The Liberty Incident Revealed
Page 37
16.Churchill and Churchill, The Six Day War, 89–90.
17.Prior to 1948 there were various military and paramilitary Jewish forces in Palestine. See Zeev Schiff, History of the Israeli Army (1870–1974) (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1974).
18.Ezer Weizman’s distinguished career culminated in his serving as president of Israel from 1993 to 2000.
19.Ibrahim al-Awwal, meaning “Abraham the First,” was built in Great Britain as a Hunt-class destroyer. It was acquired by Egypt and named in honor of the son of Muhamed Ali, the founder of the royal dynasty that ruled Egypt until the Egyptian revolution of 1952.
20.Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 147. The Kersaint is listed in Jane’s Fighting Ships of 1956–57 as D622.
21.See Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage (New York: Harper Paperbacks, 1999), 54, where the authors state that “the Soviets signaled ‘Able, Able’—international Morse code for ‘Who are you? Identify yourself.’ Gudgeon sent back, ‘Able, Able.’” See also Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), 121: “Now a destroyer on his port bow flashed ‘Alpha Alpha’—identify yourself.”
22.Interview of Moshe Oren by this author on January 11, 1990, in Tel Aviv, Israel.
23.Interview of Capt. Shmuel (“Samek”) Yanay, commanding officer of the Israel Navy destroyer flotilla during the 1956 Sinai campaign, by this author on January 16, 1990, in Tel Aviv, Israel.
24.Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, 147.
25.Interviews of Rear Adm. Shlomo Erell by this author: August 16, 1989, Haifa, Israel; January 13, 1990, Caesaria, Israel; June 16, 1990, Caesaria; August 16, 1991, Caesaria; June 7, 1992, Caesaria; June 6, 1993, Caesaria; and October 20, 1994, Haifa.
26.According to Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1966–67 (London: Jane’s Publishing), 146–47, in 1967 the Israel Navy consisted of twenty-nine warships: four submarines; three destroyers (Eilat [formerly HMS Zealous] and Jaffa [formerly HMS Zodiac], both Z-class destroyers, and Haifa [formerly Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim al-Awwal, before that the Chinese Lin Fu, originally HMS Mendip, a British Hunt-class destroyer); nine motor torpedo boats; two high-speed gunboats; five patrol vessels; and six amphibious craft.
27.Abraham Rabinovich, The Boats of Cherbourg: The Secret Israeli Operation That Revolutionized Naval Warfare (New York: Seaver Books/Henry Holt, 1988). The Israel Navy has a very important role on a day-to-day basis in guarding Israel’s coastline against terrorist intrusions. It continues to accomplish this mission in a very effective manner.
28.From this author’s annotated English translation of a Hebrew transcript of the Israel Air Force audiotapes of pilot/controller transmissions on June 8, 1967.
29.Interviews of Aharon Yifrach by this author: January 15, 1990, Ashkelon, Israel; January 4, 1993, Ashkelon; April 1, 1997, telephone conversation from Miami, Fla., to Ashkelon; April 7, 1997, telephone conversation from Miami to Ashkelon.
30.Rabinovich, Boats of Cherbourg, 69.
31.JCS message 01l545Z June 67.
32.See Report of House Armed Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 92d Cong., 1st sess., under authority of H. Res. 201, May 10, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).
Chapter 2. The Two-Month Crisis
1.The critical time period from April 7, 1967, through June 4, 1967, is covered in detail in several excellent sources. See Richard B. Parker, introduction to The Six Day War: A Retrospective, ed. Richard B. Parker (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1996); L. Carl Brown, “Origins of the Crisis,” chap. 1 in The Six Day War, ed. Parker; Ahron Bregman and Jihan El-Tahri, The Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs (New York: TV Books, 1998, 1999), chaps. 7–10.
2.New York Times, April 8, 1967, 1.
3.See “USS Liberty Command History Report, 1967,” available at the Naval Historical Center, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. Why was the Liberty off Africa? The ship may have been sent in part to monitor the deteriorating situation in Nigeria following the breakaway of the short-lived Republic of Biafra. In addition, from May 2 to June 2, 1967, a team of Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO) scientists were on board studying the unique application of the Navy Navigation Satellite System to problems of precise positioning in equatorial areas. Their mission was canceled, and the team left the ship at Rota, Spain, on June 2; “USS Liberty Command History Report, 1967,” 27–28 of enclosure 1.
4.Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 3.
5.Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 79, quoting Egyptian vice president Zakaria Muhieddin: “He [Nasser] acted like a man playing poker. He was bluffing, but a successful bluff means your opponent must not know which cards you are holding. In this case Nasser’s opponent could see his hand in the mirror and knew he was only holding a pair of deuces.”
6.Interview of Maj. Gen. Ahmed H. Halim by this author, October 18, 1994, at the National Center for Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt.
7.Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 41.
8.Ibid., 43.
9.Ibid., 44.
10.Parker, Six Day War, xviii.
11.Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, The Six Day War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), 36; Parker, Six Day War, 189. The United Arab Republic (UAR) was a union of Egypt and Syria into a single country formed in 1958 and from which Syria withdrew in 1961, thus dealing a severe blow to Nasser’s dream of becoming the leader of a “progressive” revolutionary Arab world and of Pan-Arabism. Egypt continued to use the UAR flag and the term “UAR” in reference to itself until January 1, 1972.
12.Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 47.
13.Israel mobilized 438,000 men in less than forty-eight hours without a public announcement.
14.Numerous reports confirm complete Egyptian control of Sharm al-Shaykh by May 22, 1967.
15.Message from JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] to USCINCEUR [U.S. Commander in Chief Europe] 201910Z May 67: “1. (S) Confirming reftelcon [most likely refers to telephone conversation as opposed to teletype conference] it is understood that elements of SIXTHFLT are being moved to Eastern Med. Center of Gravity of area of operations will be within two days steaming of the Eastern Shore with Eastern edge no more than one days time.”
16.Max Frankel, “Hammarskjold Memo on Mideast Disclosed,” New York Times, June 19, 1967, 1.
17.Under this international maritime treaty, signed in 1936, the Soviets were required to give ten days’ notice of sending warships from the Black Sea through the Bosporus and into the Mediterranean.
18.Commander, Service Squadron Eight (COMSERVRON EIGHT) message 240020Z May 1967. At the time, the Liberty was under the operational control of COMSERVRON EIGHT, a component of Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT).
19.The Foreign Broadcast Information Service is a part of the Central Intelligence Agency, under the direction of the deputy director for science and technology. It records radio broadcasts in original languages around the world. It then translates the text, prints it in booklet format by region, and distributes the information.
20.James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s Most Secret Agency (New York: Penguin Books, 1982/1983), 280.
21.Message from Liberty 241732Z, May 1967. 0530Z = Greenwich mean time (GMT). This was 0730 Sinai time, 0030 eastern standard time, and 0130 eastern daylight time.
22.This meeting was described to this author by Eugene V. Rostow during an interview in Washington, D.C., on April 29, 1992. Another account of the meeting was presented by Ambassador Ephraim Evron in Ambassador Parker’s book The Six Day War: A Retrospective. On page 134 of the book there is a picture captioned “Foreign Minister Abba Eban calling on President Lyndon Johnson, May 26, 1967.” The
picture shows Assistant Secretary of State Joseph P. Sisco, Israeli ambassador Avraham Harman, and Minister Counselor Ephraim Evron as also in attendance at the meeting. The accounts of the meeting are similar.
23.Interview of Eugene V. Rostow by this author on April 19, 1992, in Washington, D.C.
24.There is a disagreement among reports on whether a vote was taken at this meeting on whether to attack or to allow the time the Americans had requested to achieve an international solution to the navigation problem.
25.CINCUSNAVEUR message to COMSIXTHFLT 270152Z May 67: “A. Routine training operations may be conducted North and West of the line connecting 36–00N9, 28–30E3 and coast of Libya at 23–00E5. B. No air ops auth within one zero zero miles of the UAR.”
26.New York Times, May 30, 1967, 2. The article with dateline Beirut, Lebanon, referenced Damascus radio and went on: “The radio said that Brigadier General Mahmoud Ereim signed for Iraq and Major General Adel Sheik Amin signed for the Syrian Defense ministry. General Ereim arrived in Damascus, Syria’s capital, last Wednesday with the first Iraqui [sic] troops for stationing on the Syrian border facing Israel.”
27.At this time the Liberty came first under the operational control of Commander in Chief, European Command (USCINCEUR) and then immediately was assigned to Adm. John S. McCain Jr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR). See JCS message 291602Z May 67 and USCINCEUR message 300932Z May 67. Thus as of June 1, the Liberty’s chain of command was from JCS to USCINCEUR to CINCNAVEUR.
28.Bamford reports that the Liberty “carried only French linguists” (Puzzle Palace, 281). This is contrary to what Staff Sgt. Bryce Lockwood, USMC, is reported to have told Maury Maverick of the San Antonio Express-News.
29.Conversation between Sergeant Lockwood, USMC, and this author on June 8, 1991, in Washington, D.C. To the question “Were there any Hebrew linguists aboard?,” Sergeant Lockwood replied, “Nope, just Arabic and Russian, we were interested in the Russkies.” This is corroborated by an interview of Lockwood reported by Maury Maverick in his article “Marines Met Death on Liberty” in the San Antonio Express-News, August 11, 1996.
Conspiracy theorists have alleged that there were or may have been Hebrew linguists on board. In particular Communications Technician First Class Richard K. Baker, now Communications Technician Chief Baker, retired, is alleged to have been a Hebrew linguist. Chief Baker has not participated in the discussions of his linguistic qualifications and could not be found for an interview.
This author believes that there were no Hebrew linguists on the Liberty, primarily because the ship’s preassigned patrol pattern would not have been in the receiving range of any Israeli land-based VHF or UHF transmissions.
30.As a result of the start of the war on June 5, 1967, the ceremony for presentation of Nolte’s credentials was canceled. New York Times, June 6, 1967, 17.
31.Liberty’s sailing orders, transmitted in JCS message 011545Z June 67, directed her to proceed from Point Alpha to Point Bravo, 31-22.3° N, 33-42° E; thence to Point Charlie, 31-31° N, 33-00° E. At the time these orders were issued, Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip. The closest point of approach to Israel-controlled territory, which was located northwest of Point Alpha and across the Gaza Strip, was more than twenty-five miles from Point Alpha on the day the orders were issued.
32.Interview of Gen. Mordechai Hod, commander of the Israel Air Force in 1967, on January 11, 1990, at Tel Aviv. General Hod told this author that only four planes were held back on the ground. Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948–1967 (New York: Pegasus, 1969), 325, suggests that twelve aircraft were held back, with four on the ground and eight flying combat air patrol over Israel. See also Edgar O’Ballance, The Third Arab-Israeli War (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1972), 66.
33.A “back-channel” message is a message sent by other than the regular or formal or official communications network. The message from Israel to Jordan was sent through Swedish general Odd Bull, at the United Nations.
34.Personal interview with (name withheld by request) on January 14, 1990, at Tel Aviv. He was the commanding officer of Israeli MTB 206 on June 8, 1967.
35.Arthur Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 57.
36.Churchill and Churchill, Six Day War, 161.
37.Interview of Aharon Yifrach, who was combat information center officer on MTB 204 on June 8, 1967, by this author on January 15, 1990, at Ashkelon, Israel.
38.House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971. There is substantial controversy over the exact time that operational control of the Liberty was changed to the Sixth Fleet. According to the Liberty deck log, her position at 2000Z on June 5, 1967, was 35-47.7° N and 17-37.3° E (about 125 nautical miles [nm] WSW of the eastern tip of Sicily). On June 6, 1967, at 0800Z her position was 34-49° N and 21-37.8° E (about 95 nm WSW of the western tip of Crete). The Tuesday, June 6, 1967, deck log entry, signed by Ens. M. M. Watson, USNR, reads: “00–04 Steaming independently on course 111, speed 17 knots. Enroute from Rota, Spain, for operations in the eastern Mediterranean Sea in accordance with CINCUSNAVEUR MOVORD 7–67. Condition of readiness III modified and material condition Yoke are set. 0136 c/c 106.”
By interpolation or by dead reckoning, her position at 0001Z on June 6, 1967, was about 35-25° N, 18-57° E. This position was close to the Sixth Fleet and about 210 nm west of the western tip of Crete. Today, with modern military global positioning systems, it is possible to determine location on the face of the earth to within a few yards. In 1967, even state-of-the-art navigation on ships was not nearly so precise. It is therefore possible that the positions reported in the Liberty deck log were not exact. Therefore, the positions and locations indicated herein should be considered approximate positions. However, variations of even a few miles are not significant to the story being told.
39.See CINCUSNAVEUR message to COMSIXTHFLEET and Liberty 061357Z June 67 acknowledged by the Liberty in 062000Z June 67 and 062036Z June 67. Now a fourth level of reporting was added to the chain of command that controlled Liberty’s operations: JCS to USCINCEUR to CINCUSNAVEUR to COMSIXTHFLT.
40.“The UN: Egypt Refuses to Agree to Council Truce Deadline,” Washington Post, June 8, 1967, 1. “Israelis Rout Arabs, Approach Suez, Break Blockade, Occupy Old Jerusalem; Agree to UN Cease-Fire; UAR Rejects It,” New York Times, June 8, 1967. Office of Public Information, United Nations, “Adoption of Second Cease-fire Resolution,” Year Book of the United Nations: 1967 (New York: United Nations, 1969), 177–78.
41.House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.
42.JCS top secret message to USCINCEUR 080ll0Z June 67. Although the Liberty was an information addressee on this message, which was intended to keep her one hundred miles off the coast of Sinai, the message could not be received by the Liberty as a normal message over the fleet broadcast system because of its top-secret classification.
43.U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, testimony of Ens. John D. Scott, USNR, 59.
44.In 1967 Uri Meretz was an intelligence officer with the rank of lieutenant commander in the Israel Navy, on a program of study at Tel Aviv University. When the 1967 war began, he was assigned as naval intelligence representative to general headquarters. Later he was promoted to the rank of commander and served as deputy chief of naval intelligence.
45.Israel Defense Forces, History Department, Research and Instruction Branch, The Attack on the “Liberty” Incident, June 1982, 6 [hereafter cited as IDF History]. The aircraft used for these reconnaissance missions was a standard Transport Command Nord 2501 Noratlas, which was flown by an air force crew with a naval officer on board as an observer.
46.IDF History, 7, confirms: “Later at 0603 hours, an additional report arrived from the plane, which described the vessel as a supply ship of the US Navy.”
47.Thames TV, Attack on the “Liberty,” aired on British television on Tuesday, January 27, 1987, script 26, items 127 and 128.
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br /> 48.Interview of Uri Meretz by this author on June 11, 1992, at Tel Aviv. Meretz was not certain whether he spoke to the chief of naval intelligence or to a naval intelligence officer named Moshe Barnea when passing this information.
49.Stella Maris, or Star of the Sea, was the name given to an underground bunker atop Mount Carmel in Haifa originally constructed by the British armed forces during the Mandate period. It was used by the Israel Navy as its command-and-control center during the 1956 Suez campaign and during the 1967 war. It contained a large room where the naval commanders sat on an elevated platform and looked out over a large tabletop painted to display the seas around Israel. Enlisted personnel placed colored wedges on the map table to indicate the tactical situation. This was done World War II–style, with wooden rods or bridges to push the wedges about the board. The facility is located over sixty miles north of the Kirya, where Israel’s Ministry of Defense and military general headquarters, except for the navy, were located.
50.Interview of Uri Meretz by this author on June 16, 1990, at Tel Aviv, and interview of chief of naval intelligence [name not to be disclosed] by this author on January 12, 1990, at Haifa.
51.House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971.
52.CINCUSNAVEUR message to COMSIXTHFLT 080455Z June 67. The message instructed Vice Admiral Martin to “take for action” JCS 08011OZ.
53.Thames TV script, 28, items 135 and 136.
54.COMSIXTHFLT secret message to Liberty 080917Z June 67.
55.House Armed Services Committee Report of May 10, 1971, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Fact Finding Team Report (the Russ Report).
Chapter 3. Why Was the Liberty in Harm’s Way?
1.Robert Silverberg, If I Forget Thee, O Jerusalem (New York: William Morrow, 1970), 577.
2.Interview with former Secretary of State Dean Rusk by this author, April 5, 1989, in Athens, Georgia.
3.Interviews with Ambassador Ephraim Evron by this author on June 7, 1988; August 15, 1989; and January 16, 1990; all in Tel Aviv.