Zibaldone

by Leopardi, Giacomo

  The love of life and the fear of death are not innate as such: otherwise no one would kill themselves. Self-love is innate, and therefore so too is the love of personal well-being, and hatred of personal harm: and therefore no one can fail to love themselves, nor can they love what they believe to be harmful, etc. It is therefore natural that all living beings judge life to be their greatest good and death their greatest ill. And in fact they reach this judgment without fail, unless they have moved very far away from the state of nature. This is how nature has therefore made true provision for preservation, by rendering this error of judgment unavoidable, although it has not generated [4243] a love of life. Love of life is a reasoning, not a feeling: therefore it cannot be innate. What is a feeling is self-love, from which love of life is a natural—though false—consequence. But another consequence of self-love (though not a natural one) is a person’s decision to kill themselves by their own hand. (8 [January] 1827.)

  “Senza più oltre” or “più avanti” or “innanzi pensare” [without further thought] and other similar expressions, often simply mean the same as “senza punto pensare” [without any thought]. The same with “senza pensar più là.” Likewise “senza più,” either alone or accompanied by verbs (“senza più pensare”) or by nouns, is often the same as “senza nulla” or niuno, just like the Spanish mas for niuno, as mentioned elsewhere [→Z 4163]. Senza pensar più oltre. See Firenzuola, Ragionamenti, Classici Italiani ed., p. 229, i.e., penult. page. Bembo, Asolani, p. 10, col. 1, end, at the end of his Opere.1

  On the spread of the Italian language among foreigners during the 1500s, see also Speroni, Oration in praise of Bembo; Tasso, Opere, ed. Mauro, vol. 9, p. 148, letter 238; Lettere di principi or a principi, Venice 1573, fol. 226, verso.2

  Disdain or ignorance of Latin literature on the part of the Greeks. See Speroni, Dialoghi, Venice 1596, p. 420. —The Greeks may resemble the French in this respect.

  The replacement of the s with the aspiration is found also in English. Salle French—hall English.

  Altro for niuno or niente. Firenzuola, Ragionamenti, Classici Italiani ed., p. 89, line 2, p. 230, i.e., last page.3

  “Tu profferisti chiunque con due sillabe; la qual parola non mi voglio ricordare che si truovi se non con tre” [“You pronounced chiunque with two syllables, which word I cannot recall being found except with three”]. Firenzuola, loc. cit. above, p. 84.4 It means non mi vuol venire alla mente [it will not come back to me], non mi posso ricordare [I cannot recall]. Grecism. Similar case on p. 162. “Lucrezia, chè così mi voglio ricordar che fusse il nome della vedova” [“Lucretia, that, as far as I recall, was the widow’s name”]. In other words, così mi vuol dire, così mi dice, la memoria; così mi pare, mi vien fatto, di ricordarmi [so my memory tells me; this is what it seems to me, as far as possible, to remember]. (Sunday 14 [January] 1827.)

  Mia, tua, sua Florentine and ancient plurals.

  For p. 4156.5 To us it does not seem that such outbursts, this screaming, wailing, tearing of hair, collapsing, rolling about, banging of heads against walls, such behavior in times of grief, as practiced by the ancients, by uncivilized people, by common folk today, can provide any comfort to distress. And [4244] truly, for us, it would not, because we are no longer affected and influenced by nature in any way. And even if we were to behave in such a manner, it would be strained, it would be artificial and unnatural, and therefore useless, so greatly has nature in us been changed, defeated, eliminated by habituation. And yet it is certain that these acts, learned (about which there can be no doubt) from nature, are of great comfort to those who practice them naturally, and provide most effective relief in times of calamity. The resistance which the mind naturally exercises against adversity and pain is the most distressing part of our misfortunes. It is the greatest pain that man experiences. When the mind is subdued, every calamity, however serious it might be, is tolerable. This subduing of the mind, this surrender to necessity, this compliance with the course and condition of things, occurs in us over time, which Voltaire for that reason calls a consoler.1 But it works slowly, and that initial resistance, as well as lasting longer, has this even more painful aspect, which is directed and operates against ourselves: it is the resistance of mind against mind. Whereas in savages and common people, it operates against external things, so to speak, and as its workings are faster, thus it fades and vanishes more quickly. It afflicts the body and therefore torments the mind much less, precisely because the mind is afflicted as well as the body and therefore such people, following these acts of grief, find their mind subdued and reduced, so to speak, by their own behavior, into submission, without waiting for time to pass. In this way, when they awake from such frenzy, such outbursts, their mind is already in a condition to deal with misfortune, to be able to look it firmly in the face, without for that reason being courageous. And it is known and remarked from everyday life that great misfortunes last much less among plebeians than among the cultured. So that those outbursts are indeed a medicine, almost a narcotic, prepared by [4245] nature itself, to enable people to cope with their ills more easily. And we are left not knowing or understanding the way in which they benefit those whom we see exercising them naturally. And this is another effect of philosophy and civilization. It claims to teach us how to cope with calamity better than nature does, preaching contempt of pain, making us shameful about showing it, as if it were something unworthy of men, typical of cowards and the uninstructed; and by doing so it has deprived us of that assistance that nature had provided for us, which was much more effective than any of theirs. See p. 4283. (Recanati, 15 [January] 1827, St. Paul, the first hermit.)

  For p. 4184. Many things which are to be found among the ancients, such as the belief described above, befit and demonstrate an exquisite humanity that is greatly superior to any modern idea. Of such a kind was the use of those ἔρανοι [charitable collections or loans] which were so famous among the Greeks, and so frequent that, like any good and human institution and practice, it produced abuses that today seem extremely odd. See Casaubon, on Athenaeus, book 7, end of ch. 5.1 (See p. 4469.) And see also in the same, book 6, beginning of chapter 19, the humanity with which servants, in other words slaves, were treated by the Athenians, and the strange rights that they were given under the laws of that republic.2 See p. 4280, paragraph 3. (15 [January] 1827.) See p. 4286.

  Melato, mellitus, for melleus [of honey] or dulcis [sweet]. Spedito, espedito, expeditus [quick, fluent], etc. Spigliato. Sforzato, sforzatamente (esforzado). Crusca.

  Strascicare [to drag].

  Attero [to wear away], attritum–attritare, contritare. Crusca. See Forcellini. Glossary, etc.

  Taranta. Speroni, Dialoghi, Venice 1596, p. 135.—Tarantola [tarantula]. Tarantella. Salvini. See Dictionary of Alberti. Tarande–tarantule. Tarantolato [affected by tarantism]. See the Spanish, etc.

  Βάτος–βατὶς [skate fish]. See the Lexicons and Casaubon on Athenaeus. Name of fish, σκίαινα–σκιαινὶς [maigre]. See Casaubon, ibid., bk. 7, beginning of ch. 10, end of ch. 20. ἔγχελυς–ἐγχέλιον [eel] ibid., middle of ch. 12.3

  With regard to Sassetti, who was the first person to have identified the Sanskrit language, as I have stated elsewhere [→Z 3018], I note that here again there is confirmation of that observation that the Italians seem destined to discover, and then leave it to others to use and develop, and receive the glory and also the reputation of having been the discoverers. (19 [January] 1827.)

  ὗς—the ancients σῦς [pig], σύαγρος [wild boar], etc. See Athenaeus,4 and the Lexicons, with compounds and derivatives, etc.

  [4246] Superstitious imitation and veneration of Petrarch in the 16th century, which I refer to elsewhere [→Z 2533–36], etc. See in the works of Tasso the Observations on the Sonnet “Spino, leggiadre rime,” etc., and Tasso’s Response (ed. Mauro, vol. 6).1 See also Guidiccioni in Lettere di diversi eccellentissimi uomini, Venice, Giolito, 1554, pp. 43–48.

  Sevum [tallow],
sevo–sego. Rovo–rogo [bramble].

  Trasognato for trasognante [daydreaming]. Straboccato, traboccato for traboccante [overflowing], or che suol traboccare.

  “Τοιαύτην γὰρ ἡ φιλία βούλεται” (in other words, πέφυκε, debet [must], etc.) “ποιεῖν ἑνότητα καὶ σύμπηξιν” [“for friendship wants to bring about unity and consolidation”] (wants, tends by its nature to do). Plutarch, περὶ πολυφιλίας [On Having Many Friends], De amicorum multitudine, p. 95a. See Casaubon, on Athenaeus, bk. 7, ch. 16. Voler used absolutely for dovere, see in the Veronese Addenda. (Recanati, 25 [January] 1827.)

  Preciado Spanish for prezioso, like our pregiato [fine]. Continuato or continovato for continuo, and thus continué, etc.

  VittUaglia, vittUaria–vittoVaglia, vettoVaglia, vettUvaglia. Vettuaglia [victual], Ricordano, chs. 125, 133.2 M. Villani in Crusca under Casale. Capua, Padua, Mantua, with derivatives Capova, Padova, Mantova, etc. etc. Balduino and Baldovino. MenOVare, i.e., menUare [to diminish]. See Crusca.

  Auto [had], riceuto [received], etc., in the ancient writers, such as Ricordano,3 etc., the v for avuto, etc., omitted.

  Monte GUarchi, often used in Ricordano4 for Montevarchi.

  From mutolo for muto [mute], ammutolare, ammutolire [to be struck dumb] for ammutare, ammutire which fell into disuse.

  Nutrire [to nourish] for avere [to have] (io nutro speranza [I nourish hope], etc.). See Crusca. French, Spanish, etc.—exactly like τρέφω [to nourish] for ἔχω [to have]. Casaubon on Athenaeus, bk. 7, end of ch. 18.

  Disguizzolare [to rummage]. Parlottare [to murmur]. Borbottare [to mumble].

  Digiuna [fasting] plural for quattro tempora [ember days].5 Dino Compagni, beginning of bk. 3.6 The Crusca has Digiune.

  Ragionato for ragionevole [reasonable], ragionatamente, etc. See Crusca. Minutus, minuto, etc., from minuo, for piccolo [small]. Svagato, divagato, distratto, distrait, etc., for someone who is generally distracted, etc. Dissipito, in other words non saputo for dissipiente, che non sa, non ha sapore [insipid, flavorless]. Dissapito. Dissaporito.

  Sfondare [to break through]—sfondolare, sfondolato. Aratro ancient word arato–aratolo [plough].

  For p. 4144. I think it is certain that Epictetus (who lived in Rome) alludes in this passage to the Roman custom of calling women dominae, a custom that certainly existed, and passed into common usage since in our common language domina (donna [woman]) remained a synonym of mulier [wife], and even replaced it. See Du Cange, under Domina, [4247] § 6 and Forcellini, who refers to mothers of families and wives, and states that the latter, i.e., married women, are properly called donne in Italian. This is therefore, in my view, the correct interpretation of the passage in Epictetus, in other words that women, when they are married, take the name of donne, which is the same as padrone. Similarly, we describe women who are not married as donzelle, or padroncine. See Du Cange, under Domicellus, and see also Domnus. Married men also were particularly called domini. Forcellini. (Recanati, 2 Feb., Feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 1827.)

  Good magistrate.a Bad magistrate. How can he be recognized? Among all the different qualities you will not find one about which, once the facts are established and agreed, there are not varying and opposing judgments or interpretations that are sometimes good, sometimes bad. Rigorous, severe: if you praise him for this quality, others will describe him for the same quality as vindictive, cruel, an instrument of tyranny, one who prosecutes private vendettas and grudges concealed under public guise, an enemy of citizens, a fanatic, a persecutor, an enemy of enlightenment, liberty, progress, civilization. Merciful: he will be cold, weak, a protector of vices and evil deeds, a friend of society’s rebels, a champion of evil works. If there are opposing parties, and he favors one of them, the other or others will condemn him; if he favors none, he is foolish, craven, cunning if nothing else. The same with ambition; etc. etc. But so far as abstinence or appetite in relation to the property of others or the public are concerned, you will not find two people who, having agreed on the facts, do not disagree in praising or condemning, or even interpreting it. And this is almost the only quality upon which in truth the reputation which magistrates acquire of being good or bad depends. Good means being disinterested, bad means covetous; integrity means disinterest, etc. From this it would seem that men are in agreement only about the concept of property, and that the public official can make free use of the life, honor, liberty, of all the other goods which citizens have, provided that he respects their money and possessions. (4 Feb., Sunday, 1827.)

  Cano is, con–cino is [to sing, to play music], etc.—Vati–cinor aris [to foretell], etc., buccinare [to sound the trumpet], etc. See Forcellini.

  [4248] ἐθέλειν [to want] for δύνασθαι [to be capable of]. See Casaubon, on Athenaeus, bk. 8, at the end of ch. 10. Plato, ed. Ast, vol. 4, p. 104, line 23; p. 200, line 9.1

  μοχθηρος has a different accent when it means unhappy and when it means wicked; μόχθηρος or μοχθηρὸς, as I have noted elsewhere [→Z 3343, 4213] about πονηρος. See Casaubon, on Athenaeus, bk. 8, ch. 10, title and beginning.

  On the Aeolic digamma, see Casaubon, on Athenaeus, bk. 8, ch. 11, twice.2

  To what I have said elsewhere [→Z 3569–70] about curtus, cortar, scortare, scorciare, accorciare, etc., add accortare.

  Metior iris–metor aris [to measure]. And also metio (Lactantius uses the passive metiebantur)3 and meto.

  Capperi [Good heavens!]. Greek origin of this exclamation. See Ménage, on Laertius, bk. 7, § 32.4

  ῾Ρακεία–racaille [rabble, riffraff]. See Casaubon, on Athenaeus, bk. 9, ch. 5.

  Sottosopra [upside down], sossopra, sozzopra, etc.—ἄνω κάτω.

  Assegnato for parco [thrifty], etc. See Crusca, and Caro, Letter 175, vol. 1.

  Certainly many things in nature do well, in other words they exist in such a way that they can survive and continue, which otherwise they could not. But an infinite number, perhaps many more than the former, do badly and are badly put together, to the extreme discomfort of creatures, things both moral and physical which could easily have been put together well. Yet because they do not destroy the present order of things, they do badly regularly and naturally, they are regular and natural ills. But we do not argue from them that the structure of the universe is the work of a nonintelligent cause; rather, from the things that do well we believe that we can argue with certainty that the universe is the product of an intelligence. We say that these ills are mysteries, that they seem ills to us but are not; yet it does not occur to us to suspect that those goods too are mysteries, and that they seem goods to us but are not. These considerations confirm the system of Strato of Lampsacus, described by me in a little work on this specific matter.5 (18 February, Sexagesima Sunday, 1827.)

  ῎Αλλος [other] redundant. See Casaubon on Athenaeus, bk. 9, ch. 10, after the middle, where Casaubon does not seem to have paid attention to the Grecism, nor to have properly understood it.

  For p. 4184. Anyway, because of my tendency to monophagy I can be compared with the bird the Greeks called a porphyrion, if the account of Athenaeus and Aelian is true that it doesn’t like witnesses when it is eating. See Casaubon on Athenaeus, 9, ch. 10, after the beginning.6 See p. 4422.

  [4249] “Giuoco di mano, giuoco di villano [magic trick, low trick], is a very true saying, among the few true sayings of the Italians.” Chesterfield, Letters to His Son, letter 259.1 The Count of Chesterfield was truly most knowledgeable and knew the language, even in the particulars and smallest sayings commonly used by us. Nor do I disapprove of his many opinions about our literature and affairs, such as, e.g., his view about Petrarch (letter 217), which is similar to that of Sismondi:2 “Petrarca is, in my mind, a sing-song lovesick Poet; much admired, however, by the Italians: but an Italian, who should think no better of him than I do, would certainly say, that he deserved his Laura better than his Lauro” (alluding to the coronati
on of the Poet in Rome); “and that wretched quibble would be reckoned an excellent piece of Italian wit.”3 Begging pardon of his Lordship, I do not believe that the last remark is true, nor that it was so in his time, though I quite agree with his opinion about Petrarch. See p. 4263. Such a view would find few supporters in Italy, except for myself. But what he writes about our sayings and proverbs is certainly false, etc. (It might be useful for an article about proverbs.) (Recanati, 27 Feb., last day of Carnival, 1827.)

  Ultimatamente for ultimamente [lately], Crusca. Bembo also uses it in his Letters.

  Bembo was a 16th-century Cesari; Cesari is a 19th-century Bembo. They are similar in the effects they brought about, and in the circumstances of their times as far as language is concerned, and in the methods used and in their ideas, that is, in their devotion to the 1300s, etc. But they are also very similar in their natural being (apart from being neighbors, and from the same province). Much reading and study: no natural intelligence; no semblance of it being acquired by art. Never a glimmer, never a spark of genius, never a happy streak in their writing. Aridity, sterility, bareness and desert everywhere. Few or none of our writers and books that have enjoyed fame and are still in print were ever so poor in this respect as Bembo and his writings. (27 Feb. 1827.)