Grant The Forgotten Hero

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by Charles Henry Vessey


  The one criticism leveled at him for his actions before Donelson was his leaving his command without someone in charge during his visit with Foote on February 15th. Anyone with military experience knows that command automatically devolves upon the next ranking person. It requires no formal delegation of responsibilities as in civilian organizations. So what was the response of the on scene commanders when attacked by the enemy? They did exactly as they were supposed to do, they fought.

  If there was any fault to be found, it was probably with Grant's staff. The staff was new and was comprised of many civilians. When McClernand sent for help, he should not have solicited Wallace, but Grant's staff. When Wallace finally asked Grant's staff for direction, Rawlins should have requested advice from Smith who was the next ranking officer and by far the most experienced military man. Grant's staff was inexperienced and can be forgiven due to lack of knowledge in these matters. These mistakes would not occur later in the war.

  Immediately following the execution of the surrender, Grant sent a report of the Fort Donelson capture to Department Headquarters.

  Headquarters, District of West Tennessee,}

  Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862. }

  Brigadier-General George W. Cullum,

  Chief of Staff, Department of the Missouri:

  I am pleased to announce to you the unconditional surrender, this morning, of Fort Donelson, with twelve to fifteen thousand prisoners, at least forty pieces of artillery, and a large amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property.

  I left Fort Henry on the 12th instant, with a force of about fifteen thousand men, divided into two divisions, under the command of generals McClernand and Smith. Six regiments were sent around by water the day before, convoyed by a gunboat (or boats), and with instructions not to pass it.

  The troops made the march in good order, the head of the column arriving within two miles of the fort at twelve o' clock M. At this point the enemy's pickets were met and driven in. The fortifications of the enemy were from this point gradually approached and surrounded, with occasional skirmishing on the line. The following day, owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats and reenforcements sent by water, no attack was made, but the investment was extended on the flanks of the enemy, and drawn closer to his works, with skirmishing all day. On the evening of the 13th, the gunboats and reenforcements arrived. On the 14th, a gallant attack was made by Flag-Officer Foote upon the enemy's river batteries with his fleet. The engagement lasted probably one hour and a half, and bid fair to result favorably, when two unlucky shots disabled two of the armored boats, so that they were carried back by the current. The remaining two were very much disabled also, having received a number of heavy shots about the pilothouses and other parts of the vessels. After these mishaps, I concluded to make the investment of Fort Donelson as perfect as possible, and partially fortify, and await repairs to the gunboats. This plan was frustrated, however, by the enemy making a most vigorous attack upon our right wing, commanded by Brigadier-General J. A. McClernand, and which consisted of his division and a portion of the force under General L. Wallace.

  The enemy were repelled, after a closely contested battle of several hours, in which our loss was heavy. The officers suffered out of proportion. I have not the means of determining our loss, even approximating, but it cannot fall far short of twelve hundred killed, wounded, and missing. Of the latter, I understand, through General Buckner, about two hundred and fifty were taken prisoners. I shall retain here enough of the enemy to exchange for them, as they were immediately shipped off, and not left for recapture.

  About the close of this action the ammunition and cartridge-boxes gave out, which, with the loss of many of the field officers, produced great confusion in the ranks. Seeing that the enemy did not take advantage of it, convinced me that equal confusion, and, consequently, great demoralization, existed with him. Taking advantage of this fact, I ordered a charge upon the left (enemy's right) with the division under General C. F. Smith, which was most brilliantly executed, and gave to our arms full assurance of victory. The battle lasted until dark, and gave us possession of part of the intrenchment. An attack was ordered from the other flank after the charge by General Smith was commenced, by the divisions under McClernand and Wallace, which, notwithstanding hours of exposure to a heavy fire in the fore part of the day, was gallantly made, and the enemy further repulsed. At the points thus gained, night having come on, all the troops encamped for the night, feeling that a complete victory would crown their efforts at an early hour in the morning. This morning, at a very early hour, a note was received from General Buckner, under a flag of truce, proposing an armistice. A copy of the correspondence which ensued is herewith enclosed.

  I could mention individuals who especially distinguished themselves, but will leave this to division and brigade commanders, whose reports will be forwarded as soon as received.

  Of the division commanders, however, Generals Smith McClernand, and Wallace, I must do the justice to say that all of them were with their commands in the midst of danger, and were always ready to execute all orders, no matter what the exposure to themselves.

  At the hour the attack was made on General McClernand's command, I was absent, having received a note from Flag-Officer Foote, requesting me to go and see him, he being unable to call on me, in consequence of a wound received the day before.

  My staff, Colonel J. D. Webster, First Illinois artillery, chief of staff; Captain J. A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant-general; First Lieutenants C. B. Lagow and William S. Hillyer, aides; and Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. McPherson, chief engineer, and Colonel John Riggin, junior, volunteer aide, are all deserving of personal mention for their gallantry and services.

  For details, see reports of engineers, medical director, and commanders of divisions and brigades, to follow.

  U. S. GRANT, Brigadier-General 54

  In Grant's usual style, he lavished praise on others such as the division commanders and his staff. He was quick to praise those he thought deserving. Something missing in his correspondence, which is commonly found in the letters of others, is self congratulation. Grant wanted to be judged by his actions and never felt the need to pat himself on the back.

  Another point to consider in his report is his truthfulness. Grant's veracity in his memoirs has been questioned by his critics concerning various issues. As mentioned earlier in the book, these lapses can be attributed to disease and memory due to the amount of time which had passed. In this particular case, the report was written the day of the surrender. The reader will note Grant's candid explanation of events to his superior. Unlike others, he did not try to omit embarrassing details such as his being away from his command during the Confederate attack or that parts of his command ran out of ammunition during a crucial point in the battle. He purposely removed any possible excuses he may have had before anyone could level charges of dereliction of duty against him. This is another tribute to Grant’s honesty and belief in justice and his cause.

  The day after the surrender Grant sent the following congratulatory order to his command. He was not one to hog the glory for himself, but rather he wanted to pay tribute to those who deserved it.

  Headquarters, District of West Tennessee,}

  Fort Donelson, February 17, 1862. }

  General Orders, No. 2.

  The general commanding takes great pleasure in congratulating the troops of this command for the triumph over rebellion gained by their valor on the 13th, 14th, and 15th inst.

  For four successive nights, without shelter during the most inclement weather known in this latitude, they faced an enemy in large force in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly fortified by nature, all the safeguards suggested by science were added. Without a murmur this was borne, prepared at all times to receive an attack, and with continuous skirmishing by day, resulting ultimately in forcing the enemy to surrender without conditions.

  The victory achieved is not only great in breaking down rebellion, but ha
s secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever taken in one battle on this continent.

  Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the maps of our united country, and the men who fought the battle will live in the memory of a grateful people.

  U. S. GRANT, Major-General commanding. 55

  Ulysses S. Grant found himself the man of the hour in the United States. This was unfamiliar territory for him. After so many years of failure in the civilian world, this doubtless gave him a sense of success and pride, but he was not one to let it go to his head. He was on top of the world right now, but soon his sparkling image with the public would be tarnished.

  CHAPTER THREE

  "I respectfully ask to be relieved"

  February 17, 1862 - March 17, 1862

  Out of Touch

  Effective February 15, 1862, Ulysses S. Grant was assigned a larger command, designated the District of West Tennessee, with no defined limits. Remember Grant was in Halleck's department whose territorial limits extended to the Cumberland River.

  Grant was immediately promoted to the rank of Major General of Volunteers following his victory at Fort Donelson. His commission was dated February 19, 1862, so he outranked everyone in the department except Halleck.

  On the surface, it appeared Grant’s promotion was justly deserved and wholeheartedly awarded, but behind the scenes, events were occurring, which placed him under a cloud.

  Regretfully, jealousy is a powerful human emotion, which has played a significant role in human history. Henry Halleck, Grant's immediate superior, was an arrogant, pompous and jealous man. While, one might normally think a subordinate's success would bring his superior, accolades, promotions, and gratitude, such was not the case with General Halleck. Halleck coveted overall command in the West and was not about to let anyone interfere with his plans. Grant had become a potential rival.

  On February 17th, just one day after the fall of Fort Donelson, Halleck began his campaign to promote himself and undermine his rival. While Halleck received plaudits from the citizens of St. Louis for the victory at Fort Donelson, he could not bring himself to congratulate Grant. On the 17th Halleck wired McClellan: "Make Buell, Grant and Pope major-generals of volunteers and give me command in the West. I ask this for Forts Henry and Donelson." 1 About this time, Halleck communicated with Sherman, who had been moved into Grant's position at Cairo and had been instrumental in forwarding troops to Grant at Donelson. To Sherman he promised: "You will not be forgotten in this." 2

  While he could not bring himself to send congratulations to Grant, he was able to find time to send the following message to General Hunter who was at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas. "To you, more than any other man out of this department, are we indebted for our success at Fort Donelson. In my strait for troops to reenforce General Grant, I applied to you. You responded nobly, placing your forces at my disposition. This enabled us to win the victory. Receive my most heart-felt thanks." 3

  In his memoirs, Grant wrote: "On the 19th there was published at St. Louis a formal order thanking Flag-Officer Foote and myself, and the forces under our command, for the victories on the Tennessee and the Cumberland. I received no other recognition whatever from General Halleck." 4

  Also on February 19th, Halleck sent a wire to Washington: "Smith, by his coolness and bravery at Fort Donelson, when the battle was against us, turned the tide and carried the enemy's outworks. Make him a major-general. You can't get a better one. Honor him for this victory, and the whole country will applaud." 5

  On the 20th of February, Halleck continued to pressure Washington. He telegraphed McClellan: “I must have command of the armies in the West. Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity. Lay this before the President and Secretary of War. May I assume the command? Answer quickly." 6

  Alas, it did not take a genius to decipher Halleck's dispatches to comprehend his objectives. Stanton and Lincoln felt that they had finally found a general who was eager and willing to fight. Lincoln was delighted with the victory at Fort Donelson and knew there was only one man responsible for it and that was Grant. So, Lincoln only sent one man's name to the Senate for confirmation as major general. The others would have to wait, which meant that Grant outranked everyone in the West but Halleck.

  To complicate matters and make his predicament worse, Grant was ready to move by February 18th. Displaying incredible foresight, he could see that an aggressive general at this point in the war could lay open the entire Confederacy with decisive action. The Yankees could have taken Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis, and Vicksburg with little opposition.

  As he said in his memoirs: "I promptly informed the department commander of our success at Fort Donelson and that the way was open now to Clarksville and Nashville; and that unless I received orders to the contrary I should take Clarksville on the 21st and Nashville about the 1st of March. Both these places are on the Cumberland River above Fort Donelson. As I heard nothing from headquarters on the subject, General C. F. Smith was sent to Clarksville at the time designated and found the place evacuated." 7

  Technically, Grant could have been exceeding his jurisdiction here. His district had no defined limits, but Halleck's department ran up to the Cumberland River. Therefore, Nashville could possibly fall within Grant's command, but Clarksville was clearly on the other side of the river, in Buell's department. It is problematic whether this created ill feelings between Grant and Buell, but it certainly did not endear Grant to Buell.

  On February 21st, Smith occupied Clarksville. Grant reported this action to Halleck's chief of staff, General George Cullum, who had been sent by Halleck to Cairo to act as liaison with Grant. Luckily for Grant and unknown to Halleck, Grant had stayed in constant communication with Cullum. Included in his communication with Cullum on the 21st, Grant said he would proceed no further without direction from Halleck, but added, "It is my impression that by following up our success Nashville would be an easy conquest." 8 Grant was just being himself, ready to push things to the limit. Coincidentally, the same day, Flag-Officer Foote also sent a note to Cullum. Instead of Grant's mere suggestion about Nashville, Foote was more straightforward: "General Grant and myself consider this a good time to move on Nashville." 9

  As had happened when he first requested permission from Halleck to move against Fort Henry, his request fell upon deaf ears, yet Halleck was imploring McClellan to give him command in the West quickly because delay was costing the Union lost opportunities. Grant was cautioned not to send gunboats any farther than Clarksville.

  Disregarding Halleck's feelings about Grant as a potential rival, Halleck felt Grant was moving too fast and not allowing enough time for logistics to catch up with his operations. In addition, prior to Forts Henry and Donelson, Halleck had planned to demote Grant, not for malfeasance, but because Halleck had been trying to place other commanders he had known previously into key positions. He had been stifled because of Grant's success at Donelson and his accompanying promotion. In short, Grant was showing too much independence and Halleck was just the person to nip it in the bud.

  Grant was at Fort Donelson on February 24th, when General Nelson of Buell's command reported to him. Grant had been forbidden to go any farther, but he was aware that Buell was advancing toward Nashville. Not requiring reinforcements, he sent Nelson on to Nashville to rejoin Buell. He also sent along a gunboat for additional protection. Grant reported this move to Cullum on the 25th in a letter. "I wrote you that General Nelson's division (of Buell's army), had been sent to Nashville; since then I have learned that the head of General Buell's column had arrived, on Monday evening. The rebels have fallen back to Chattanooga, instead of to Murfreesboro, as stated in a former letter. I shall go to Nashville immediately after the arrival of the next mail, should there be no orders to prevent it. I am getting anxious to know what the next move is going to be." 10

  Grant wrote two letters to Julia during this time, which shed light on his motives. Only excerpts of the letters are offered which are per
tinent to the subject.

  Fort Donelson, Feb. 24th 1862.

  Dear Julia,

  .....To-day a Division of Gen. Buell's Army reported to me for orders. As they were on Steamers I ordered them immediately up to Nashville. "Secesh" is now about on its last legs in Tennessee. I want to push on as rapidly as possible to save hard fighting. These terrible battles are very good things to read about for persons who loose no friends but I am decidedly in favor of having as little of it as possible. The way to avoid it is to push forward as vigorously as possible.... 11

  Fort Donelson, Feby. 26th, 1862.

  Dear Julia:

  I am just starting to Nashville and will drop you a line before starting. Gen. Buell is there, or at least a portion of his command is, and I want to have an interview with the comdg. officer and learn what I can of the movements of the enemy. I shall be back here to-morrow evening and remain until some movement takes place. Since my promotion some change may take place in my command, but I do not know. I want however to remain in the field and be actively employed. But I shall never ask a favor or change. Whatever is ordered I will do independently and as well as I know how. If a command inferior to my rank is given me it shall make no difference in my zeal..... 12

  The excerpts from these two letters are offer insight for a number of reasons. Remember these two letters were written to his wife, not for posterity's sake, and at the time the events were occurring.

 

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