To get a better idea of the size of Liberty’s flag, it is useful to compare it to the “star-spangled banner” that was “seen through the night” on September 12, 1814, during the War of 1812. That flag, flown by Maj. George Armistad over Fort McHenry, in Maryland, was thirty feet by forty-two feet, and each stripe was two feet wide. The Liberty’s flag was forty square feet, while the banner over Fort McHenry was 1,260 square feet, or more than thirty-one times larger than Liberty’s flag, which was much more akin to the flags flown on private homes on national holidays than to the huge flags frequently flown by American automobile dealerships. The ship also had her abbreviated hull designation, “GTR 5,” painted on both sides of her bow and stem in white letters and numbers with a black shadowing. The number 5 was about ten feet tall, while the letters were about half that size. Many crew members believe that these features should have been sufficient for identification by the approaching aircraft. Also, many crew members believe that the ship, with her various arrays of antennae, was so unique that her configuration should have been identified by the attacking aircraft as well as by the motor torpedo boats.
Many people have held these beliefs for more than thirty years, and in most cases they are not likely to reconsider them. The primary argument, frequently referred to as the “Liberty was clearly marked” argument, is that June 8, 1967, was a clear day, a fact not disputed by anyone; that the Liberty was in international waters, which is also undisputed but also not really significant, since she was in eye view of hostilities; and that she was clearly marked by flying on the main halyard, a five-by-eight-foot U.S. flag that was fully extended at the time of the attack. The flag was visible to crewmen on the deck of the Liberty; therefore, the argument goes, it had to have been seen and identified by the attacking aircraft.
Attack profile of a Mirage IIIC: Aircraft flying against ship displaying 5 × 8 foot flag
The pilot could discern a 5 × 8 foot shape at about three nautical miles out. However the pilot could not discern color, or distinguish the stripes, outside of one quarter of a nautical mile.
What does a pilot see during a head on run at a ship?
The ship is steering west at 5 nautical mph. The plane is flying east at about 600 mph.
The first question one must ask is, from how far away could a pilot of an attacking military aircraft see a flag? If the flag was perpendicular to the approaching aircraft and in good light, according to the mathematical formula for visual acuity, the red and white stripes on a five-by-eight-foot U.S. flag might be identifiable at 1,323 feet.5 A military aircraft pilot approaching at almost a thousand feet per second (almost six hundred miles per hour) would have a little less than two seconds to see and identify the flag. A jet airplane attacking at high subsonic speed would complete firing its guns in two to three seconds during its attack run and wou1d have pu1led off the target before getting closer than 2,500 feet, which is not close enough to see or identify a five-by-eight-foot flag.
But suppose the flag could have been seen from a distance longer than the calculated 1,323 feet. What, then, does a pilot see during a head-on run at a ship? If the flag was extended and flying in a normal manner—that is, corresponding to and parallel with the length of the ship—a pilot attacking from the bow would see the edge of the flag, which would be of no assistance in identification. It is this author’s conclusion that under the wind conditions at the time of the attack, the flag was not extended but rather drooped on the halyard and did not help in identification. A number of the Liberty crew have recollections of looking up at the flag and seeing it fully or partially extended. Appendix H of the Ennes book, Assault on the “Liberty,” “Ship Weather Observation Sheet” for June 8, 1967, shows wind observations up to 1100 GMT, 1300 Sinai time, about an hour before the air attack. The document shows light winds and calm seas. It is possible to argue with the Ennes calculations, but it is not necessary, because the report ends an hour before the attack and therefore contributes nothing other than a history of the morning weather conditions. The U.S. Navy court of inquiry in June 1967 concluded that “the calm conditions and slow ship speed may well have made the American flag difficult to identify.” In a separate message Admiral McCain advised the Secretary of the Navy on June 14: “Following received from Liberty. Quote: . . . c. Flat calm condition and slow (5) knot speed of Liberty in forenoon when she was being looked over initially may well have produced insufficient relative wind for steaming colors to be seen by pilots.”6
Gun-camera film from first Mirage IIICJ during the attack on the Liberty at about 1400 June 8, 1967. Note that the smoke ascends straight up; thus the flag hung straight down as the air attack took place. Kursa Flight Leader Photos
Royal Flight leader, the attacking Israeli pilot of the second flight to hit the Liberty, reported to air force control that there was no flag (actually, that they saw no flag) on the ship, as is evident from the recording at 1412. This was stated again in Kursa Flight leader’s pilot debriefing report filed at 1500 Sinai time on June 8: “We had an identifying run around her and saw it did not have an Israeli Navy sign as published. There also was no flag on the mast.”7
The best evidence of the status of the flag at 1400 comes from Kursa Flight leader’s gun-camera film. When Kursa Flight leader made his attack runs on the Liberty, his gun camera recorded the conditions. An examination of the films, a frame of which is shown on the cover of the first edition of this book, and of other frames shown here, shows that the huge pall of smoke from the fire on board the Liberty, which was in the vicinity of the main halyard where the flag was hoisted, is ascending straight up. If the smoke rose straight up, then the flag drooped straight down, as, indeed, the U.S. Navy court of inquiry concluded.
The Israeli gun-camera film was not available for examination by the court of inquiry, but pictures were taken on the Liberty itself during the attacks. These pictures were available to the court and are contained in exhibits in its official record. The pictures include both the attacking aircraft and the attacking motor torpedo boats.8 These pictures independently establish what the Israeli gun-camera film shows: a straight-up ascent of smoke rising from the ship, confirming that there was hardly any relative wind.9
Assuming for the sake of argument that the wind and the light were right and the Israeli pilots got close enough to see the flag for a second or two, would that have been enough to make an identification? Americans are familiar with the U.S. flag, consisting of red and white horizontal stripes and a field of blue studded with stars. The Liberian flag also has horizontal red and white stripes and a field of blue (as does the flag of Malaysia). At any given time in the last half-century, there were probably more ships on the high seas flying Liberian flags than U.S. flags, because of the ever-increasing practice of flagging ships in Liberia. No U.S. warship had made a port call in Israel since November 1963. Israel Air Force pilots did not often see the U.S. flag flying on a naval ship so near the coast in the eastern Mediterranean, although most Israelis would probably recognize an American flag quite easily if they had a clear view of it. But many more ships flying the Liberian flag than the American flag had made port calls in Israel in the years between 1948 and 1967.
Further, the International Committee of the Red Cross has pointed out in its Law of War Handbook that a flag is not a reliable means of identifying the nationality of a warship.10 This is because the law of naval warfare permits warships to fly a false flag as a “ruse of war.”11
In one of the most famous naval battles ever fought by the American navy, on September 23, 1779, Capt. John Paul Jones sailed the Bonhomme Richard, flying a British flag, alongside the British ship Serapis: “[British captain] Pearson hailed, ‘What ship is that?’ Paul Jones, in order to get into close action, was flying British colors. . . . [The Serapis] hailed again, ‘Answer immediately, or I shall be under the necessity of firing into you.’ Jones struck his British colors, caused a big red white and blue striped American ensign to be raised, and gave the word to fire his st
arboard broadside.”12
During World War II, German captain Hans Langsdorff flew a French flag from the German pocket battleship Graf Spee while approaching his targets before attacking.
Now Langsdorff used a new technique. He steamed straight at his victims, believing rightly that they would not recognize him head-on as a German and would probably think he was French. Sometimes he flew the French flag, and changed it at the last moment for the German swastika.13
The Graf Spee’s crew ran to action stations with the prospect of the first bit of excitement for more than three weeks. Again the French Tri-color was hoisted, and the 5.9-inch guns were loaded.14
It is thus recognized in professional military circles that the identification of a warship by means of its flag is neither practical nor conclusive.
The size of a ship on the surface is of little help in identifying it from the cockpit of a plane. In May 1941 the British were chasing the German battleship Bismarck. The British cruiser Sheffield was a few miles behind the Bismarck. The British carrier Ark Royal launched its Swordfish torpedo bombers. They promptly dove through the clouds and launched their torpedoes against the Sheffield, a vessel just under a fifth the displacement of the Bismarck.15 Fortunately for the Sheffield, the Fleet Air Arm pilots’ aim was no better than their ship identification. All the torpedoes missed. It made no difference to the Royal Navy pilots that the Bismarck was about eight hundred feet long and displaced about 42,000 tons, while the Sheffield was only 591 feet long and displaced only nine thousand tons.16 The Sheffield was less than 73 percent of the length of the Bismarck and almost one-fifth of its displacement. The El Quseir was 275 feet long, or about 60 percent of the Liberty’s 455-foot length, and displaced 2,640 tons, less than a quarter of the Liberty’s 10,680-ton displacement.17
Over the water, with no points of reference, it is very difficult to judge height or distance, or the length or displacement of a ship. An observer cannot be certain whether a ship is smaller and closer to the observer, or larger and farther away. It is interesting, however, to compare the silhouettes of the Liberty and the El Quseir; each had a mast forward, a mast to the rear, a superstructure in the middle, and a single smokestack. The CIA report concluded they could easily be mistaken by an overzealous pilot. It is even more interesting to compare the silhouettes of the Bismarck and the Sheffield. The Bismarck has two single-pole masts, while the Sheffield has two tripod masts; the Bismarck has one smokestack as compared to two on the Sheffield.
The Israeli pilots and motor-torpedo-boat sailors had never before seen either the Liberty or the El Quseir, while the British pilots from the Ark Royal had been fully briefed on their target, the Bismarck, and had also been steaming in company with the Sheffield for weeks.
In the U.S. Navy, naval aviators were trained to report ship traffic by the configuration of the bow, number of masts, number of smokestacks, placement of the stacks, and placement and description of the superstructure. They were seldom expected to identify ships by name or even type. An Israel Air Force officer told this author that the Israel Navy had “two types of ships, big Dabours and little Dabours.” In fact, the Israel Navy had six types of large missile boats of the Saar class (saar means “tempest”) and two types of smaller patrol boats of the Dabour class (dabour means “wasp”). The typical Israel Air Force pilot was not well trained in the identification of ships at sea.
On June 4, 1967, the commander of the United Nations Emergency Force, Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye of the Indian army, was flying in his personal plane from Cairo to El Arish. Passing Port Said, the general remembers that
the captain of the aircraft, who looked extremely excited, came up to me, and pointing at some ships at sea below, said “Sixth Fleet! They’re just a few miles off Port Said.” He was referring to the United States Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean area.
We made several circuits, gradually losing altitude. Through a pair of binoculars all I could see were a number of oil tankers, whereas the captain insisted he had seen an aircraft carrier. I was taken up to the cockpit to get a better view, where a very excited first pilot . . . shouted “Sixth Fleet! Sixth Fleet!” . . . All I could see, however, were oil tankers steaming towards the north end of the Suez Canal . . . I was amazed at the inability of the air crew, probably all of whom at one time or another had served in the UAR air force, to differentiate between an aircraft carrier of nearly fifty thousand tons and oil tankers, none of which was over ten thousand tons.18
General Rikhye’s comparison of the ten-thousand-ton tankers to the “fifty thousand ton” carriers is similar to the disparity between the Bismarck and the Sheffield; the Bismarck was about five times the displacement of the Sheffield. In fact, the carriers America, at 61,174 tons, and Saratoga, at 59,098 tons, were each approximately six times the displacement of the ten-thousand-ton tankers. The tankers were being observed by persons on an aircraft who had the luxury of making “several circuits, gradually losing altitude” without the stress of a war in progress within view.
It has been said that under wartime tensions and pressures one will find whatever one wants to find. If one wants to find enemy infiltrators, one will find them; if one wants to find an enemy submarine, one will find it; if one wants to find an enemy ship, one will find it. During the American Civil War, on May 2, 1863, Confederate soldiers wanted to find infiltrating Yankees. They found them, and as a result, the Confederate army lost one of its most famous and able generals. “Stonewall” Jackson died after his own troops mistook him for the enemy and mortally wounded him as he was returning from a scouting mission. In a parallel event during the 1948 War for Independence, an Israeli sentry, looking for an Arab infiltrator, shot and killed Brig. Gen. Mickey Marcus, mistaking the American volunteer for an enemy infiltrator. Marcus, a West Point graduate, had joined the Israel Army in 1948 and was in command of the Israeli forces fighting for Jerusalem.
According to Geoffrey Regan in his book Blue on Blue: A History of Friendly Fire, “The most remarkable example of amicicide in naval history occurred in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War,” when Russian admiral Zinovi Rozhestvensky identified a British trawler fleet of hundred-ton vessels fishing off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea as a fleet of Japanese torpedo boats and attacked them.19 Only the terrible aim of the Russian fleet kept the tragedy from being worse.
On October 15, 1918, the British Q-ship Cymric was looking for a German submarine. Instead, she sank the British submarine J-6. “Cymric noted a limp ensign flying from the submarine’s flagpole, but took no notice of that—they had been fooled by false colors in the past.” According to Regan in Blue on Blue, “In World War I, three times, British submarines mistook British ships for German and tried to torpedo them.”20 Regan notes, “Conversely, three British cruisers tried to ram British submarines, mistaking them for German U-boats.”21
Mistaken identification of a ship by an aircraft is not a new phenomenon. On February 22, 1940, a lone German bomber sank two German destroyers at a cost of 578 lives.22 The Lebrecht Masse was struck with two bombs, broke in two, and sank. In 1974 off Cyprus, Turkish F-4s sank their own former U.S. Fletcher (DD 445)–class destroyer with the flotilla commander on board.
During the 1956 Suez campaign a flight of four Israeli Mystère aircraft, led by Danny Shapira,23 were finishing bombing runs when they observed an Egyptian Z-class destroyer in the Gulf of Aqaba.24 They immediately attacked the ship, inflicting slight damage. Soon they learned that the “Egyptian” destroyer had been in fact HMS Crane, a British destroyer that had proceeded to a point in advance of where the Royal Navy had advised Israel that it would be operating.25 The largest tank battle of the 1956 Suez campaign occurred at Abu Ageila, where two Israeli tank units fought each other with devastating results.26 The United States and the Israelis have each suffered from amicicide in every war in which they have fought.
The myth of the invincible and faultless Israel Defense Forces has been replaced with the analysis that the IDF is a superior fight
ing force but neither invincible nor faultless. Israelis do make mistakes. On June 5, 1967, the Israel Air Force bombed a column of Israeli Sherman tanks during the battle for Jerusalem. On June 8, 1967, the IAF bombed and strafed the Israel Army just a few hours before the attacks on the Liberty began. In the preceding days, Israeli forces had mistakenly killed a number of Indian and Brazilian UN troops in the Sinai.
Adm. John S. McCain Jr., the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, who endorsed Admiral Kidd’s U.S. Navy court of inquiry report with the comment, “The attack [on the Liberty] was in fact a mistake” (see chapter 12), was aware from personal experience that a flag flown on a surface vessel offered little in the way of identification and protection against friendly air attack. During World War II, McCain commanded the U.S. submarine Gunnel (SS 253) on a secret mission to guide the U.S. invading armada to the beaches of Morocco. When the Gunnel’s mission was complete, McCain was ordered to sail away from the invasion site on the surface flying an American flag illuminated by a spotlight. While proceeding as ordered, the Gunnel was attacked and strafed by an American P-40.27
Unfortunately, another more recent example underscores the difficulty of positively identifying the enemy under stressful conditions. On April 14, 1995, in northern Iraq, on a clear day, in broad daylight with visibility unrestricted, U.S. Air Force F-15s shot down two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters, each with six large U.S. flags prominently painted on all sides. No shooting war was taking place at the time. There was no adrenaline flowing. The helicopters had little or no offensive capability as far as the F-15s were concerned, nor were they a threat to U.S. or coalition forces in the area. This tragedy was compounded by the fact that the F-15s had state-of-the-art Identification Friend or Foe transponder equipment on board and were being controlled by a U.S. Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft with state-of-the-art radar and electronic surveillance equipment.
The Liberty Incident Revealed Page 11