Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  The results of the Battle of Raymond were overwhelmingly in favor of the Federals. Union losses were: 66 - killed; 339 - wounded; and 37 - missing for a total of 442. Confederate losses were: 73 - killed; 251 - wounded; and 190 - missing for a total of 514.

  To demonstrate how confused Pemberton was regarding Grant's intentions, the following is an excerpt from Pemberton's report. This message was written on the 12th and addressed to Major-General Stevenson. "From information received it is evident that the enemy is advancing in force on Edward's depot and Big Black bridge.....You must move up your whole division to the support of Loring and Bowen at the bridge." 78

  Battle of Jackson

  Grant learned of McPherson's victory at Raymond about sundown on the 12th. At the time, he was with Sherman at Fourteen-mile creek on the road towards Edward's Depot. He could see that the road to Jackson was open and was his for the taking. By moving on Jackson, he would avoid a fight with Pemberton on terrain favorable to the enemy and forestall any reinforcements headed to Pemberton.

  As usual, as opportunity knocked, Grant was ready to grab it. He ordered McPherson to move at daylight from Raymond to Clinton only ten miles from Jackson. Sherman was directed to move at 4 A.M. to Raymond and McClernand was ordered to move three divisions to Raymond leaving one division to guard the crossing at the Big Black.

  As Grant moved on Jackson, General Joseph Johnston arrived in Jackson to take command of all the Confederate forces in the State of Mississippi. It was fortunate Grant was so perceptive and acted with such celerity; otherwise he could have found himself between two large opposing forces. Johnston was a man of great ability and Grant knew Johnston would act with more resolution than Pemberton.

  When Johnston arrived in Jackson the evening of the 13th, he found six thousand defenders, mostly those that had been driven from Raymond. He was expecting a brigade from the south on the 14th, as well as others under General Gist. Johnston estimated when all were collected he would have a force of about eleven thousand men. In addition, he urged the Confederate authorities to expedite twelve thousand additional men currently on the road to Jackson from the east.

  Grant had to move fast or face attack on both flanks. Johnston immediately perceived the situation and sent Pemberton the following message during the evening of May 13th. "I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General Sherman is between you with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to reestablish communications, that you may be reenforced. If practicable, come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment would be of immense value. All the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-important." 79

  Pemberton failed to obey this order and consequently, the Southerners lost much more than Vicksburg due to his failed leadership. Pemberton never was able to grasp Grant's strategy. He believed Grant's movements south of Vicksburg to be nothing more than another of Grant's diversions. After all, everyone knew that Grant was a head on fighter not a grand strategist.

  On May 1st, when he realized Grant had landed in force, he telegraphed for reinforcements. Johnston immediately ordered Pemberton to concentrate his forces and confront Grant which was exactly what Pemberton should have done. Jefferson Davis, on the other hand, advised him Grant's move was only a raid and to hold on to Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Pemberton closed his eyes to reality and chose to side with Davis. He decided to defend against Grant by holding the line along the Big Black River. Eventually, Pemberton thought, Grant's supply line would be stretched and he would be able to cut it at will. Normally this would have a unreasonable move, but Grant was not a conventional general. His bold move south of Vicksburg should have revealed that to Pemberton.

  By the evening of the 13th, all Grant's forces were in the position he wanted for an attack on Jackson. Grant ordered McPherson to move on Jackson at dawn from his position at Clinton. Sherman was ordered to move on Jackson at the same time from his position at Raymond. During the night, Sherman and McPherson coordinated their movements so they would arrive at Jackson at the same time, but from different directions. Grant ordered McClernand to send one division to Clinton to be in a position to reinforce McPherson and another division just past Mississippi Springs to afford Sherman the same option, if required. But Grant had a more important consideration in mind, for he knew what was good military principle, therefore, he fully expected Pemberton to strike him in the rear. As shown earlier, this was exactly what Johnston had ordered and what Pemberton failed to do. Grant held McClernand's divisions in the rear to guard against such an attack and if none came they would be that much closer to Vicksburg for the advance on that place.

  Early in the morning of the 14th of May, Grant sent word to Halleck that he would "attack the state capitol today." He sent this message via courier to Grand Gulf. This was the first report he had made since he severed his lines of communications.

  At daylight on the 14th, both corps went into action. All through the night the rain came down in buckets causing a quagmire on the roads. At about nine o' clock A.M., the pickets of Crocker's division came into contact with the enemy about five miles west of Jackson. The enemy pickets were quickly driven in and Crocker pushed to within two and one half miles of the city where the main body of Confederates were located. Johnston had been reinforced during the preceding night, so his force now consisted of about eleven thousand men.

  McPherson and Sherman were now about the same distance from Jackson, but their positions were separated by about two miles. The opposing armies began enfilading each other's position with cannon fire. As the Union commanders were positioning their men for the attack, a heavy rain shower passed and delayed the operation for another hour and a half.

  At eleven o' clock, McPherson ordered his men to advance. Crocker's division drove the enemy back along the Clinton road for a mile and a half until the Union forces came within range of the main Confederate artillery at Jackson. There they were forced to halt and regroup.

  Meanwhile, Sherman's forces had been encountering stiffer opposition primarily from artillery as they approached the town. Sherman drove the defenders until they reached the intrenchments of Jackson. At that point, the enemy kept up a rapid fire of artillery causing Sherman's attack to bog down. Grant, who had been with Sherman, had the corps commander send a detachment to the right to determine if they could flank the enemy. This detachment discovered a weak spot in the enemy's defenses and caused the rebels to retreat from that part of the line. Tuttle's division of Sherman's corps entered Jackson through the weak spot and came in on the rear of the enemy artillerists which were holding Sherman at bay.

  It soon became apparent that Johnston had abandoned the town leaving the artillery detachments to cover his escape. Both McPherson's and Sherman's corps entered the town at the same time. By three o' clock the afternoon of May 14th, the National troops took possession of Jackson, Mississippi. The results of the Battle of Jackson were as follows. Union casualties were: 42 - dead; 251 - wounded; and 7 - missing for a total of 300. Confederate casualties were: 17 -dead; 64 - wounded; and 118 - missing for a total of 199.

  Grant had successfully divided the opposing forces and greatly diminished the chances of anyone reinforcing Pemberton. The situation for the Southern forces was grim. Pemberton, who had disobeyed Johnston's order, was now groping south from Edward's Station in search of Grant's non-existent communications with 23,000 men. Vicksburg was garrisoned with 9000 men. Johnston was moving north to unite with Pemberton with 12,000 men and soon would soon be reinforced with an additional 10,000 men. The sizes of the opposing forces were roughly the same with a slight advantage in numbers to the Confederates, but there was a big difference. Grant's army was concentrated in an area bordered by Jackson, Clinton and Raymond, while the rebel forces were in four smaller bands in four different directions. Grant found himself in position to easily dispose any of these forces which might attack him.

  Battle of Champion's Hill

  As the Yankee troops entered Jackson in triumph, th
ey were jubilant from another glorious victory. A certain aura began to pervade the Army of the Tennessee. They had never known defeat and this particular movement began to take on a special significance. They came to the realization that they were alone in enemy territory, surrounded on all sides, yet had beaten the enemy in three successive battles and with minimal supplies and rations. This was something special. Grant was leading them where no one else had ever trod, rewriting the annals of military history as he went. People talk about Lee's audacity, but no one could out do what Grant was doing now, his men trusted him.

  As already discussed, Johnston had sent a message to Pemberton ordering him to unite his forces with those of Johnston. Pemberton had failed to obey those orders and had struck out in search of Grant's supposed line of communications. This message was sent on the 13th. Apparently Johnston sent this order in triplicate hoping one would reach Pemberton. One of the couriers entrusted with delivering the message was a Union agent and promptly delivered the dispatch to General McPherson's headquarters. McPherson promptly forwarded it to Grant the evening of the 14th.

  When Grant received the copy of Johnston's order he assumed Pemberton would obey and was on his way to Edward's Station. He knew he had to prevent the two enemy forces from uniting, so he issued orders for the 15th to McPherson directing him to make haste for Bolton about twenty miles west of Jackson. Sherman was told to remain in Jackson and destroy the railroads. By the evening of the 15th, Grant had concentrated approximately 32,000 men between Bolton and Raymond.

  The evening of the 15th found the hapless Pemberton near Raymond. There he received a second order from Johnston ordering Pemberton to unite with him. Failing to discover Grant's supply lines, Pemberton began to sense something was askew and feared he may have been wrong not obeying Johnston. Pemberton immediately decided to turn north to unite with Johnston. It was too late for Grant was between them. What Pemberton should have done was continue to the south, away from Grant's army saving his army for another day.

  To demonstrate how baffled the rebels were about Grant's movements, even Joseph Johnston failed to grasp what was transpiring. Johnston spent the evening of the 14th in the town of Canton about six miles north of Jackson. From there he wrote to Pemberton. "As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. Can Grant supply himself from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him." 80 It never occurred to Johnston or Pemberton that Grant might not have any supply lines.

  Grant continued to exhort everyone to rapid action. On the 14th, he sent a dispatch to Blair who was just arriving on the scene. "Their design is evidently to cross the Big Black and pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers. We must beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all the trains with you. Smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. If practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and trains." 81

  Grant rejoined his rapidly advancing forces during the evening of the 15th. Grant's advancing line was formed roughly on a north-south axis running from Bolton to Raymond. Blair's division of Sherman's corps was finally up and near Raymond. On his arrival at Clinton, Grant ordered McClernand to move early on the 16th for Edward's Station, but cautioned him to watch for the enemy and not to bring on an engagement unless sure of success.

  At about five o' clock on the morning of May 16th, two railroad workers who worked for the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad, were brought to Grant. They told him they had passed through Pemberton's army on the evening of the 15th. Pemberton's army was then located at Edward's Station some fifteen miles to the west and was advancing to the east. They estimated his force at approximately 25,000 men. Pemberton's intentions, according to the two railroad workers, were to attack Grant's rear. Remember Johnston had previously told Pemberton to do just that. Also, keep in mind Grant and Johnston had fought the Battle of Jackson only 48 hours before, so it was natural for Pemberton to assume he could still come up on Grant's rear. Grant had moved with such rapidity that this was no longer possible. In fact, he had moved with so much vision and authority he was now moving to attack Pemberton in his front.

  Prior to receiving this information, Grant had envisioned leaving part of Sherman's corps in Jackson to complete the destruction of the enemy's supplies. This new information changed his plans and at 5:30 A.M. he ordered Sherman to move at once upon Bolton to support the rest of the army. As usual, Sherman promptly obeyed and had his first division on the road to Bolton within one hour.

  There were three roads on which to move between Bolton and Raymond toward Edward's Station. By now, some of the divisions belonging to the various corps were intermingled. Blair's division of Sherman's corps was travelling with McClernand's corps, while Hovey's division of McClernand's corps was moving with McPherson, but all were in sync with no apparent discord.

  As McClernand advanced, Hovey's division moved west along the northern most road; Osterhaus and Carr moved west via the middle road; and Blair and A. J. Smith along the southern most road. McClernand was travelling with Osterhaus and Carr on the middle road.

  The advance began early and about seven o' clock in the morning Smith's division encountered the enemy's skirmishers. These were first encountered on the southern road about five and a half miles east of Edward's Station. Smith continued the advance for about half a mile as Osterhaus, upon hearing the firing, pushed rapidly forward on the middle road toward the base of Champion's Hill.

  Pemberton was not aware of the presence of any Union forces let alone, Grant's entire army. As the fighting intensified, he had his division commanders form a line of battle across the heights of Champion's Hill overlooking the intersection of the northern road with the middle road. The defensive position was well selected. The hill had steep sides rising to a height of one hundred and forty feet above the surrounding land. The sides of the hill were cut up with ravines and overgrown with thick forest.

  McClernand notified McPherson of the movements of his command, prompting McPherson to order up Logan and Crocker to support Hovey along the northern road. McPherson also sent word to Grant about the situation and by half past seven, Grant was on the road to the front. By the time he arrived, Hovey's troops were heavily engaged with the rebels.

  By eleven o' clock, Hovey had his division disposed to attack along the Bolton road and two brigades of Logan's division were placed to Hovey's right. Crocker was still making his way to the front along the Bolton road. Grant would not allow an attack to begin until he heard from McClernand, so several staff officers were sent in succession to hurry McClernand along. At 10:15 A.M., he finally sent McClernand the following orders: "From all information gathered from citizens and prisoners, the mass of the enemy are south of Hovey's division. McPherson is now up with Hovey, and can support him at any point. Close up all your forces as expeditiously as possible, but cautiously. The enemy must not be allowed to get to our rear. If you can communicate with Blair and Ransom, do so, and direct them to come up to your support by the most expeditious route." 82

  By eleven o' clock, the battle had become intense and Hovey began to advance up the hill with Logan on his right. As they advanced, the troops conformed to the shape of the hill becoming a semicircle. Hovey pressed the enemy hard pushing them back about six hundred yards, capturing eleven guns and three hundred prisoners and finally attained the top of the hill. Once at the top, the rebels took a position in the road running through the hill. This formed a strong fortification and brought Hovey's advance to a halt. Pemberton quickly brought reinforcements to bear on Hovey's position forcing him to fall back and lose some of the guns he had just captured. For awhile, Hovey bore the entire weight of the battle.

  Grant observed the battle from another ridge and seeing the tide swing against Hovey, immediately dispatched some of Cr
ocker's division to his support. These reinforcements came in between Hovey and Logan causing Logan to move further to the right, almost positioning Logan to the rear of Pemberton's forces.

  The Confederates now made a determined attack against Logan's division in an attempt to dislodge a battery which had been placed on Hovey's right by McPherson and was enfilading the Confederate position. Logan's forces drove the enemy back and continued to advance threatening to turn the rebel left. Discovering their position threatened, the Southerners made a desperate attack against Hovey's left compelling his exhausted troops to retreat. It appeared that while the Federals were about to gain the Confederate rear, the Confederates were about to turn the Union left. The tide of battle seemed to be turning against the National forces.

  At 12:30 P.M., Grant sent another urgent dispatch to McClernand exhorting him to attack the enemy and relieve pressure on Hovey. McClernand still did not arrive as the Union position became more critical. Grant now directed McPherson to throw the two remaining brigades of Crocker between Hovey and Logan where a gap had emerged. McPherson executed the movement instantly and the Southern onslaught was stopped in its tracks. The battle seesawed back and forth with the Federal position still in danger.

  During this crisis, Logan moved Stevenson's brigade around to the extreme far right of the Union line. Stevenson made an attack sweeping into the enemy's rear and cut off the only road available to the enemy for retreat. Due to the lack of knowledge about the country and lack of maps, neither Logan nor Grant realized the advantage they had attained. Logan and Grant may not have realized the advantage they gained, but the gravity of the situation was not lost on Pemberton. He instantly began to withdraw his forces from the front and started to retreat for what he hoped was safety behind the Big Black River. Hovey and Crocker made one final assault and the rebels fled for their lives. The battle of was over between three and four o' clock that afternoon.