The message the Liberty transmitted on July 6 to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) stated that “Aldis lamp not utilized until after the torpedo attack.”15 This was apparently a handheld Aldis lamp, because the starboard twenty-four-inch Aldis lamp had been destroyed in the air attack. Commander McGonagle testified at the court of inquiry that “the center boat of the [Israeli] formation was signalling to us. . . . It was not possible to read the signals because of the intermittent blocking of view by smoke and flames.”16 While the Liberty testimonies indicate no signaling in response to the MTB signals, the MTBs thought they saw a response of “A-A.” A U.S. embassy officer in Tel Aviv spoke with an Israeli MTB officer and reported: “The source officer said he was comm[unications] officer on his MTB and worked the signal light himself. He sent the international request for identification to Liberty, A-A and Liberty responded with A-A.”17
Whether the Israeli officer (who was probably Aharon Yifrach) saw flashes of light or just imagined he saw a return signal of “A-A” will never be known. Perception at that moment was more important than reality, whatever that reality was.
As the MTBs were signaling with their lights and trying to communicate with the smoking ship, the Liberty opened machine-gun fire on the MTBs. This fact is beyond dispute and was clearly reported in the testimony of Commander McGonagle before the court of inquiry on June 13, 1967, and in a videotaped press conference given by McGonagle on board the Liberty on July 29, 1967,18 the day Liberty arrived at her home port in the United States. McGonagle said, “I had previously directed a man from the bridge to proceed to the forward starboard gun mount and take the torpedo boats under fire in an attempt to defend ourselves. When I saw what appeared to be the Israeli flag, I yelled to the fo’c’sle because I had no phone communications with the men and I yelled to him to tell him to hold fire. But before he was able to understand what I was trying to tell him, he opened fire on the boats as I had [previously] directed.”19
There is some disagreement about the number of Liberty’s guns that fired and whether one gun fired as a result of flames detonating its ammunition or was fired by a gunner.20 At least one MTB commander has told this author that he was not certain that the MTBs knew they had been fired upon. However, as early as the IDF report by Col. Ram Ron, dated June 16, 1967, the Israelis mention gunfire emanating from the Liberty and directed at the MTBs, and Commander McGonagle was of the impression that the boats knew they were being shot at. The Ram Ron report quotes the Division 914 war log, “At 1435 the torpedo boats reported seeing gun flashes from the ship’s direction.”21 The 1982 IDF History report states that “the latter [the division commander] discerned flashes of gunshot fire emanating from the ship, and the commander of T-203 saw the fire and reported hits in the vicinity of T-206.”22
A very important factor that added to the MTBs’ misperception was that the Liberty opened machine-gun fire on them. When the Liberty began shooting at the MTBs as they signaled, a new reality set in, rendering any light signal response or lack of response from the Liberty unimportant. Commander McGonagle testified on June 13, 1967, “As far as the torpedo boats are concerned, I am sure that they felt that they were under fire from USS Liberty.”23
It gets worse. The MTB division commander, Cdr. Moshe Oren, is the one who ordered the signal “A-A” sent to the smoking ship in front of him. The formal definition of signaling repeatedly “A-A” as a flashing-light transmission is stated as “Call for unknown station or general call.” The formal answering signal would be a continuous sequence of “TTTT” (four Ts). A sequence of signal exchanges would then follow and would finally result in the vessels transmitting their respective identification codes to each other. In everyday use on the high seas, the formal sequence is shortened to flashing repeatedly a series of “A-As.” The receiving vessel is expected to signal its international identification code, which for the USS Liberty was “NIYR.” The originating ship would then respond with its identification code. This of course assumes that the receiving ship understands what is being signaled.24
Looking for an enemy ship, Oren was not without prior experience in this type of situation. Eleven years before, he had been the gunnery officer on the destroyer Jaffa when she engaged the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim al Awwal. On that occasion, the Jaffa had signaled “A-A.” Ibrahim al Awwal had signaled back “A-A.” Now, on June 8, 1967, Oren said to himself, “Déjà vu. You ask an Egyptian ship to identify itself and it returns the same signal back.”
Each MTB carried an IDF-produced ship-identification guide called the “Red Book.” The formal title of the guide was Identification of Arabian Navies.25 As Oren observed the smoking ship and thought he saw a signal of “A-A,” the MTB commanders on the other two boats each looked at their Red Books. They saw in the water before them an “old tub” of a ship covered with smoke. The ship had a superstructure and one funnel in its center, as well as one mast forward and one aft. The Egyptian Z-class destroyers also had one funnel, with two masts, but they had substantial gun mounts, which this ship did not have. The only other ship in the Red Book with that configuration was the old Egyptian transport El Quseir. At about the same time, the boat commanders of MTBs 203 and 206 independently identified the target as the El Quseir. Moshe Oren was certain the target was Egyptian. When he heard that the other boat commanders identified her as the El Quseir, he said, “If [name not released],26 the commanding officer of boat 203, says it is the El Quseir, it is the El Quseir.” Uri “Chera” Tsur, a junior officer in training, stood next to the commanding officer of boat 206 as he compared the burning target with the picture of El Quseir in the Red Book and was not satisfied with the identification, but what is a junior officer in training to do when his opinion differs from that of his superiors?27
Shortly after 1417, about five minutes after Colonel Kislev stopped the air attack, air force headquarters in Tel Aviv contacted navy headquarters in Haifa by telephone to advise that the air force had some question about the identification of the target ship. At about the same time, Commander Oren, the MTB division commander, was transmitting by radio to Capt. Issy Rehav, the officer then in tactical command of the navy, at the navy command center in Stella Maris, Haifa, requesting, “Tesha vuv.” Tesha vuv is Hebrew for “nine V,” which was the coded authorization to launch torpedoes.
Rehav was getting some information by telephone from the air force in the Kirya concerning the identification of the ship. He responded, suggesting the MTBs hold up because there was some doubt about the identification of the ship.28 Now Oren, with his boats under fire, informed Rehav that he had no doubt about the identification of the ship as an enemy vessel, simply because it was shooting at him!29 It would have been difficult to deny a request for permission to attack to a commander on the scene who was taking enemy fire. Indeed, if the MTBs were engaging an Egyptian destroyer, they were in mortal danger. Four Soviet-built Egyptian destroyers were armed with four 5.1-inch guns each, and two British-built Egyptian destroyers were armed with four 4.5-inch guns each. Whether anyone remembered that the British-built Z-class destroyers were in the Red Sea is not known, but the four Soviet-built Skory-class destroyers were in the Mediterranean. A direct hit from any of those guns could easily penetrate the wooden hull of an MTB and blow the craft to smithereens. Captain Rehav had a few seconds to make his decision.
If Rehav was not aware of the identification of the target as El Quseir and believed the target was an Egyptian destroyer, as earlier suspected and reported, then his authorization of the torpedo attack was appropriate. Yet the naval headquarters war log and the report of Col. Ram Ron make it clear that by 1424, Rehav had received a report that the target “may be a commercial vessel or a supply ship,” and by 1436 the MTB division had reported that the identification as El Quseir was definite. Nevertheless, Rehav responded, “Tesha vuv approved.” The time was about 1430.
Commander Oren, in the lead torpedo boat, boat 204, immediately began racing toward the Liberty for a torpedo attack. Doctrine
and training demanding simultaneous runs from different angles from both sides of the target vessel were ignored. The other two boats followed as best they could, ultimately launching five torpedoes. The Liberty, on her part, did not execute any evasive maneuvers. Commander McGonagle testified, “I elected to maintain a course of 283 at maximum speed.”30 Only one of the five torpedoes struck the Liberty. The torpedo that hit came from MTB 203. The other torpedo from boat 203 passed ahead of the ship and was seen by some of Liberty’s crew. The other three torpedoes, two from MTB 206 and one from MTB 204, passed astern the Liberty. When the captain of MTB 204, Gil Keren, was asked by the other boat captains why he had launched only one torpedo, he replied, “Moshe Oren said ‘launch torpedo,’ not ‘launch torpedoes.’”31 A graphic of the torpedo attack was prepared based on an interview of the commanding officer of MTB 203, who told this author that the Liberty had turned to the north and the MTBs attacked on a westerly heading. Commander McGonagle testified that the Liberty maintained a heading of 283°, which is thirteen degrees north of west. In either situation the MTBs would have had the sun somewhat in their eyes during the torpedo run. It is possible that the Liberty was still steering a little more north of west than her skipper remembered following the air attack, and it is also possible that the MTB commander was incorrect in his recollection. The difference in headings is not significant. Notwithstanding the precise headings of the Liberty and the MTBs, the attack was carried out essentially in the manner depicted in the graphic.
MTB Torpedo Attack
Torpedo attack all MTBs on the starboard side of Liberty. Attack was toward the sun at an elevation of 50° and azimuth 88°.
According to Rear Adm. Benjamin “Biny” Telem, the commander in chief of the Israel Navy during its most successful period of operations, the 1973 war,32 the torpedoes on MTB 203 and MTB 204 were German-made nineteen-inch torpedoes, acquired as part of the Israel Navy’s worldwide shopping efforts. The torpedoes on MTB 206 were eighteen-inch torpedoes purchased from Italy. All of the torpedoes were originally aircraft torpedoes that had been converted for use by Israel Navy surface ships. The only one of these torpedoes that ever actually hit a target was the one that hit the Liberty. According to Telem, over a period of several years prior to the attack on the Liberty, and including the five torpedoes launched against the Liberty, the Israel Navy had launched about fifty torpedoes, mostly in training exercises. Forty-eight of these torpedoes missed their targets. Of the remaining two, a few years before 1967, one torpedo ran hot and circled back to hit the Israeli ship that had launched it.33 The other one hit the Liberty.
Throughout the torpedo attack, the MTBs fired their .50-caliber machine guns as well as their 20 mm and 40 mm cannon in a response to the fire from the Liberty. They continued firing, as standard procedure would warrant. As they passed the Liberty, they reported a flag hanging limp and partially obscured by the smoke. Following the air attack but prior to the torpedo boat attack, the Liberty hoisted her larger, seven-by-thirteen-foot holiday ensign. According to an interview with Aharon Yifrach, the MTBs distinguished the red color in the flag and immediately reported to their command center that they thought the target might be Soviet. Within minutes they passed the curved stern, which bore the name Liberty, and observed non-Arabic letters on the ship. This is different from entries in both the Israel Navy headquarters war log and the MTB Division 914 war log. The MTB Division 914 log reads: “1451—Report to SEA/3: ‘vessel may be Russian.’ SEA/3 asked on what basis? DIV Commander replied: Based on writing on back [stern] of vessel.” The IDF Navy headquarters war log reads: “1451—May be Russian nationality, based on writing on aft. An order was made to dispatch a tug boat from Ashdod.”
MTB 203 then recovered one of the damaged life rafts that had been put over the side by the Liberty crewmen in anticipation of abandoning ship.34 The raft had “U.S. Navy” painted on it. At this point the crew of MTB 203 concluded the ship was American. Commander McGonagle testified that “immediately after the ship was struck by the torpedo the torpedo boats milled around astern of the ship at a range of 500 to 800 yards. One of the boats signaled by flashing light in English ‘Do you require assistance?’” The Liberty log reports indicate (and McGonagle later testified before the U.S. Navy court of inquiry) that the first offer of help from the Israeli MTBs occurred at 1503, a little less than thirty minutes after the torpedo hit the ship. According to Ensign Yifrach, the CIC officer on MTB 204, at about 1630 Sinai time the MTBs again approached the Liberty to a distance where they could speak by megaphone and again offered help. Official U.S. reports state that the offer of help was declined.35 Yifrach said, “They told us to go to hell.”
Admiral Erell arrived back at the navy headquarters in Stella Maris after the authorization for the torpedo attack had been given but before the report of the torpedo strike was received at the navy command center. Upon being briefed on the situation, he immediately countermanded the order, and his order was transmitted by radio to the MTB division commander on board MTB 204. Commander Oren stated he did not receive the order. There is evidence that the order was received by the CIC officer on MTB 204. It is not possible to know for certain if the order was given or received before the torpedoes were launched or after the torpedoes were in the water.
The MTBs were communicating by radio with the navy command center at Stella Maris. The air force planes communicated by radio with the Kirya and with the MTBs by UHF radio. The air force communicated with the navy by land line or conventional telephone. If the incident were not so tragic, some of the air force controller’s transmissions would be humorous. As is clear from the air control recordings, the Israel Air Force had just been through a roller-coaster ride: it is an Egyptian ship; it is an American ship; it is a Soviet ship; it is an American ship! The air force air controllers were confused as to whether they were initiating rescue operations of friends or capturing Egyptian enemy prisoners.
The first Israeli search-and-rescue Super Frelon helicopter pilot to reach the Liberty after the air attack and the torpedo strike saw no one on deck and did not see a flag.36 He remembers that occasionally a door or hatch would open and a crewman would scurry in or out, and some waved him away. About thirty minutes after the conclusion of the attacks, at about 1512, the second Israeli helicopter pilot reported to the air force command center that he saw an American flag on the ship.37 James Ennes, George Golden, and many others have claimed that there exists a recording of an Israeli pilot stating he saw an American flag on the Liberty before or during the air attack. Thus far no one has produced such a tape. The only publicly released recorded statement of an Israeli pilot reporting an American flag on the ship is the report of the second helicopter pilot made at least forty-four minutes after the air and sea attacks had been terminated.
The translations of the transcripts of the tapes of the Israeli air traffic controllers recorded in Hebrew at Israel Air Force command headquarters reveal a great deal. It is clear from the conversations between the air controllers that they were still trying to sort out the identity of the Liberty thirty to forty-five minutes after the last shot was fired. (See excerpts of the translations of the transcriptions of the Israel Air Force tapes in appendix 2.) Although the air attack lasted twelve to fourteen minutes and the sea attack was over by approximately 1440, many of the Liberty crew members remained terrified, fearful of further attacks, until after the sun went down, approximately four hours after the attacks were over.
Meanwhile, over five hundred miles to the west, the Sixth Fleet was responding to the information that a U.S. ship was under attack near geographic coordinates 31-23 N, 33-25 E. Admiral Martin, the Sixth Fleet commander, ordered F-4B Phantom jet fighters and A-1 Skyraiders launched to defend the Liberty. The naval messages transmitted, including the situation reports sent by Admiral Martin to Admiral McCain, Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Europe, indicate that the aircraft were launched at about 1600 Sinai time from the carriers America and Saratoga and were recalled by Martin foll
owing receipt of the message from Commander Castle, the U.S. naval attaché in Tel Aviv, advising that the Israelis had attacked the ship by mistake. The records of the messages establish that Martin recalled the aircraft before or at about the time the first word of the attack reached President Johnson in Washington. When the Israeli high command in the Kirya became aware with certainty that the target was a U.S. Navy ship, Lt. Col. Michael “Mike” Bloch, an IDF army intelligence officer serving as liaison with foreign military attachés, was ordered to advise the U.S. naval attaché in Tel Aviv of the situation. Bloch contacted Cdr. Ernest Castle at the U.S. embassy by telephone and advised him of the attacks and offered to send a car to take him from the U.S. embassy on Hayarkon Street in Tel Aviv to the high command headquarters at the Kirya.
Bloch later told this author that he has had better duty than telling his friend at the American embassy that Israel had just attacked a U.S. ship. Castle told this author that he had never seen his usually self-confident Israeli counterparts so totally shattered, nor had he ever been offered a car before, or was he thereafter. A brief meeting took place between Bloch, Lt. Col. Arye Shalev, and one other Israeli officer. When Commander Castle arrived, they were studying a volume of Jane’s Fighting Ships. Castle was told that they believed they had attacked a U.S. Navy ship. Castle, who had not been aware of the incident until informed about it by Bloch, was angry and later recalled that it was difficult for him to remain restrained. He was then driven back to the U.S. embassy, arriving at about 1600 Sinai time. He reported the incident to Ambassador Walworth Barbour, who had just received a similar report from the Israel Foreign Ministry.
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