Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  On the 17th, Sherman, having received heavy siege guns for the reduction of Savannah, sent General Hardee a letter requesting him to surrender and avoid the useless effusion of blood and possible killing of civilians. Hardee refused. At this time, Hardee still had open to him one avenue of escape, an old road into South Carolina. Sherman began to make plans to secure this road using a force from General Foster's command in South Carolina, but before he could put his plan into effect, Hardee evacuated Savannah during the evening of December 20, 1864.

  On the morning of the December 21st, Sherman's army entered and occupied Savannah. The March to the Sea was a fait accompli. Indeed, Sherman had demonstrated that the Confederacy was a hollow shell. Once again the Confederacy had been sliced in half. One could now see the end on the horizon.

  In his memoirs, Grant, in his magnanimous manner, had this to say about Sherman's March to the Sea. "However this may be, the question of who devised the plan of the march from Atlanta to Savannah is easily answered: it was clearly Sherman, and to him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution." 90 Even though Grant had thought of the idea long and often before Sherman, he wanted to be sure Sherman got the full credit for everything. He was truly a self-effacing individual.

  While the end of the year looked promising on the Atlantic coast, back inland, things were shaping up poorly for the Union.

  Battle of Nashville

  Prior to Sherman's move from Atlanta, Hood had positioned himself for a strike north toward Nashville, exactly as Grant had foreseen. Indeed, Hood's grandiose plans were something to behold, if they could be fulfilled. He was convinced he could force Sherman to give up Atlanta and follow him by moving into Tennessee. Even if he could not force Sherman to fall back from Georgia, Hood felt strong enough to attack and overwhelm the remaining forces under Thomas. Once he regained Nashville, so his thinking went, Hood planned to threaten Cincinnati and the Ohio River area and then move east crossing the Cumberland Mountains and fall upon Grant's rear. Hood's plans were nothing if not ambitious, but there was more than that, they were a fantasy born out of desperation.

  Before Sherman left on his March to the Sea, Grant had sent Thomas, General James Harrison Wilson to command his cavalry, in an effort to add some dash to his command. Grant hoped that the addition of Wilson would provide some offensive punch to Thomas's command and allow him to cope with that devil Forrest. What Wilson found when he arrived in Tennessee was that Thomas' cavalry was in bad need of re-equipping, so much so, that most of his cavalrymen lacked horses. This problem was going to cause great consternation in the upcoming weeks.

  After Sherman sent Thomas back to Tennessee to guard against an invasion by Hood, he ordered Thomas to concentrate all his forces at one location. Shortly, thereafter, Grant sent Thomas a similar order telling him to concentrate his forces. Thomas, however, felt differently and tried to hold a defensive line along the Tennessee River between Decatur and Eastport. The resulting problem was that Hood was able to find a place to cross the Tennessee, which he did on October 30th and by doing so, automatically threatened the flank of the Union troops east of Florence, Alabama and north of the Tennessee River. When Hood crossed the Tennessee River, Sherman again ordered Thomas to concentrate and evacuate all his minor outposts, but to no avail.

  Finally, on November 21st, Hood began to move his army north from Florence, Alabama, in response to Sherman's deeper penetration into Georgia. He moved with an army of approximately 40,000 infantry, artillery and cavalry. Opposing Hood was Thomas' conglomeration of forces numbering about 60,000 men, but strewn out throughout much of southeastern Tennessee.

  As Hood's army advanced, he moved by roads just west of Pulaski, Tennessee, where General Schofield had his troops positioned. Hood was attempting to force his way between Schofield and Thomas hoping to fall upon Schofield's command and beat it in detail. Thomas however, ordered Schofield to retreat to the vicinity of Columbia.

  With Hood's intentions entirely evident, Thomas recalled all the garrisons between Memphis and Chattanooga. On the night of November 23rd, Schofield evacuated Pulaski and on the 24th, he was in position at Columbia.

  This was the beginning of about three weeks of frantic telegrams passing between Grant, Thomas and Washington. Grant stated the case in his memoirs. "Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that place almost without interference. Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe against the attack of Hood. He had troops enough even to annihilate him in the open field. To me his delay was unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications." 91

  Grant was one of the most offensive oriented generals in the history of the world. To compare a defensive-minded general, such as Thomas, to Grant, is probably unfair, but for Thomas to allow Hood to advance almost unmolested to the gates of Nashville was inexcusable.

  Two analogies come to mind which resemble Thomas' situation. The first would be to paraphrase Patton's comments about Montgomery during the Second World War. Patton described Montgomery by saying that "he appeared to be more concerned about losing a battle than winning it." Another analogy was the conversation Grant had with Buckner upon meeting him to effect the surrender of Fort Donelson. Grant stated the gist of the conversation in his memoirs. "In the course of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me that if he had been in command I would not have got up to Donelson as easily as I did. I told him that if he had been in command I should not have tried in the way I did." 92

  Thomas was allowing Hood to advance almost unopposed the way Floyd and Pillow allowed Grant to approach Fort Donelson and Thomas knew better. Not only was Thomas trained at West Point, but he was a far superior soldier when compared to the likes of Pillow.

  Toward the end of his memoirs, Grant offered an analysis of General Thomas which really sheds light on his character and ability. Whether one agrees with Grant's analysis or not, many others, who knew Thomas, have mentioned similar traits and characteristics which helps shed light on some of his actions. Grant made these remarks about Thomas. "I had been at West Point with Thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army. He was a man of commanding appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave. He possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree. He gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost their love. This implies a very valuable quality. It is a quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops serving under the commander possessing it.

  Thomas' dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. He could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. He was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action." 93

  Apparent in Grant's analysis, as well as others, was that Thomas was deliberate. He had to have all his t's crossed and i's dotted before he would commit to offensive action. By pursuing this course, he obviously lost any advantage which might be gained through the element of time. Grant always appreciated the value of timing in all his military operations. Thomas never really understood the concept of using time as his ally. While Hood was advancing, Thomas was concerned more with remounting his cavalry than with the threat Hood posed to all that had been gained.

  Thomas also lost sight of two of the cardinal principles of the Civil War from the North's point of view. One was that Hood's army was the objective, not the holding of geographical places. Such was the ill-fated strategy of Halleck. The other principle was that in order for the North to win the war, they had to attack. If the Confederates were left to hold their territory, they automatically would become a nation. The North had to force the rebels back into the Union.

  With this background, it will be easier to understand how and why the situation around Nashville developed as it did.

  As previously stated, Schofield was established at Columbia on November 24th. From here on, the divergent views o
f making war are evidenced in the correspondence between Grant and Thomas. On November 24th, Grant telegraphed to Thomas: "Do not let Forrest get off without punishment." Thomas replied, "The moment I can get my cavalry, I will march against Hood." 94

  Thomas was worried about making preparations to fight, while Grant wanted immediate action. As Hood advanced, he threatened Schofield's position. Instead of worrying about cavalry, Thomas should have moved forward to support Schofield. On November 27th, the rebels pressed Schofield hard indicating an attempt to get around his position at Columbia and cut off his escape routes. So on the night of the 27th, Schofield evacuated Columbia hoping reinforcements would arrive so he could hold the line along the Duck River. By the 29th, Schofield was in jeopardy of being cut off again from Thomas. Hood had managed to get his forces across the Duck River north of Columbia. Now it was a race to Spring Hill, Tennessee. If Hood could reach there first he would have succeeded in dividing the Union armies.

  Seeing this, Schofield sent Stanley with two divisions to hold Spring Hill to cover his trains and keep his communication open. Stanley arrived in time to drive off the rebel cavalry, but by 4 P.M., Hood arrived in force. Hood attacked, but Stanley held on until darkness closed out the battle. Schofield arrived after dark and moved the army during the night to the town of Franklin. The movement of Schofield's force was unimpeded, yet they moved within earshot of the entire Confederate army. Hood failed to realize it, but his best chance to annihilate Schofield's force of 22,000 had been lost. Hood had succeeded in interposing himself between Schofield and Nashville, but had failed to take advantage of it. Schofield, through adroit movement had possibly saved the Union army in the West, but with no help from Thomas.

  When Columbia was evacuated, Thomas recalled most of his forces between Nashville and Chattanooga. So far Thomas had given up an immense amount of territory to the enemy without a fight. The authorities in Washington were beginning to wonder if he was going to retreat all the way to the Ohio River.

  Hood still hoped to destroy Schofield before he could reach Nashville, so on November 30th he attacked Schofield at Franklin in one of the most desperate battles of the war. Hood pushed forward with an army of about 40,000 against Schofield's 22,000. The rebels made 13 charges against the fortified Federal line. The Battle of Franklin lasted from about 3 P.M., until 10 P.M., before petering out. Schofield lost over 2000 men in killed, wounded and missing, but Hood's army was decimated. His total losses were greater than 6000 men including six generals wounded, five killed and one captured. The Battle of Nashville was won by Schofield at the Battle of Franklin.

  Now was the time for Thomas to rush his remaining forces to Franklin and together with Schofield, crush Hood. Thomas did nothing and Schofield retired upon Nashville during the evening of November 30, 1864. On December 1st, Hood took up a position in front of Nashville.

  On December 1st, Thomas telegraphed this message to Grant. "After Schofield's fight yesterday, feeling convinced that the enemy far outnumbered him both in infantry and cavalry, I determined to retire to the fortifications around Nashville, until General Wilson can get his cavalry equipped.....If he remains until Wilson gets equipments, I can whip him, and will move against him at once." 95

  Grant was stunned. He believed from a dispatch from Thomas late on the 30th, that he planned to move immediately against Hood in order to take advantage of Schofield's lopsided victory at Franklin. So on December 2nd, he sent Thomas this telegram.

  CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864.

  MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

  Nashville, Tenn.

  If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc.

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieutenant-General. 96

  Grant sent this telegram at 11 A.M., on December 2nd. He quickly found out that he was not the only one concerned about Thomas' behavior. At noon on December 2nd, Grant received a telegram from Secretary of War Stanton. "The President feels solicitous about the disposition of Thomas to lay in fortifications for an indefinite period, 'until Wilson gets equipments.' This looks like the McClellan and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing, and let the enemy raid the country. The President wishes you to consider the matter." 97

  Hoping to exhort Thomas to action, Grant sent him another telegram at 1:30 P.M. the same day.

  CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864.--1.30 P.M.

  MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

  Nashville, Tenn.

  With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily disposed of. Put forth therefore every possible exertion to attain this end. Should you get him to retreating give him no peace.

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieutenant-General. 98

  Thomas replied to Grant's urgings at 10 P.M., that night. "Your two telegrams of eleven A.M. and 1.30 P.M. received. At the time that Hood was whipped at Franklin, I had at this place but about five thousand men of Smith's command, which added to the force under Schofield, would not have given me more than twenty-five thousand; besides, Schofield felt convinced that he could not hold the enemy at Franklin until the five thousand could reach him. As General Wilson's cavalry force also made only about one-fourth that of Forrest's, I thought it best to withdraw troops back to Nashville, and wait the arrival of the remainder of Smith's force, and also of a force of about five thousand, commanded by Steedman, which I ordered up from Chattanooga. The division of General Smith arrived yesterday morning [December 1], and Steedman's troops arrived last night. I now have infantry enough to assume the offensive, if I had more cavalry; and will take the field anyhow, as soon as McCook's division of cavalry reaches here, which I hope will be in three or four days. We can neither get reinforcements nor equipments at this great distance from the North very easily, and it must be remembered that my command was made up of two of the weakest corps of General Sherman's army and all the dismounted cavalry except one brigade; and the task of reorganizing and equipping has met with many delays which have enabled Hood to take advantage of my crippled condition. I earnestly hope, however, that in a few days more I shall be able to give him a fight." 99

  Grant remained dubious of this rationale when he received Thomas' dispatch, but, nevertheless, it had always been his longstanding policy to let the on-scene commander exercise his judgment as best he saw fit, so for now he would let it ride. Grant displayed a great deal of anxiety during the weeks that Hood lay in front of Nashville. At no other time during the war, had anyone on his staff witnessed him in such a state. He truly feared the loss of all that had been accomplished to date in the West.

  As Grant had warned, Hood now sent Forrest to raid Thomas' lines of communication and supply. With each passing day, Hood's fortifications grew stronger. With more gloomy news coming out of Nashville, he again telegraphed Thomas.

  CITY POINT, VA., December 5, 1864.

  MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

  Nashville, Tenn.

  Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to where he can cross it? It seems to me whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens him in all possibility as much as it does you.

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieutenant-General. 100

  On December 6th, Thomas replied to Grant's telegram of the 5th with more excuses. "Your telegram of 6.30 P.M., December 5, just received. As soon as I can g
et up a respectable force of cavalry, I will march against Hood. General Wilson has parties now out pressing horses, and I hope to have some six or eight thousand cavalry mounted in three or four days from this time. General Wilson has just left me, having received instructions to hurry the cavalry remount as rapidly as possible. I do not think it prudent to attack Hood with less than six thousand cavalry to cover my flanks, because he has under Forrest at least twelve thousand. I have no doubt Forrest will attempt to cross the river, but I am in hopes the gunboats will be able to prevent him." 101

  Before Grant had received the above response, he had decided to act, giving Thomas a direct order. He could tolerate inaction no longer.

  CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864.--4 P.M.

  MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

  Nashville, Tenn.

  Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio River,

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieutenant-General. 102

  Thomas replied at 9 P.M., the same evening. "Your telegram of four P.M. this day just received. I will make the necessary dispositions and attack at once, agreeably to your orders, though I believe it will be hazardous, with the small force of cavalry now at my service." 103

  Later the evening of December 6th, it seemed Grant's worst fears were about to be realized when the following message was received from the telegraph operator at Nashville. "Scouts report large force twenty miles down river, towards Harpeth shoals, and say rebels propose to cross Cumberland river there, soon as it can be forded and river is too low for gunboats, which will be soon, unless rain falls." 104