Zibaldone

by Leopardi, Giacomo

  The Latin language was introduced, took root, and persisted in those parts of Europe where civilization had penetrated and been established since ancient times. This meant only Spain and Gaul. Right from ancient times Spain produced the Senecas, Quintilian, Columella, Martial, etc., then later Merobaudes, St. Isidore, etc., and gradually very many others who became men of letters and writers in Latin without even leaving their own country, like the former did, or at any rate while being able to be educated in it, rather than at Rome like the former were. Gaul produced Petronius Arbiter, Favorinus, etc., then later Sidonius, St. Ireneus, etc. Civilization had already been introduced to these places before the Romans by Greek settlers. The Latin court was also based there for some time. Whereas Germany, despite also being under the Romans’ yoke and part of the Roman empire, never gave rise to civilizations or letters, not in the good, mediocre, or bad times of that empire. It was always barbarian. Not one of the writers of any era of Latin culture [3367] (apart from possibly the very lowest) had Germanic origins or was born in Germany, unlike virtually every other province and part of the Roman empire. This is why Germany, despite being a Roman subject, despite being close to, indeed bordering on, Italy just as France does, and much closer than Spain, did not accept the use of the Latin language and does not speak Latin (i.e., a language deriving from Latin), but retains its own ancient idiom. (Perhaps one of the reasons for this and the other things mentioned above was that Germany was never subdued entirely, nor was it a peaceful subject like Spain and Gaul were, both because of this nation’s natural ferocity, and also because it lay on the fringes of the Roman conquests, and near to the unconquered peoples of Europe who were enemies of the Romans and always restless and rebellious, which explains the facility and the stimulus, opportunity, support, and ease with which they rebelled.) Without this Latin would undoubtedly have extinguished the Teutonic language, and no greater notice or trace of it would remain than there does of the Celtic language or the others which Latin extinguished so thoroughly in Spain and [3368] France. The Teutonic language could not have been any harder or more difficult to extinguish than these others were. Indeed, the Celtic tongue in ancient times must have been far more learned and perfect and well formed than the Teutonic one, as may be seen both from the reports that we have of the peoples that spoke it and their institutions (e.g., the Druids, Bards, i.e., poets, etc.), their religion, customs, knowledge, etc., and from that which remains of the Celtic language and the Bardic poems composed in it, etc. England appears to have accepted the use of the Latin language only up to a point: as a literary and written language, certainly, if nothing else.a It also had writers not only from very late Latin, but also middling, such as Bede, etc. But it was already too late, for by this stage the Latin language was corrupt and moribund everywhere, including its first home Italy, and because the Roman empire itself was in the same situation. Hence it was easy for the Saxons to destroy the Latin language in England, where it was still infirm and poorly rooted, the sole property of the learned (I believe), and replace it with [3369] the Teutonic one, triumphing at once (at least in much of the island) over the natural, indigenous, ἐπιχώριος [local], and vernacular language, that is, Celtic, etc.; to which triumph the Latin language must also have contributed, as it too was subdued, and more quickly and thoroughly than the native one, by the language of the conquerors. Whereas in Gaul the Franks, despite being conquerors, could obviously not introduce their own language nor eradicate Latin as the latter was so well rooted, due to the length of time it had been there, and because along with it Latin customs, civilization, letters, and religion had penetrated and become established in Gaul, and because the Latin language was not merely the property of the learned, but was also common to the people, hence the conquerors themselves learned it, and spoke it, etc. The same may be said of the Goths, Lombards, etc., in Italy, of the Vandals, etc., in Spain. For if the Latin language triumphed over the Germanic languages in Italy, France, and Spain despite their being spoken by the conquerors, this may be an indication that it would have triumphed in Germany, too, where these languages were spoken by the conquered peoples, had it not been prevented from doing so for the reasons described above. Hence, it is clear that the Latin language triumphed [3370] over the others not so much because it was the language of the conquerors and masters, overcoming that of the conquered peoples and servants, nor because it was the indigenous and naturalized language overcoming the foreign, short-lived, and new ones, but rather because it was a cultured and fully mature language overcoming barbarian, uncultured, unformed, uncertain, imperfect, poor, inadequate, indeterminate ones. Otherwise it would not have proved impossible, as indeed it did, for the subsequent conquerors of Italy, France, and Spain, to do what the Romans in the same countries did in conquering them; that is, to introduce their own languages in place of those of the vanquished. Whereas the Saxons in England, who were certainly neither more civilized nor more powerful than the Franks, the Goths, the Moors, etc., the Saxons in England, I repeat, then the Normans, triumphed without prejudice to the indigenous languages of the island, for these were still ill-formed, albeit not in the slightest barbarian and even in some cases (such as Celtic) more cultured, etc., than their own were. But these victories of the Latin language, both in terms of being introduced among conquered peoples, and as a foreign tongue driving out native languages and in being maintained despite the conquerors, and rather than ceding ground to them becoming proper to them too, were in large part due, as I have said, to the civilization [3371] of Latin customs and Latin letters being introduced with or maintained along with the language, in such a way that the language did not achieve these victories merely because it was cultured and mature in its own right, but because it was bound up with and belonged to cultured and civilized customs, to Latin opinions and letters. Thus, as I have said, whenever it was separated from them, that is, wherever Latin civilization and literature, and the custom of Latin life, either were not introduced or maintained, or were introduced and preserved to a limited degree, there too, the Latin language either was not introduced, as in Germany, or was not maintained, as happened in England. And this is not merely seen in those parts of Europe which did not admit Latin civilization because of their excess of barbarity, or which in not admitting it remained barbarian, but also in those where an indigenous civilization and literature excluded the foreign one, which in not admitting Latin customs or letters, nonetheless remained as they were, civilized and literate: that is, the Greek nations. Which in not accepting the Roman way of life, did not accept the language either, despite the fact that the seat of the [3372] Roman empire, and Rome and Latium themselves, were, so to speak, transported to them and dwelled in their midst for a very long time. But despite this, Greece never spoke or wrote Latin, and to this day speaks and writes only Greek. Nonetheless, it was the most civilized part of Europe, not even excluding Rome itself, exactly the opposite of Germany. Thus, from opposing but analogous and corresponding, equivalent and proportionate causes, the same effect is born.

  All that I have said about England should be adjusted by consulting the historians, and what I have written elsewhere [→Z 994–95, 1033–34, 2875] regarding the use of the Latin language in that country and in Scotland and Ireland. (6 September 1823.)

  Dialects in Latin. See Cicero, Pro Archia poeta, ch. 10, end, where he speaks of the Cordoban poets as “pingue quiddam sonantibus atque peregrinum” [“in their sounds somewhat gross and strange”]. These poets had certainly not written in the native Spanish language, which the Romans never understood, just as they did not understand any other foreign languages either, except for Greek, but in a form of Latin sounding Spanish, much as Livy’s Latin apparently [3373] sounded Paduan. Cicero’s words here cannot mean anything else, if one looks at them carefully and even if taken at face value. For the term peregrinum would be inappropriate if it referred to a foreign language, which is wholly strange in nature, not in part or due to some quality or other that it has. Nor would
this be considered to be a fault, and in seeking to interpret it as such, this simple phrase that the language and style of those poets sounded foreign would have been either unduly superficial or disproportionate. In addition, both the language and style would have been barbarian, and would have sounded quite strange to Roman ears, coarse, insolent, unbearable, not merely tainted with the occasional gross or strange element. Latin language and literature had already been introduced to Cordoba (the other parts of Spain having already been conquered, whereas this province was only conquered gradually, and with a considerable amount of time elapsing from the conquest of one part to that of the other, as Velleius notes (Velleius, 2, 90, 2–3; Florus, 2, 17, 5; Livy, 28, 12)1 and of all the Roman conquests this province was the one that put up the greatest resistance, took longest, was most difficult, and for a long time was the most in doubt); to Cordoba, I repeat, as [3374] is shown by the fact that it had been able to produce Senecas and Lucans. The example of these writers, at least insofar as style is concerned, may unfortunately serve as an eloquent commentary to Cicero’s words here, which, if I am not mistaken, are to be understood with respect to language as much as to style.1 (6 Sept. 1823.)

  I have said on several occasions [→Z 1661–63, 1680–82, 1923–25] that nature creates almost nothing but dispositions in man. Now a distinction must be drawn between these. Some are dispositions providing the potential to be, others are dispositions to be. By virtue of the former man may become such and such; may, I repeat, and no more. By virtue of the latter, in living naturally and eschewing art, man certainly becomes such as nature wanted him to be, even though it did not make him so but merely disposed him to become such. In the latter nature’s intentions must be considered; not so in the former. And if by virtue of the former man can become such and such, this does not mean that in becoming such and such he becomes what nature wanted him to be, for nature, by means of these dispositions, did no more than grant man the possibility to become such and such, nor are these dispositions [3375] any more than possibilities. I have distinguished between two kinds of disposition for purposes of clarity. Now I shall be more precise. Natural dispositions providing the potential to be, and dispositions to be, do not differ from each other individually, but individually are the same. One and the same disposition provides man with the potential to be something and makes him become it. Insofar as the latter is concerned, in following his natural inclinations, and uninfluenced by unnatural circumstances, man acquires only those qualities which nature has reserved for him, and becomes what he ought to be, that is, what nature intended him to become when it placed that disposition in him. Insofar as the former is concerned, under the influence of various unnatural circumstances both intrinsic and extrinsic, man acquires many qualities not intended for him by nature, many qualities which may even be counter to nature’s intention, and becomes what he ought not to be, that is, what nature did not intend him to become in creating that disposition in him. However, he does not become so by nature, despite the fact that this disposition is natural. For this disposition was not ordained to this [3376] end, that he should become such, but was ordained to other qualities, many of which are entirely contrary to those which he did acquire by means of this disposition. But if he had not naturally had this disposition, he could not have become such. This is the sum of the part which nature has in the fact that he has become such. So if the physical disposition of our body was not what it is by nature, man would not, for example, be able to experience pain, to become ill. But this is not because nature has disposed our bodies to feel pain and become infirm, nor is that disposition ordained to this result, but to quite other and opposite ones. Man is not infirm by nature. He may become infirm, and this happens naturally, but his becoming infirm occurs contrary to nature, or outside and independent of nature, which did not intend to dispose him to infirmity.

  Similar things can be said of other animals and by degrees applied to other types of creatures, albeit in proportion and with the proviso that in other animals, the [3377] inborn dispositions are more to be than potential to be. This means that animals are naturally less adaptable than man is; that as a result of their natural dispositions, not only can they not acquire qualities other than those which nature has reserved to them, which is a property of man too, but they cannot acquire qualities much different from these, unlike man is able to do; that they cannot acquire so many and such varied qualities as man, because man is so supremely adaptable; finally that their natural dispositions do not make possible such a variety of results, and may therefore not be applied and used so variously as those of man may be. Hence animals acquire virtually no qualities other than those reserved to them by nature, become only what nature wanted them to be, what it intended them to become in giving them these dispositions. Which means that they remain in their natural state, which is no more than I have already said, that is, to become what nature intended them to be. For animals too are not born, but become, nor does [3378] nature create qualities in them but dispositions, albeit much more limited than those of man. In the same way, and again in due proportion, coming now to the plant kingdom and hence descending the whole chain of being, you will find that gradually the dispositions are increasingly dispositions to be rather than dispositions of the potential type, that is, they become more and more limited, until we arrive gradually at those beings in which nature has placed neither dispositions to be nor the potential to be, but only qualities. In truth I do not believe there is anything in this category absolutely and strictly speaking, but in broad terms we may say that this planet of ours, considered in its entirety and compared to the solar system or universe, fits in this category, and similarly also the planets and the sun and the stars and other celestial bodies. In which, and in their movements and life, so to speak, and in their respective existence compared to each other, no disorder may be found, no irregularity, no disease, no injury, no accident, outcome, or effect which is counter to, or outside of, the intentions which nature had in placing in them the qualities that it did; that is, the respective qualities [3379] which they have compared to one another, which in their effects and application invariably and entirely correspond to the initial intentions of nature, and unchangingly retain and efficiunt [bring about] that order of the universe which nature expressly desired and desires, and that life or existence which nature itself has reserved for it, and such, and no less, as it intended and ordained it to be. Climbing back up to man from this category of beings, we will find a gradual decrease according to the order of species and genera in the number, effectiveness, and importance of the qualities engendered by nature in each of those genera or species, and a parallel increase in the number or extensiveness, the variety or rather the variability or adaptability of the dispositions engendered in them by nature; we will find that from the beginning these dispositions are almost entirely dispositions to be, and later on also with the potential to be, increasingly so as we ascend from plants to polyps and from these through the various species of animal until we reach the monkey, and savage man, and from these species man himself. In the part of man described as being moral or spiritual, we will find, as I have said, that [3380] nature by its own hand has placed virtually no fixed qualities whatsoever, or hardly any, and these being very simple, all the rest being dispositions not merely to be but with the potential to make man become many different things and acquire various different qualities, so many more than any other kind of creature known to us. In ascending this scale we will find to the same degree, that the lower the number and value of the innate and natural qualities in each genus and species, and the more dispositions there are, also natural, and the more of these dispositions are such as to provide the potential to be (or to become), then the greater by exactly the same amount, in each of these kinds and species and hence in their existence and the effects which they have above and beyond themselves, is the number and magnitude of the disorders, irregularities, diseases, cases, accidents, and outcomes which occur that are unnatural, unwante
d, or expressly not wanted by nature, contrary to what were the intentions and purposes of nature in forming such genera and species, and in arranging them as it arranged them, both with respect to themselves, and to the other genera and species to which they are related, and to the entire [3381] universe of things. All this may be seen in meteors, plants, and in animals above all, and among the animals predominantly in man, that is, in the human race. For the living creature is composed less than all other things of natural qualities, and more of dispositions, and among living creatures this is true of man above all. In man there is more life than there is in other living creatures, and life, based on the considerations I have made hitherto, may be defined as a greater or lesser degree of adaptability, a number and value of dispositions prevailing in some way (more or less) over the number and value of innate qualities. Particularly with respect to the spiritual, to the intrinsic, to that which may be said, properly speaking, to live; to that which is properly found and expresses itself in life, in which the vital principle resides, and the faculty of action, internal and external, that is, the faculty of thought and sensory operation, etc. In which faculty life itself properly lies. (6–7 September 1823.) Conversely, the things which have least part in life are the ones which by nature have fewest qualities and the greatest number of dispositions, that is, the ones which are least adaptable naturally. And if there is something which is not at all naturally adaptable, such a thing has no part in life but merely exists, it should properly be [3382] said to be purely and simply existing, etc. etc. etc. (8 Sept., Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 1823.)