fort bordering Hickman Creek. McClernand's division was placed south of the fort as close to the Cumberland River as possible. This, it was hoped, would curtail any possibilities of escape. Grant established his headquarters in the rear of Smith's command.

  During the remainder of the 12th and 13th only minor skirmishing took place. The Union forces were trying to probe the Confederate positions, while the rebels mysteriously left Grant alone to complete his investment.

  By the evening of the 13th, the fair weather which had prevailed during the investment turned dramatically colder. The temperature fell to twelve degrees as it began raining, turned to sleet and finally to snow. The wind turned to the north and before long the soldiers found themselves in the middle of a blizzard. No fires were permitted due to the close proximity of the enemy, so the Federals who had thrown away their overcoats and blankets suffered greatly.

  Around midnight on the 13th, Foote and his fleet arrived, three ironclads and two wooden gunboats. Grant had the ironclad, Carondelet, with him. The Carondelet, commanded by Henry Walke, had exchanged fire with the fort's batteries at
long range in an effort to divert the rebels’ attention from Grant's investment. With the arrival of the full naval contingent, Grant could commence his attack on the 14th.

  Accompanying the fleet was Thayer's brigade which Grant had ordered to Fort Donelson via the transports. These were the first six regiments Halleck had ordered to reinforce Grant. These troops were landed on the morning of the 14th and marched to a position between Smith and McClernand. In addition, after Fort Henry had been strengthened, Grant had ordered up Lew Wallace and his command. Thayer became part of Wallace's command and this new division took the position between Smith and McClernand. The investment was now complete with all three of Grant's divisions in place.

  Grant sent Halleck the following message during the morning of February 14th. "Our troops now invest the works at Fort Donelson. The enemy have been driven into their works at every point. A heavy abatis all around prevents carrying the works by storm at present. I feel every confidence of success and the best feeling prevails among the men."37 Foote and his fleet were ready for action by 3 P.M. on the 14th. Foote began to pound the fort from a long range of about a mile. At this range, the rebel batteries were ineffective, while the Yankee gunboats could fire at will. Trying to exploit the lesson he had learned at Fort Henry, Foote closed to less than five hundred yards. Fort Henry had been was situated in a low area, so the gun emplacements were barely above the riverbank. At Fort Donelson, however, the gun emplacements stood 30 or 40 feet above the river. As Foote closed the distance, his guns were shooting up at a higher and higher angle. Many of the shots missed the southern gun positions arching high in the air and coming down in the National army lines.