Zibaldone

by Leopardi, Giacomo

  Memory, imagination and, besides these, the other faculties as well of the mind and the intellect weaken and are sometimes extinguished with age, even independently of the extrinsic circumstances of life, experience, and the other things which have an influence on character, mind, intellect, and modify it, etc. The foolishness of old people is very often a real thing, very often premature as well through illnesses, which make people radoteurs [dotards] at the age of 50, or not much before or after. People like this are very ready to cry like children. That can happen also in the full bloom and vigor of age because of a transitory or lasting enfeeblement of the physical forces, and with them of the mental faculties. I have seen examples of this. This should all be applied to the discussion I had to prove that there are natural and inborn differences between talents [→Z 3197–98, 3206–207, 3344–47] on which subject see also [3945] pp. 3891, and 3806–10 and the following thought. (6 Dec. 1823.)

  For p. 3923, margin. In the same way great talents are seldom found in strong bodies. Given equality of circumstances and the rest, the weaker are more cunning than the stronger, through natural physical disposition also, etc., for which elsewhere on the subject of women [→Z 2259–63, 3767–68]. Great cunning is very unlikely to be found in a corpulent man (if his corpulence is not the result of illness and chance, etc.) even if he is well practiced in everything which most favors and requires cunning. Neither great nor refined talent in a large body, and less in a corpulent body, etc. etc. Differences of talents are for the most part recognized and usually correspond, not only to the various conformations and dispositions of the cranium, etc., both internal and external, etc., but even of the rest of the person in general, and of many of his parts in particular.1 These observations should be applied to the matter of the previous thought. (6 Dec. 1823.)

  For p. 3898. Museau. Niffolo, see the Crusca under Niffo [snout]. This word is also in Rucellai, Api, l. 990, who writes nifolo,2 from nifo, which is also in the Crusca. —One must note, when the positive is not found in the language to which the diminutives which appear positivized belong, whether perhaps in ancient times that positive was to be found there, proper to that language, or came to it from somewhere else, and if it is there whether it had the same meaning which that diminutive has today. And the same when in other languages too the positive in question can be found with the same meaning as the diminutive. E.g., in Italian [3946] muso [snout] can be found and it has exactly the same meaning as museau, which certainly comes from a similar word; but who can say that once in French there was not muse with a different meaning? (see the Spanish). And see on this topic what was said on p. 3852 about the word fourreau [sheath]. (6 Dec. 1823.)

  For the same page, margin. Some of these words could also come from Latin, either unknown, or vulgar, or barbarian, etc., and see the Glossary and also Forcellini, etc. (6 Dec. 1823.)

  The Greek language truly and properly belongs to our family of languages (Latin, Italian, French, Spanish, and Portuguese), not only because it cannot belong to any other, and would be a family on its own or only with Modern Greek, not even only because it is sister or, as others say, mother to Latin (in the first of which cases it would have to be placed at least with Latin, and in the second it is clear that it must be put in our family), but especially and principally because its literature is truly the mother of Latin literature, which is the mother of all of ours, and therefore Greek literature is truly the origin of all of ours, which for the most part would not be in any way at all what they are and of the nature they are (except by some completely fortuitous coincidence) if they had not come from there. And since literature is what gives form and determines the manner of being of languages, and a formed language and a literature are almost the same thing, or certainly [3947] things which are not separable, and of corresponding and companion qualities; and since consequently Greek literature (beside the many words and particular phrases) was what truly and principally gave form to the Latin language, and determined its manner of being, its character and spirit, in such a way that Latin language and literature, even if they were born, formed, and grew without Greek, they would certainly not have been what they were, but truly different, and to a very great extent different by nature and by character and form, and by general and particular qualities, and both overall and in their greater or lesser parts, from what they were; given, I say, all of this, Greek literature (in addition to the direct study made of it by those who formed our languages, as by those who formed Latin) came to be truly the first mother and the origin of our languages, as Latin is their direct mother. These languages (even French which together with its literature is the one that has moved furthest from its origin, and from the Latin form, and from the character of Latin, and therefore also of Greek) would be in no way what they are, but would be other and to a very great extent different both in spirit, and in a hundred and a thousand particular things, if they had not in primitive times derived their origin to a very great extent from Greek via Latin. And truly the Greek language through its literature is the first (as far back as our memory of antiquity reaches) and true and very efficient cause of both Latin language and literature and our languages and literatures, even French, being what they are, [3948] and not other; because by nature they could be very different also in very many things which are essential and belong to the spirit and the character, etc., and somewhat different, more or less, in many other more or less essential or nonessential things. And perhaps examples are not wanting of other literatures and languages, ancient or modern, also southern, etc., which since they do not come from Greek, are very different, in character as well, etc., and in general terms, etc., no less or little less than in particulars, from Latin and our local ones. And proof of this could be to see how far French has moved away, in spirit too, from Latin and Greek with which however it was extremely consistent in the 16th century, etc. (see p. 3937), without any change of climate, etc. Certainly our times are very different from those of the Greeks and Latins, even when the climate is consistent, our nations, their governments, opinions, customs, events, and all kinds of conditions are and were very different, both between themselves, and each one of them from itself at different times, and from the Greek, and from the Latin nation too. Nevertheless, their languages and literatures have been consistent, especially until recent centuries, both between themselves, and their various periods, and with Greek and Latin, etc. So such consistency must not be attributed either solely or principally to the climate, not to any other natural or fortuitous circumstances, but to the accident of being effectively derived from Greek and Latin, because they might well have derived from nothing, or from somewhere else, etc. etc.

  I grant that, as I have said elsewhere [→Z 2181–82, 3400–401] Italian and Spanish languages and literatures, especially the ancient ones, and all the more the more they are considered in their ancient and still unformed state, and ancient French, etc., resemble Greek perhaps more [3949] than Latin through their character, etc., and almost certainly more than Latin, and they take after Greek, etc. (6 Dec. 1823.)

  Disserto as from dissero ertum [to discuss]. (7 Dec., Vigil of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 1823.)

  For p. 3885. At that time Italian was principally known and thought of by foreigners as the language of Metastasio, and through his theater,a1 in short as the language of the Opera. It would have been worse if Frederick had taken his notion of Italian, as is indeed likely, from that of his friend Algarotti,2 etc. (7 Dec. 1823.)

  Participles used as adjectives, etc., on which elsewhere in several places [→Z 1968–69, 2458–63, 2484–85, 3683, 3938]. From many participles are formed words which are no more than adjectives, because they do not have any verb of which they could be participles, such as innocens [harmless], invictus [invincible], intentatus [untried] (which do not have innoceo, invinco, etc.) and a hundred thousand others. And see on the subject of invictus and the like, the entry cited on p. 3938. Nevertheless such words still preserve a participial sense, e
xcept for some of them sometimes (such as illaudatus for illaudabilis [blameworthy], see Forcellini), which besides not being participles any longer because they have no verb, have also undergone a second change, that is in meaning. (7 Dec., Vigil of the Immaculate Conception, 1823.)

  Passive participles in an active or neuter sense, etc. Dañado from dañar for dañante, that is nocente, dannoso [damaging]. It is used in an adjectival form, as should also be understood in very many other such participles, Latin or modern, which are still used, either for the most part, or occasionally, as I say, in adjectival form. (7 Dec., 1823.)

  [3950] For p. 3942. Indeed you can say that man, especially the human mind and the advances it has made, and those the individual and his manual or intellectual, etc., faculties have made, and the development of his dispositions, of his mind, talent, imagination, etc., is all imitation—Contrary to what I said there, habituation is a kind of imitation; just as memory is a habituation and, on the contrary, every habituation is a kind of memory and recollection, according to what I have said elsewhere [→Z 1255, 1370–71, 1523–25, 2047–49]. (7 Dec., Vigil of the Immaculate Conception, 1823.)

  One does not have recollection without prior attention, etc., as elsewhere [→Z 1733–37, 2110–12, 2378–81, 3737]. This is one of the principal causes why children, especially at the beginning, struggle to commit things to memory, much more than mature or young people do. For they are distracted and not very reflective and attentive, through the very multiplicity of things to which they have to attend, and the facility, rapidity, and force by which their attention is continually swept from one object to the other.1 People who are distracted, not very reflective, etc., never learn anything. This does not prove their limited memory, as is thought, but their limited faculty or habit in paying attention, or the multiplicity of things to which they pay attention, which is called distraction. For too much ability to pay attention to everything, whether by nature or habit, too much susceptibility of the mind to be keenly affected and swept away by every sensation, every thought, multiplies the subjects of attention, and weakens them all, because there are many of them and they are confused, and each of them is necessarily short, [3951] so that every little thing distracts the mind and applies it to something else, and the very force with which the second focus of attention succeeds and cancels out the force of the first makes memory very scarce or nonexistent, and recollections few and weak. And so the very facility and excessive force of paying attention produces or includes the inability to pay attention, and that is what it is usually called, although it actually has its origin in its opposite, that is in too much ability to pay attention (as always, excess gives rise to or is equivalent to or coexists with nothingness or its opposite quality or thing), and the excess of the faculty of paying attention is reduced to the lack or limited nature of this faculty, depending on whether the excess mentioned is greater or smaller. This takes place principally, because of the rule and order of nature, in children. —Where a sensation, etc., even if received and paid attention to only once, is often enough to bring a recollection which is lively, firm, clear, full, and lasting, the same sensation repeated a thousand times and never paid attention to is not enough for the slightest recollection, or only for a recollection which is weak, obscure, confused, limited, lacking, brief, and transitory. Therefore twenty repetitions are not enough to make someone who does not pay attention learn what is learned by someone who does pay attention sometimes after a single occasion, or with very few extrinsic repetitions, etc. (7 Dec., Vigil of the Immaculate Conception, 1823.)

  [3952] From what is said elsewhere [→Z 109–11, 1234–36, 1701–706] about the concomitant ideas attaching to the meaning or even the sound itself and other qualities of words, and these ideas playing such a large part in the effect of writings, especially the poetic or oratorical, etc., effect, it follows that necessarily the effect of the same poem, oration, verse, phrase, expression, any part, greater or smaller, of writing, is, especially with regard to the poetic, infinitely varied, according to the listeners or readers and the occasions and circumstances in which each of them find themselves, which may also be transitory and changeable. For those concomitant ideas, even completely independently of the word or phrase in itself, are very different in a thousand respects, according to the differences in persons. As the poetic effects, etc., of a thousand other things as well, perhaps indeed all things, are infinitely varied according to the variety of both persons and their circumstances, whether habitual or transitory or whatever. For example the same scene of nature can and does produce very different sorts of impressions in the spectators according to the differences discussed; for instance if that is their native place, and that scene linked with recollections of infancy, etc. etc., if the spectator finds himself in this or that emotional state, etc. etc. And very often it produces no impression at all on one person, at the same time as it produces an enormous impression on another. And so on about the words and the style of which it is composed and which come from it, and its qualities and differences, etc., and this similarity is very much to the point.

  [3953] These observations are to be applied to what has been said by me elsewhere [→Z 227–28, 2233–36] about how great the difference in men’s judgment of the worth, etc., of writings is naturally bound to be, since their effect is naturally very different (even leaving completely aside envy, ignorance, and such things which vary or falsify judgments through human fault, although they too are inevitable and natural); and how much the fame of writings, writers, styles, etc., depends on circumstances, and on infinite and very different circumstances, and combinations of circumstances. The art of the writer is reduced and must be reduced to observing which effect, which ideas, by and large and roughly speaking, are produced or usually produced by these or those words and their combinations and usages in the majority of men or fellow nationals considered generally, in the majority of circumstances of each person and those which, through nature or the most widespread habits, etc. etc., are the most normal. And writings, writers, and styles which enjoy the highest fame and worth are those which have better and more happily observed the things mentioned and have regulated themselves according to these observations and been able to profit by them and apply them to the use of writing and make their ways of writing conform to them. They are not those which are pleasing and produce the same effect, and to the same degree, on everyone, including fellow nationals, in every time and circumstance, or even only produce an unremarkable effect, or the same sort of effect, because all of this is impossible for any man born, and it is not the case with anyone, poet or writer, etc., book, style, etc., nor will it ever be, [3954] and never was.

  These observations should also be applied to the difficulty or impossibility of translating well, to what a book loses in the best-made translations, to the absolute impossibility, and contradiction in terms, of the existence of a perfect translation, especially with regard to books whose chief worth, or whole worth or a good part belongs to the style, to the extrinsic, to the words, etc., or with whose effect the words are particularly and essentially linked, etc., which must necessarily be more or less all books of true poetry in verse or in prose, etc. etc. (7 Dec. 1823.) —These observations should also be extended to the diversity of the concomitant ideas of a single word, etc., and therefore the effect of a single piece of writing, etc., according to times and nations, foreign or home, descendants more or less remote or contemporaries, etc. And extended therefore to the limited durability and possible extension of the fame and esteem of a piece of writing however excellent it may be, at least of the same level and quality of fame and esteem, and the judgment on it, perfect translations especially being impossible, whether from ancient to modern, or from one modern language to another, etc., as above. And the differences brought about in readers by the differences in times, customs, climates, places, etc. etc. etc. (7 Dec. 1823.)

  “Quoi qu’on en dise, il vaut mieux être heureux par l’erreur que malheureux par la vérité” [
“Whatever one says, it is better to be happy because of error than unhappy because of truth”]. Lettres du Roi de [3955] Prusse et de M. d’Alembert, Lettre 101, of the King, ending.1 He is talking of the advantage of illusions. (8 Dec., Feast of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 1823.)

  Grace from contrast. Expletives in the mouth of women whether masculine in form and manners, or gentle and delicate, etc. Words, discourses, expressions, acts, thoughts, etc., tending toward the masculine, judicious, learned, etc., in women of masculine forms, etc., or the opposite, etc. Attractive, etc., women of course, and masculinity not going beyond the bounds of the graceful into the improper, etc. See p. 3961. (8 Dec., Feast of the Immaculate Conception, 1823.)

  From chaudron (caldaio), diminutive of chaudière (calderone) [cauldron], chaudronnier in the positive sense, that is, calderaio [boiler man]. In Latin and especially in late Latin and in the daughter languages there is an infinite number of derivatives of this and many other types, and sorts of meanings, etc. (see p. 4006, etc.), which since they have a positive sense, and one which corresponds to that of the positive from which they take their origin, are therefore formed from a diminutive (in use or not, and also simply assumed) of that positive, whether that diminutive has a positive use, or not, etc., whether such words derive from Latin, or not, etc. See pp. 3963, line 18, 3980, lines 3 and 4. Perhaps the reason for such derivations which in a positive sense are formed from diminutives, is that they and perhaps the diminutives from which they derive, have a frequentative sense or something similar. Purulentus, purulentia [pus], etc., esculentus [succulent, edible] virulentus [virulent], vinolentus [full of wine, intoxicated], see pp. 3968–69, 3992, temulentus [drunk, intoxicated], etc., nidulor [to build a nest], unless it is frequentative or frequentative-diminutive. In fact diminution in a frequentative sense absolutely and uniquely, or in company with this sense, is very common in Latin, in Italian, etc., as elsewhere in several places. And many absolute frequentatives (verbs or nouns, etc.) are only so because of the diminutive form which they have, and this is the only thing in them which indicates frequency, etc., whether those that are positive in sense or form or both, etc., exist and are used, or not, or whether they cannot even exist, as is often the case in Italian, etc., for example, balbettare [to stammer] does not have nor could [3956] have balbare, to which however it would be equivalent, etc. (8 Dec., Feast of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 1823.)