•In 1991, during the Gulf War, almost as many British soldiers were killed by United States forces as by Iraqis.
•In Afghanistan in 2002, the U.S. Air Force dropped a laser-guided five-hundred-pound bomb that killed four Canadians and wounded eight.
•Later in Afghanistan, National Football League star Pat Tillman was killed by members of his own Army unit.
•On the first day of the Iraq war, the United States shot down a British jet and incredibly the next week shot down a U.S. Navy jet.
•On May 7, 1999, the United States, by mistake, bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia; to this day the Chinese refuse to accept the explanation that the bombing was a mistake.
In military operations, attention to detail is important. The smallest detail or oversight can result in inefficiency, ineffectiveness, failure, and even disaster. With the Liberty, there were many little mistakes on both sides, each of which, if it had not occurred, might have broken the chain of events that led to the tragedy. Military operations require precision, attention, and knowledge in order to succeed. It is prudent to keep friendly forces advised of force movements and deployments.
It is useful to remember that the United States had announced in the Security Council of the United Nations that no U.S. ship was within hundreds of miles of the war zone. This announcement did not contribute to the safety of the Liberty. In 1943, an American transport was sunk by an American torpedo boat whose officer had relied on assurances that there were no friendly vessels in the area.28 During the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943, when transports laden with paratroopers overflew a U.S. amphibious force that was undergoing a German bombing attack at night, the amphibious force opened fire and shot down twenty-three U.S. planes, killing sixty air crewmen and about forty paratroopers. Cdr. Thomas Krupp, the naval attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv during 1989 and 1990, was asked if he had an opinion on whether the attack on the Liberty was a mistake.29 He replied: “The only time I was wounded during my naval career was on April 16, 1972, while serving on the destroyer Worden (DLG 18) off Vietnam. The Worden was attacked by U.S. Air Force F-4 aircraft.”30
The Liberty incident is a classic illustration of the terrible results that can occur when friendly forces fail to keep their friends informed of their movements. Intelligence operators are typically paranoid about the security of their missions. The general rule is that security is based on the need to know. It is well established that the National Security Agency did not inform either the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv or any entity in Israel of the intended operations of the Liberty close to the war zone. On the contrary, as noted, the U.S. government had officially stated that there were no U.S. ships in the area. If the NSA had advised the Israel Defense Forces of the voyage of the Liberty along the coast of Sinai, very likely the Liberty incident would not have occurred.
Lt. Col. Danny Grossman (Ret.) of the Israel Air Force sent the following e-mail to this author on August 21, 2001:
I know only too well from dealing with bereaved families of soldiers killed in combat by friendly fire that this is a situation where no explanation can ever be satisfactory. It is one thing to lose a loved one who falls in combat while defending his country and protecting his buddies. Families and survivors learn to deal with this. It is much harder to accept the idea that a loved one is gone due to thoroughly avoidable circumstances. Our [Israel’s] own experience in Lebanon and the U.S. experience in the Gulf War has shown that many parents and survivors [of friendly fire] can never rest until they feel that someone has been made to account for their loss. The facts may never be sufficient for many survivors, but they should be presented in order to help those who are able to finally make peace with the reality that caused so much pain.31
Chapter 8
SURVIVORS’ PERCEPTIONS
By the time the Israeli attacks on the Liberty were over, 34 Americans, most of them working directly for the National Security Agency, were dead and 171 were wounded, many severely.1 On June 8, 1967, William L. McGonagle was the commanding officer of the USS Liberty.2 Although wounded in the air attack, he refused to leave his duty station on the bridge of his ship and continued to command her, directing damage control and the departure from the area following the air and sea attacks. That night he lay on his back on the deck, steering the ship by reference to the stars, to a dawn rendezvous with the U.S. destroyers Davis and Massey. For his “conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty,” President Johnson awarded McGonagle the Medal of Honor.
On June 13, 1967, five days after the attack, McGonagle testified under oath before the U.S. Navy court of inquiry that, following the air attack and as the MTBs were approaching, “I realized that there was a possibility of the aircraft having been Israeli and the attack had been conducted in error.”3 This author first met Captain McGonagle in Washington, D.C., on June 7, 1991. He had refused to comment publicly on the Liberty incident since his press conference in June 1967, other than to praise the professionalism and valor of his crew in saving the ship. This author learned that he and Captain McGonagle had a common interest in flying and that following his retirement from the navy, McGonagle had obtained a commercial pilot’s license in preparation for a career in civil aviation. (He was not able to pursue that career, because he could not maintain his aviation medical certificate as a result of deteriorating vision.)4 Thereafter a warm, friendly relationship developed by correspondence and telephone.
Captain McGonagle was under the impression that he had been intentionally slighted by President Johnson because he received his Medal of Honor at the Navy Yard, while the president awarded twelve other Medals of Honor at the White House on the same day. This author provided him with information that resulted in his writing a letter on August 20, 1998, stating:
Thank you so much for sending a copy of President Johnson’s Daily Diary for June 11, 1968.
I stand corrected on my long held erroneous belief that the President had presented 12 Medals of Honor at the White House on the same day that I received my medal at the Navy Yard. . . .
Your thoughts about “ . . . if President Johnson wished to diminish the honor (of the award) he could have declined to sign the Citation . . .” seems to me to be sound reasoning.5
Captain McGonagle’s Medal of Honor citation
Capt. William L. McGonagle, commanding officer of USS Liberty, wearing his Medal of Honor. U.S. Navy photo
When this author’s doctoral dissertation was published by the Graduate School of International Studies of the University of Miami in 1997, two copies were provided to Captain McGonagle at his request. He wanted one for himself and another that he said he planned to forward to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
A trip together to Israel to meet with Israeli participants in the attacks was discussed, but it was not to be. McGonagle died of lung cancer on March 3, 1999. He was buried with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery on April 9, 1999. The New York Times obituary quoted him as declaring, at a gathering of Liberty survivors in Washington, D.C., in 1997:
I think it is about time that the state of Israel and the United States Government provide the crew members of the Liberty and the rest of the American people the facts of what happened and why the Liberty was attacked 30 years ago today.
For many years I have wanted to believe that the attack on the Liberty was pure error. It appears to me that it was not a pure case of mistaken identity. It was, on the other hand, gross incompetence and aggravated dereliction of duty on the part of many officers and men of the state of Israel.6
This author agrees with Captain McGonagle that it is time to declassify the few remaining classified documents relating to the Liberty incident. In September 2001 this author obtained from the Israel Air Force the transcripts of audiotapes of communications between Israeli air controllers and transmissions of the pilots in the attacking aircraft recorded at IAF command headquarters on June 8, 1967. The tape
s show the confusion of the attacking forces regarding the identification of the target. It is time for the U.S. National Security Agency to grant this author’s Freedom of Information Act appeal and release the transcripts and translations of the tapes recorded by the NSA team on board the U.S. Navy EC-121 aircraft under the supervision of Dr. Nowicki, at the same time the Israel Air Force tapes were recorded, in order to corroborate the Israeli tapes and bring closure to this matter.
The Liberty crewman and personnel assigned to the NSA detachment are a fine group of men who risked their lives in the service of their country. Some of the Liberty’s survivors are bitter and hold various grievances as a result of their traumatic, tragic experience. It is bad enough when shipmates are hit by an enemy. It is probably worse when they are the victims of friendly fire.
Following the incident of June 8, the crew of the USS Liberty were assigned to other ships and stations throughout the fleet. Some left the Navy. Most were disappointed with the treatment they received when they returned to the United States. Like many servicemen during the Vietnam conflict, they did not receive the triumphant welcome home and the warm, affectionate attention that had been showered on their predecessors upon their returns home from World War II. By June 1967 the general public mood of America had turned against the military because of the fierce debate surrounding the Vietnam conflict, and the Liberty veterans were treated just like their comrades in arms who were coming from that theater. While this mistreatment was neither appropriate nor fair, it had nothing to do with their involvement in the Liberty incident. However, some of the Liberty veterans, including some who were suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, perceived their treatment as being connected to the tragic event itself.
In 1981, the Liberty Veterans Association was formed.7 Its first reunion was scheduled for Washington, D.C., on June 5 and 6, 1982. While the real motives of some of the founding members who had not served on the Liberty and certain actions of the association itself might be questionable, it has become an excellent support group for the surviving crew members in general, especially those still suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. The association attempts to hold annual reunions each June and publishes a newsletter several times a year.
The Liberty Veterans Association is composed of individuals who differ in their views about many issues, including the question of whether the Israeli attack was a case of mistaken identity or an intentional attack on a U.S. Navy ship. A short while after the association was formed, a letter from one Liberty officer, who wished to remain anonymous, complained: “I hope you will tone down the radical and extremist nature of the newsletter and that you will avoid outrageous claims. For instance, can you substantiate your claim that Liberty men were held against their will in San Juan and questioned while under the influence of sodium pentothal? I don’t recall press curb or coverup except before the court report was published or with regard to classified material. Can you substantiate these claims?” The letter was signed, “A Liberty officer who requests anonymity.”8
When people are shot at and their shipmates are killed or wounded, it is difficult for them to accept the idea that such an attack was a mistake, let alone to be objective. The Liberty Veterans Association continues to request a congressional investigation of the incident even though five congressional investigations have been conducted since 1967. Certainly, the U.S. government has not been completely forthcoming about the incident. In fact, the U.S. government did release a false statement, but only about the Liberty’s mission off the coast of Sinai on the day she was hit. The Clifford Report of July 1967 was not declassified until October 1995, and the record of proceedings of the U.S. Navy court of inquiry of June 1967 was kept classified for more than nine years, until 1976. As a result, some members of the association have been crying “cover-up.”
On the day of the incident, even before the aerial attack, Liberty crew members observed a good many aircraft around their ship that they presumed were Israeli. As has been mentioned earlier, the ship was observed and positively identified as the Liberty by the Israeli air force routine morning reconnaissance flight. On the other hand, since a major war was being fought in this vicinity, it could be argued that not all the Israeli or other aircraft observed were concerned with the Liberty. In addition, the presence of “a ship” off El Arish was observed and even reported to the Israel Air Force headquarters by other Israeli high-altitude aircraft the Liberty crew never sighted.9
About twenty years after the Liberty incident, word of the theory that the Israelis intentionally attacked a U.S. ship reached a British Thames TV producer, who subsequently came to the United States and listened to the story as told by a number of crew members. He spent a great deal of time with them in 1985 and 1986. The producer believed that some of the survivors were still suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.10 The Liberty veterans themselves confirmed this as recently as 1996 in their newsletter, Liberty News,11 in an article entitled “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.”12 The severe trauma experienced and the lingering after effects are, undoubtedly, deserving of sympathy, but they do not enhance the ability of the victims to impartially analyze the incident.
The argument made by some Liberty veterans that the Israeli attacks were conducted in the knowledge that the Liberty was a U.S. ship and were not a result of mistaken identification is not supported by the evidence. These veterans adopt and repeat a number of allegations about the attacks and believe that they are true. All of the surviving Liberty crew members suffered a horrible experience on June 8, 1967. Many continue to suffer from that experience to this day. Like many other victims of “friendly fire,” they have become obsessed with the cause of their pain as they perceive it, all the more so since they have attracted willing but unholy allies who, if anything, have fanned the flame in order to promote their own agendas. With all the respect that is certainly due the survivors of the Liberty incident, their objectivity is lost or tainted.
Lt. Cdr. George Golden was a lieutenant and the engineering officer on the Liberty on June 8, 1967. He was third in command, and upon the death of Lt. Cdr. Phillip Armstrong, Liberty’s executive officer, Golden became second in command. He testified at the court of inquiry and was the signatory on the Liberty’s engine bell book, which was admitted in evidence as Court of Inquiry Exhibit 15. He and his chief machinist mate, Richard J. Brooks, heroically manned the engine room of the Liberty and kept her engines operating.
Lieutenant Commander Golden, former president of the Liberty Veterans Association, has an excellent memory of many details of events that he personally observed inside the engine room on June 8, 1967, and also many memories of his participation in the production of the Thames TV documentary The Attack on the “Liberty” (see chapter 14). However, Lieutenant Commander Golden confirms that all he knew about the Israeli side of the attack was what he had heard from others.13
Chief Machinist Mate Richard J. Brooks was the senior chief petty officer on the Liberty.14 His general quarters station, or battle station, was in the engine room. When the general quarters alarm sounded at the commencement of the air attack, he went immediately to the engine room, where he remained with Lieutenant Golden until both the air and sea attacks were over. He has a vivid recollection of what took place when the torpedo struck: “Within an instant the Liberty assumed a 9° list and the lubrication alarms sounded as a result of the oil shifting in the oil tanks.” Chief Brooks immediately began pumping oil into the tanks from the reserve tanks. Chief Brooks recalls frantically running the oil from the reserve tanks, because without sufficient oil, the power trains would overheat and self-destruct in seconds. Chief Brooks was emphatic that the ship’s movement from a normal upright position to the nine-degree-list position occurred in an instant.15 This prompt action kept the engines running and was a major factor in keeping the ship under power and ultimately saving her. Chief Brook’s prompt professional action was recognized by the award of the Silver Star. He also was awarded a Purple Heart.<
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Seaman Steven Richards was in the aft deck division locker room with Seaman Thomas Anthony Quintero when the air attack began. Seaman Richards heard a loud noise and thought the TRSSCOMM dish antenna had tipped over. Then the general alarm sounded, and he ran to his battle station, which was forward on the flying bridge on the 04 level. He heard the aircraft but did not see them. He recalls a slight upheaval of the ship when the torpedo struck, followed by a resettling in the water and then a slow roll to the nine-degree-list position.16
The two different recollections of the same event, the ship rolling to a nine-degree list, give a classic example of how perception may differ from reality. Chief Brooks’s perception was influenced by an urgent situation that needed resolution with all possible haste, while Seaman Richards’s perception was not subject to the impending disaster like the one that Chief Brooks was urgently trying to prevent. Thus when recollections of the same event differ, the reason for the difference in most instances is the observer’s perspective rather than lack of candor.
In 1979, James M. Ennes Jr., a Liberty crew member, published a book entitled Assault on the “Liberty”: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship.17 By his own testimony, Ennes was seriously wounded in the leg during the first few minutes of the Israeli air attack and was taken below deck for medical treatment.18 His knowledge of the remainder of the air attack and the subsequent naval attack was based on what he heard or was told rather than on what he observed at first hand.
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