The Liberty Incident Revealed

by A. Jay Cristol

  While the Liberty was en route to her patrol area, three significant events took place. First, the United States publicly announced to the world on June 6 at the UN Security Council that it had no carriers or aircraft within hundreds of miles of Egypt or Israel.6 This was clever, because it was only true on the day of the announcement. On that day, Liberty was still two days away, sailing across the Mediterranean toward Point Alpha.

  Second, at 0745 on Monday, June 5, the 1967 war began. Third, on June 7, almost three days after the commencement of fighting, the U.S. National Security Agency determined it was not safe for the Liberty to be fourteen miles from the beach of the Sinai, in the midst of a major combat area, and requested that a message be sent to the Liberty ordering her not to approach her originally assigned patrol path.7 Although ultimately five such messages were sent, none of those messages reached the Liberty until after the Israeli air and naval attacks. Some never reached her at all.

  At El Arish on June 8, 1967, the Israel Army observed explosions around its positions and a gray ship on the horizon, which the Israel Defense Forces correctly assumed was a warship. Since the IDF controlled the air and the land, its forces erroneously concluded that they were being bombarded from the sea and referred the matter to the navy through the IDF High Command Headquarters in Tel Aviv.

  By the fourth day of the war all branches of the IDF had scored major victories except for the navy, which was eager to get some of the combat action. The Israeli navy headquarters was located in Haifa and thus physically isolated from the Tel Aviv headquarters of the other branches of the IDF. When the navy was told that El Arish was being bombarded from the sea, several assumptions were appropriate. First, it was assumed that the warship bombarding El Arish was a destroyer, because no Arab navy had any other types of ships capable of shore bombardment. Second, it could be inferred the destroyer could steam at thirty knots per hour, as destroyers are generally capable of that speed. Third, the destroyer would be Egyptian, because Egypt had six destroyers and no other Arab combatant had any. The assumption that the ship off El Arish was a destroyer was further reinforced by the erroneous calculation of the target speed by the Israel Navy MTB combat information center officer. The assumption that the target was Egyptian was further reinforced by its heading westward in the general direction of the Egyptian port of Port Said. When an Israeli motor torpedo boat commander calculated that he would not be able to overtake the target, because at the speed he thought the target was steaming it would reach the safety of Port Said before he could overtake it, he asked for air support. Anyone with knowledge of the rivalry between the Israel Navy and the Israel Air Force would agree that the navy would never have asked for air support if it had even the slightest chance of catching up with the target on its own.

  After the attacking aircraft realized they were not attacking an Arab warship and had been withdrawn and the MTBs arrived near the smoking, burning vessel, the Liberty was still under way and at this point probably moving faster than five knots. It also apparently became clear that the ship was not a destroyer, as had been previously suspected; it had the hull of a freighter or merchant ship and no large gun mounts typical of a destroyer. However, when the Liberty opened fire on the MTBs, it was reasonable for the MTB commander to assume that she was foe rather than friend.

  Whether the torpedo attack should have been authorized by Capt. Issy Rehav is a judgment call—one with which, incidentally, the commander of the Israel Navy, Rear Adm. Shlomo Erell, disagreed (after the fact). However, it was reasonable to assume that the ship, which had opened fire on the MTBs, was an enemy ship.

  All of the foregoing is relevant evidence in support of the explanation that the attack was carried out in the mistaken belief that the target was an enemy ship. The facts are beyond dispute. If one questions the explanation and the assumptions and chooses to believe that the assumptions were not made and that the explanations were not true, then the evidentiary scale is empty—there is no evidence on the issue. That leads one to the second conclusion, which every single official investigation has taken—that is, that there is no evidence whatsoever that the attack was not a case of mistaken identity.

  History cannot be properly reconstructed by looking backward after the actual results of an action are known. History must be constructed by going back in time and looking forward into the as yet unknown before the action took place. What seems clear in hindsight is usually quite obscure when looking forward. It is essential to examine what was known at the time, what was learned thereafter, and when it all was learned. Judging history through hindsight usually results in conclusions that are out of context; it subjects history to a slant according to the judging historian’s a priori position.

  This author—having applied to his research an initial investigative question (“Did the Israelis know?”) and his know-how and experience as a U.S. naval aviator and a U.S. federal judge—firmly concludes that there is substantial competent evidence that the Israeli attack was made as a result of a mistaken belief that an enemy ship was being attacked. He concurs with the second position of the official reports, that there is no evidence to be found that the attack was made on a target that the Israelis knew to be a U.S. ship. The argument that lack of evidence is a lame excuse not to find Israel guilty is itself a lame argument under the American system of justice, where there is a presumption of innocence until guilt is proven.

  After more than five hundred interviews, conducted in Israel, the United States, England, and Egypt, with persons connected with all aspects of the event; review of hundreds of articles and books and of thousands of pages of official investigations; and collection and study of close to 3,100 original documents—this author has reached the following conclusions:

  1.The sympathy of the United States must go out to the crew of the Liberty and the NSA detachment and NSA civilians on board. They deserve gratitude for their heroism and sacrifice.

  2.That fact of having been on a ship under attack does not make the victim really aware of the broader picture of what happened, nor does it qualify the victim to make statements based on conjecture, hearsay, or plain wishful thinking.

  3.The best evidence of whether a U.S. flag hoisted on the Liberty was extended and thus easily seen by the Israeli pilots is the gun-camera photographs on page 81 of this book and in the gun-camera film that this author personally investigated. The film shows smoke billowing straight up from the ship at the precise time of the attack. This is further corroborated by a picture showing smoke going straight up, taken on the Liberty by Commander McGonagle (or the ship’s photographer) at about the same time. It therefore proves that there was no wind and thus that the much-talked-about flag was drooping straight down.

  4.The Israelis were smart enough to know that there could be no benefit from the attack on a U.S. naval ship, even if it might have provided some immediate tactical advantage, which it did not.

  5.There was neither a conspiracy nor a cover-up concerning the attack. It was not preplanned. That the attack involved a mistake in identity was announced by Israel immediately and accepted by the United States. The more than a dozen investigations thereafter by both the United States and Israel confirmed there was no credible evidence that the attack had been made against a ship known to be American, let alone a ship known to the Israelis as the USS Liberty (GTR 5). There is in fact substantial credible evidence that the attack was indeed a case of mistaken identity. No one has been able since 1967 to show a piece of real evidence to prove otherwise.

  6.The Liberty incident involved a long list of unfortunate bad mistakes on the part of both Israel and the United States. These mistakes snowballed and converged to the point where the stage was set for tragic disaster. Unfortunately, the disaster did occur, and on the Israeli side the responsibility falls mainly on the Israel Navy. The Israel Air Force participated in the action but only at the request of the navy and on the basis of a representation that the navy had identified a target. Thus the Israel Air Force has the burd
en of secondary responsibility. The eagerness of navy personnel to get into combat action removed the last safety net that might have prevented the disaster. It is easy to place blame when one is warm and dry, with no one shooting at one or expected to; or when one is not involved in the heat and fog of a major war; or with hindsight. The governments of Israel and the United States finally resolved the diplomatic aspects of the incident by an exchange of diplomatic notes on December 17, 1980, without either country accepting responsibility.8

  7.The failure by the Israeli and U.S. governments to make more of the details of the official investigations public for between ten and twenty-five years after the incident greatly contributed to the likelihood that detractors with agendas would cry “cover-up,” and it led to much speculation and many conspiracy theories, some bordering on the bizarre. Some critics went as far as to conclude that the Liberty had been there to spy on Israel for the Arabs, while others concluded that she was there to spy on the Arabs for Israel. Later speculation was that the Liberty was there to monitor the Israel nuclear facility at Dimona.9 Most recently, it has been speculated that the Liberty was there to listen and determine if Soviet pilots were flying aircraft of the Egyptian air force.10 Finally, thirty-four years after the incident, by letter to this author dated June 14, 2001, about FOIA Case 40039, the National Security Agency admitted that “the NSA has publicly acknowledged that the USS Liberty was deployed on a SIGINT (electronic signal intelligence) collection mission on June 8, 1967.” If there was a cover-up, it related to the reason the NSA had sent the Liberty to the eastern Mediterranean and not to the issue of whether the Israelis knew they were attacking a U.S. ship.

  To the best of this author’s knowledge, all the significant documents and reports have now been declassified, with the exception of an accurate and detailed statement on why the Liberty was sent by the United States to the eastern Mediterranean in the first place.

  There is an old U.S. Marine Corps adage that is perhaps appropriate here: “Never attribute to malice that which can be explained by stupidity.” Recall from an earlier chapter that when this author first met Gen. Mordechai “Motti” Hod, who had been the general in command of the Israel Air Force during the 1967 war, General Hod was reluctant to discuss the Liberty incident. He said that the families of those lost and the surviving crew members of the Liberty had suffered enough and that it was not appropriate to disturb old wounds: “If it gives them some comfort to believe the attack was not a mistake, then let them so believe.”11 After hearing from this author some of the conspiracy theories, as we have seen, however, Hod changed his mind—because the stories were not true, he felt, they created pain rather than provided comfort. To anyone who takes comfort in the conspiracy theories, this author says, “So be it.” Unfortunately, the survivors of the Liberty, their families, and the families of the fallen are subjected to the cruelty of persons and organizations who pursue various conspiracy theories for their own political, financial, or personal objectives and agendas without regard for the distress, pain, and suffering they continue to inflict. Detractors of U.S.-Israel friendly relations and collaborations have continuously fueled mot of the conspiracy theories. Sensationalists have used the latter to promote their own interests.

  To those who are interested in reviewing the facts, this book is an honest effort to list and study all the sources of information so that they may be reviewed and considered, together with conclusions of the official investigations. Additional documentary data may be found on the website The Liberty Incident, at www.thelibertyincident.com. This author, after almost three decades of studying the matter, concurs with those conclusions.

  Unless their minds were made up prior to reading this book, readers will, I hope, by now agree with this author that the totality of the evidence establishes that the attack on the Liberty was a tragic case of mistaken identity and friendly fire, a tragedy that resulted from a compounding of bad mistakes perpetrated by both the United States and Israel, and nothing more.

  EPILOGUE TO THE FIRST EDITION, BY ERNEST C. CASTLE

  On June 8, 1992, a plane departed Sde Dov Airport, just north of Tel Aviv, twenty-five years to the day—at the hour, almost the minute, of my takeoff in the Super Frelon helicopter provided to me by Israel in my capacity as naval attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv. In 1967 my mission had been to try to assist the USS Liberty.

  The 1992 flight was in memory of the 1967 event. airborne, Judge Jay Cristol, the author of this book, set a course to the point where the Super Frelon had overflown the Liberty on the late afternoon of that fate-blemished day. Also in the small aircraft was my wife, Dr. Jeanie Castle; Maj. Danny Grossman, an Israel Air Force flyer (and former U.S. Air Force flyer); and Grossman’s young son, Akiva. Cristol flew the aircraft, with the aid of the Global Positioning System, to the precise point where I had observed the Liberty twenty-five years before. As the plane circled the point, Judge Cristol dropped thirty-four pink carnations into the sea, one in the name of each American who had lost his life. The aircraft’s flight path and the laws of gravity caused the flowers to fall in an approximate circle around the ship’s position twenty-five years earlier.

  I asked a blessing upon the souls of the dead and on their surviving loved ones. The U.S. Navy hymn was recited. Major Grossman intoned the Kaddish, the Jewish prayer for the dead. The event was sufficiently moving to bring tears.

  In silence the little plane broke away from the site and returned to Tel Aviv. It was a small tribute paid to the gallant sailors who had died in the tragedy—tragedy for them, their loved ones, their country, and Israel. The sorrow-filled event is now over four decades behind us. I have waited all that time for the emergence of this book. It is, for the first time, the complete, accurate, and evenhanded report of the Liberty incident. It is now time to turn this final page and to close the book.

  Ernest C. Castle

  Captain, USN, Retired

  U.S. Naval Attaché, Tel Aviv

  November 1965–November 1967

  Captain Castle was awarded the Silver Star during the Korean conflict.

  IN MEMORIAM

  Lieutenant James Cecil Pierce, USN

  Lieutenant Stephen Spencer Toth, USN

  Chief Petty Officer Raymond E. Linn

  Chief Petty Officer Melvin D. Smith

  Petty Officer William B. Allenbaugh

  Petty Officer Francis Brown

  Petty Officer Ronnie J. Campbell

  Petty Officer Jerry L. Converse

  Petty Officer Robert B. Eisenberg

  Petty Officer Jerry L. Goss

  Petty Officer Curtis A. Graves

  Petty Officer Warren E. Hersey

  Petty Officer Alan Higgins

  Petty Officer Richard W. Keene

  Petty Officer James M. Lupton

  Petty Officer Duane R. Marggraf

  Petty Officer Anthony P. Mendle

  Petty Officer John C. Smith Jr.

  Petty Officer John C. Spicher

  Petty Officer Alexander N. Thompson

  Petty Officer Thomas R. Thornton

  Petty Officer Phillipe C. Tiedtke

  Petty Officer Frederick J. Walton

  Seaman First Class Gary R. Blanchard

  Seaman First Class Lawrence P. Hayden

  Seaman First Class Carl L. Hoar

  Seaman First Class James L. Lenau

  Seaman First Class David W. Marlborough

  Seaman First Class Carl C. Nygren

  Seaman First Class David Skolak

  Sergeant Jack L. Raper

  Corporal Edward E. Rehmeyer

  National Security Agency civilian Allen M. Blue

  Appendix 1

  OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE LIBERTY INCIDENT

  U.S. Reports

  U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, June 18, 1967

  Conclusion: Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on Liberty on June 8 was in fact a case of mistaken identity.

  CIA Report, June 13, 1967

  Conclusion:
“It remains our best judgment that the Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty was not made in malice towards the United States and was a mistake.”

  Joint Chiefs of Staff (Russ Report), June 9–20, 1967

  Conclusion: General Russ did not make any findings about the actual attack. The report compiled all message traffic and contains no evidence that the attack was not a mistake.

  Clifford Report, July 18, 1967

  Conclusion: The information available does not reflect that the Israeli high command made a premeditated attack on a ship known to be American.

  Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 12, July 14, July 26, 1967

  Conclusion: “The attack was not intentional.”

  Senate Armed Services Committee, February 1, 1968

  Conclusion: Very difficult for a commander not on the scene to know what happened.

  House Appropriations Committee, April and May 1968

  Conclusion: “The use and operational capabilities of the Defense Communications system is nothing less than pathetic, and the management of the system needs to be completely overhauled.”

  House Armed Services Committee Investigation, May 10, 1971

  Conclusion: “[The] Navy remains in the dark ages insofar as routine communications with its deployed ships.”

  Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1979/1981

  Conclusion: No merit to the claims of intentional attack.

  National Security Agency, 1981

  Conclusion: Liberty was mistaken for Egyptian ship as a result of miscalculation and egregious errors.