by Ken Coates
Hartmann finds that humanity has already passed through the two earlier stages (see below) and is now in the third stage. He seeks to demonstrate that all three are illusory and that the quest for happiness and well-being is doomed to frustration and failure. Looking at the history of the Western civilization and treating it as paradigmatic of humanity’s evolution, he argues that the idea of happiness in the here and now is dominant at the beginning of civilization and thought. Greece and Rome as well as Judaism represent the illusory quest for fulfillment and happiness in the present. This gave way to the second stage represented by Christianity and the Middle Ages. Here earthly existence is seen as evil - full of pain and suffering and man as ‘fallen’ and sinful. Earthly life is seen in terms of a preparation for an afterlife with the promise of eternal life and deliverance from evil. This religious belief in a supramundane life of bliss begins to weaken with the Renaissance and Reformation. Skepticism and humanism start making inroads into the notion of heavenly peace and happiness and the focus shifts to this world. The development of science, including that of the social sciences, and technology gives man greater control over the physical and social world. This leads to a belief in the idea of progress and the prospect of a better future for humanity. The result is increasing secularization, the waning of religious beliefs, and a gradual weakening and marginalization of the idea of happiness in a life hereafter. But in the long run this secular belief in a happy life, made possible through material progress, is also doomed to failure. Why? Because progress may diminish but never get rid of the fundamental sufferings of existence, e.g. illness, age and other painful conditions. Second, material progress there may be but not moral progress. Civilization can only change the form but not the substance of the innate egotism and destructive impulses of humankind. Third, the more the ‘palpable external ills of human life are removed’ the more evident it will be that the source of pain and suffering is existence itself’ ( 114). It is only after humanity has seen through the illusions of progress that it will be ready at last to seek deliverance from the evil of existence ( 12, 79, 91, 114-5).
What are the main reasons for H’s assertion that the ills of existence – the pain and suffering and the sheer immorality of man – far exceed the good and the pleasure that it affords us? The reasons he puts forward are not particularly original or indeed very different from those advanced by Schopenhauer, as we saw earlier. Thus according to Hartmann the so-called good things of life, e.g. health, youth, freedom, material possessions, do not represent a positive value to us. Rather they signify the absence of negativities such as sickness, old age, servitude, and poverty and insecurity. He emphasizes the ‘felt’ or subjective experience of these and argues, along the lines of Schopenhauer, that whereas we feel these negatives of life keenly we take the positives for granted. For example, having normal eyesight and being able to see does not make us happy. On the other hand we feel the loss of sight and the resulting deprivation far more keenly. In short, the presence of pain, suffering and deprivation are felt far more strongly than their absence. Moreover many of the pleasures of life come at a great cost. For example from the beginning of puberty until the time that a young man can afford to get married he has to endure the agony of intense sexual frustration. He has to seek relief through all kinds of unnatural and abnormal, if not immoral, practices. The pleasures of love, marriage and family also come at a great cost. The pain and suffering involved in pregnancy and childbirth for women, the arduous task of caring for and bringing up children plus all other privations and disappointments involved in family life are scarcely compensated by the pleasures and gratifications that it brings us. Indeed it is instinct and unconscious attachment to life (the element of will) and sexual compulsion that urges people to reproduce. He agrees with Schopenhauer in his view that without the extreme pleasure in the act of procreation (for men?) no one would inflict life upon someone in cold blood. He reviews a long list of human activities and relationships and finds them a greater source of ‘toil and trouble’ than well-being and happiness (see e.g., 23-5, 47-8). Nonetheless, Hartmann finds that in our assessment of life in general, including the balance of pain and pleasure, we are mostly biased in favor of life. This is primarily due to our instinctive impulse of self-preservation and attachment to life. We call life good not because it is so but because we are instinctively attached to it ( 8-10) . Hartmann maintains that the more conscious and reflective we are about the nature of our existence the more we can see through life’s illusions and appreciate the truth of his viewpoint. It is through education, knowledge and enlightenment of the mind that we become free from the veil of illusion. And thus far this enlightenment has been available to only a small minority of peoples of the world ( 10).
But how does Hartmann envision the transcendence of existence? The metaphysical principle underlying his philosophy of existence is that once reason or consciousness comes into its own it will see the folly of existence and will seek liberation from its bondage to the will. He believes that the third (the current) stage of human development will gradually raise our consciousness further so that in the long run the greater part of humanity will come to realize the fundamentally flawed nature of existence and its inescapable miseries. Once this perception takes hold, volition will cease and the world process will come to an end. Hartmann sets great store by the growing antagonism between will and reason. The former, he writes, strives after ‘absolute satisfaction and felicity’ while intelligence emancipates ‘itself more and more from the impulse through consciousness’ ( 123-4).
But how precisely would all this come about? Hartmann rejects all individual approaches, e.g. suicide, or the renunciation of the will (Schopenhauer), and looks for a collective solution. Liberation of a few individuals from the yoke of the will means very little since the mass of humanity and the rest of existence will keep going. And Hartmann’s objective is nothing short of bringing all of existence to an end. Hence existence must be brought to an end through a collective global resolve. Indeed he envisions not only the end of human existence but of all life forms and their sources to ensure that life and especially human or conscious life may not start all over again. Hartmann puts forward three necessary conditions for the transcendence of existence (135-9). First, human consciousness as a whole should be sufficiently developed to see the folly and futility of existence; second, that the unconscious or the will and spirit (reason) operating in the world should become concentrated in humanity relative to the rest of life 1; and finally that there should be ‘sufficient communication’ among the peoples of the world to ‘allow for a simultaneous common resolve’ (139) in this regard. He finds it difficult to be specific about how exactly the process will unfold. But he believes that in the meantime human development should continue on its course and that it is a moral obligation on everyone’s part to contribute to the process of world development until the three necessary conditions are met and existence is brought to an end. For Hartmann the endeavour to bring existence to an end is an altruistic act meant to end at the same time the immorality of life as well as its pain and sufferings2. Underpinning his belief that world-evolution is moving in that direction is his metaphysical premise that the world began from an original state of rest and non-being and that return to that initial state is immanent in the process of evolution itself. It also stands for the ultimate victory of intelligence and reason over volition and the will-to-live ( 120-7; Darnoi 1967, 102-3).
Summary and Comments: If Hartmann’s view of existence is very similar to Schopenhauer’s his perspective on emancipation differs radically from the latter’s. And in some respects he makes an original and interesting contribution to the problem. First, unlike Schopenhauer’s timeless view of will and existence Hartmann sees the problem of existence in historical and evolutionary terms. This coupled with his idea of a conflict between the will, which seeks to perpetuate existence, and the developing consciousness, which sees through the illusory promise of the will and seeks to put
an end to existence, makes the potential for emancipation inherent in the world process itself. Put somewhat differently, this conflict between will and reason develops through the growth of consciousness, most advanced in humankind. And for Hartmann this is what forms the basis for the denial of the will that Schopenhauer speaks of. He is rightly critical of Schopenhauer’s notion that the denial of the will occurs through the will turning against itself. This is self-contradictory given that Schopenhauer considers the will as a blind force, with its ceaseless striving and the perpetuation of existence. Certainly Hartmann’s idea that the fundamental unconscious, the primordial element behind all existence, consists of both will and idea or reason and that the latter develops in the course of evolution as consciousness offers a plausible basis for a source of growing opposition to the will and its perpetuation of existence. It is worth noting that this is the basis of the belief that ‘knowledge’ abnegates existence, a belief that is common to all three world-views, viz. Hinduism, Buddhism and that of Schopenhauer, encountered earlier.
The second important idea, linked to the above, concerns the intellectual and cultural development in the course of the world process. This means that as a greater part of humanity develops educationally and intellectually more and more people can become conscious of the fact that pain and suffering are an irremediable part of existence and can see through the veil of illusion which makes us believe in the possibility of progress and happiness. In other words higher intellectual development leads to greater awareness of the evils of existence and the rejection of bondage to nature which perpetuates this evil.
The third point is that although Hartmann’s periodization of human history into three distinct phases cannot be considered as having literal validity there is a modicum of truth in this perspective on history. This is especially the case if we look at his third or current phase which he sees as one of increasing secularization, i.e. the waning hold of religion on people’s beliefs and world-views. Clearly this provides a fertile ground for the development of a perspective on the world which finds existence morally and metaphysically unacceptable. And although the idea of the greater mass of humanity becoming convinced of the worthlessness of existence seems far-fetched, if not wishful thinking, there is little doubt that a secular world provides a favorable context for the spread of anti-existential ideas and attitudes. At least we can expect this to result in the spread of the philosophy and practice of anti-natalism based on the rejection of existence. Indeed as we know, over the last thirty years or so anti-natalism, stemming from a variety of reasons which include, it is safe to assume, anti-existential attitudes as well, has been on the rise. More and more people in the advanced world are choosing not to procreate ( see e.g. Basten 2009). Although Hartmann looks towards a collective demise of humanity, indeed of all existence, based on his metaphysical and teleological beliefs we need not take that seriously. The main point is that he is right in drawing attention to the weakening of religious beliefs and the increasing secularization of the world as an important context for the increasing rejection of existence.
Finally, his idea of increasing communication worldwide – a result of economic and technological development – as one of the enabling conditions for greater awareness and action aimed at bringing existence to an end has considerable merit. Leaving aside the fanciful notion of collective suicide by humanity his point regarding increasing communication is an important one, especially taken in conjunction with the two earlier points, viz. greater intellectual and cultural development and secularization. For what we are witnessing today is not only the dissemination of anti-existential ideas through books and journals but also the beginning of a debate on these issues on the internet. To this we can add the formation of associations, e.g. VEHMT (Voluntary extinction of humanity movement), and others which seek to connect people with anti-existential as well as anti-natalist viewpoints3. In sum, indirectly more than directly, Hartmann provides us with a set of bold and original ideas on liberation from existence which can be seen as a body of thought which borrows heavily from Schopenhauer but also contributes new ideas relevant to rejectionist theory and practice.
Endnote – Chapter 2.
1. This is a fuzzy notion. However since Hartmann envisions nothing short of the complete cessation of all life he is forced into a position which seeks to equate the end of humans with the end of all life. He seems to conceive of the relative predominance of humans in two ways. First that economic and technological development of the world, including the growth of human population, would advance so far as to marginalize and diminish the rest of nature very considerably, and second that it will so empower humans as to be able to abolish the rest of nature. On closer examination and in light of more than a century of population growth, environmental degradation and the technological advance of humanity, these ideas do not seem quite as fanciful as at first sight. See Hartmann (1884, 135-7).
2. For Hartmann egoism is a major source of immorality and evil in the world. He sees the gradual enlightenment and freedom from the futile quest for pleasure and happiness as the path to overcoming egoism and achieving liberation. For him the Christian notion of immortality is both an expression of, and a major prop to, egoism. He is against all individual acts of rejection, e.g. ‘willlessness’ a la Schopenhauer, suicide, as well as the Buddhist quest for individual nirvana, for they all cater to the self and egoism. His idea of a collective resolve on the part of humans to bring existence to an end is based very much on the rejection of egoism in favor of an act of solidarity and transcendence of selfishness. For Hartmann ‘morality and religion demand the utter uprooting of selfishness; redemption is not redemption of self but redemption from self (italics added). The denial of the will is not to be individual in any sense, and nowise partial. It should be universal and final, and should register the extinction of the entire world-process.’ (Tsanoff 1931, 329, 326-31).
3. For a list of these organizations see Basten (2009, 15). For VHEMT see
Chapter 3. Philosophical Perspectives: 20th century and Beyond
Among the philosophical currents of the 20th century it is existentialism that has the most relevance to the main theme of this book, viz. the implication of man’s existence in the world as a conscious being 1 Philosophers and writers such as Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, Unamuno and Cioran are some of the notable figures who may be said to have contributed to this genre of thinking (on the last three writers see Dienstag 2006). However with the exception of Cioran who rejects existence openly and totally, all others, in the end, reconcile themselves to existence on the basis of a variety of rationalizations and viewpoints 2.
Although philosophers such as Heidegger and Sartre analyze man’s being-in-the-world in considerable detail they take largely a value-neutral stance on the question of human existence and procreation. Only Camus is explicit in posing the question whether ‘life is worth living’ and in raising the question of suicide as a response to the ‘absurdity’, i.e. the meaninglessness, of man’s existence. He ends up by arguing in favor of accepting life in spite of its many failings and its fundamental absurdity (Camus 1975). It is worth noting that he is silent on the question of procreation. Heidegger rejects the label of ‘existentialist’ (in fact only Sartre ever claimed to be one although he too distanced himself from the label later) arguing that his philosophy was concerned with the nature of man’s being and not with questions of values, ideologies and other humanistic concerns. Heidegger, Camus and Unamuno were all married and had children. Sartre remained childless but it is not very clear whether it was a rejectionist measure or more a matter of choosing a ‘childfree’ lifestyle. It appears to have been a bit of both. But apart from his novel Nausea in which the main character pours scorn on the idea of having children, there is little in his writings on the theme of anti-natalism. That leaves Cioran who is said to have claimed that not having children is one of the best things that he has done in his life ( Ligotti 2010, 176). As a total rejectionist
Cioran’s thinking on existence should potentially be of great interest. Unfortunately he is something of a belletrist with an allusive, aphoristic and paradoxical style. His writings take the form of random reflections on a variety of subjects. Philosophical concerns almost always inform his writings yet he remains elusive and unsystematic in the extreme as a writer. It is difficult, if not almost impossible, to grasp his thinking, let alone discern any pattern to it.3
Peter Wessel Zapffe: Against Procreation
A little-known Norwegian philosopher and writer, Peter Wessel Zapffe (1899-1990), who may also be considered an existentialist, joins the company of Cioran in being a rejectionist and an anti-natalist. Although Zapffe’s magnum opus On the Tragic (1941) is still only available in Norwegian his essay ‘The Last Messiah’ and other short pieces, including an interview, provide us with an outline of his view of existence. Zapffe is in favor of phasing out human existence through non-procreation or even by a general policy of limiting the number of children begotten below replacement levels (Tangenes 2004). As we shall see below, the South African philosopher David Benatar presents a comprehensive philosophy of anti-natalism as a means of preventing future suffering and the path to liberation from existence. But it is Zapffe who must be credited with being the first rejectionist to come up with the idea of anti-natalism as the way out of existence for humans.4 It is to Zapffe’s main ideas that we turn next.