The Liberty Incident Revealed

by A. Jay Cristol

  When the inquiring judge’s decision had been rendered, it was classified and sent to the United States by two different routes. One copy was delivered at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., by Deputy Chief of Mission Ephraim Evron, to the U.S. Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach. Katzenbach read the report in Evron’s presence and then stated that it was an excellent report except for the last sentence. The last sentence stated, “I hold that there is no sufficient amount of prima facie evidence, justifying committing anyone for trial.”

  As a general rule of appellate review, many cases fall into a category called “fairly debatable.” In such cases, the reviewing court allows the decision to stand and does not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the judge who heard the testimony and had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and appearance of the witnesses and deal with the evidence at first hand. Perhaps if the judge had been American rather than Israeli, a decision to prosecute might have been reached. It is always easier for someone conducting a review of actions taken and decisions made under great pressure to calmly and peacefully decide what would have been the best decision. But at the time and place of the event, when the original actors’ glands were pumping adrenaline and the fight-or-flight syndrome was affecting their brains, it becomes more a question of whether they acted reasonably than whether they acted perfectly. Judge Yerushalmi put it this way in his decision: “For all my regret that our forces were involved in an incident with a vessel of a friendly state, and its sad outcome, I ought to put the behavior of each of the officers, who had any connection with the incident, to the test of the conduct of reasonable officers during war operations, when the Naval arm of the Israel Defense Force was confronted with maritime forces superior in numbers, and when all involved were conscious of the task before them—to protect the safety of Israel, to identify every enemy threatening from the sea, to attack it and speedily destroy it. The criterion for reasonable conduct under these conditions may possibly differ from that in time of relative quiet.”8

  A copy of the decision was delivered to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Thomas Moorer, who limited it for dissemination to only four codes in his office: one copy stayed with the CNO, Code 00; one copy went to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Code 09; one went to Operations, Code 62; and one went to Intelligence, Code 92. Although the document has never been declassified, it is easily obtainable in the Pentagon and in Israel.

  Neither Ram Ron’s report nor Judge Yerushalmi’s decision was satisfactory to the U.S. Department of State. The position of the State Department had been since the Liberty incident occurred that the responsible military persons should be punished. The language of the initial notes from Dean Rusk to the Israeli ambassador stated this in no uncertain language. A note handed personally to Ambassador Avraham Harman of Israel by Under Secretary Eugene V. Rostow contained the language, “The Secretary of State wishes to make clear that the United States Government expects the Government of Israel also to take the disciplinary measures which international law requires in the event of wrongful conduct by the military personnel of a State.”9 The Clifford Report also recommended that Israeli military personnel be punished.10

  It is quite common for the country of victims harmed to cry out for punishment by another country of individuals responsible for inflicting the harm. It is far less common for countries to take formal disciplinary action against their own personnel. In the Cam Pha Harbor incident, in which U.S. Air Force planes attacked the Soviet ship Turkestan by mistake, killing and wounding Soviet sailors, a general court-martial against the pilots who made the attack and the colonel who failed to report, or covered up, the incident resulted in acquittal of the pilots and a six-hundred-dollar fine for the colonel. In the USS Stark incident, a court-martial of the Stark’s commanding officer was considered, but instead he was allowed to retire at the next lower rank.11 Although Turkey called for disciplinary action when Sea Sparrow missiles were accidentally launched from the U.S. aircraft carrier Saratoga into the bridge of the Turkish destroyer Muavenet, killing the captain and others and wounding a large number of crew members, the only punishment was a letter of reprimand placed in the file of one U.S. naval officer. In the Black Hawk helicopter shoot-down, one low-ranking air force officer, Capt. James Wang, was sent to court-martial, where he was promptly acquitted.

  Ambassador Evron told this author that the issue of punishment had often been discussed between him and Itzhak Rabin, who on numerous occasions had said to Evron that it was unfortunate that there had been no formal punishment of some military person involved, because people in the United States interpreted the lack of punishment of a lower-ranking person as an indication of a cover-up at a higher level.

  While there was no court-martial, punishment within the understanding of the naval service itself was clearly evident in an event that took place about two weeks after the 1967 war, the most successful war in the history of the state of Israel. Capt. Issy Rehav, the second in command of the Israel Navy and the most likely candidate to become the next commander in chief of the navy, resigned from the service.12 Had Rehav been fired? When asked, Rear Adm. Shlomo Erell, the commander in chief of the navy in 1967, said no. He also said that he had had a heart-to-heart talk with Rehav and pointed out to him that he had made a serious error in judgment when he authorized the tesha vuv, the torpedo attack. Erell pointed out that on the afternoon of June 8, 1967, the burning ship off El Arish had been no threat to Israel or the Israel Defense Forces. There had been many other options, including capturing the ship, that should have been considered. So while most of Israel was rejoicing over the great 1967 victory, a man who had spent his adult life working his way up to a position from which he would probably become commander in chief instead resigned from the navy.

  Royal Flight Mystere attacking from the stern.

  U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  An Israeli torpedo boat passes the port side of USS Liberty following its attack.

  U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  An Israeli torpedo boat passes across the Liberty’s bow. Note the ship’s 10° list to starboard.

  U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  Liberty turns to port during the torpedo attack.

  U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  Capt. Donald D. Engen, right, with Vice Adm. C. T. “Tommy” Booth, Commander, Naval Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, on the flight deck of USS America. On June 8, 1967, Engen was commanding officer of America. Before he retired as a vice admiral, he served as deputy commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet. He later served on the National Transportation Safety Board, as president of AOPA Safety Foundation, as administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, and as director of the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum.

  U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  An A-4C Skyhawk of VA-64 seconds away from launching from the America. On June 8, 1967, America launched four of VA-64’s Skyhawks armed with AGM-12 “Bullpup” air-to-ground missiles to defend Liberty.

  U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  Liberty arrives at Valletta, Malta. Note the torpedo hole on the starboard side.

  U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  In Malta, Cdr. William L. McGonagle, commanding officer of the Liberty, surveys the damage to his ship. Liberty had arrived safely at Valletta, Malta, on June 14. For his actions on June 8, McGonagle received the Medal of Honor.

  U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  Liberty’s superstructure bears mute testimony to the severity of the attack. As a result of the encounter, 34 crewmen were killed and 171 were wounded, many severely.

  U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  Liberty on the day after the attack, with a decided starboard list. The helicopter hovering near the bow is removing casualties to the America. The large holiday 7 × 13–foot flag is more than twice the size of the flag that flew at the beginning of the air attack. Even the larger flag appears small in comparison to the size of the ship.

  U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  America’s sailors “man the rail” to observe the scarred and listing intelligence ship. Evid
ent in both photographs is a helicopter working to evacuate Liberty’s wounded and dead to the carrier. The guided missile cruiser USS Little Rock, flagship of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, passes alongside in the background.

  U.S. NAVY PHOTO

  In June 1982 the Israel Defense Forces, History Department, Research and Instruction Branch, published a classified document in Hebrew and English entitled The Attack on the “Liberty” Incident. The document says its object is to present an authoritative version of the circumstances and chain of events that led to the Liberty incident and to respond to some of the claims made regarding Israel’s intentions.13

  The IDF history report is essentially what was provided to the investigators from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The report itself was written by Lt. Col. Matti Greenberg, head of the Combat Research Branch. It is still classified but is easily obtainable in the United States and Israel. Some of the documentary items listed in the eighty-eight endnotes are far more difficult to obtain. (The original Hebrew version of this document is thirty-two pages; the English translation is forty-two pages.)

  The IDF history is probably the most extensive research accomplished in Israel on the Liberty incident up to the time of its publication. It was not prepared under serious pressure, and its author had access to all Israeli data. The movements of the Liberty to the combat zone are discussed, followed by the details of the “attack.”14 The report then discusses the causes of the errors and Israel’s actions following the incident. It ends with a discussion of the revival of the affair. It suggests that the incident has an inherent interest because of the “mystery of a spy ship,” “the drama of war,” and the “tragedy of the killed and wounded.” The report finds two common denominators in the stories put forth by the various doubters: first, the categorical assertion that the Liberty was maliciously attacked by Israel with the intention of sinking her; second, weighty-seeming reasons why Israel acted maliciously. These common denominators are linked with “flights of imagination, missing facts, half truths or false conclusions.”15 The report then spends several pages responding to the alleged reasons for malice. The IDF report comes to the following conclusion:

  An examination of the facts in the Liberty incident, in their proper context proves beyond any doubt that the attack on the American intelligence ship came about as a result of innocent error by the forces which operated on the spot and the HQs which supervised them.

  Though the attack on the armed forces of a friendly nation is a most regrettable and painful occurrence, incidents of this kind do occur in war-time.

  It goes without saying that such an incident must be thoroughly investigated, that all causes of the tragic encounter must be examined, conclusions drawn, and proper instructions issued which will prevent the occurrence of such an incident in the future. From Israel’s point of view all these steps have been carried out in a most thorough and comprehensive manner. However, it is inappropriate to attribute malicious intent to Israel, when the evidence does not bear out such an attribution.16

  The carefully worded conclusion leaves the blame on “forces which operated on the spot,” which would include the Liberty and the “HQs which supervised them,” including the U.S. higher command.

  The Israelis make a good point on their two common denominators. Most, if not all, of the doubters start with a conclusion that Israel intentionally attacked a known U.S. ship, without offering any evidence to support the conclusion, instead offering reasons why Israel intentionally attacked.

  The Liberty incident remains a very sensitive issue with the IDF, and while the Israelis have always insisted that they are entitled to only part of the blame for the tragedy, they go out of their way to be delicate about putting blame on the United States. A good example of this sensitivity is reflected in the letter from the officer in command of the Israel Navy in response to an article published in the Naval Reserve Association Newsletter. As gentle as the letter is, it accepts only “humanitarian responsibility” and refers to the diplomatic settlement that left open the issue of blame on both sides:

  Commander in Chief of the Navy of Israel

  As General Officer in Command of the Navy of Israel, I read with pain and sorrow the article published in the June issue of the Naval Reserve Association Newsletter. On June 8, 1967, the U.S.S. Liberty sailed into the middle of our Six Day War. That she did so was a mistake on the part of the U.S. Navy, as has been thoroughly established by an extensive investigation of the House Armed Services Committee of the Ninety Second Congress, under authority of H. Res. 201, published by the Superintendent of Documents in 1971. It is undisputed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Agency believed that it would be dangerous for Liberty to approach the Sinai Coast, and sent at least five Naval Messages to her directing her to remain clear of the area. These messages were misdirected by the Naval Communications System, and were not received by Liberty until after the tragedy had occurred. The next mistakes were ours, and a series of blunders on our part resulted in our attacks on a naval vessel of our best friend in the world at that time.

  We immediately accepted humanitarian responsibility, offered our apology and condolences and paid humanitarian reparations to the dead and the wounded in amounts set by the United States government.

  Thereafter we settled the remaining issues regarding the Liberty with the United States at the diplomatic level.

  Mere words can never ease the pain of young lives lost in their prime. We sent you our words of condolence in 1967 full knowing that words are not enough. Still today, twenty five years later, we share your grief and pain. Again I express to you our apology and condolences. I regret the tone of the author of your June 1992 article. I fully understand his bitterness and my sympathy for him and his shipmates is in no way diminished by his perhaps less than objective perspective.

  We made the mistake, we admitted it and we remain extremely sorry and distressed.

  There have been at least ten official investigations of the incident both in Israel and in the United States. Every official investigation, yours and ours, has concluded that the event was a tragic mistake. There have also been numerous unofficial investigations, such as those conducted by Thames TV, ABC News, and NBC News, to name a few. These unofficial investigations, after examining the evidence, have also concluded that the event was a tragic mistake. The published article confirms this with the words “after filming was completed . . . [the] producers slanted the story to favor the Israeli version.” The “story” does not favor Israel. An examination of the facts merely confirms the tragic mistake.

  Confirmation of the true version of events is readily available in the record of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry or the C.I.A. report, both of which are now declassified and available to you.

  Israel and the Navy of Israel have a great debt to the United States and the United States Navy. Our first General Officer in Command of the Navy of Israel, the equivalent to your CNO, was a U.S. Naval Academy graduate. Your traditions are our traditions. In this case, your grief and your loss are also our grief and our loss.

  With my deepest respect,

  Michael Ram

  Commander in Chief

  Israel Navy.17

  Chapter 14

  TELEVISION’S PERSPECTIVE

  In 1986, a well-known Thames TV producer, Rex Bloomstein, heard of the intentional-attack theory and came to the United States with a team to do the story. His team consisted of himself as producer/director, Adrian Pennink as research editor, Mary Horwood as production assistant, and David Hudson-Millman as film editor.1 The taping began in Washington, D.C., with the allegations of a number of surviving Liberty crew members: Lloyd Painter, George Golden, James Ennes Jr., and Phil Tourney. At the time of the taping, the U.S. Navy court of inquiry record of proceedings and the CIA report had already been declassified, but they were not in the Thames TV research files.2 The Thames team became very fond of, and sympathetic to, the Liberty crew. Early scripts of the program contemplated
telling the Liberty veterans’ story, concluding with a few authenticity shots in Israel and a remark that the Israel Defense Force declined comment, because, until that point, the official Israeli position on the Liberty incident had been “no comment.”

  When the Thames team concluded its shooting in the United States and went to Tel Aviv, the script changed dramatically. It contacted the office of the Israel Defense Force Spokesman, the counterpart of the U.S. Department of Defense public affairs officer, and requested an official comment about the Liberty. The Deputy IDF Spokesman was a reserve colonel named Raanan Gissin. Instead of responding “no comment” as expected, Colonel Gissin, along with Israel Air Force major Danny Grossman and army lieutenant colonel Matti Greenberg of the IDF Combat History Branch, took the request directly to the IDF Spokesman and argued that it was time to tell the Israeli side of the story. They won their argument, and suddenly the Thames team found themselves with a very large group of Israeli military personnel who had been authorized to meet with them, answer questions, and cooperate. A high-ranking and highly decorated retired naval officer, Capt. Yaacov Nitzan, was assigned to provide technical assistance. The navy provided documents and pictures. The air force provided gun-camera film, as well as transcriptions and translations of audiotape of the attack. The more Bloomstein and Pennink investigated, the less confidence they had in their original script concept. The producer developed enough doubt to change the program format from the Liberty Veterans Association’s allegations and an Israeli “no comment” to a presentation of the crew members’ story and their evidence followed by the Israeli response. The producer merely reported what each side presented and did not take a position endorsing either. Near the end of the Thames program, Bloomstein, as commentator, made the following statement: “Any examination of the conflicting arguments must first come to terms with motive. 24 hours after the attack on the ‘Liberty,’ the Israelis took the Golan Heights. Was this a coincidence, or was the assault on the spy ship designed to stop it intercepting plans for the invasion?”3