Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  Rawlins arrived in Washington on July 30th, and went immediately to see General Halleck. He was warmly received and reported such back to Grant. He also reported to Grant that Halleck had reconsidered his position on Pemberton's paroled army and now viewed Grant's action "as being proper as well as wise." Following the meeting with Halleck, Rawlins went over to the White House to meet the President and the cabinet. Once there, Colonel Rawlins presented the following letter to President Lincoln.

  SIR: the bearer of this, Lieut, Col. John A. Rawlins, is the assistant adjutant-general of the Army of the Tennessee. Colonel Rawlins has been connected with this army and with me in every engagement from the battle of Belmont to the surrender of Vicksburg. Colonel Rawlins goes to Washington now by my order as bearer of the reports of the campaign just ended, and rolls and paroles of prisoners captured. I would be pleased if you could give Colonel Rawlins an interview, and I know in asking this you will feel relieved when I tell you he has not a favor to ask for himself or any other living being. Even in my position it is a great luxury to meet a gentleman who has no ax to grind, and I can appreciate that it is infinitely more so in yours.

  I have the honor to be very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  U. S. GRANT 22

  Rawlins' mission to Washington was more than to report the results of the Vicksburg campaign. During the course of his interview with the President and the cabinet, it became evident Grant had sent Rawlins to Washington for a designed purpose.

  As the interview progressed, several of the cabinet officers became favorably impressed with Rawlins. He was a straight-forward, honest man, who seemed somewhat out of place in a den of thieves like Washington. By this point in the war, the President and his people had met a great many army officers, but none like John Rawlins. His quiet demeanor and unpretentious manner was something of an anomaly when compared to officers’ behavior in the eastern army.

  Rawlins made it quite clear during the interview that his mission was more than to tell everyone about Grant or to describe the battles and present facts and figures. Before long the situation of McClernand arose and Rawlins described in detail how McClernand had been insubordinate on a series of occasions, but that was not the half of it, he had been argumentative and as a general, was just plain incompetent. Instead of attempting to function as a team, which is what an army is supposed to do, McClernand desired to act independently in search of glory. This disharmony among his corps commanders was what riled Grant the most. Grant was so distrustful of McClernand's abilities that, for the safety of the men under his command, Grant had to pay as much attention to McClernand's command as his time would allow. Before long, it became painfully obvious that although Rawlins was prejudiced in his statements about McClernand, there could be no doubt McClernand was a hindrance and an obstruction to the operations of the Army of the Tennessee. His removal was fully justified by army regulations and Grant had shown remarkable restraint in not removing him sooner.

  Grant demonstrated keen political insight by sending Rawlins to see the President. McClernand had been making plenty of accusations and threats since he had been removed. At the end of June, McClernand had written the Secretary of War demanding an investigation into the conduct of General Grant from Belmont to the assault on Vicksburg on May 22nd. It was clear McClernand was trying to resurrect the age old specter of Grant's drinking, but by this time those charges were beginning to wear thin. Nevertheless, by Grant sending Rawlins to see Lincoln, he had satisfied the President of the facts of the case and armed the President with plenty of material with which to fend off any belated attempts by McClernand to create havoc.

  Grant sent Rawlins to Washington to soothe any ruffled feathers he may have caused with the removal of McClernand and in this he entirely succeeded. Lincoln saw who was the real culprit and was favorably impressed by Grant's political adroitness.

  While Rawlins was in Washington, Secretary Stanton proposed to bring Grant back east to command the Army of the Potomac. This was an assignment Grant did not want. As stated previously, one of the characteristics Grant valued most in his commanders was the ability to get along with one another. The Army of the Potomac was known far and wide for its cliques, jealousy and backbiting, so naming an outsider to its command would be a disaster. Grant was well aware of this and wanted to avoid that assignment like the plague. Dana and Halleck tried to feel Grant out about this assignment, but when they found out how strongly opposed he was, they were able to persuade Secretary Stanton to drop the idea. On August 5th, Grant wrote to Dana regarding this proposition. "It would cause me more sadness than satisfaction to be ordered to the Command of the Army of the Potomac. Here I know the officers and men and what each Gen. is capable of as a separate Commander. There I would have all to learn. Here I know the geography of the Country, and its resources. There it would be a new study. Besides more or less dissatisfaction would necessarily be produced by importing a General to command an Army already well supplied with those who have grown up, and been promoted, with it.....I feel very grateful for your timely intercession in saving me from going to the Army of the Potomac. Whilst I would disobey no order I should beg very hard to be excused before accepting that command." 23

  Shortly after that, he wrote to Congressman Washburne about the same topic. "Had it not been for Gen. Halleck and Dana I think it altogether likely I would have been ordered to the Potomac. My going could do no possible good. They have there able officers who have been brought up with that Army, and to import a commander to place over them certainly would produce no good. Whilst I would not possitively disobey an order I would have objected most vehemently to taking that Command, or any other except the one I have. I can do more with this Army than it would be possible for me to do with any other without time to make the same acquaintance with others I have with this. I know that the soldiers of the Army of the Ten. can be relied on to the fullest extent. I believe I know the exact capacity of every General in my Command to command troops, and just where to place them to get from them their best services. This is a matter of no small importance." 24

  While Rawlins was in Washington explaining the McClernand episode, Grant returned to what he viewed as the next logical movement, an expedition against Mobile. As stated before, Grant had taken the liberty, on July 18th, to propose just such a campaign to Halleck. Halleck responded with his own obtuse view of strategy and proceeded to scatter his forces against trivial objectives.

  Not to be deterred, Grant returned to the Mobile proposition on July 24th. "It seems to me that Mobile is the point deserving the most immediate attention." 25 Once again, on August 1st, he telegraphed Halleck: "Mobile can be taken from the Gulf Department, with only one or two gunboats to protect the debarkation. I can send the necessary force. With your leave I would like to visit New Orleans, particularly if the movement against Mobile is authorized." 26 Grant, always restless with inaction, returned to the subject on September 25th: "I am confident that Mobile could now be taken, with comparatively a small force. At least, a demonstration in that direction would either result in the abandonment of the city, or force the enemy to weaken Bragg's army to hold it." 27 In one of the finest examples of his incredible determination, Grant repeated his idea on September 30th: "I regret that I have not got a movable force with which to attack Mobile or the river above. As I am situated, however, I must be content with guarding territory already taken from the enemy. I do not say this complainingly, but simply regret that advantage cannot be taken of so fine an opportunity of dealing the enemy a heavy blow." 28

  Lincoln greatly admired any general who was eager to press the enemy and he was beginning to admire just about anything associated with General Grant. Noticing Grant's continual imploring about a movement against Mobile, Lincoln must have felt the need to shed some light on why the administration was not willing to allow a movement against Mobile at that time. On August 9th, Lincoln wrote Grant a short letter offering a cursory glimpse into international politics. "I see by a de
spatch of yours that you incline quite strongly toward an expedition against Mobile. That would appear tempting to me also were it not that, in view of recent events in Mexico, I am greatly impressed with the importance of reestablishing the national authority in western Texas as soon as possible. I am not making an order, however; that I leave, for the present at least, to the General-in-Chief." 29

  In fact, during this period, the French Emperor Napoleon III was preparing to install the Austrian Archduke Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico. A French army had occupied Mexico City and these people were suspected of harboring a willingness to aid the Confederacy. Lincoln desperately wanted to reestablish a Federal presence in Texas at all costs. For this reason, the Union was unable to benefit from Grant's strategic foresight and with it went an opportunity to shorten the war.

  For the time being, the Mobile expedition was being scrapped, but this was not all, much of Grant's army was being dismembered in the time honored tradition of General Halleck. Halleck was in the habit of scattering his forces following a campaign and this was no exception. The reason for this can only be surmised, but possibly Halleck had no conception of what to do next. Whatever the reason, the summer of 1863 was a rough one for Grant caused by a lack of activity and direction.

  Immediately following the surrender of Vicksburg, Grant was requested to send parts of his army to reinforce others. He sent Banks, in Louisiana, 4000 men, Schofield, in Missouri, 5000 men, the Ninth Corps was returned to Burnside in Kentucky, a brigade was sent to Natchez and another into the Yazoo delta. Finally, on August 7th, Grant was ordered to send Ord's entire corps to Banks. By the end of the summer, his remaining force had its hands full merely chasing down bands of guerrillas.

  The reader will recall the trip Rawlins took to Washington during the latter part of July. This journey demonstrated skills which had been witnessed little during Grant's early life possibly because there had been nothing recorded or more probably because the development of political skills often comes with age. Rawlins was sent to Washington specifically to soothe ruffled feathers caused by McClernand's removal. This episode demonstrated keen political insight on the part of Grant. In a letter written in late August, he again displayed astute political skills as he negotiated a political mine field.

  HeadQuarters, Dept. of the Ten.

  Vicksburg Miss. Aug. 29th 1863

  Jno. G. Thompson, Esq.

  Sir:

  Your letter of the 10th inst. asking if "Democratic" newspapers, pamphlets etc. will be allowed to circulate within this Army, and stating that it is reported that such documents are destroyed by Postmasters, Provost Marshals etc. is received.

  There can scarsely be a foundation for the report you speak of. If such a thing has ever been done in any one instance it has been without authority and has never been reported to me. This Army is composed of intelligent, reading, thinking men, capable of forming their own judgement, and acting accordingly. Papers of all persuasions, political and religious, are received and freely read. Even those from Mobile & Selma are some times received and no effort is made to keep them out of the hands of soldiers. I will state however that whilst the troops in this command are left free to vote the ticket of their choice no electioneering or circulation of speaches of a disloyal character, or those calculated to create dissentions, will be tolerated if it can be avoided.

  Disloyalty in the North should not be tolerated whilst such an expenditure of blood and treasure is going on to punish it in the South.

  I have the honor to be

  very respectfully

  your obt. svt.

  U. S. GRANT

  Maj. Gen Commanding 30

  This illustrates two details about Ulysses’ character. The first confirms how he had grown as a person. He could be tough as nails when the situation dictated, but as shown, he could also tread delicately through a political mine field. The second detail is how fair Grant was, even during wartime, when a field general could flex much political muscle. The military has always been criticized by people who have never worn the uniform. One idea many people form is that military people all think alike not allowing any divergent ideas. Nothing could be further from the truth and Grant perfectly exemplified this attitude. He knew democracy was one ideal he was fighting for and in a democracy, freedom of speech is one of the basic tenets. In order to allow for freedom of thought and speech, he more than anyone, knew other viewpoints must be permitted. Therefore, he would be the last to censor or suppress opposing newspapers or political literature.

  In accordance with orders to cooperate with General Banks, Grant left on August 30th for a visit to New Orleans. He notified Halleck of his departure. "General Banks is not yet off, and I am desirous of seeing him before he starts, to learn his plans and see how I may help him." 31

  Grant arrived in New Orleans on September 2nd, after a brief stop at Natchez to see how Ransom's brigade was getting along. That night he attended a reception in his honor. He detested such events and when asked to speak, always had a staff officer give thanks of appreciation, but declined to speak himself.

  The next morning Grant and Banks went for a carriage ride with Grant in control of the reins. Invariably, with Grant setting the pace, they quickly left the others behind. He loved to put horses through their paces. The evening of September 3rd, he attended a party in his honor at Banks’ house.

  The following morning he was scheduled to attend another review of Banks’ army. Banks’ army consisted of two corps; Ord's Thirteenth Corps from Grant's army and Franklin's Nineteenth Corps of Banks’ army. The two corps were positioned next to one another in preparation for the review by the generals. Knowing Grant's fondness for strong and fast horses, (Banks had witnessed this affinity for himself the day before), he arranged for Grant to ride a half-broken charger who he deemed the "fleetest and best." Grant quickly galloped on ahead of the remaining generals and staff officers. When the rest of the party caught up, the review began, which deeply moved Grant because many in Ord's corps were veterans who had served with him at Shiloh and Vicksburg.

  After the review, he and the remainder of the party adjourned to a local establishment before returning to town. While returning to the city, the general once again galloped far ahead of the group when a locomotive came around a curve near the road. The thundering steam engine startled the horse causing both horse and rider to fall. Grant was not thrown from the saddle, but the horse came down on top of him. Grant was knocked unconscious and his entire left side was crippled. He was taken to a nearby inn while doctors were summoned. They found nothing broken, but he would require bed rest for weeks.

  If anyone other than U. S. Grant had been injured by a horse falling on him, the case would have not incited speculation. Grant had been severely injured and normal speculation was to be expected. What was strange about this incident is that it caused so little conjecture, possibly because he had been on such public display during his previous 48 hours in New Orleans. In fact, there had been witnesses to the accident. As with all eye-witnesses, everyone viewed the accident differently, but there was clearly no consensus the accident had been caused by alcohol. Actually, the only consensus that developed was that it was an unfortunate accident.

  General Grant remained confined in New Orleans for over a week, but finally was able to be carried to a steamer and transported north to Vicksburg, arriving on September 16th. Julia was soon in Vicksburg with their youngest son Jesse and a better atmosphere for Grant's healing could not be created. Julia always boosted Grant’s spirits.

  On September 13th, Halleck telegraphed to Grant the following message: "All of Major-General Grant's available force should be sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth and Tuscumbia, to cooperate with General Rosecrans." 32 Grant was unaware Rosecrans had occupied Chattanooga on September 9th, and appeared to be driving Bragg's Confederates south. As Rosecrans pursued the enemy, it dawned on him that Bragg seemed to be laying a trap for the Union. By September 12th, Rosecrans began to hear of General Longst
reet from Lee's army being sent west with his entire corps to reinforce Bragg. Rosecrans quickly concentrated his scattered forces behind a creek in northern Georgia named Chickamauga. On September 12th, Rosecrans sent urgent telegrams to the War Department revealing his depth of concern about the situation. Hearing the news of Longstreet’s mission, official Washington became deeply concerned for the safety of Rosecrans' army. This is what prompted the telegram from Halleck to Grant on September 13th. The problem which now arose concerned the telegraph system. All messages from Washington to Vicksburg had to be routed through Cairo and via steamer to Memphis and on to Vicksburg. The messenger sent to deliver the September 13th telegram did not deliver it until much later.

  A concerned Halleck sent another telegram on September 15th: "All the troops that can possibly be spared in West Tennessee and on the Mississippi river should be sent, without delay, to assist General Rosecrans on the Tennessee river.....Information just received indicates that a part of Lee's army have been sent to reinforce Bragg." 33 This telegram finally reached Grant in Vicksburg on September 22nd. He was somewhat surprised, not knowing what had happened to Rosecrans, but went straight to work complying with the request.

  Sherman's forces were in camp along the Big Black River some fifteen miles east of Vicksburg. On the 22nd, Grant sent Sherman the following order: "Order at once one division of your army corps to proceed to reenforce Rosecrans, moving from here by brigade as fast as transportation can be had." 34 Still on the 22nd, J. E. Smith's division of McPherson's corps, which had been ordered to General Steele in Arkansas was diverted to Memphis. General Hurlbut in Memphis was also ordered to forward two of his divisions to Rosecrans. In all, Grant ordered four divisions to the aid of Rosecrans and Halleck was notified of what provisions had been made.