Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  Lee's position was still not entirely known by Grant on the 24th. On the 25th, Grant received news that Lee was retiring towards Richmond, so Grant had Hancock and Warren advance their forces to see if Lee was still there and how formidable his position was. What they found was that Lee's position was unassailable. Fuller made an interesting comment about Grant's reputation in history as it related to this particular incident. "Grant has not only frequently but almost universally been accused of seeing red whenever he saw a trench, of indulging in indiscriminate assaults, and of butchering his men; yet at 10:45 a.m. on the 25th, what do we see him do? Directly he learns the exact position of Lee, and realizes that his opponent is not retiring, and does not intend to retire, he decides on another manoeuvre." 7 It was time for Grant to move again.

  Grant now faced a dilemma. He had to move again in order to try to force Lee out of his strong position, but his present position would require forethought and precise movements to extricate the army from its precarious situation. On May 25th, Grant issued orders for the next move.

  QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 25, 1864.

  MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

  Commanding A. P.

  Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow. Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road to Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact. Send it with Wright's best division or division under his ablest commander. Have their places filled up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can, Littlepage's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and artillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make a forced march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede their march. At the same time this starts commence withdrawing all the 5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the same place. The two divisions of the 9th corps not now with Hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the 5th and 6th corps. Hancock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. To-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. As soon as the troops reach Hanover Town they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. I think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's left, to-morrow afternoon, also.

  U. S. GRANT

  Lieut.-General. 8

  The initial stages of the secretive move away from the North Anna began during the evening of May 25th. On May 26th, Grant sent a telegram to Halleck explaining his next move.

  QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 26, 1864.

  MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,

  Washington, D. C.

  The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee's right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox Ford, and his left at Little River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford and covers the right of Lee's army. One division of the 9th corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility. The 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and near to the enemy.

  To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the enemy by his right, between the two Annas, is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by the left leaves the Little River, New Found River and South Anna River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed. I have determined therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies.

  During the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings. The balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing.

  Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already assured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy.

  We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and Fredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap on the roads north of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere.

  Even if a crossing is not effected at Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected. I think it advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port Royal to the White House. I wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to hold it.

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieut.-General 9

  The master of the frontal assault and butcher of his men made two extraordinary comments in the above letter. "to make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify." He also talked about turning the enemy's left and right flanks. Yet history records Grant as unconcerned for his men and uninterested in maneuver.

  Battle of Cold Harbor

  On the 25th, Grant's move began with Wilson's cavalry division making a vigorous demonstration toward Lee's left. Wilson pushed across the North Anna and on toward the Little River. This feint caused Lee to telegraph Richmond: "From present indications the enemy seems to contemplate a movement on our left flank." 10

  On the night of May 25th Russell's division of Wright's corps was withdrawn from the lines and moved by the rear of Burnside and Hancock. In order to maintain secrecy, Russell was halted at daylight on the 26th, and did not resume his march until dark on the 26th.

  During the afternoon of May 26th, Sheridan's cavalry moved rapidly toward Hanover Town. That evening, the remainder of the army was carefully withdrawn from its position along the North Anna. Guards were left in position until the last moment to detain the enemy and then they burned the bridges as they withdrew.

  By the morning of the 27th, Sheridan's cavalry had secured the crossings at Hanover Town and Russell's infantry was dug in on the south side of the Pamunkey to hold the crossing.

  Lee was apparently deceived once again because on May 27th, he telegraphed to Richmond: "Enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at Hanover Town." 11 The Yankees had begun leaving Lee's front on the 25th and were all gone by the 27th. On May 27th, at 4:20 A.M., Lee's adjutant sent the following to General Anderson. "General Lee wishes you to ascertain what is in your front, and if you discover that the enemy is leaving you to be prepared to move your command promptly to the south side of the South Anna River." 12

  Once again history recor
ds Lee as anticipating every move Grant made, yet the record manifests an entirely different story. Lee was not sure, as late as the 27th, whether Grant's army was in his front, while the bulk of Grant's army was between ten and twenty miles from the North Anna position.

  By noon on the 28th, all of the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Pamunkey except Burnside's corps which was left on the north side to guard the wagon trains. From Hanover Town there were two roads leading to Richmond, which was twenty miles distant. One route was via Meadow Bridge, while the other was via Cold Harbor. The Cold Harbor position was important to Grant because it covered the new supply base at White House and there were roads leading from Cold Harbor to the southeast over which the army would have to travel to reach the James River.

  As soon as the army was over the Pamunkey, it fanned out with Wright on the right, Hancock in the center and Warren on the left. Sheridan was sent toward Mechanicsville, to ascertain Lee's position. On the 29th, the army made a reconnaissance in force to find Lee.

  Finally, on May 30th, both armies came into contact between five and ten miles to the southwest of Hanover Town. Lee's army was well entrenched, but some skirmishing took place all along the line. Lee had once again placed himself in Grant's path, but now Grant was within striking distance of the James River, so he got off a dispatch to Halleck. "I wish you would send all the pontoon-bridging you can to City Point to have it ready in case it is wanted." 13 This would fulfill his goal which had been stated before the campaign began.

  Later on the 30th, Grant received news of the arrival of General Smith and his corps at White House. He immediately notified General Meade.

  NEAR HAWES' SHOP, VA.,

  6.40 P.M., May 30, 1864.

  MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

  Commanding A. P.

  General Smith will debark his force at the White House to-night and start up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 A.M. in the morning. It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of Smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well out towards Cold Harbor, and also on the Mechanicsville road. Wright should be got well massed on Hancock's right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the Totopotomy if necessary.

  I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 A.M. in the morning, to communicate with Smith and to return with him. I will send orders for Smith by the messenger you send to Sheridan with his orders.

  U. S. GRANT 14

  Sheridan advanced toward Old Cold Harbor on May 31st, as instructed, keeping an eye on Lee's forces and preventing him from moving against Smith's corps which was en route from White House. Sheridan found the enemy entrenched and the position held by both cavalry and infantry. Lee knew the importance of the roads leading from Cold Harbor, so he was trying to deny Grant access. Sheridan promptly went into action to drive the rebels away and was succeeding when more Confederate infantry arrived. He began withdrawing, but as he was evacuating the position, he received orders to hold his position at all hazards. Sheridan promptly dismounted his men reoccupied the rebels works they had captured and prepared to defend the position.

  Darkness arrived before the enemy could attack, but Grant knew they would attack Sheridan in the morning, so he ordered Wright's corps to move from the National right and reinforce Sheridan on the left. Wright was ordered to make a forced march behind the army and try to arrive before daylight. Wright did not arrive until 9 A.M. By that time the rebels had assaulted Sheridan twice, but with his repeating carbines he was able to hold off the attacks.

  When Wright arrived, Sheridan's men were relieved and the possibility of Lee attacking Grant's line of communication with White House evaporated. General Smith was also expected at Cold Harbor on the morning of June 1st, but due to a mix-up in orders which mistakenly directed Smith to Newcastle, he did not arrive until three o' clock in the afternoon.

  Lee, comprehending Grant's movement of Wright to the Union left, made a corresponding move with Anderson's corps. They were observed moving along Warren's front so he was ordered to attack Anderson in flank, but as usual, Warren was slow which allowed Anderson to pass unmolested.

  Finally, Smith arrived at Cold Harbor and at 6 P.M., both Smith and Wright attacked the Confederate right. They scored a minor success capturing the rebel's first line and several hundred prisoners and were now in a position to make a heavier attack. While Smith and Wright were engaged, the enemy attacked Warren's corps three times and Hancock's and Burnside's corps as well.

  In addition to the movement and activity all along the front on June 1st, something else happened which became part of Grant folklore and placed him in a bad light.

  Grant's headquarters were moved to Via House which was closer to the Cold Harbor battlefield. As Grant and his staff rounded a bend on the way, they caught sight of a teamster beating his horses in the face with a whip because his wagon had become stuck in the mud. Grant immediately spurred his horse and dashed to the scene calling out to the teamster: "What does this conduct mean, you scoundrel? Stop beating those horses!" The teamster looked at Grant and calmly delivered another blow saying: "Well, who's drivin' this team anyhow--you or me?" The enraged general now shook his fist in the teamsters face and cried: "I'll show you, you infernal villain!" He then called for an officer and said: "Take this man in charge, and have him tied to a tree for six hours as a punishment for his brutality." 15

  This incident is always bandied about as proof that Grant cared more about horses than the men brutally dying around him at Cold Harbor. Actually, what this incident represents is what Gant abhorred most, injustice.

  Only one other instance throughout the entire war is recounted of Grant losing his temper. Joe Bowers recalled that during the Iuka campaign, Grant and his staff came upon a Union straggler who had stopped at a house and assaulted a woman. Grant leaped from his horse grabbed the musket from the soldier's hands and struck him over the head with it sending the soldier sprawling to the ground. 16 Instead of the public being told of this episode, historians continue to recant the incident with the teamster, why is this? The common thread which ran through both incidents was the injustice in both situations. Grant's anger appeared only during times of injustice, otherwise he was as cool as a cucumber.

  For Grant to bear the unjust title of "butcher" has to be one of the most humiliating defamations of character in history. Most people look at a picture of Grant and see someone who is determined, stolid or slow. The author's wife took her first look at Grant's picture and came to a very different conclusion. She said "he has obviously seen too much death, grief and destruction, for you can see it in his eyes." How true! There was probably no one in history that had seen, first hand, more death and destruction than Ulysses S. Grant and hated it more. There was also no one more anxious for peace than him. That was probably the driving force behind his words as he accepted his first nomination for the Presidency, "Let us have peace."

  After Wright's and Smith's minor success late in the day of June 1st, Grant thought he saw the opening he had been trying to achieve. What the Federal attack uncovered on the Union left was a hastily assembled Confederate force opposing them. On top of this, they had not much time to dig in properly, so it appeared another assault could turn Lee's right. If successful, Grant would finally attain what he had desired to put himself between Lee and Richmond.

  What he needed now was one more army corps on his left to make the assault sure, so after dark Hancock began moving his corps from the Union right to the left. The migration of the National forces south from Hanover Town had been going on for days and when Hancock arrived in place, Grant's forces would be deployed right to left as follows: Burnside - IX; Warren - V; Smith - XVIII; Wright - VI; and Hancock - II.

  Hanco
ck's men moved the night of June 1st - 2nd, but in the darkness, confusion ensued. The corps lost its way, organizations were fragmented and in an effort to straighten out the mess a thundering noise was created which the enemy could not help but hear. Hancock had to march twelve miles in addition to all the confusion, so the advance elements of his force did not begin arriving in position until 6:30 A.M., on June 2nd. The men were tired, hot and hungry and it would take hours for the entire strung out corps to get into position, so Grant postponed the attack until 4 P.M. By noon, it became apparent that Hancock's men were exhausted and Smith reported his corps as not ready for action, so Grant told Meade to postpone the attack until 4:30 A.M., the next morning.

  During the afternoon of June 2nd, Warren and Burnside's corps were rearranged to form a better line of battle and their movements stirred up quite a fight along their fronts. In fact, the rebels along this part of the front actually came out from behind their works and attacked. Burnside's troops repelled the attack, but failed to make a counterattack. When Grant learned of such a great opportunity lost, he was greatly displeased. It seems the Army of the Potomac continually let him down.

  Because of this action, Meade felt Lee might be weakening his line at places other than where the attack had been planned, so orders were issued for Warren and Burnside to attack at 4:30 as well.

  Lee was a general who would take advantage of every opportunity presented and this is exactly what he got when the National offensive had to be postponed. Lee detected the Union move on June 2nd and made corresponding moves to strengthen his right. He moved Breckinridge's force along with two divisions of Hill's corps to his right. His forces were now deployed right to left as follows: Breckinridge and Hill on the right; Hoke and Anderson in the center; and Early and Heth on the left. The rebel line was about six miles long, while Grant's was somewhat longer. Lee's line contained about 70,000 men and Grant's about 100,000.