Truth, Knowledge, or Just Plain Bull: How to tell the difference

by Bernard M. Patten

  Or this: “You are not going to pass this course unless you sleep with me.” Attempting to persuade another by threatening her with some undesirable state of affairs instead of presenting evidence for one’s view is irrelevant. There is nothing wrong with pointing out the consequences of a particular course of action, but to use a threat is to use an irrelevant appeal since the threat has no reasoned relation to the conclusion. Sex for a passing grade is a bad argument. To see how bad it is, I’ll recast it into standard form. Parentheses enclose the implicit premises:

  Since I want to have sex with you,

  I want you to have sex with me.

  Since I have control over whether you pass,

  (And, thus control your future professional life),

  (And you wouldn’t want to jeopardize your professional life),

  (And I will jeopardize it if you don’t have sex with me).

  (Conclusion:) Therefore, you will have sex with me.

  Stated that way, the argument wouldn’t convince any reasonable person of the rightness of the action sought. But that argument has probably brought about compliance with the request more often than one might think. It is a potent device to achieve results, but the threatening premise along with the implicit premises (in parentheses) that are employed in such arguments are irrelevant.

  Arguments that make you feel bad or feel guilty are irrelevant. “You mean after we flew you down here to Cancun at no cost to you and put you up for three days at the Maya Palace Hotel with all meals and entertainment provided, you are not going to buy even one of our timeshare condos?” This broker is exploiting strong feelings and trying to instill a feeling of guilt in the potential customer for accepting the enticements and not the product. If such enticements were offered, as they usually p. 256 are, with no strings attached, there is no reason for the customer to feel guilty about anything, much less failure to purchase a condo that he doesn’t want. Any attempt to influence an action by an appeal to emotion—in this case, the emotions of guilt and shame—is irrelevant.

  A proper response to the broker might be: “We were under no obligation to buy anything. That was one of the original conditions by which you offered us this free vacation, as stated in your brochure. We thank you, but we have no interest in buying the condo.” At this point, it wouldn’t hurt to give the guy a reason, if you have one: “We don’t like the condo because (fill in the blank).”

  All bribes and all appeals to the personal interest of officials are irrelevant. “Do me the personal favor of awarding me the McDonald’s franchise at Camp David.”

  President: “No way. I want it here where it belongs—at the White House.”

  Any attempt to influence a government official by appealing to personal favor or to personal interest is an emotional appeal and therefore not relevant. Use of money to persuade a politician to vote for or against anything is irrelevant and therefore unreasonable. All payoffs and bribes are not reasons that support a conclusion. Therefore, they are wrong.

  Many politically incorrect items are irrelevant.

  For instance, is ogling OK? Who knows. Some people think it is not OK because it may make a man uncomfortable when women do it. On the other hand, it seems natural enough and is unlikely to hurt anyone significantly. If women ogle me, I don’t mind.

  One could construct a natural argument to justify ogling: Women are likely to ogle men as a prelude to flirting, which, in turn, might be a prelude to love, which, in turn, might lead to sex, marriage, and reproduction of the species. Therefore, right or wrong, ogling might well be part of the natural landscape, like sniffing the breeze when a steak is cooking. Yes, women will ogle men on this planet until the sun burns out. Therefore, perhaps a better, less prejudicial word for ogling would be “admire.” Yes, that’s it. Women will admire men until the sun burns out. As that is the reality, it doesn’t seem right to argue much against it. A similar natural argument was used by Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1815-1902) in the Declaration of Sentiments: “Resolved, that all laws which prevent woman from occupying such a station in society as her conscience shall dictate, or which place her in a position inferior to that of p. 257 man, are contrary to the great precept of nature, and therefore of no force or authority.”[1] If such an argument in support of women’s rights is reasonable, then I would think the argument that women admiring men and men admiring women is also reasonable because it is also natural.

  Flattery or any form of praise cannot be reasonably substituted for evidence. Yet because we are so influenced by affirmation, we can be easily manipulated by the cheap trick of flattery.

  “I really hate to ask you this because you have been so kind and generous to me in the past, but would you mind loaning me another $100,000? I feel that I can ask you this because, unlike those other stingy bastards, you possess the true spirit of Christian charity.” The petitioner has used flattery rather than reason for his request. In fact, other than the dubious moral argument that a true Christian would make the loan, no evidence of need is mentioned.

  What about this? “My numbers are behind this month, so I need the sale. Please buy this TV. I need it. My wife needs it. My children need it.” Appeals to pity are not evidence of need, nor are they reasonable arguments for us to buy a TV. A discussion of the benefits to us of owning that TV would be more in order. Does the TV in question meet my personal need? Is it sixty-five inches? Does it have surround sound? How about high definition? MicroFine Phosphor CRTs? Is it too big to get into my home? What is the price? Payment plans? Can it be delivered this week? All those things might be relevant to the question of whether I should buy. But the pitiable state of the salesman’s numbers that month is (or should be) irrelevant to my decision. His needs, if real and not mere assertions to make the sale, would be relevant reasons for him to make the sale. They are not reasons, though, for us to buy.

  Politicians are notorious for using irrelevant evidence.

  “Mr. Perot, it seems to me that if you were elected president, the Congress with which you would have to work would not be very cooperative.”

  “Well, if I were elected, about half of the members of Congress would drop dead of heart attacks. Half of my problem would be solved.”

  Perot doesn’t address the reporter’s question. Instead, by using humor, Perot diverts consideration from a real issue. Such diversions are called red herrings after the famous trick used in fox hunting. The partially baked red herring was rubbed over the fox’s tail so the dogs would have a good scent to follow. People who disliked fox hunting could divert those dogs by using their own red herring.

  p. 258 During the 1984 presidential campaign, President Reagan’s age concerned some people. I remember the TV debate where the issue was raised (again) as the president was running against Walter Mondale, a much younger man.

  Reporter: Mr. President, might you be too old to handle a nuclear war?

  Reagan: Not at all. And I am not going to exploit my opponent’s youth and inexperience.

  Reagan did not address the issue (except with a general denial unsupported by evidence) but diverted attention from the issue with humor. The president cleverly pointed out that using age as a sole criterion to appraise the president’s ability in handing nuclear war could work both ways.

  Sometimes politicians use irrelevant evidence that is not humorous, just stupid. Representative Tom DeLay was recorded as saying that kids should not go to Baylor University or to Texas A&M because “there is sex in the dorms and they don’t teach creationism.” DeLay is entitled to his opinions. But when he gives reasons for the opinions, then he opens himself to analysis and criticism of the reasons. Selection of a proper college is not simple. Rather, it is a complex, multifaceted task that should include more reasons than the two mentioned by DeLay. To say that Baylor is bad simply for two partially selected small pieces of evidence is to disregard a massive amount of evidence that Baylor is good. Such partial selection of evidence is an error in thinking. Any conclusion based on partial selection
is, to that extent, wrong. Furthermore, DeLay implies that because there is sex in the dorms and no creationism taught, Baylor is bad for all students. Some students might thrive in such an environment, as in The Harrad Experiment.[2] Therefore, DeLay’s statement is overly general. Overgeneralization is an error, and any conclusion based on an overgeneralization is, to the extent of the overgeneralization, wrong. Besides, if educational institutions were to be judged by the two reasons mentioned, then Harvard, Columbia, Princeton, Yale, Stanford, the Sorbonnne, and most of the other great universities of the world would be excluded. Above and beyond those considerations, it’s hard to consider the teaching of creationism a standard for evaluation of educational institutions. Quite the opposite is true: Creationism disregards thousands of scientific studies and a fossil record that goes back p. 259 2.5 million years. A discipline that disregards massive amounts of carefully gathered scientific evidence is not worthy of attention.

  When questioned about this, DeLay said, “The guy who recorded me is a former member of the ACLU.” Whether the guy who recorded DeLay’s speech is a former member of the American Civil Liberties Union, a present member of the ACLU, or never was a member of the ACLU is irrelevant to whether the statement was reasonable. DeLay is just trying to divert attention from having to defend his own statement by resorting to an irrelevant ad hominen argument of no merit.

  Empty consolation is irrelevant.

  “Councilman, I am retired and barely making ends meet. If you vote another increase in property taxes, I don’t see how I can survive.”

  “You’ll just have to bite the bullet. Things could be worse. You are lucky to live in Taylor Lake Village. Taxes in River Oaks are much higher.”

  This is a common form of red herring designed to shut up the opposition and to prevent further rational consideration of the issues. What is offered instead of a reason that taxes have to be raised is just a reassertion of the point in question. Instead of intelligent discussion, the retired person gets empty consolation, which seeks to draw attention away from the complaint by claiming that the complainant should be satisfied with an undesirable situation because “things could be much worse” or because the situation with some other group is much worse.

  “Things” could almost always be worse. “Things” could almost always be better, too. That is not a real issue. Somewhere and sometimes, chances are that things are worse. Somewhere and sometimes, chances are that things are better. That’s a trivial truism, a tautology of no information value.

  Drawing attention to such a phony issue is simply a way to avoid dealing with the complaint. One way of countering such diversionary arguments is to point out the obvious: that things could be much worse, but things could also be much better, too: taxes in Deer Park are less than those in Taylor Lake Village. Or one could explain that River Oaks is the wealthiest part of Houston. Comparing its tax structure with Taylor Lake Village is like comparing the value of diamonds with pebbles. In other words, comparing Taylor Lake Village to River Oaks is a false comparison, a false analogy.

  Another example: “Please smoke outside, not in here.”

  “Secondary smoke is no worse than the diesel exhaust of the idling trucks outside. Those fumes can make you sick.”

  p. 260 Yes, diesel fumes can make you sick. So what? That is empty consolation for the smoke in the office. The issue that smoking outside would be better for those who work in the office was not addressed. Calling attention to the diesel fumes as a greater wrong is an irrelevant, though psychologically powerful, move that works by contrasting two effects, secondary smoke and diesel fumes, and by that contrast makes the cigarette smoke look better than diesel fumes, which it is. But the point of inquiry was not whether second-hand smoke was better, worse, or the same as diesel fumes. The point of inquiry was that clear air would be better for those in the office than air contaminated by tobacco smoke. That point was not addressed. Anyway, why not get rid of both?

  All vague definitions and all linguistic confusions are irrelevant. Use and misuse of vague expressions; wrong definitions, whether broadcast or not; equivocation; ambiguity; and distinctions without a difference are irrelevant:

  1. “Max likes tennis better than his wife.”

  2. “People should not eat fish caught in Illinois twice in the same week because of mercury.”

  3. Question: “Should I turn left?” Response: “Right!”

  4. “For us Americans, no setback is a setback.”

  Ambiguous wording and infelicitous expressions such as those above interfere with reaching the correct conclusion. We don’t know whether Max likes tennis better than he likes his wife, or whether Max likes tennis better than his wife likes tennis. People should not eat fish twice in the same week is the more likely interpretation of example two, since it is unlikely that in the same week the same fish would be caught twice. Example three leaves us in the lurch because we don’t really know which way to turn because the word right has two meanings: “to the right” and “correct.” Which meaning applies in the context? You can’t tell. And last—a setback is a setback by definition. This billboard slogan on Highway 45 and Dixie Farm Road is designed to unify public opinion despite the setbacks in Iraq. The slogan is a contradiction because a thing can’t be a thing and not a thing at the same time. That firm rule applies to setbacks, too, such that a setback can’t be a setback and not a setback. That is logically and physically impossible. What is logically and physically impossible is logically and physically imposp. 261sible even for determined Americans. What I suppose is really meant is that setbacks won’t set us back for long or significantly because we as Americans are determined to meet and solve the setbacks. But that, unfortunately, is not what the slogan says. And because it doesn’t say that, the slogan implies that the setbacks are not a serious problem that needs to be intelligently and adequately addressed and solved. The slogan, instead of encouraging us to think about the reality situation, encourages us to irrationally dismiss the problem because, after all, “a setback is not a setback for us.”

  Statements that cannot lead to a correct conclusion are irrelevant.

  In general, when things are unclear, ask. Don’t be embarrassed to ask about something that you don’t understand. Don’t be embarrassed to ask about something that you suspect of being improperly phrased. It is better to be a skeptic or risk appearing naive or stupid than to come to a false conclusion.

  Distinctions without a difference are irrelevant.

  Take, for example, “I wasn’t copying, and I certainly wasn’t cheating. I was just looking at her paper to jog my memory.” This argument tries to distinguish cheating, copying, and looking at someone else’s paper to jog the memory. It is based on a fundamental confusion about the definition of cheating versus copying versus jogging the memory. All those distinctions are there, but they don’t make a difference. Saying that they do make a difference does not make it so. The student who has been caught cheating is attempting, by offering a distinction without a difference, to avoid the penalty for cheating. Distinction without a difference is a diversionary argument that is irrelevant.

  What about this statement from President Nixon: “I’m not a crook!” Whether he was a crook can be debated and would depend on what he did and on the definition of the word crook. Let’s assume for a moment that he wasn’t a crook. That doesn’t mean he didn’t violate his oath of office to preserve and protect the Constitution. Nixon is attempting to make a distinction between what he ordered men to do in the Watergate break-in versus what real crooks do during other break-ins, a distinction without a difference. Since the distinction is irrelevant to the conclusion, the conclusion is not supported. The implied conclusion was that since he was not a crook, he should not be punished like one.

  Here is another example: “I didn’t lie to you; I merely told you what you wanted to hear.” He did lie. Perhaps he lied for the stated reason. p. 262 So what? He is trying to make a distinction between lying and lying for a reason. In this
case, he says he was lying to console her. He wants her to conclude that the lie was justified because it gave her what she wanted to hear. However, there is no difference between a lie and a lie for a nice reason. It’s still a lie and a distinction without a difference. To deliberately use a distinction that makes no difference is irrelevant to any conclusion.

  Begging the question is irrelevant.

  Question begging, arguing in a circle, tautology, pleonasm (redundant expressions like “pretty much” and “very unique”), complex questions, leading questions, mere assertions, and the like are irrelevant. They were covered (more or less) previously.

  By now you should be able to answer the question, “Do you enjoy using crack?” Hint: the answer does not involve a yes or a no. The question must be rejected. A negative reply implies that you use crack but don’t enjoy it. When asked questions like this on the witness stand, I usually just sit there and stare in silence at the questioner until the question is rephrased.

  All unwarranted assumptions are irrelevant.

  Unwarranted assumptions include the fallacy of the continuum and the arguments that appeal to tradition. In a sense, false analogy is based on unwarranted assumptions, as is the fallacy of novelty, that new things must always be better. Under black-and-white thinking, we discussed the fallacy of false alternatives. Under wishful thinking, we discussed the misuse of human hopefulness—because you want something to be true will not make it true. Conversely, because you want something not to be true will not make it not true.

  Three closely related unwarranted assumptions are the fallacies of composition, of division, and of the mean. A part is not necessarily the same as the whole, nor is the whole necessarily the same as or even similar to its parts. The mean is just a mathematical abstraction that may or may not relate to the subject under discussion.