by Ken Coates
Zapffe’s focus is on the contingent nature of man’s existence both at a collective and individual level. Yet the consciousness of existence, which makes the human animal unique, creates the need to find an overarching meaning to it all. This is a need that will not go away and yet it cannot be satisfied except through resorting to myths, fables and lies, in short to bad faith. Thus evolution has produced a freak of a species that is conscious of its existence. And that is its undoing, making it fearful of life itself, indeed of its own being. As Zapffe ( 2004, 2) writes in The Last Messiah, “Despite his new eyes, man was still rooted in matter, his soul spun into it and subordinated to its blind laws. And yet he could see matter as a stranger, compare himself to all phenomena’. Nature having ‘performed a miracle with man’ later disowned him’ (2).
Quite apart from the need for an overarching meaning of life humans have developed values and sentiments absent in all other species. Longing for a just world is one of them, compassion for the suffering of all sentient beings is another. Yet these have no place in the universe. The lack of meaning reveals to man, ‘a nightmare of endless repetition, a senseless squander of organic material’ while the ‘suffering of human billions makes its entrance into him through the gateway of compassion’ (2).
Zapffe concludes that human beings are a clear case of a species that ‘had been armed too heavily – by spirit made almighty without, but equally a menace to its own well-being’. Here is the ‘tragedy of a species becoming unfit for life by over-evolving an ability’ (i.e. an over-abundance of consciousness) (2). Besides the knowledge of and fear of death man’s creative imagination conjures up new and ‘fearful prospects behind the curtain of death’ so that even death fails to be the sanctuary that it is meant to be’. Given these inbuilt contradictions and the paradoxical nature of the species Zapffe wonders why it has not gone extinct through the inability to cope with these fundamental conditions of life. His answer is that most people learn to limit the content of their consciousness through a variety of strategies and techniques developed by culture and society. He goes on to elaborate these (3-7).
Essentially they involve the repression of the ‘damaging surplus of consciousness’. At least four major types of mechanisms are involved: isolation, anchoring, distraction, and sublimation (4). In practice they may overlap. Isolation is about the ‘arbitrary dismissal from consciousness of all disturbing and distressing thought and feeling’. In everyday life this takes the form of a conspiracy or code of mutual silence about the fundamental questions concerning existence. Anchoring involves a range of institutions, beliefs and social norms which act to protect the self against the consciousness of the void or abyss that surrounds us. Zapffe writes of anchoring ‘as a fixation of points within, or construction of walls around the liquid fray of consciousness’(4) . Culture and ideologies provide the main source of anchoring which often act unconsciously but could also be conscious for the individual, e.g. adopting a goal to be pursued, dedicating oneself to a cause. God, the church, the state, the nation are major examples of the resources for anchoring. Distraction is a mode of protection which seeks to deflect attention away ‘from the critical bounds’ to a variety of impressions. This is most visible and obvious with children who have to be provided with various diversions to stave off the sheer boredom of existence. For grown-ups distraction can take the form of games and entertainments of all sorts. But above all it is the constant pursuit of desires, the continual striving for something or the other that is a major form of distraction. As soon as a goal is reached one moves on to another. Here Zapffe seems to have in mind something like Schopenhauer’s idea of constant willing and striving without which we face boredom and the emptiness of existence. But Zapffe argues that this ‘striving forward’ is equally an ‘escape from,’ something that is not generally recognized. But escape from what? The answer, expressed in religious terms, is from ‘the vale of tears’, ‘from one’s own inendurable condition’. Indeed, writes Zapffe, if ‘awareness of this predicament is the deepest stratum of the soul….then it is also understandable why the religious yearning is felt and experienced as fundamental’ (7). Sublimation, the fourth remedy, is a matter of transformation rather than repression. Thus stylistic or artistic gifts can transmute existential anxiety and despair into literature or painting which becomes a source of aesthetic appreciation and a form of release from anguish. Of course this particular remedy is available to only a few and therefore may be regarded as the least important of the four methods of coping with the problem of consciousness. Zapffe concludes by claiming that however effective these might have been in the past they cannot save humanity from itself for ever. Writing in the 1930s he notes that communism and psychoanalysis are among the most recent attempts to ensnare the ‘critical surplus of cognition’.
He has no doubt that humans will persist in ‘dreaming of salvation and affirmation and a new Messiah’. But after many messiahs have come and gone the Last Messiah will come. He will be a man ‘who has fathomed life and its cosmic ground, and whose pain is the Earth’s collective pain’. He will tell humans the truth about themselves in no uncertain terms. ‘The sign of doom is written on your brows’. There is ‘only one conquest and one crown, one redemption and one solution’. And that is ‘know yourselves – be infertile and let the earth be silent after ye’ ( 9). However Zapffe is under no illusion about how such a message would be received. Led by the guardians of existence, and far more savagely than in the case of the Crucified One, the Last Messiah will be sat upon and torn apart by the multitude,
Zapffe, an assessment: Zapffe has apparently developed these themes at greater length in his book On the Tragic. But the essentials of his viewpoint appear to be as sketched above. Undoubtedly there are problems with Zapffe’s argument. The basic premise on which he builds his case for anti-natalism, viz. that human beings cannot bear the burden of consciousness - the over-developed faculty that they are endowed with - can be questioned. (Incidentally his argument is reminiscent of T. S. Eliot’s “Human beings cannot bear much reality”). Undoubtedly, man is an anomaly produced by nature and his consciousness of existence gives rise to many metaphysical and existential problems. The need for ‘meaning’ is one of these and which is at the heart and centre of Zapffe’s thought. However as he argues humans have developed a variety of beliefs and institutions, most prominently those centered on religion, to cope with the problem of existence including its legitimation. And if there is a weakening of religious beliefs and increasing secularization a form of secular humanism seems to be taking the place of religion in providing a rationale for existence. The belief in ‘progress’ driven by science and technology and the prospect of a rising standard of material life for more and more peoples of the earth is a part of this rationale. In any case the protective walls and the many diversions outlined by Zapffe have worked in the past and they could presumably go on working in the future. Moreover one cannot underestimate human capacity to invent new ways of shoring up existence. Thus it is difficult to accept Zapffe’s idea that the contradictory or paradoxical state that humans represent will of itself lead to the demise of the species in the manner of the antler with overly large horns - referred to by Zapffe - or other such species that have become extinct. Perhaps Zapffe is speaking here metaphorically. But this is not to suggest that Zapffe’s theme of the problem of meaning and its implications lacks validity. Indeed not only the pointlessness of existence and human awareness of the same but also what he calls the ‘brotherhood of suffering’ of all creatures taken together provide a strong basis for rejecting existence.
But this is more a question of individual enlightenment and choice rather than a self-evident truth which by its very nature calls forth a certain type of action. The ‘tragedy’ which Zapffe finds in human condition is unlikely to be perceived or felt by more than a minority of individuals, mostly intellectuals. And even among those many are prepared to accept the insoluble paradox of conscious existence, placing ‘life’ abov
e ‘truth’. Not only Nietzsche but also Unamuno and Camus for example come to mind. And unless we think along the lines of Hartmann, i.e. that with increasing intellectual and cultural development reason will triumph over Will enabling the negation of existence, the appreciation of the tragic will be limited to the few. It will be recalled that we found considerable merit in Hartmann’s belief that general ‘progress’ will also facilitate the advance of rejectionism. In any case, Zapffe’s notion of the ‘objective’ nature of the tragic, i.e. the craving for a metaphysically meaningful and just world and the impossibility of its attainment, remains and will remain a fundamental feature, a void at the heart of human existence. For Zapffe living with this truth is only possible through elaborate subterfuges, in short lying and self-deception. The alternative is to acknowledge the insoluble metaphysical and moral problems of human existence and to bring this misadventure to an end voluntarily, once-and -for-all.
Although Zapffe’s emphasis is on the metaphysical, i.e. the question of meaning, for him ethical awareness ( ‘the brotherhood of suffering’ ) is also a part of the problem of human consciousness. To live is to suffer and humans not only have to contend with their own suffering but also with the awareness of the pain and suffering of all other creatures. Homo sapiens will do no harm and do themselves and the environment a lot of good ( Zapffe was an early ecologist who decried the destruction of nature with the advance of industrialization ) by voluntarily disappearing from the earth. As he wrote, even a ‘two-child policy could make our discontinuance a pain-free one’ (quoted in Ligotti 2010, 29). What he found particularly objectionable is the doctrine that ‘the individual “has a duty” to suffer nameless agony and a terrible death if this saves or benefits the rest of the group’. For Zapffe ‘no future triumph or metamorphosis can justify the pitiful blighting of a human being against his will’ (29).
Zapffe practiced what he preached remaining childless on principle. Unlike earlier rejectionists, including Schopenhauer and Hartmann, Zapffe’s route to liberation is by way of non-procreation. This makes him a ‘modern’ rejectionist, i.e. secular, rational and with a preventative approach. As we shall see below this approach to existence has been developed and argued in detail by David Benatar.
David Benatar: Philosophy of Anti-Natalism
Unlike Schopenhauer and Hartmann, David Benatar, a contemporary philosopher, is not a metaphysician. He is not concerned with questions such as what is the fundamental nature of reality (Schopenhauer) or whether there is a teleological principle at work in the world leading towards a goal such as the negation of existence (Hartmann). What he shares with these two 19th century philosophers is his interest in exploring, indeed his passionate engagement with, the question of existence which he finds problematic in that it invariably entails a great deal of pain and suffering. In common with these earlier thinkers he too seeks a way out of the pain and suffering of existence (Benatar 2004 and 2006).
Although Zapffe was also an anti-natalist, Benatar is unique in his focus on procreation and in his strong advocacy of anti-natalism on philosophical grounds. He holds procreation to be an immoral act in that it inflicts gratuitous pain and suffering on someone who has not asked to be born and who is brought to being primarily to serve the interests of others, including of course the parents. While other philosophers have touched upon these issues, Benatar’s work is the first comprehensive and detailed treatment of issues surrounding procreation or what he calls ‘creating people’. It is a work of modern philosophy in that, written in the 21st century, it is free of metaphysical assumptions and relies entirely on reasoning and empirical evidence for its arguments. On the other hand it is in line with traditional philosophizing in that it does not shy away from value judgment with regard to the nature of existence in general and human existence in particular. Benatar uses the term ‘analytic existentialism’ to characterize his work, a term that encapsulates both his method and the nature of the problem he tackles (Benatar 2004, 1-3). In short his work uses the methodology of 20th century English philosophy in order to grapple with issues of existence.
The term ‘existentialism’ has been historically associated with Continental philosophers of the 19th and 20th centuries, such as Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre. It is they who have been concerned with issues of human existence. However their approach has often been rather “expressionist” and rhetorical, insightful but not characterized by analytical rigor and logic (1-3). Coming from a philosopher from the English-speaking world Benatar’s book Better Never To Have Been (2006) is in this regard a path-breaking work. Furthermore as Benatar points out not only English philosophy of the 20th century but also Continental philosophy of existentialism has had little to say about procreation and the ethics of bringing new people into the world ( 9). Much of that philosophy has been concerned with those who already exist, rather than with the philosophical issues raised by the creation of new lives. An important difference between the attitudes and the approach of 19th century philosophers, such as Schopenhauer and Hartmann, and 20th century existentialists such as Heidegger and Sartre, has been the latter’s emphasis on the individual and his manner of being (see e.g. Sartre 1948; Watts 2001, 55-6).The burden of making sense of existence and choosing to act in a particular way is laid squarely on the individual. The only value upheld by the existentialists is that of authenticity, i.e. that individuals choose their life course and course of action in the fullest awareness of the situation and the consequences of their choice. To simply follow conventional norms, religious injunction or any other external authority is to act in ‘bad faith’ (Sartre), or to be ‘inauthentic’ (Heidegger). Since existence precedes essence (Sartre), the creation or affirmation of values and making sense of existence becomes an individual act. There is no escape from this ‘dizzying’ freedom . The existentialist philosopher steers clear of value judgment, at least in any explicit manner, concerning life and its significance in general.
By contrast Benatar’s approach is one where he commits himself, he takes a stand. He lays his cards on the table and is quite open about his assessment of the nature and value of existence and seeks to convince others to act in accordance with his perspective and beliefs. His conclusion is that procreation is an immoral act which brings significant harm to lives which could and should be spared that harm. It is time, however, to move beyond these introductory remarks to a detailed look at his substantive thinking about existence.
The Asymmetry of Pain and Pleasure: Unlike Schopenhauer and Hartmann Benatar starts not with the big picture, e.g. the nature of the world, but what might be called the micro-philosophy of procreation. His starting point is that all sentient beings suffer some harm or ‘bad’ in their lives and many suffer significant harm. However it is only humans who have the consciousness and the ability to prevent this harm by not creating new lives. For no matter how lucky a life might be it is bound to undergo some pain and suffering. True, lives also consist of pleasures or ‘good’s of various kinds. But whereas we have a moral obligation not to inflict harm on anyone if we can help it we have no corresponding obligation to bestow pleasure on future people. Thus by refraining from procreation we prevent harm to future people but because of the asymmetry between pain and pleasure we do nothing immoral in depriving such people of the pleasure they may have had had they been brought into being. If conferring pleasure on future people were to be a moral obligation we would have to have as many children as possible. This asymmetry of procreational morality is at the heart of Benatar’s philosophy (Benatar 2006, 28-31). In support of this fundamental asymmetry he refers to four other asymmetries considered as valid and normal by people. It is of course related to his view of existence as a source of pointless pain and suffering inflicted on all sentient beings.
Largely implicit in Benatar’s view of life is the notion that whatever we consider as the positive aspects of life they do not in any way justify the ‘cost’ in terms of the inordinate amount of pain and suffering involved. However his conce
rn is not with existing people and their emancipation from the shackle of existence in the manner of the Buddhist nirvana or Schopenhauerian renunciation of the will. It is prevention rather than cure that his thinking is aimed at. As we shall see later he is not opposed to suicide, especially rational suicide. But his centre of attention is procreation – the means through which people are brought into being and subjected to the unnecessary pain and suffering of existence. Indeed not only the progeny suffers but in so far as it becomes itself a source of further proliferation of lives each new life represents ‘the tip of a generational iceberg of suffering’ ( 6). For example, if each couple begets three children, in ten generations that mounts up to over 88,000 people which ‘constitutes a lot of pointless suffering’ (6).
The Immorality of Procreation: A child may simply be conceived as a byproduct of copulation. Here it is simply coital interest which gives rise accidentally, as it were, to a child. With the development and widespread use of contraception coital interests can be satisfied without resulting in procreation. But even where a child is conceived intentionally it is not usually for the sake of the future child itself. Rather the guiding motive for having children is the parents’ own interest. This can take many forms. One may wish to have one’s own genetic offspring for the sake of biological reproduction and continuity of oneself, i.e. passing on one’s genes to the next generation. It may be out of parenting interest, i.e. to have the experience of nurturing and raising a child and establishing a lifelong bond with the child one has raised. When grown up the child can act as a support for the parents in their old age. One’s property, title, social status and the like can be passed on to the child. Parenting interest is different from reproductive interest in that the former can be satisfied through adoption although most people prefer to do it through reproduction. Apart from these direct interests and motives for procreation there may be other considerations that favor natalism. These may be religious – raising a family as a duty, economic, e.g. state policies aimed at increasing the working age population, political and cultural, e.g. in the interest of preserving or increasing the size of a nation or tribe. This is only a short list of reasons for having children. Many others could be added.