Zibaldone

by Leopardi, Giacomo

  [3773] It is claimed that man by nature is more social than all other living creatures.1 I say that he is the least social of all, because since he has more vitality, he also has more self-love, and therefore necessarily each human individual has more hatred toward other individuals, whether of his own species or of others, according to the principles expounded by me in several places [→Z 55, 872ff., 2204–206, 2644]. Now what other quality is more antisocial, more exclusive by its nature to the spirit of society, than extreme love toward oneself, the extreme appetite to draw everything toward oneself, and extreme hatred toward all others?2 These extremes are all found in man. These qualities are naturally in man to a much greater extent than they are in any other species of living creature. For these parts he occupies the highest level in terrestrial nature, just as generally he occupies the peak among terrestrial beings.

  This fact demonstrates, contrary to how others interpret it, that man by nature is the most antisocial of all the living beings which by nature have some form of society between themselves. Hence humankind has gone beyond the boundaries of that very minimal and very loose-knit society which nature had prescribed for it, more minimal and looser than [3774] that prescribed and effectively established by nature in many other species of animals. Philosophers, politicians, and a hundred sorts of persons have constantly been engaged in finding a perfect form of society. From then onward, after so many researches, after so many experiences, the problem remains exactly where it was. There have been infinite forms of society among men for infinite reasons, with infinite diversities of circumstances. They have all been bad, and all those which exist today are equally so. The philosophers acknowledge it, but they must see that all the enlightened minds of philosophy, so refined today, have never been able, nor will ever be able, to find a form of society that is acceptable in itself, let alone perfect. Nevertheless they still say that man is the most social of living creatures. By perfect society all I mean is a form of society whose individual members, by reason of the very society, do not harm each other, or if they do, it is by chance, and not inevitably, a society whose individuals do not attempt always and inevitably to do each other harm. This is what we see occur with bees, ants, [3775] beavers, cranes, and other similar creatures, whose society is natural, and at the level intended by nature. Their individuals all work always toward the common good, and they help each other mutually, the only aim, the only reason for uniting in society; and if one ever hurts another, it is only by chance, nor is the aim and purpose of each inevitably and continuously that of overwhelming or harming the others in some way. And sometimes one group does harm a member of another group, or all harm a single one or a few, for the sole object of the common good or the good of the majority, as when bees punish lazy bees. They do not do it for the good of a single individual. Nor does the one carrying out the punishment do it only for its own good, but rather for the good of the one being punished. And indeed this doing harm to another is a way of working toward the common good. But in human society that sort of behavior never occurs, always the following. Laws, punishments, rewards, modes of behavior, opinions, religions, dogmas, teachings, culture, exhortations, threats, promises, hopes and fears of another life, none of these have ever managed, ever can, and ever will be sufficient to make any individual of any human society whatsoever, however constructed, I do not say help another, but even abstain from abuse, or perhaps we would better say from making use of any advantage which he has over others, in order to benefit himself by the suffering of others, from attempting to have more than others, to overwhelm, in a word to direct as far as possible, the whole of society toward his own advantage or pleasure, none of which can happen without the disadvantage and affliction of the other individuals. The forms of customs, opinions, institutions, governments, and the varieties of laws, etc., were [3776] and are infinite and extremely diverse, infinite and extremely diverse those which philosophers, etc., of all ages and civilized nations have imagined and imagine and which have never been put into effect, but in every one of these forms those same things have happened, or certainly would happen. What means, what devices have been imagined or employed to prevent that? What study, what doctrine, what experience, what labor, what force of mind has been spared to obtain such an effect? How many supreme intellects have turned their thoughts to it? But all has been absolutely in vain, and whoever has any keenness of judgment must without any difficulty agree, that this will always be the same, no matter what new and strange circumstance may present itself, no matter what new expedient and way of doing things may be discovered. In short all this means that a perfect society, and nothing more perfect than in the terms described above, without which the idea of society is a contradiction in terms, a society, I repeat, perfect among men, indeed even a real society is impossible. Now how can it be that it is impossible, if nature had [3777] prescribed it for us, and if man outside such a society were unable to achieve his natural perfection and happiness? We can see indeed that the kind of society which is prescribed by nature for animals so inferior to us has existed from the beginning, and exists constantly, perfect in its kind, although the animals have never had and do not have legislators, nor philosophers, nor experience of other forms of society, etc. In fact we can see that it is perfect, not just in its own kind, but absolutely in relation to the whole kind and idea of society, which entails a greater or lesser multitude of individuals cooperating together in one form or another to the good of the multitude as a whole, and in no way prejudicing it, other than by chance; and furthermore, communicating with each other more or less, it being of no importance whether this be very much or very little, provided they cooperate toward the common good, inasmuch as they communicate among themselves, a lot or a little as the case might be. Ought we not therefore to deduce from everything said above, both the reasons and the experiences of so many people and so many ages, that humankind by nature either is not destined to have any sort of society within itself, or (as is the case) is destined to have a kind, or better, a level of society completely different from all of those which have existed among human beings from the very beginning of humanity’s (so-called) transition from savagery, right down to the modern day? That is, destined for an absolutely minimal level of communion between individuals, and in that communion, in accordance with its extent and the demands it made, each individual would have cooperated toward the common good of all the individuals which comprise it, and no one, other than [3778] by chance, would have caused harm. From this would have emerged among men a species of society perfect in itself and relative to its own subjects, and perfect in relation to the idea and the essential conditions of a society considered in the absolute. Since this species of society was very quickly lost, no other species of perfect society has ever been able to replace it in I do not know how many thousands of years, nor will it ever replace it, because nature is not replaced, nor can more than one perfection (and that is of its natural state) be granted to any species of created beings, and therefore not more than one kind of happiness.

  Given the general nature of living beings, and especially that of man in particular, a close-knit society, something which has been shown inevitably to produce among men inequality of a thousand kinds and around a thousand benefits and iniquities, cannot help but excite and set in motion, as man’s nature effectively does, the passions of envy, of emulation, of competition, of jealousy, which are necessary consequences, or indeed variants and nuances of hatred toward others, which is natural to any being which naturally loves itself. Now what is more antisocial than these passions? They would have no place in the minimal and loose-knit society prescribed for us by nature, and its role would be limited to the true purpose of every society, that of mutual support at moments of need (which in nature are few), and especially in relation to those needs (which are even fewer) which require the cooperation of several individuals. As for instance defense against other enemy animals, for which purpose even the least social animals come together and create among the
mselves a temporary society, which lasts as long as the danger lasts, as horses do when they pack closely together in a circle, each with its rear hooves facing outward, to defend themselves from the wolf, etc.1 The passions mentioned, [3779] I repeat, would not have had any place, both because such a society is not close-knit, and because in it and in the natural state of man, the natural advantages of one individual over another, are few, rare, and small, and social advantages would not have existed at all. The inequality among men, which society makes naturally supreme and of a thousand kinds, would have been almost of no account, and limited to very few things. In fact among other animals, inequality between individuals is rare and always absolutely minimal; so too the advantages of one group over another. Therefore the passions mentioned, which are of necessity aroused by these advantages and by the inequality which is inevitably produced by a close-knit society, are extremely rare and weak among other animals. And those which arise from the natural pride of each individual, which is of necessity wounded and afflicted and tormented by command, by honors, by all kinds of preeminence, by the esteem and the glory of the other individuals of the same species or company, would have had no place at all in the minimal society, nor do they have among the more social animals, because the objects which excite those passions would not have existed in that minimal society, nor do they exist among the more social animals, and in fact the very idea of them, let alone the desire for them, would not exist. And so far as command is concerned, if there is any trace of it among the animals, such as bees, cattle, elephants (see Arrian, Indica),1 it stems from superiority of nature and almost of species, in which envy and emulation have no place, just as the sheep cannot envy the ram who leads them and almost governs them because he is of a stronger sex, nor do women envy men their greater strength, in the same way as we do not envy it in the lion. In addition command [3780] and any other sort of preeminence among animals, since it was placed there by nature, is therefore by all the other subject animals always recognized as useful to all of them, and useful not only in terms of potential and purpose, but continually in act and in effect, and as such they naturally submit to it, not only without the slightest repugnance, but with pleasure, and they greatly regret it if that preeminence, by whatever chance, is taken from them, as when bees lose their queen, etc. But in a close-knit society, especially human society, it is an unavoidable necessity that all the preeminences mentioned exist, as it is equally necessary that they offend greatly the natural pride of other individuals. And among these preeminences it is an unavoidable necessity that there exists command, and this among men cannot be the effect of a superiority of nature or species. On the contrary, it is necessary for one who is equal to lord it over equals. And it is without question inevitable that command and subjection among men, though useful in an institution, are most times extremely damaging in their effect on those who obey and are subordinate, and who recognize that effect. And from this there naturally follow envy and supreme hatred against those who command, a highly antisocial hatred, especially because command is necessary, etc. And again it is inevitable that not infrequently (in fact almost always), command and lordship by their very origin and institution are directed toward injuring the subordinate and toward the sole good of the lords, as are lordships acquired by brute force or guile, against the will and the intention of the subjects: these are called tyrannies. And it is certain that all or most principates of the past and present originated by force or artifice, and that all the thrones of Europe [3781] can be traced back, through their genealogy, to these roots. In short, as it is absolutely certain that the whole world is the heritage of force (whether physical, that is vigor, or moral, that is intellect, guile, etc., which amounts to the same thing), and that it is made for the strongest, it therefore follows that in a close-knit society, inevitably, whatever form it takes, the weakest individuals are bound to be, were, are, and will be the prey, the victim, the property of the strongest. So it absolutely cannot be the case that there exists, much less among men, a close-knit society which achieves the purpose of society, that is the common good of the individuals of which it is composed, and whose outcome is the common good mentioned before. Without which society can have no justification. In a loose-knit society the strongest do not have either the means or the opportunity or the desire or any stimulus to exercise and carry to fulfillment the superiority of their forces over the individuals of that society, except only occasionally by chance, in a minimal and fleeting way. What they propose to obtain is not at the expense of their society, nor of any one of its individuals. It is outside that society. Their society is too minimal for any individual to have designs on it, and to put their happiness in benefits which depend upon or belong in some way to that same society, of which they are scarcely aware of being part, and which is, in a manner of speaking, outside of their vision, and therefore also of their thoughts, for most of the time at least, etc. Wolves form a society to attack a sheepfold, but the designs which [3782] they form both at the time of this fleeting society, and at other times, and the advantages which they, and among them especially the strongest, propose to achieve, are not against the other wolves, but against the sheep. If then, in the division of the spoils, some discord arises among them, and if in this the strongest gain the most, these are chance and short-lived events, and do not create rancor among the weaker, because the society is immediately dissolved, so that the effect of the discord is limited to those few moments, and in the end the advantage which the wolves have gained from that society is greater, since without it they would not have gotten into the sheepfold, and greater also is the advantage which the weaker have gained from the stronger who fought more than they did, etc., than the harm those wolves received from the discord, and the weaker from the stronger.1 But the exact opposite happens in human societies, where the stronger have no purpose other than to do harm to the weaker and to society, and any superiority of force whatever is always harmful to others, because always (at least these days, and most times in the past) it is adopted for the sole good of its possessor.

  Close-knit society, which throws individuals into contact with each other, of necessity gives essor [free rein] to the innate hatred of one living creature toward another, and this hatred is in no animal so great, not even toward individuals of a different and naturally inimical species, as it is among individuals of a close-knit society toward the other individuals of the same society. Because every [3783] hatred naturally increases a thousandfold with the continued presence of the hated object, and of its activities, etc., especially when this hatred is natural, so that, by its nature, it can never be put aside. Now, whatever one says, and however (even under the appearance of love) one masks this hatred toward others (as prolific in its transfigurations as its twin, self-love), it is as true that man naturally feels hatred to man as it is that the hawk feels hatred toward the sparrow. It is therefore as consistent to bring hawks and sparrows together in a republic under good laws (provided one clips the hawks’ talons, and ensures that their physical strength does not exceed that of their fellows) as it is to bring men together in a close-knit society under any kind of legislation you like. And even when the close-knit society does not increase the hatred mentioned, it can certainly not be denied that it awakens and ignites it, that society alone provides the opportunities to exercise it, thus making it absolutely fatal to the species, and sets in train the mutual hatred innate to the individuals of that species, which without society or in a loose society would be completely or almost completely harmless, and ineffective, to the species, and never even felt through lack or insufficiency of opportunities and stimuli. Which would be in accordance with nature’s intentions, and also with absolute reason, since it cannot be thought that nature wanted any species (much less the human) to die by its own hands, or to be made unhappy (and as a consequence prevented from achieving the perfection and purpose of its being) by [3784] its own individuals—so that such a species became the cause of destruction and unhappiness, and ther
efore of imperfection, against itself, and so that its very existence was the direct cause, at its own hand, not another’s, of its own ceasing to exist, either by destroying itself, or by making itself unhappy, which means depriving itself of its proper purpose and complement, and therefore producing its own nonexistence, and even worse. Just as with suicide, or torturing oneself because of self-hatred, where the former is evidently against nature, and the latter would be, if it could ever exist, so the war between individuals of the same species, reciprocal killings, and all sorts of evils carried out by like against like, are things evidently against nature, even while they are absolutely inevitable, and not accidental (unless it be occasionally, but not generally and not when taken all together), but an essential and constant element of any close-knit society. See p. 3928.1 These, since they are very evident and formal contradictions, are excluded from absolute reasoning. The very principle of our reason either has to be acknowledged as false, and we can discuss it no further, or it blocks the idea that such contradictions can exist in nature, which, however, would necessarily have to exist if nature had intended a close-knit society for any species, since in a close-knit society, whatever its form was or is or will be, the things described above have always existed and will always exist. From which one can effectively deduce that to suppose that nature intends a close-knit society in any species, and especially in the human (which on the one hand, being the first, should have been the happiest and most perfect, and on the other, in a close-knit society, is of necessity exposed more than others to the disadvantages mentioned) is in direct contradiction of the very principle of reason. Nature has not instilled hatred toward others in the living creature. Hatred is born of itself from self-love because of the nature of the latter. This self-love is a supreme and necessary good, and in any case it is born of itself from the awareness of existing, and any being which was aware of its own existence and did not love itself would be a contradiction, as I have stated elsewhere [→Z 2499]. But from this principle, which is a good and which nature could not fail to instill in the living creature, and which [3785] indeed, without the direct operation of nature, is necessarily born of life itself (whence nature itself, so to say, had and has it, toward itself, independently of its will—see p. 3813), from this principle is necessarily born hatred toward others, which is an evil, because it is harmful by its own nature to the species. And from the same principle there come a hundred other consequences, which are evils, and produce by their nature very harmful effects, not just to the species and to other individuals, but to the individual himself. Now these effects were not intended by nature, nor is nature at fault for this (as it would be), because it has ensured that those bad consequences of self-love were ineffective, and they would have been such in the natural being of that particular individual and species. Therefore it has thus ensured that hatred toward other individuals of the same species was ineffective, except by some absolute chance, because the hatred is deprived of opportunity and stimulus and circumstance in which it could operate. And it has done this by prescribing for individuals of the same species, and among these for men, either no society at all, or one which is minimal and loose-knit.