Zibaldone

by Leopardi, Giacomo

  This might be expected to lead the nations to hierarchies, and indeed that is what happened at the start, and it happens among the still uncivilized peoples, and also among the civilized. But as society little by little became corrupted, and as the abuse of power was introduced, and then when peoples threw off the yoke and recovered natural liberty, by the same token they recovered equality also. And aside from the fact that the latter naturally follows from liberty, I have demonstrated elsewhere [→Z 567–70] that true liberty in the exact sense of the term cannot be maintained in a republic without a far greater measure of equality than society can ever muster.

  But man’s liberty and equality, although it is natural to him in his original state, does not fit and is not compatible, especially as strictly understood, with the state of society, for the reasons given above. Since in society man needs to serve man and this is contrary to equality, it only remained for a man in one society to be served by men from another or from several other societies or nations, or by a part of that same society that had been excluded from its rights, benefits, property, equality, and liberty, and that was, in short, regarded as extraneous to the [915] nation, almost as another race and kind of men, for it was dependent, inferior, and subordinate to the race that was free and equal. Here, you have the use of domestic slavery among free and equal peoples, a use that is more inherent in a people’s constitution the more intolerant it is of its own servitude, as was seen among the ancients. In this fashion, inequality in a given free people was reduced to a minimum, since daily tasks and base duties that would have degraded the equality of the free man, the cultivation of the land, etc., were assigned to slaves. The free man, whoever he was, and no matter how poor he was, remained his own master, not being obliged to perform the everyday and mercenary tasks that necessarily serve to strip him of his independence and liberty, and playing virtually no part in activities tending to the common benefit of society, except for his concern with public business and his own government, and the preservation or extension of his homeland by means of war, etc., with only those differences that stemmed from individual merit, etc.

  That indeed was the nature of slavery in the ancient republics. So it was in Greece, and with the Helots, a race wholly enslaved by the Spartans, the stock of Helos (῞Ελος), the town (oppidum) or city (thus Strabo in Cellarius, 1, 967) in the Peloponnese, taken by force by the Spartans in the—I believe—Messenian wars, and with the entire population reduced to servitude, they and their descendants in perpetuity. See the Encyclopédie. Antiquités, article “Ilotes,” and Cellarius, 1, 973.1 That was the nature of slavery among the Romans, on which see among others Montesquieu, [916] Grandeur, etc., ch. 17, before the middle.1 Florus, 3, 19. “Terra frugum ferax” (Sicily) “et quodammodo suburbana provincia, latifundiis civium Romanorum tenebatur. Hic ad cultum agri frequentia ergastula, catenatique cultores, materiam bello praebuere” [“This land, so rich in corn, a province lying, as it were, at our very door, was occupied by large estates in the possession of Roman citizens. The numerous prisons for slaves employed in tilling the soil and gangs of cultivators who worked in chains provided the forces for the war”]. And what a horde of slaves there was among the Romans may be guessed at on the basis of the Servile War, and from the danger that ensued. The Romans, I believe, had slaves from every sort of nation; and Florus loc. cit. mentions a Syrian man and slave as the cause and leader of the Servile War;2 Fronto, in his last Greek letter, a Syrian woman slave,3 etc. etc., something that can be seen in all the writers dealing with Roman antiquity. See Pignorius, De servis and, if you will, the original article by Cavaliere Hager in the Spettatore of Milan, 1 April 1818, Issue 97, bottom of p. 244–top of p. 245, where this argument regarding the great horde of Roman slaves is touched upon, and various examples and proofs are adduced, and the above-mentioned Pignorius, who should be in Graevius,4 etc. Cybale, an African female slave, is mentioned by name in the Moretum.5

  And the ancients’ moral conception of slavery may be deduced from a hundred other writers and passages, and facts and customs of antiquity, but most notably from this passage in Florus, 3, 20: “Enimvero servilium armorum dedecus feras. Nam et ipsi per fortunam in omnia obnoxii;” (scil. nobis) “tamen quasi secundum hominum genus sunt, et in bona libertatis nostrae adoptantur” [“One can tolerate, indeed, even the disgrace of a war against slaves, for although, by force of circumstances, they are liable to any kind of treatment; yet they form as it were a class, though an inferior class, of men, and can be admitted to the blessings of our liberty”].6

  This second race of men therefore sustained the equality and liberty of ancient peoples, in proportion to that liberty and equality and to the respective resources, military or financial, etc., upon which this or that people could draw in order to [917] enslave or to buy slaves. And ancient equality and liberty really was maintained with the help and support of slavery, but the slavery of persons who had nothing in common with the body, the commonwealth, or the society of those who made up the free and equal nation. So that the liberty and equality of a nation required and presupposed the inequality of nations, and no one nation was independent, even within its own borders, save through the subjection of other nations, or parts of other nations, etc.

  And the truth of all the above considerations and of the way in which the use of or the need for slavery in a free people may have its immediate cause not in the liberty but precisely in the domestic equality of that people can be plainly seen in the following observation, which sheds a great deal of light on this discourse. Arrian (Historia Indica, ch. 10, §§ 8–9, the Wetstein edition with the Expeditio Alexandri, Amsterdam 1757, edited by Georg Raphel, p. 571) says among the things that are recounted of the Indians: “Εἶναι δὲ” (λέγεται) “καὶ τόδε μέγα ἐν τῇ ᾿Ινδῶν γῇ, πάντας ᾿Ινδοὺς εἶναι ἐλευθέρους, οὐδέ τινα δοῦλον εἶναι ᾿Ινδον· τοῦτο μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοισιν ἐς ταυτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ ᾿Ινδοῖσιν·” (qua quidem in re Indis cum Lacedaemoniis convenit. Translator) “Λακεδαιμονίοις μέν γε οἱ εἵλωτες δοῦλοί εἰσιν, καὶ τὰ δούλων ἐργάζονται· ᾿Ινδοῖσι δὲ, οὐδὲ ἄλλος δοῦλός ἐστι, μήτοιγε ᾿Ινδῶν τις” [“Another notable thing recounted of India is that all Indians are free and none a slave: in this they are like the Spartans. Yet the Spartans have Helots for slaves, and they do servile work. But the Indians have no slaves at all, still less is any Indian a slave”]. (μήτοιγε. nedum [still less]. Word index.) [918] Observe first of all that this fact struck Arrian as remarkable and peculiar. Then observe that the Indians were free, that is, some of them had monarchies, but they resembled the original one in Rome, which was a kind of Republic, and the earliest Greek monarchies; some were “πόλιες αὐτόνομοι,” wholly free and independent cities. (Id., ibid., ch. 12, §§ 6 and 5, p. 574.) What then was the cause of this peculiarity? Although Arrian does not perceive the cause himself, it is manifest in what he then goes on to add. And it reads as follows: “Νενέμηνται δὲ οἱ πάντες ᾿Ινδοὶ ἐς ἑπτὰ μάλιστα γενεὰς,” *“All the Indians are divided into about seven classes”* (translator), that is, castes. (Id., ibid., ch. 11, § 1, p. 571.) The first consisting of wise men (“σοφισταὶ”), the second of farmers (“γεωργοὶ”), the third of shepherds and plowmen (“νομέες, οἱ ποιμένες τε καὶ βουκόλοι”), the 4th *“of artisans and merchants”* (“δημιουργικόν τε καὶ καπηλικὸν γένος”), the fifth of soldiers (“οἱ πολεμισταὶ”), who merely had to wage war when required, others having to see to furnishing them with weapons, their upkeep, their pay (both in war and in peace), and to providing whatever services they might need in camp, such as guarding the horses, leading the elephants, cleaning the weapons, supplying and driving the carts, so that only purely warlik
e functions were left to them;1 the sixth of *“overseers or inquisitors”* (“οἱ ἐπίσκοποι καλεόμενοι”), who were police inspectors of sorts, who could not [919] recount anything false, and “no Indian was ever found guilty of a lie,” “τις ᾿Ινδῶν αἰτίην ἔσχε ψεύσασθαι” (ch. 12, § 5, p. 574, end); and finally the seventh, “οἱ ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν βουλευόμενοι ὁμοῦ τῷ βασιλεῖ, ἢ κατὰ πόλιας ὅσαι αὐτόνομοι,” (liberae. Translator) “σὺν τῇσιν ἀρχῇσιν” [“those who deliberate about public business with the king or in such cities as are self-governing with the authorities”]: a caste surpassing all the rest in wisdom and justice (“σοφίῃ καὶ δικαιότητι”), from which were chosen the magistrates, the “district governors” (“νομάρχαι”), the prefects (“ὕπαρχοι”), the “quaestors” (“θησαυροφύλακες”), the “στρατοφύλακες” (“commanding officers”), “ναύαρχοί τε, καὶ ταμίαι, καὶ τῶν κατὰ γεωργίην ἔργων ἐπιστάται” [“and admirals, and financial officers, and those overseeing agriculture”] (ibid., ch. 12, §§ 6–7). Here, then, is the reason that the Indians made no use of slavery. Because, though free, they did not have equality.

  But how then did they preserve liberty when they did not have equality? Arrian does not comment on this, either, but the cause may be deduced from what he immediately goes on to say (ibid., §§ 8–9). “Γαμέειν δὲ ἐξ ἑτέρου γένεος, οὐ θέμις· οἷον τοῖσι γεωργοῖσιν ἐκ τοῦ δημιουργικοῦ, ἢ ἔμπαλιν· οὐδὲ δύο τέχνας ἐπιτηδεύειν τὸν αὐτὸν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο θέμις· οὐδὲ ἀμείβειν ἐξ ἑτέρου γένεος εἰς ἕτερον· οἷον γεωργικὸν ἐκ νομέως γενέσθαι, ἢ νομέα ἐκ δημιοργικοῦ. Μοῦνον σφίσιν ἀνεῖται, σοφιστὴν ἐκ παντὸς γένεος γενέσθαι· ὅτι οὐ μαλθακὰ τοῖσι σοφιστῇσιν εἰσὶ τὰ πρήγματα, ἀλλὰ πάντων ταλαιπωρότατα” (non mollis vita sed omnium laboriosissima. Translator.) [“To marry out of any class is unlawful—as, for instance, into the farmer class from the artisans, or the other way; nor must the same man practice two pursuits; nor change from one class into another, such as to turn farmer from shepherd, or shepherd from artisan. It is only permitted to join the wise men out of any class; for their business is not an easy one, but of all the most laborious”].

  This constitution, which still exists among [920] the Indians regarding the division into castes and the ban on passing from one caste to another whether by marriage or in any other fashion;a1 this constitution, which also exists in part, I believe, in China, where the son is obliged to exercise the same profession as the father and the ranks are very precisely differentiated; this constitution, of which some trace, if I remember rightly, can still be found among the ancient Persians in the very first or among the first books of the Cyropaedia;2 this constitution, of which some evidence can be found among the Jewish people, where the Priesthood was reserved for one tribe alone;3 this constitution, which seems to have been common either in whole or in part from the very earliest times among the peoples of Asia, and can be seen, if I am not mistaken, even nowadays in some nations on the coasts of Africa;4 this constitution, in which many resemblances to others known to us could also perhaps be found, especially in the most ancient, as in the ancient constitution of Rome—this constitution, I maintain, is perhaps the best, perhaps the only one capable of preserving, as far as possible, liberty without equality.

  Because, by placing a curb and a limit on ambition and on the greed of individuals, and by denying [921] them the ability to change and improve their circumstances beyond a certain point, it serves to a large extent to remove the clash of powers and domestic conflicts; it serves to preserve balance, to maintain the original state of the republic (which should be the principal aim of political institutions), to perpetuate the established order, etc. etc.

  It is true, however, all too true, that I doubt that we shall find the great benefits of liberty in this constitution. We will find calm, and this constitution will be adapted to a people that for whatever reason is able to be content with this benefit and to contain its desires within the limits of tranquil, free well-being and living well without worrying about the better, which in truth is always an enemy of the good. But enthusiasm, life, and the splendid virtues of free peoples do not appear to be compatible with this constitution. Once the two incentives of ambition and greed, that is, of self-interest, have been taken away, once the incentive of hope, at least of great hope, has been all but taken away, inactivity and a paucity of valor in the full sense of the word and a paucity of national power, etc., are bound to follow. If self-interest is not bound up with the interest of the homeland, or at least with interest in its progress—because this progress would not be [922] connected, or hardly, to that of the individual and, in particular, of the very individual who had ensured its progress—and if very few take part in government and so the multitude does not feel inwardly that it is part of the homeland or of the same nation as its leaders, it follows that love of country in such a people either must not formally and perceptibly exist or certainly must not be very strong, or a cause of great effects, or able to propel the individual to make great sacrifices.

  The facts bear out the observations made above. Because an inevitable consequence of this constitution must be, according to my argument, that such a people, though it is free, and its freedom is enduring, at any rate at home, and in the public sphere, can nevertheless not be conquerors. Now, this is the very thing that Arrian tells us, how it is that not only were the Indians never conquerors, but on the one hand, from Bacchus and Hercules onward up until Alexander, it was held that “οὐδένα ἐμβαλεῖν ἐς γῆν τῶν ᾿Ινδῶν ἐπὶ πολέμῳ” [“no one invaded India in order to wage war”] (loc. cit., ch. 9, § 10, p. 569)1 and that is the reason that, without a great deal of national and domestic power, their state was able to last a long time; and, on the other hand, it was also held (§ 12, from the page quoted) that “οὐ μὲν δὴ οὐδὲ ᾿Ινδῶν τινα ἔξω τῆς οἰκείης σταλῆναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ, διὰ δικαιότητα” (ad bellum missum [923] esse. Translator.) [“no Indian ever went outside his own country on a warlike expedition, so righteous were they”]. And elsewhere more briefly (ch. 5, § 4, p. 558): “Οὗτος ὦν ὁ Μεγασθένης λέγει, οὔτε ᾿Ινδοὺς ἐπιστρατεῦσαι οὐδαμοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισιν, οὔτε ᾿Ινδοῖσιν ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους” [“This Megasthenes says, moreover, that the Indians waged war on no man, nor other men on the Indians”]. That is, up until Alexander. A natural consequence of this constitution, although Arrian reports it in a disjointed manner, as if it stood on its own, and he does not see how these things are linked. See p. 943, paragraph 2.

  The fact is that just as no nation is so well suited to conquest as a free nation—as is evident from the facts and argument presented in the previous thought, etc.—so, too, is it unfortunately true that the greatest danger to a people’s liberty arises from its conquests and from any expansions it might undertake. These gradually destroy equality, without which there is no true liberty, and alter customs and the original condition and order of the republic, so that in the end they plunge it into obedience. This, too, is demonstrated by the facts. (4–6 April 1821.)

  Since love of country or national love is simply an illusion, but one that readily comes about in nature once society has been established—just as self-love is natural in the individual, and love of family once the family has been established, as may be seen also in the animals—so too it does not endure and does not produce good fruit without the illusions and prejudices that naturally stem from it, or whic
h indeed are its foundation. Man is not always reasonable, but he is always consistent in one way or another. How then will he love [924] his own country above all others, and how will he be ready in practice for all the consequences that follow from this overriding love, if in reality he no longer believes his country worthy of being loved above all others, and therefore the best, and all the more if he believes other countries, or some other, to be better than his own? How will he resent the foreign yoke, and be zealous about nationality in every respect, and ready to give life and possessions in order to escape foreign domination, if he believes the foreigner to be equal to his compatriots, or worse still, believes him to be better? One thing is beyond doubt. Ever since a member of a nation has been able or has wished to think about nations, and to judge them, ever since all men have been equal in his mind, ever since merit so far as he is concerned has not depended upon belonging to the community of one country, etc. etc., ever since he ceased to be persuaded that his nation was the flower of them all and his race the summit of human races—once, I repeat, all this had occurred, the nations were doomed, and as in opinion so too in practice they were confounded one with another, and indifference in mind, judgment, and thought carried over inevitably into indifference in feeling, inclination, and action. And the prejudices for which we reproach France because they offend the self-love of foreigners are the preeminent safeguard of its national independence, as they were for the ancients. [925] They are the cause of that national spirit that continues to exist in her, of the sacrifices that the French are prepared to make, and have always made, in order to preserve themselves as a nation and not to depend on foreigners, and the reason why that nation, though so cultured and educated (things that are totally contrary to love of country), nonetheless still preserves, perhaps more than any other, the semblance of a nation. And there is no doubting the fact that it was thanks to the strength of such prejudices in France, as among the ancients, that there followed the predominance over the other nations of Europe which she enjoyed up to now, and which she will probably regain. (6 April 1821.)