Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  On March 11th, Grant received a letter, which Halleck had mailed on March 6th. Enclosed was an anonymous letter forwarded by the Honorable Judge David Davis alleging extensive improprieties at Fort Donelson including the embezzlement of Confederate stores and equipment. In the cover letter Halleck remarked: "The want of order and discipline and the numerous irregularities in your command since the capture of Fort Donelson are matters of general notoriety, and have attracted the serious attention of the authorities at Washington. Unless these things are immediately corrected I am directed to relieve you of command." 28 Ulysses S. Grant almost never lost his temper, but this correspondence caused him to see red. His response to Halleck was uncharacteristically caustic. "Yours of the 6th instant, inclosing an anonymous letter to the Hon. David Davis, speaking of frauds committed against the government, is just received. I refer you to my orders to suppress marauding as the only reply necessary. There is such a disposition to find fault with me that I again ask to be relieved from further duty until I can be placed right in the estimation of those higher in authority." 29

  Halleck's conniving was beginning to backfire. In rapid succession, he had lost McClellan's unwitting cooperation; Lincoln was telling him to produce the evidence or desist; and worst of all, Grant was threatening to take the issue to a court of inquiry. This last item was something Halleck could not allow. If a court of inquiry was convened, the entire fiasco would come to light and Halleck could find himself reduced in rank or dismissed from the service. Halleck had to backpedal fast to prevent things from getting out of hand.

  On March 13th, he sent Grant this message. "You cannot be relieved from your command. There is no good reason for it. I am certain that all the authorities at Washington ask, is that you enforce discipline, and punish the disorderly. The power is in your hands; use it, and you will be sustained by all above you. Instead of relieving you I wish you as soon as your new army is in the field to assume the immediate command and lead it on to new victories." 30

  On March 14th, Grant replied to Halleck's telegram apparently feeling that he had over reacted. He agreed to resume command and stay in Halleck's department. "After your letter, enclosing copy of an anonymous letter, upon which severe censure was based, I felt as though it would be impossible for me to serve longer without a court of inquiry. Your telegram, of yesterday, however, places such a different phase upon my position, that I will again assume command, and give every effort to the success of our cause. Under the worst circumstances, I would do the same." 31

  On March 15th, Halleck finally brought the episode to a close with the following letter to the War Department.

  Headquarters, Department of the Mississippi,}

  St. Louis, March 15, 1862. }

  Brigadier-General L. Thomas,

  Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington:

  In accordance with your instructions of the 10th instant, I report that General Grant and several officers of high rank in his command, immediately after the battle of Fort Donelson, went to Nashville, without my authority or knowledge. I am satisfied, however, from investigation, that General Grant did this from good intentions, and from a desire to subserve the public interests. Not being advised of General Buell's movements, and learning that General Buell had ordered Smith's division of his (Grant's) command to Nashville, he deemed it his duty to go there in person. During the absence of General Grant, and a part of his general officers, numerous irregularities are said to have occurred at Fort Donelson. These were in violation of the orders issued by General Grant before leaving, and probably under the circumstances were unavoidable. General Grant has made the proper explanations, and has been directed to resume his command in the field; as he acted from a praiseworthy although mistaken zeal for the public service in going to Nashville, and leaving his command, I respectfully recommend that no further notice be taken of it. There never has been any want of military subordination on the part of General Grant, and his failure to make returns of his forces has been explained as resulting partly from the failure of colonels of regiments to report to him on their arrival, and partly from an interruption of telegraphic communication. All these irregularities have now been remedied.

  H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. 32

  Halleck provided Grant with copies of this letter and the letter from Lorenzo Thomas, but conveniently failed to provide the damaging letters he sent McClellan. As was mentioned earlier, Grant did not find out about these letters until many years after the war and when he did, it left an indelible mark upon him. During any discussion of these events, either during the war or years after, he felt he was "in disgrace and under arrest, and practically without a command." 33 That he sincerely felt this was the case, there is no doubt, but, in fact, he was never under arrest. Possibly, the memories of his failures during the preceding decade caused him to view this situation as another insurmountable obstacle.

  Finally, Grant had succeeded where previous impediments caused him to stumble. He clearly had won his fight with Halleck and conceivably, this incident may have toughened him for further political battles ahead.

  Grant resumed his command on March 17, 1862, and proceeded up the Tennessee River to the town of Savannah, Tennessee where C. F. Smith had located his headquarters with the expedition he was leading. Grant would make his headquarters there as well. If Grant felt he had just weathered a political battle for his very existence, a storm was brewing which would test his military mettle to the breaking point.

  CHAPTER FOUR

  "Lick 'em tomorrow"

  March 18, 1862 - April 10, 1862

  A Long War

  Grant arrived in Savannah at 4 P.M. the afternoon of March 17th. Shortly after he had established his headquarters at Savannah, General Smith, who had led the expedition up the Tennessee, went on the sick list. He had scraped his leg on the seat of a yawl, causing an infection. Little did anyone realize, but Smith would never survive this seemingly trivial incident. The Union lost one of their most accomplished soldiers when Smith died on April 25, 1862.

  Before Grant arrived, Smith had assembled five divisions comprised of his own plus the divisions of McClernand, Lew Wallace, Hurlbut, and Sherman. When Smith was incapacitated, command of his division passed to Brigadier-General W.H.L. Wallace. Grant’s total force numbered approximately 40,000 men. Meanwhile, Buell with a force of similar size left Nashville to join Grant at Savannah.

  The expedition up the Tennessee had two primary objectives. One was to secure the Tennessee River for Federal operations. The Tennessee provided an easy invasion route for the National forces. The other objective was to secure a footing as far south as possible to provide bases for operation against Alabama and Mississippi. When one studied a map of this region, it was easy to determine where one of the most critical positions was. That was Corinth, Mississippi, where there was an intersection of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. The capture of this location would greatly disrupt the movement of Confederate troops and material. The Southerners would fight for this location.

  The Tennessee River was swollen and had flooded much of the countryside from the spring rains. In order for the Federal forces to make a lodgment and move against Corinth, they would have to land somewhere in that vicinity. The only places available that could accommodate such large forces were the landings at Savannah, Crumps, Hamburg and Pittsburg.

  Prior to Grant's arrival at Savannah, and in accordance with General Halleck’s orders, General Smith attempted to complete the expedition’s objective. He sent General Sherman up the Tennessee River to land near Eastport, Mississippi and cut the Memphis and Charleston Railroad between Tuscumbia and Corinth, Alabama.

  Sherman was unable to land at Eastport, so he disembarked a few miles below and immediately set out to destroy the railroad operations at Burnsville. The country had been inundated with flooding which prevented any action from being taken. Consequently, Sherman reembarked his forces and dropped down the river to a place called Pittsburg L
anding. Here he met Hurlbut’s division still on their transports. Leaving his command there, he returned to Savannah to report his findings to Smith. After hearing Sherman's report, Smith ordered Sherman to disembark his and Hurlbut's divisions at Pittsburg Landing and move inland leaving room for the remainder of the army. Smith thought he would arrive there soon and would lead his entire force against the railroad. Sherman disembarked both divisions at Pittsburg Landing on March 15th. This was how the site was selected for one of the most famous battles in history.

  Halleck's intention in the movement against Corinth was to concentrate Grant's and Buell's armies and move against the rebels. Halleck's dispatches during this time reflected his normal cautious approach. On March 13th, Halleck telegraphed: "Don't bring on any general engagement at Paris. If the enemy appear in force, our troops must fall back." 1 On the 16th: "As the enemy is evidently in strong force, my instructions not to advance, so as to bring on a general engagement, must be strictly obeyed. General Smith must hold his position without exposing himself by detachments, till we can strongly reenforce him." 2 On the 16th, Grant heard from Halleck regarding Buell's movements. "General Buell is marching in this direction." 3 On the 20th, Grant heard once more from Halleck concerning Buell. "Buell is at Columbia, and will move on Waynesboro with three divisions." 4

  Grant still felt, as he had been since the victory at Donelson that an energetic campaign on the part of the National forces could drive deep into the heart of Dixie. He knew the rebels were concentrating around Corinth, and saw that waiting for Buell was of no value. The Confederate increase in size would probably offset the combination of the two Yankee armies, thereby negating any delay to build up the Union forces. Consequently, he felt an immediate move against Corinth was the best approach to take, but regretfully, Grant's and Halleck's views were diametrically opposed.

  Grant received a telegram from Halleck on March 18th, which he hoped would provide him the opportunity to strike. The wire read as follows: "It is reported that the enemy has moved from Corinth to cut off our transports below Savannah. If so General Smith should immediately destroy railroad connection at Corinth."5 He instantaneously saw the opportunity and was ready to take immediate advantage. He responded promptly to Halleck saying: "Immediate preparations will be made to execute your perfectly feasible order. I will go in person, leaving General McClernand in command here."6

  As quickly as the opportunity appeared, Halleck yanked it away. Halleck always viewed Grant as a loose cannon, so in response to his wire Halleck sent back a warning. "Don't let the enemy draw you into an engagement now. Wait until you are properly fortified and receive orders. 7 Always obedient, he knew these instructions precluded offensive operations, so he would have to bide his time.

  Grant’s assessment of the buildup of Southern forces at Corinth was manifested in a conversation he had with General Smith on March 23rd. "I am clearly of the opinion that the enemy are gathering strength at Corinth quite as rapidly as we are here, and the sooner we attack the easier will be the task of taking the place." 8 Grant saw matters correctly, delay would only increase casualties and Smith concurred.

  For now he was stuck waiting for Buell. Monitoring Buell's progress, Grant wrote to Buell on the 19th. "There is every reason to suppose that the rebels have a large force at Corinth, and many at other points on the road towards Decatur." 9 The 26th, Grant informed Halleck: "My scouts are just in with a letter from General Buell. The three divisions coming this way are yet on east side of Duck river, detained bridge-building." 10 The 27th: "I have no news yet of any portion of General Buell's command being this side of Columbia." 11 The 31st of March: "Two soldiers from the head of McCook's command(of Buell's army), came in this evening. Some of this command crossed Duck river on the 29th, and established guards eight miles out that night." 12 On the 31st he communicated with McCook: "I have been looking for your column anxiously for several days." 13 April 3rd, Grant informed Halleck: ".....a dispatch from the telegraphic operator is just in. He states that General Nelson is in sight. The advance will arrive probably on Saturday." (April 5th) 14

  Grant was anxious to get moving as was apparent in his conversation with General Smith, but Buell acted with great deliberation and was in no hurry to reach Savannah. He took seventeen days to go approximately eighty miles.

  During the last two weeks of March Grant could only wait which allowed him to catch up on his correspondence. These letters provide keen insight into his character and views about the war. March 18th found Grant writing to Julia: "With one more great success I do not see how the rebellion is to be sustained." 15 On March 22nd, he wrote Congressman Washburne a revealing letter detailing the episode with General Halleck. In the letter, he wrote the following paragraph. "So long as I hold a commission in the Army I have no views of my own to carry out. Whatever may be the orders of my superiors, and law, I will execute. No man can be efficient as a commander who sets his own notions above law and those whom he is sworn to obey. When Congress enacts anything too odious for me to execute I will resign." 16 This is a shining example of his patriotism.

  March 23rd, Grant wrote to Julia recounting the Halleck episode and explaining to her the background about some of the stories she had read in the papers concerning Fort Donelson. He wrote a couple sentences evidencing his sensitive side and how the criticism distressed him when he bent over backwards to be above board and do the correct thing. "I am so conscious of having done all things right myself that I borrow no trouble from the lies published. I say I dont care for what the papers say but I do. It annoys me very much when I see such barefaced falshoods published and then it distresses you." 17

  He wrote again to Julia on March 29th, exhibiting his continuing feelings that one more battle with the rebels would finish them in the West. "A big fight may be looked for someplace before a great while which it appears to me will be the last in the West. This is all the time supposing that we will be successful which I never doubt for a single moment." Grant, ever the optimist, never gave a second thought to defeat. This was not arrogance, but a supreme confidence in his and his troop's abilities.

  In the same letter, he continued: "I am pulling no wires, as political Generals do, to advance myself. I have no future ambition. My object is to carry on my part of this war successfully and I am perfectly willing that others may make all the glory they can out of it." 19 Ulysses’ true qualities surface of the dutiful, obedient servant of cause and country

  When Grant arrived at Savannah on March 17th, he found the disposition of his forces as follows; Sherman and Hurlbut's forces occupied Pittsburg Landing; Lew Wallace's division had been posted at Crump's Landing; while, McClernand and Smith's (W.H.L. Wallace) divisions were encamped around Savannah.

  Grant quickly discerned the impending danger to his scattered forces, so within one hour of his arrival at Savannah he issued orders for Smith's and McClernand's divisions to move to Pittsburg Landing. He left Lew Wallace where he was, supposing that he was on the same side of the river and within supporting distance of the main body of troops.

  As for himself, he decided to remain at Savannah to oversee the organization of new troops arriving daily from Missouri and to keep in contact with General Buell, who he expected before long. About this time, General Prentiss reported to Grant causing another division to be organized and sent to Pittsburg. Meanwhile, Grant visited Pittsburg daily returning to headquarters in the evenings.

  The Pittsburg Landing encampment was one of great defensive strength. Geographically, Pittsburg Landing runs on a southwest to northeast axis. The northeast boundary is the Tennessee River. The field backs up to the cliffs along the Tennessee which at some points are 100 feet above the river. On the northwest, the field is bounded by Owl Creek and Snake Creek. These formed an excellent barrier for the Federal right flank. Both creeks were normally deep, but were swollen due to the spring rains creating an even larger barrier. A similar situation existed on the Federal left flank. On the southeast, the field is bounde
d by Lick Creek which presented a significant obstacle to any attacking army.

  The long and the short of this analysis is that if the Southerners were to attack the Yankee camps, they would be forced to make a frontal attack from the Southwest. Even to an untrained observer, this made the defense of the Northern positions a much easier undertaking than the position of the attacking army. In his memoirs, Sherman stated: ".....thus narrowing the space over which we could be attacked to about a mile and a half or two miles." 20 In actuality, the distance between Owl Creek and Lick Creek was about three miles at the narrowest spot.

  On March 19th, Sherman sent Rawlins the following correspondence.

  HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, }

  PITTSBURG LANDING, March 19, 1862.}

  Captain Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant-General to General GRANT,

  Savannah, Tennessee.

  SIR: I have just returned from an extensive reconnaissance toward Corinth and Purdy, and am strongly impressed with the importance of this position, both for its land advantages and its strategic position. The ground itself admits of easy defense by a small command, and yet affords admirable camping-ground for a hundred thousand men. I will as soon as possible make or cause to be made a topographical sketch of the position.....