Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  General Wright's corps had literally arrived in the nick of time. Grant was right about pressure on the Richmond area being the best way to parry the continuing thrusts against the North. He had pinned down Lee. The force Early led north was hardly similar to those led by Lee against Antietam or Gettysburg. Lee could ill afford to let loose a force of that magnitude because of Grant's position, so Grant really had not uncovered Washington. Even without Wright's corps, there would have been plenty of troops available in the upper Potomac area to fend off actions like those of Early if only led by a good commander.

  One other lesson resulted from Early’s movement. It showed that for once, Grant had the easier way to transport his troops. Troops leaving City Point by water could reach Washington quicker than the enemy's infantry invading overland. Lee's hope of causing Grant to relax his grip had failed.

  On July 12th, Grant received a very candid message from Charles Dana, the Assistant-Secretary of War. "Nothing can possibly be done here for want of a commander. General Augur commands the defences of Washington, with McCook and a lot of brigadier-generals under him. Wright commands his own corps. General Gillmore has been assigned to the temporary command of those troops of the Nineteenth corps in the city of Washington; General Ord to command the Eighth corps and all other troops in the Middle Department, leaving Wallace to command the city alone. But there is no head to the whole, and it seems indispensable that you should at once appoint one. Hunter will be the ranking officer, if he ever gets up, but he will not do; indeed, the Secretary of War directs me to tell you, in his judgment Hunter ought instantly to be relieved, having proven himself far more incapable than even Sigel. He also directs me to say that advice or suggestions from you will not be sufficient. General Halleck will not give orders except as he receives them. The President will give none, and till you direct positively and explicitly what is to be done, everything will go on in the deplorable and fatal way in which it has gone on, for the past week." 22

  The above communication is quite extraordinary. It could be classified as a bit of friendly advice from one friend to another. One would never find such a candid dispatch winding its way through the chain of command. Two points come instantly to the fore. The first depicts the extent to which the entire government was relying on Grant to provide direction. The second vividly describes the need for one central commander to be appointed to head that department.

  Grant's reply to Dana was an immediate telegram to Halleck dated July 12, 1864. "Give orders assigning Major-General Wright to supreme command of all troops moving against the enemy, regardless of the rank of other commanders. He should get outside of the trenches with all the force he possibly can, and should push Early to the last moment, supplying himself from the country." 23

  By July 13th, General Wright was in full pursuit of Early. On the 15th, Hunter's troops were ordered to report to Wright, but the junction was not made until July 17th. The rebels had a one day lead on Wright who pursued as far as Snicker's Gap leading into the Shenandoah Valley. On July 20th, Wright called a halt after verifying the Confederate retreat. The present threat had ended and it appeared an aggressive commander had taken charge. The situation had stabilized so Grant promptly requested Wright's corps to return to Petersburg. Early's invasion had ended, the threat was over and everyone breathed easier, so it seemed.

  Catastrophe at the Crater

  Just after the Union forces began to settle in for the siege of Petersburg, Grant began looking for options which he hoped would succeed in breaking Lee's line. He knew he did not have enough troops to completely invest the Richmond-Petersburg area, so he could not rely exclusively upon siege tactics. He also realized his true objectives, as was seen earlier, were the railroads. If he could not seal off Lee's forces, as in a total siege, he would have to eliminate Lee's sources of supplies. Comprehending these facts from day one, Grant hoped there might develop an alternative option which may allow him to accelerate Lee's demise.

  It just so happened that in General Burnside's front there was a fort which was hindering his progress. Within Burnside's command, resided a regiment under Colonel Pleasants, composed of many Pennsylvania coal miners. These miners had come up with the idea of blowing up the fort which would offer an opportunity to advance through the gap. Pleasants received permission from Burnside after he had consulted with Meade and Grant. Both Meade and Grant were dubious of the chance of success, but nevertheless, acquiesced.

  On June 25th, construction of the tunnel for the mine began, but the work had to be done by the regiment on its own time. Pleasants got little or no support from the army for his scheme.

  The work on the mine continued during the early part of the siege in almost total obscurity. Most people, including Grant, relegated it to trivial importance and went about day-to-day camp life paying attention to more immediate concerns such as the strikes against the railroads or countering Early's advance.

  As every day camp life became the norm, it is interesting to note some of the effects prolonged camp life had upon Grant and his everyday activities. This was the first time during the war where Grant had a permanent headquarters arrangement and it lasted for nine months. Without the hassle of moving from one place to another, activities were bound to be more stable, but with his increased responsibilities, they were also more complex. A perfect example of this was that this was the first time during the war where his attention was devoted to more than his immediate front. Operations at City Point were busy with his attention being focused on actions taking place at far distances such as Georgia or Washington.

  The telegraph was the means by which Grant was able to keep his pulse on events happening in far flung places. No matter how tense situations became in Washington or at Petersburg, Grant's power of concentration awed everyone on his staff. Messengers were constantly coming and going. Daily and hourly telegraphic messages arrived, requiring decisions, but no matter how much distraction appeared, nothing could break his train of thought about whatever question he was contemplating. Grant had the ability to concentrate so thoroughly he could sit through a cannonade without flinching.

  Another item of note mentioned by several historians, and seen abundantly throughout this text, was Grant's clearness in his writing. This was perceptible around City Point because of the length of time and the number of messages which emanated from that location.

  Some examples of the clearness found in Grant's orders from this time period are given in the following. "One thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. If they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders." 24 "Unless General Hunter is in the field in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death." 25 "We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. If we give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant." 26 "I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville Road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington." 27

  The above are just some examples of his writing during the time period, but they are indicative of his writing style throughout the war. He wrote his dispatches himself without waiting for the benefit of a secretary to correct spelling and punctuation. Grant's orders were so clear and concise that rarely did someone have to reread the message to understand it. In fact, one would have to go to great lengths in an effort to misinterpret the meaning.

  While Grant remained at City Point, it was inevitable that the old charge of drunkenness would again rear its head. While this charge no longer carried any weight with official Washington, it was bound to give credence to Grant's detractors. As was stated before, some of Grant's detra
ctors were generals he had to remove for lack of military competence, one of which was General W. F. Smith. Upon removal, many of these generals, apparently for revenge, started rumors about the drinking at Grant's headquarters.

  As declared repeatedly throughout this book, the author could find no evidence of Grant being an alcoholic or a drunk. He apparently was a social drinker on the rare occasion when he drank at all. Horace Porter offered this evidence in his book, Campaigning With Grant. "It so happened that no one in the mess had any inclination to drink wine or spirits at meals, and none was carried among the mess's supplies.....Upon a few occasions, after a hard day's ride in stormy weather, the general joined the officers of the staff in taking a whisky toddy in the evening. He never offered liquor of any kind to visitors at headquarters. His hospitality consisted in inviting them to meals and to smoke cigars." 28

  After W. F. Smith's removal, he tried to get even by starting many of the "Grant was drunk" rumors which even exist today. A number of these stories have their basis in supposed meetings where General Benjamin Butler wooed General Grant in an effort to keep Grant from removing Butler from front line command and placing him in command at Fort Monroe. In place of Butler, Smith was to be the front line commander at Bermuda Hundred. Butler did not want this downgrade and as the story goes took Grant on a roving tour of corps headquarters whereupon Grant became drunk. Supposedly Butler then threatened Grant that if he persisted in his plan, Butler would expose his drunkenness. The problem with this story is this. No one in the army, or the country for that matter had as much political power as Butler. If Butler did not want to be removed, Grant could not do it and Lincoln would not do it because he needed Butler's Democratic support. This whole episode was brought about because Smith and Butler did not get along and ended with Smith being removed leading to the bevy of rumors spread by Smith.

  Interestingly, if any of the above rumors were true, Butler would later have had ample opportunity to do Grant's reputation even greater harm by confirming Smith's rumors. Butler had plenty of reason to be vengeful, because later, Grant was forced to remove him for general military incompetence, but when his time came, Butler went without a whimper and more remarkable was what Butler wrote in his autobiography. "The weight of evidence, not all of it as impartial as one might wish, seems to indicate that Grant was a total abstainer during the Virginia campaigns. That he drank at times during the war is likely, but there is no evidence that his drinking injured his military efficiency." 29

  There were not many people in the United States with more political power nor more vengeful than Ben Butler. If he wanted to do Grant harm, he easily could have confirmed Smith's rumors. That he chose to refute them only reinforces the truth that Grant did not drink much, if at all, and only serves to confirm the evidence that people like Smith were self-serving, vengeful, rumor mongers.

  With a regular routine established at City Point, instead of going to bed early, Grant began to stay up late around the camp fire. He always enjoyed company in the evenings, so the staff officers began to take turns staying up late with the general. Usually the discussions centered on army movements which had occurred during the day. Porter relayed a short story about a conversation he had one night with Grant about the lack of profanity in his language.

  "While sitting with him at camp-fire late one night, after everyone else had gone to bed, I said to him: 'General, it seems singular that you have gone through all the rough and tumble of army service and frontier life, and have never been provoked into swearing. I have never heard you utter an oath or use an imprecation.' 'Well, somehow or other, I never learned to swear,' he replied. 'When a boy I seemed to have an aversion to it, and when I became a man I saw the folly of it. I have always noticed, too, that swearing helps to rouse a man's anger; and when a man flies into a passion his adversary who keeps cool always gets the better of him. In fact, I could never see the use of swearing. I think it is the case with many people who swear excessively that it is a mere habit, and that they do not mean to be profane; but, to say the least, it is a great waste of time." 30

  Grant was always quoted as saying he kept Rawlins around to do his swearing for him. Needless to say, he had a strong aversion to profanity and for that matter to off-color jokes and stories.

  Toward the latter part of July, Grant received word that Burnside's mine was about ready, so he began to formulate plans for its detonation. The mine was ready for charging on July 23rd, but Grant deferred the charging until everything was prepared. The main gallery was 511 feet long and 4 1/2 feet square. In addition, there were two lateral galleries off the main tunnel. The tunnels were 23 feet below the surface of the ground. When charged, the mine would contain eight thousand pounds of powder. Finally, the date for the detonation was set for July 30, 1864.

  On July 24th, Grant issued Meade specific orders for how the attack was to be conducted.

  CITY POINT, VA., July 24, 1864.

  MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

  Commanding, etc.

  The engineer officers who made a survey of the front of Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. The chances they think will be better on Burnside's front. If this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to penetrate. All officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through.

  To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. Their lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. One thing, however, should be impressed upon corps commanders. If they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders. General Ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce you or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox and James rivers, as may be deemed best.

  This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all. If not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if possible.

  * * * * * * *

  Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up.....

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieutenant-General. 31

  It should be noted in the correspondence above how explicit Grant's orders were. He specifically mentioned that once the line was broken, the assaulting forces were to push beyond the enemy's immediate line so as to get into their rear. He also went on to say that if they were unable to penetrate the enemy's line they were to return to their present positions. These are important points to note when compared to what actually happened during the assault.

  Grant decided to create a diversion in favor of the attack on Burnside's front, so on July 26th, he had Meade send Hancock's corps and Sheridan's cavalry on a movement north of the James River. Hancock was placed in charge of the diversion. The plan was to have Hancock's infantry make a feint toward Richmond near Deep Bottom, while Sheridan's cavalry cut loose and drove for the Virginia Central Railroad.

  This plan had two possibilities for success. It was hoped Lee would weaken his lines around Petersburg to guard against the thrust toward Richmond. If he did, the chances of success along Burnside's front would be enhanced. If Lee did not fall for the feint against Richmond, Sheri
dan's cavalry would have an easier time attempting to cut the Virginia Central Railroad.

  At 4 P.M. on July 26th, Hancock began his part of the operation leaving his position at Petersburg and arriving at the Appomattox River by dark. The road had been illuminated along Butler's command, so before morning Hancock had crossed the James at Deep Bottom and was ready to begin the attack.

  Recall it was during this time period that Early was advancing toward Washington causing great consternation. Grant was required to send forces there to bolster the Washington defenses, but it should be noted, that no matter how much clamor was raised, it did not stop any of the operations he had been planning at the front.

  The morning of July 27th, Hancock advanced as far as Bailey's Creek where he encountered stiff rebel opposition. At 3 P.M., Grant visited Hancock on his front. Finding the outlook less than favorable, he ordered Hancock, if possible, to push the enemy's left toward Chapin's Bluff which would allow him to release Sheridan's cavalry.

  Meanwhile, the rebels had taken the bait and began to move troops from the Petersburg area, via rail, to the Richmond area near the vicinity of the supposed attack. At 10 A.M. on the 28th, Sheridan was attacked by infantry near Darbytown about four miles north of Hancock's position. Hancock now dug in and prepared for the expected onslaught. This feint on Grant's part had succeeded in drawing over 60% of Lee's forces to the north side of the James River and away from Petersburg by July 30th.