Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  I am sorry to write such a letter, infinately sorry that there should be grounds for it. My own justification does not demand it, but you, a friend, are entitled to know my feelings.

  As a friend I would be pleased to give you a record, weekly at furthest, of all that transpires in that portion of the army that I am, or may be connected with, but not to make public use of.

  I am very truly Yours

  U. S. GRANT 4

  Note Grant was still under the impression that the Confederate force which attacked him at Shiloh numbered 70,000 effectives. He was mistaken in his estimate, but was correct that he was outnumbered on the first day. This possibly caused him to believe that the opposition was larger than it was. Throughout the war he continually denied aspirations to any important positions following the rebellion. A greater patriot cannot be found.

  Grant was not alone in defending himself, particularly against the age old charge of drunkenness. Captain Rowley, who was on Grant's staff, wrote a friend from Chicago: "As to the story that he (Grant) was intoxicated at the battle of Pittsburg. I have only to say that the man who fabricated that story is an infamous liar. And you are at liberty to say to that man that I say so." 5 Rowley also wrote to Congressman Washburne. "A word with reference to the Thousand and one stories that are afloat with reference to Gen. Grant. Suffice it to say they have the same foundation as did those that were circulated after the Battle of Donelson and no more. It is sufficient to say that Gen. Halleck is now here and the conduct of the battle and all the details meet his entire approbation. And the stories in circulation have their origin in the efforts of Cowardly hounds who "stampeded" and now would be glad to turn public attention from themselves, and direct it elsewhere. Together with the eagerness of Newspaper Correspondents to get "items." I who was on the field know that had it not been for the almost superhuman efforts of the Gen. added to the assistance he had from his officers we would have been forced to Record a defeat instead of one of the most brilliant victories that was ever won on any field." 6

  Colonel J. E. Smith, another Galena man, wrote to Washburne concerning the charges being leveled against Grant. As to the matter of surprise, Smith wrote that the army was very clearly surprised-"it was worse, we were astonished", 7 but he went on to explain that he felt it was the fault of the division commanders not Grant. Other historians who have studied Grant have come to the same conclusion. Smith added: "I see also that Grant is severely censured by the public for drunkenness got up no doubt by those who are jealous of him. There is no foundation for the report." 8

  Armed with what he felt was reliable information, from people he could trust, Washburne went on the attack on behalf of Grant. On the floor of the House of Representatives, Washburne defended Grant saying, "the general who recently fought the bloodiest and hardest battle ever fought on this continent, and won one of the most brilliant victories....Though but 40 years old, he has been oftener under fire, and been in more battles, than any other man living on this continent excepting Scott." 9 Washburne went on to explain the question of surprise and why Grant was not at Pittsburg when the battle commenced. The last concern he addressed was the rumor of drunkenness. As to this rumor, he stated: '"There is no more temperate man in the army than General Grant. He never indulges in the use of intoxicating liquors at all. He is an example of courage, honor, fortitude, activity, temperance and modesty, for he is as modest as he is brave and incorruptible....It has well been said, that 'Falsehood will travel from Maine to Georgia while Truth is putting on its boots'". 10

  To demonstrate how much grief these malicious attacks had caused the whole Grant family, shortly after Washburne delivered his defense of Grant, he received a letter of thanks from Julia dated May 16, 1862.

  Hon. E. B. WASHBURNE

  DEAR SIR

  It is with a feeling of deep interest and pleasure that I have just perused a document from you in defence of my husband----It is indeed gratifying to know that he finds in you so true a friend and one who manifests such a ready willingness to exonerate him from the malicious and unfounded slanders of the press.

  Your noble and generous remarks in behalf of Mr. Grant were timely made and bearing as they do the impress of truth cannot fail of having a salutary influence.

  It is evident that you appreciate the motive that prompted him to challenge the dangers and horrors of the battle field when first our glorious government was assailed by domestic foes.

  In conclusion permit me to thank you for your bold and gallant effort to right the public mind in regard to a matter in which I feel so great a personal interest.

  Yours truly and respectfully,

  Your friend,

  JULIA D. GRANT 11

  As other eyewitnesses to the Battle of Shiloh, began to speak out, the true story of the battle began to emerge. When the public began to see that Shiloh was truly a victory, the fury began to subside. Grant eventually rode out the storm and the public's opinion of him rose once again.

  While, Grant again gained the trust of the American people, such was not the case with Halleck. As mentioned earlier, Halleck arrived at Pittsburg on April 11 and assumed command. Sherman described what happened next in his memoirs. "'It soon became manifest that his (Halleck) mind had been prejudiced by the rumors which had gone forth to the detriment of General Grant; for in a few days he issued an order, reorganizing and rearranging the whole army." He continued, "General Grant was substantially left out, and was named 'second in command,' according to some French notion, with no clear, well-defined command or authority." Sherman finished his insight, "For more than a month he thus remained, without any apparent authority, frequently visiting me and others, and rarely complaining: but I could see that he felt deeply the indignity, if not insult, heaped upon him.'" 12

  Considering both Sherman and Grant were well aware of Grant's plight, it is easy to understand there was more to this issue than paranoia on Grant's part.

  About two months after the battle of Shiloh, Halleck finished his investigation of all the allegations and wrote to Secretary Stanton completely exonerating Grant of any wrongdoing. In his letter of June 15th, he added: "the impression which at one time seems to have been received by the Department that our forces were surprised in the morning of the 6th is erroneous. I am satisfied from a patient and careful inquiry and investigation that all our troops were notified of the enemy's approach some time before the battle commenced." 13

  Considering Halleck's character, it is significant that he exonerated Grant's actions. Halleck, of all people, was more than willing to cast dispersions upon anyone's character in an effort to keep any blame from attaching to him.

  Just because Halleck had officially absolved Grant of wrongdoing, did not mean he had changed his low opinion of Grant's abilities. Hence, he kept Grant relegated to a bit player with no apparent authority. To illustrate Halleck's disdain for others, on August 13, 1862, he wrote the following to his wife. "It is the strangest thing in the world to me that this war has developed so little talent in our generals. There is not a single one in the west fit for a great command." 14 When Halleck wrote this he had recently arrived in Washington as General-in-Chief. He had come from supreme command in the West where he had few good subordinates from which to choose; such as Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas and McPherson. Based on this wealth of talent and Halleck's failure to recognize it, it is not impossible to imagine that one reason for Halleck's failure was his desire to impede the rise of anyone above him.

  While Grant still held a high opinion of Halleck, he felt slighted by the new command arrangement. The new command structure was announced on April 28, 1862, and although he felt slighted, he was still willing to give it a try. By May 11th, Grant had had enough. He sent a letter to Halleck. "As I believe it is generally understood through this army that my position differs but little from that of one in arrest and as this opinion may be much strengthened from the fact that orders to the Right Wing and Reserve, both nominally under my command, are transmitted
direct from headquarters, without going through me, I deem it due myself to ask either full restoration to duty, according to rank, or to be relieved entirely from further duty with this Department. I cannot, do not, believe that there is a disposition on the part of yourself to do me any injustice but my suspicions have been aroused that you may be acting under instructions, from higher authority, that I know nothing of. That there has been a studied, persistent opposition to me by persons outside of the army, and it may be by some in it, I am fully aware. This I care nothing for further than it is calculated to weaken confidence in me with those whom it is necessary for me to command.

  In conclusion then General, I respectfully ask either to be relieved from duty entirely or to have my position defined so that there can be no mistaking it. I address you direct instead of through the Adjt. Genl. because this is more of a private matter, and one in which I may possibly be wrong, than public." 15

  On May 12th, Halleck responded to Grant's request for clarification of his duties with a totally unsympathetic response. Halleck told Grant that if he felt like communicating directly with lower echelon commanders he would do so and there was no need to seek Grant's approval or even to inform him of what he was doing. In essence, Halleck was telling Grant, too bad, and if Grant did not like it he could leave. Halleck went on to say: "You have precisely the position to which your rank entitles you." 16 Remember what Sherman said about Grant's position, Grant "was named second in command, according to some French notion." 17

  Some historians have made excuses for Halleck's behavior such as being too busy or having a great deal on his mind. They have depicted him as being well-meaning and that he really treated Grant as he would anyone else. So that is how one would treat the winner of two great battles. He was entitled to "second in command, according to some French notion."

  Halleck went on to say: "For the last three months I have done everything in my power to ward off the attacks which were made upon you. If you believe me your friend you will not require explanations; if not, explanations on my part would be of little avail." 18

  Halleck had a lot of nerve writing anything of being Grant's friend. All he did was write a letter to the War Department exonerating Grant of any wrongdoing. Rest assured that if any of those investigations had proved Grant had made mistakes, however small, Halleck would have used it against him. During the previous three months, Halleck had treated Grant with indifference, choosing to let the shots land where they may. Contrast this behavior to Halleck's treatment of Sherman following his debacle in Louisville.

  Realizing his position was of little value, and always desiring to serve his country, Grant wanted to leave. While Grant never believed in political wire pulling to gain status or position, his staff, wanted to help alleviate the situation if possible. On May 24th, Captain Rowley wrote to Congressman Washburne concerning a possible vacant position on the east coast. A rumor had circulated that General Hunter might be relieved of his command in the Carolinas. Captain Lagow, also on Grant's staff, wrote to Washburne the very same day urging Washburne to help Grant obtain that appointment. Although Grant's staff was trying to aid their boss, nothing came of the situation.

  It would be interesting to speculate what would have happened if Grant had obtained that position. Sherman once said, "Had C. F. Smith lived, Grant would have disappeared to history after Fort Donelson." 19 This is an interesting observation. If Grant had received that appointment, it would not have been long before he would have been knocking on the doors of Atlanta or Richmond? Remember wherever Grant went, action was sure to follow and the government was willing to support any commander who displayed initiative and got results. After knowing Grant as well as he did, it is hard to imagine Sherman being so shortsighted.

  No matter what was happening with Grant or Halleck, the war would continue. Finally, by April 30th, Halleck's mighty host was ready to move against the Confederate stronghold of Corinth.

  Corinth was less than twenty miles from Pittsburg Landing. The reason the Southerners were willing to fight over Corinth was its strategic location at the intersection of two railroads. Beauregard had massed an army of approximately 50,000 men at Corinth for its defense. This force, while considerably larger than the force Grant faced at Shiloh, was no match for the army Halleck had gathered. In fact, the Yankees outnumbered the rebels by a ratio of two to one.

  The advance began on April 30th. This campaign would make the movements of Buell resemble those of a gazelle. Prior to Shiloh, Buell had marched over eighty miles in eighteen days. It would take Halleck thirty days to travel twenty miles.

  In an effort to drive home one of the lessons of Shiloh, Halleck's army would entrenched every day. Grant wrote cynically in his memoirs that: "The movement was a siege from the start to the close." 20

  Halleck, in his normal cautious approach warned his commanders not to bring on an engagement. He told them, "It is better to retreat than to fight." 21 If this sounds familiar, it is because this had been told to Grant over and over again for the past four months. Halleck seems to have been the type person Grant was referring to in his letter to Congressman Washburne dated May 14th, 1862. Halleck appears to have felt it was possible to fight a battle, or a war for that matter, without taking any risks.

  There was little fighting by the opposing armies on the way to Corinth. General Pope had little supervision, so feeling emboldened, he pushed out as far as Farmington, Mississippi on May 3rd and encountered the enemy. Halleck quickly ordered Pope's wing back to form a continuous line with the remainder of the army. Again, on May 8th, Pope moved his entire wing as far as Farmington and pressed close to the enemy fortifications. Halleck, once again, corralled Pope and made him conform to everyone else's position. That was as eventful as the entire movement on Corinth was to get.

  By late May, the National forces were closing in on Corinth. The Union army had control of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to the north of Corinth and the Memphis & Charleston Railroad to the east. Halleck's force had invested Corinth and was in control of all the territory from northwest of Corinth to the southeast. In other words, they had the city about half surrounded.

  At this point, Grant thought he saw an opportunity to capture not only the city but possibly Beauregard's entire army. Grant made the suggestion to Halleck that "if he would move the Army of the Mississippi at night, by the rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, Pope would find no natural obstacle in his front and, I believed, no serious artificial one. The ground, or works, occupied by our left could be held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. To the right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. I was silenced so quickly that I felt that possibly I had suggested an unmilitary movement." 22 Colonel Webster, of Grant's staff, stated that Halleck dismissed the idea "in the most insulting and indignant manner." 23 Webster added that he rarely saw Grant have difficulty controlling his temper as on this occasion. Grant made no more suggestions.

  Grant personally surveyed the area in question following the capture of Corinth and found that indeed, the fortifications in this area were the weakest in the whole Confederate line of defenses. He was convinced that an attack here could have demolished the rebel army.

  The Confederates evacuated Corinth on May 30th. Meanwhile, Halleck had his forces prepare for an attack which never came. Beauregard's army had slipped away. The Federals entered the city on May 30th. The victory was a strategic one, but hollow because of Beauregard's escape. In reality, the Southerners had won a victory of sorts because it took the Union forces one month to travel thirty miles and Beauregard was able to strengthen his forces following the defeat at Shiloh.

  As expected, Halleck proclaimed a dramatic triumph to Washington. McFeely stated the case well. "Halleck's monstrously large army enveloped itself. It permitted the Confederate armies around it to go free." 24 General Lew Wallace stated: "Corinth was not captured; it was abandoned to us. At dawn of May 30th we marched into its deserted works, getting no
thing--nothing--not a sick prisoner, not a rusty bayonet, not a bite of bacon--nothing but an empty town and some Quaker guns." 25

  In his memoirs, Grant had this to say about the movement on Corinth. "The possession of Corinth by the National troops was of strategic importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular....On our side I know officers and men of the Army of the Tennessee----and I presume the same is true of those of the other commands----were disappointed at the result. They could not see how the mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective rebel armies existed. They believed that a well-directed attack would at least have partially destroyed the army defending Corinth. For myself I am satisfied that Corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after the battle of Shiloh." 26

  With the Union finally in control of Corinth, Grant renewed his efforts to leave. Grant described in his memoirs how he was able to remove himself from under the thumb of General Halleck. "My position at Corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command, became so unbearable that I asked permission of Halleck to remove my headquarters to Memphis. I had repeatedly asked, between the fall of Donelson and the evacuation of Corinth, to be relieved from duty under Halleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation of the town. I then obtained permission to leave the department, but General Sherman happened to call on me as I was about starting and urged me so strongly not to think of going, that I concluded to remain. My application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to Memphis was, however, approved, and on the 21st of June I started for that point with my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company." 27

  Prior to Grant's leaving for Memphis a curious incident occurred. Curious in that the accounts of this incident appear somewhat contradictory. This incident occurred sometime during the first week of June, 1862. Grant's version of this incident was given in the above paragraph. Sherman described the incident in more detail. "A short time before leaving Corinth I rode from my camp to General Halleck's headquarters, then in tents just outside of the town, where we sat and gossiped for sometime, when he mentioned to me casually that General Grant was going away the next morning. I inquired the cause, and he said that he did not know, but that Grant had applied for thirty days' leave, which had been given him. Of course we all knew that he was chafing under the slights of his anomalous position, and I determined to see him on my way back. His camp was a short distance off the Monterey road, in the woods, and consisted of four or five tents, with a sapling railing around the front. As I rode up, Majors Rawlins, Lagow, and Hillyer, were in the front of the camp, and piled up near them were the usual office and camp chests, all ready for a start in the morning. I inquired for the general, and was shown to his tent, where I found him seated on a camp-stool, with papers on a rude camp-table; he seemed to be employed in assorting letters, and tying them up with red tape into convenient bundles. After passing the usual compliments, I inquired if it were true that he was going away. He said, 'Yes.' I then inquired the reason, and he said: 'Sherman, you know. You know that I am in the way here. I have stood it as long as I can, and can endure it no longer.' I inquired where he was going to, and he said, 'St. Louis.' I then asked if he had any business there, and he said, 'Not a bit.' I then begged him to stay, illustrating his case by my own.