Zibaldone
Page 63
In nature and in the order of things, one must take into account the original arrangement, the intention, how things worked at the beginning, how nature would like them to work, and how they should work; and not necessity, or how they cannot not work. And it is absolutely certain that, although the order of things worked naturally, in the best possible fashion, and very regularly, nevertheless it worked haphazardly; and the correspondence of cause and effect in the majority of cases was sufficient (as is required for the provision of a desired effect: the sufficiency of the cause), not necessary. And this is the case not only with men but also with animals and with every other order of things. And this is precisely why there are and occur daily in the world so many inconsistencies, aberrations, and particular accidents contrary to the general order; and indeed I do not just mean those which derive from us, but also those which are wholly independent [586] of our actions and order. Such accidents, termed evils, disasters, etc., preoccupy the philosophers, who do not see how they can occur in nature’s works; and some of these philosophers, since reason in its little operations strives to exclude the possibility of every particular accident contrary to a given general order, have been so bold as to believe that if human reason had presided over nature’s works, these accidents would not have occurred. But such accidental imperfections do not form part of nature’s plan (although not even this can be said, since we do not know the entire order and harmony of things); they are not, however, necessarily and mathematically excluded from it, and, indeed, they are almost permitted by it, in the way that God, as the Theologians say, permits sin, which is the height of evil and imperfection, and yet is accidental. At any rate, the plan, system, and machine of nature is not constituted and organized as that of reason is, and does not answer to mathematical precision.
[587] So it is then that the society that was truly primordial and natural to the human species, as to those of the beasts, in being without preeminence, subjection, inequality, ranks, or rules, could very well answer to the purpose, that is, the common good, just as the society of the ants answers to it; but a tighter, more molded society, if it lacks unity, can never answer to it. But that very first society worked haphazardly, and thus it haphazardly pursued the purpose of nature, and its own goal. Yet it was not for that reason necessary to oppose nature, and to introduce a contradiction between fact and right, a contradiction in the order of human affairs, inserting qualities contrary to the intrinsic and essential qualities of man, that is to say, a subjection and inequality contrary to liberty and natural equality.
It is no objection to say that bees have a ruler, and therefore subjection and disparity. All things being relative, the nature that made men free and equal, and likewise countless other species of animals, could make bees (and other such species [588] if there are any) unequal and subjected. And since nature did so, giving an inborn and natural superiority to certain individuals of that species, over the other individuals, therefore, as the state of man and other animals cannot be perfect without liberty and equality, because these are natural to them, so too, conversely, the state of bees is not perfect without subjection and inequality, because their species is made and ordered by nature in this way, and perfection lies in the natural state.
There is, then, nothing similar in men, nor can one deduce anything regarding them from the example of bees. Because small disparities or superiorities (small certainly compared to the disparities among bees), I mean the small disparities or superiorities of strength, stature, talent, etc., are accidental, arising out of subordinate causes, in the sense that inferiorities deriving from illnesses, falls and mishaps of every kind, etc., are accidental inferiorities. I mean that both these superiorities and these inferiorities are accidental, or, in other words, that they are not regular, and do not belong to the original, constant, invariable, [589] essential order of the species, as the disparities among bees do. My point is that if such superiorities gave to the one possessing them a right to command and to be obeyed, (1) where many possessed them to an equal degree, either one would not know whom to obey or all of them would be supposed to command, and lo and behold the idea of unity would have vanished; (2) where there was no disparity, preeminence would not be natural, but where there was, it would be; (3) and, furthermore, just as disparities can arise accidentally at various times, and therefore in one and the same society or indeed in one and the same generation of men, so too preeminence would not be natural today whereas tomorrow it would be; (4) since the child who will be of superior strength in the future is not yet such, and may not become so other than for accidental and unforeseeable reasons, he would not yet have even a hint of that right to command which he will have later by nature; (5) this supposedly natural right should nevertheless not last any longer than such superiority lasts in such a person or people, for as they lost vigor of body, or intelligence, or mind, virtue, courage, etc., through illnesses, accidents, circumstances, the alteration and corruption of [590] opinions, customs, etc., through abuse inflicted on the body, or in any case through growing older, as is inevitable, they would essentially lose not only in fact but also in right that command they were presumed to have naturally through the simple fact of being who they were. See p. 609, paragraph 1. In short, accidents should be wholly discounted when reflecting upon the original and stable order, and the nature of anything whatsoever. (29–31 Jan. 1821.)
Besides, one may see just how simple, obvious, and fundamental an idea it is, common you might say to all kinds of living being, that in any society, however unformed it is and however little distant from the earliest form of society, there is a need for unity or, in other words, a ruler and, indeed, an individual, that is, an absolute ruler, and one may see this by considering the histories of every kind of nation and every kind of association, public, private, etc., armies, hunting parties, or any venture whatsoever that has a common purpose and shared objective. I happened to hear a man with no culture or natural acuity give the following advice to a company of businessmen setting off around the world in order to profit [591] by means of a shared and indivisible capital (that is, a panorama):1 “Choose a leader among yourselves, acknowledge him, and obey him in everything” (what else is this but the notion that absolute monarchy is a necessity?). “Otherwise each man, pursuing his own interest over other people’s, which is completely opposed to your common interest and purpose, will damage others and the whole enterprise; and so everyone will be damaged, and discord” (that is, the opposite of unity) “will keep you from achieving what you are looking for.” (31 Jan. 1821.) See p. 598, paragraphs 1, 2, 3.
“Quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucribus, nantibus, agrestibus, cicuribus, feris, primum ut se ipsae diligant; (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur)” (Cicero did therefore acknowledge that beasts were endowed with liberty), “deinde, ut requirant, atque appetant, ad quas se applicent, eiusdem generis animantes; idque faciunt cum desiderio, et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani: quanto id magis in homine fit natura, qui et se ipse diligit, et alterum anquirit, cuius animum [592] ita cum suo misceat, ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus?” [“Now if it is evident in animals, whether of the air, the water, or the land, and whether tame or wild, first, that they love themselves (for this feeling is born alike in every living creature), and second, that they require, and eagerly search for, other animals of their own kind to which they may attach themselves—and this they do with a longing in some degree resembling human love—then how much more is this the case with man who both loves himself and uses his reason to seek out another whose mind he may so mingle with his own as almost to make one out of two?”]. Cicero, Laelius, sive de amicitia, ch. 21, end.
Regarding our natural inclination to involve others in sensations of ours that are in any way extraordinary, whether pleasant or unpleasant, see a remarkable passage from Cicero (Laelius, sive de amicitia, the whole of ch. 23), which passage was, I believe, the original source of this observation, so familiar and well known to the moderns.1 (31 Jan. 1821.)
/> Cicero, Laelius, sive de amicitia, ch. 11: “Quod si rectum statuerimus, vel concedere amicis, quidquid velint, vel impetrare ab iis, quidquid velimus, perfecta quidem sapientia simus, si nihil habeat res vitii; sed loquimur de iis amicis, qui ante oculos sunt, quos videmus, aut de quibus memoriam accepimus, aut quos novit vita communis” [“But if we should resolve that it is right, either to grant our own friends whatever they wish, or to get from them whatever we wish, then, our wisdom turns out to be perfect if in this matter no harm should result; but I am speaking of the friends before our eyes, of those whom we see, or of men of whom we have record, and who are known to everyday life”]. Read si perfecta quidem sapientia simus, nihil habeat res vitii [if our wisdom is perfect, no harm will result] as plainly required by the sense, which otherwise is very lame, and sibi non constat [is not internally consistent]. (31 Jan. 1821.)
Communicare for particeps fieri, to share in or to come to share in, for which meaning Forcellini [593] provides only three examples of poor quality, from late Latin, and of little authority (in the Appendix there’s nothing), is to be found in Cicero (Laelius, sive de amicitia, ch. 7): “Itaque, si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis aut adeundis, aut communicandis,” (that is to say, in sharing in the dangers faced by the friend) “quis est, qui id non maximis efferat laudibus?” [“Whenever, therefore, there comes to light some signal service in undergoing or sharing the dangers of a friend who does not proclaim it with the loudest praise?”]. See something similar in the Crusca.1
For p. 307. “Quid autem interest, ab iis, qui postea nascentur sermonem fore de te, cum ab iis nullus fuerit, qui ante nati sint, qui nec pauciores, et certe meliores fuerunt viri?” [“What difference does it make that there will be talk about you among those who will be born in the future, when there was none among those born before you, who were no fewer and certainly better men?”]. The elder Africanus to the younger, in Cicero, Somnium Scipionis, ch. 7. See p. 643, paragraph 3.
“Quid autem est horum in voluptate? melioremne efficit, aut laudabiliorem virum? an quisquam in potiundis voluptatibus gloriando sese, et praedicatione effert?” [“But how much of this is found in pleasure? Does it improve a man or make him more deserving of praise? Is anyone elated because of pride in his possession of pleasures and the publication of them?”]. (Cicero, Paradoxa, bk. 1, ch. 3, end.) These days, however, O Marcus Tullius, there is no greater glory for youth, or a purpose more brilliantly, openly, and unanimously advanced for a career, or a safer and more common means of garnering praise and respect than that [594] of pursuing and obtaining pleasures, and having an excess of them, and this more fully than others. The object of the rivalry and emulation of the most vigorous contingent of our youth is nothing else but pleasure, and the triumph and the glory goes to he who obtains the greater share of it, and who knows how to, and can enjoy and immerse himself in base pleasures more than others. Pleasures are now the stadium of youth. So much so that they are pursued not principally for their own sake but for the glory that redounds through having pursued and obtained them. And if the one who obtains pleasures cannot always glory in them in the same moment that he is enjoying them (though even this happens with many different kinds of pleasure), he would undoubtedly long to be able to do so, and to have witnesses to his enjoyment. Indeed, this enjoyment consists in large part in thinking about the glory he expects to win by it, and immediately afterward he cares for nothing so much as to broadcast and to boast of the pleasure he has experienced, even if thereby he risks barring the way to further pleasures, and even if he is then certain to harm, betray, and prove [595] unjust and ungrateful to those from whom he obtained the pleasures he sought. And although it is undoubtedly the case that even today pleasure does not make a man any better, it does make him more praiseworthy in the eyes of the present generation, something that you, O Marcus Tullius, believed could never happen. (1 Feb. 1821.)
Our extremely vulgar, familiar phrase or metaphor cuocere [to cook], meaning to harass, distress, torment, and afflict the mind (thus the Crusca, see Cuocere, § 3), was likewise known to Latin in the verb coquere, and this even in the earliest authors.
O Tite, si quid ego adiuvero, curamque levasso,
Quae nunc te coquit, et versat in pectore fixa,
Ecquid erit pretii?
[O Titus, if I should give you some help, and dispel the cares
That now afflict you, and wring your heart,
What would I gain by it?]
Ennius in Cicero (Cato Maior seu de senectute, ch. 1). Forcellini also supplies two further examples, one from Virgil, the other from Statius.1 In the Appendix, nothing.
“᾿Αμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμός δ’ ὄκνον φέρει”: “Ignorance makes man bold, [596] reflection makes him hesitate”; “Ignorance makes it easy to decide, reason makes it difficult.” In Latin they translate this as follows: “Inscitia quidem audaciam, consideratio autem tarditatem fert.” A saying in Thucydides, bk. 2, in the funeral oration pronounced by Pericles, which begins: “οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἤδη εἰρηκότων” [“Most of those who have spoken here in the past”].1 A famous saying among the ancients. Lucian (in Epistula ad Nigrinum, quae praemittitur Nigrino, seu de philosophi moribus): “᾿Αποφεύγοιμ’ ἂν” (I shall avoid) “εἰκότως καὶ τὸ τοῦ Θουκυδίδου λέγοντος, ὅτι ἡ ἀμαθία μὲν, θρασεῖς, ὀκνηροὺς δὲ τὸ λελογισμένον ἀπεργάζεται” [“I would probably avoid the saying of Thucydides, to the effect that ignorance makes us bold, while reflection makes us timid”]. “Imperitia audaces, res autem considerata timidos efficit” [“Ignorance renders us bold, but knowledge of something makes us timid”]. Pliny (Epistulae 4, 7): “Hanc ille vim, (seu quo alio nomine vocanda est intentio quicquid velis obtinendi) si ad potiora vertisset, quantum boni efficere potuisset? quamquam minor vis bonis, quam malis inest, ac sicut ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει, ita recta ingenia debilitat verecundia, perversa [597] confirmat audacia” [“If he had applied to better ends this force (or whatever we are to call this determination to get one’s own way), think how much good he could have done! And yet good men are less forceful than bad, as the saying goes, ‘Ignorance makes man bold, reflection makes him hesitate’ and so bashfulness undermines an upright disposition while boldness reinforces one that is crooked”]. St. Jerome (Epistulae 126, “Ad Evagrium”) (which is how it is numbered in my edition, tome 3, p. 31a):1 “Tuum certe spiritualem illum interpretem non recipies; qui imperitus sermone et scientia, tanto supercilio et auctoritate Melchisedek Spiritum Sanctum pronunciavit, ut illud verissimum comprobarit, quod apud Graecos canitur; imperitia confidentiam, eruditio timorem creat” [“You do not concede that to your undoubtedly spiritual interpreter; who, being ignorant of language and science, with so much arrogance and authority pronounced Melchisedek to be the Holy Ghost, so that what is harped upon by the Greeks will prove to be true: ignorance breeds confidence, erudition creates fear”].
Stupeo [to be struck senseless], or stupesco, stupefacio, stupefio, stupidus, etc., with their compounds, are not only materially preserved in the verb stupire, stupefare, stupidire, etc. etc., but, even if these are now bare, dry words and, like countless other words whose body in effect remains without a soul, have lost their etymological sense (which means “turn into tow”), nonetheless our language does still retain that original metaphor diventar di stoppa, and uses it informally for istupire [to be dazed], etc., even though it is not recorded in the Crusca.2 (1 Feb. 1821.)
[598] For p. 591. “Igitur initio reges (nam in terris nomen imperii id primum fuit)” [“Therefore in the beginning kings (for that was the first title of sovereignty among men)”] (that is to say, the first government, “le premier pouvoir,” as Dureau de la Malle translates it, “la più antica signoria,” as Alfieri translates it, was royal, that is, absolute) “diversi, pars ingenium, alii corpus exercebant
: etiam tum vita hominum sine cupiditate agitabatur, sua cuique satis placebant” [“took different courses, some training their minds, others their bodies: even at that time men’s lives were still free from covetousness; each was quite content with his own possessions”]. (That is to say, egoism did not disturb public order.) Sallust, Bellum Catilinarium, ch. 2.1
“Ius bonumque apud eos” [“Justice and probity prevailed among them”], (the Romans from the first days of the republic) “non legibus magis quam natura valebat” [“thanks not so much to laws as to nature”]. Sallust, Bellum Catilinarium, ch. 9.
“Regium imperium, quod initio conservandae libertatis atque augendae reipublicae fuerat” [“The rule of the kings, which at first had tended to preserve freedom and advance the state”]. Sallust, Bellum Catilinarium, ch. 6, end.
“At populo romano nunquam ea copia fuit,” (praeclari ingenii scriptorum) “quia prudentissimus quisque” [“But the Roman people never had so great a number” (of exceptionally intelligent writers) “since their wisest men”] (that is to say, “ceux qui avaient le plus de lumières,” Dureau de la Malle, “qual più saggio vi era,” Alfieri) “negotiosus maxume erat: ingenium nemo sine corpore exercebat” [“were always most engaged with affairs; their minds were never employed apart from their bodies”] (a passage worth recalling each time I come to discuss this matter) “optimus quisque facere quam dicere, [599] sua ab aliis benefacta laudari, quam ipse aliorum narrare, malebat” [“the best citizen preferred action to words, and thought that his own brave deeds should be lauded by others rather than that theirs should be recounted by him”]. Sallust, Bellum Catilinarium, ch. 8, end.1
“In hoc sumus sapientes, quod naturam optimam ducem, tanquam deum, sequimur, eique paremus … Quid enim est aliud, gigantum modo bellare cum diis, nisi naturae repugnare?” [“We are wise because we follow nature as the best of guides and obey it as a god, and to it we pledge our obedience … For what is warring against the gods, as the giants did, other than rebelling against nature?”]. Cicero, Cato Maior, seu de senectute, ch. 2. Sayings well suited, either jointly or separately, to serve as epigraph or motto for some book of mine. See p. 601, paragraph 1.