Anti-Natalism
Page 10
The main point is that children generally serve as a means to various ends whether the parents’ or others’ (96-8). They are not brought into being for their own sake, i.e. we do not confer life on someone simply for his or her own good. And if we believe that we are doing a favor to someone by bringing them to life then, argues Benatar, we are totally mistaken (97). For the pain and suffering that is in store – it may be more or less – for that child is not worth the ‘pleasure’ or other goods of life that might also come its way. Benatar’s main point is that one who does not exist does not miss the ‘good’ things of life but one who is born is sure of being exposed to the evils of life. And if we leave aside various extrinsic interests, including those of the parents, in procreation, i.e. which treat the child as a means to other ends, then there is no case for bringing a new life into the world. Indeed given that to bring any being to existence is to expose it to at least some degree of harm, and often a great deal of harm, it becomes a moral duty to prevent this harm if we can. Hence refraining from procreation becomes a moral duty and by the same token procreation becomes an immoral act. To this the rejoinder could be that if the parents feel happy about their own lives and are glad to have existed then it is a reasonable assumption that their child would also feel the same. But this does not necessarily follow, argues Benatar. We may feel glad to have existed at this moment but feel otherwise at another time as we go through our lives, grow older or face difficult times. Thus our opinion and attitude to life at any given moment is not a reliable basis to make that judgment. On the other hand, we do not know in advance the child’s own preference. But should we not give it the benefit of the doubt? And Benatar suggests using the famous ‘maximin’ principle of John Rawls (1971) in this situation ( Benatar 2006, 178-82).
Maximin is concerned with arriving at what might be considered a just social order through a hypothetical construct. The basic idea is that people come together in order to devise a fair system of distribution of life’s resources in the ‘original’ position, i.e. under a ‘veil of ignorance’, so that they have no knowledge in advance as to how each will be positioned in real life, e.g. whether they will be born rich or poor, intelligent or otherwise. This ensures impartiality in decision making since no one knows in advance what fate has in store for them. In this situation, argues Rawls, rational individuals would seek to maximize the minimum, i.e. the resources available to the most disadvantaged persons. In short, each would act as if he or she might be the one born disadvantaged and so ensure that certain minimum conditions of life are made available to such individuals.
If we apply the maximin principle to the choice of existence for the unborn the rational choice, argues Benatar, would be to choose non-existence. Since no one knows in advance how much pain and suffering will come their way they must proceed on the assumption that they might be the one exposed to most suffering. The only way to ensure that one does not suffer that fate is to choose not to be born. Some people have raised the question whether these hypothetical individuals should at least know the probability of being one of the worst off so that they could then decide with fuller knowledge of the situation they face. However in the application of his principle of maximin Rawls explicitly forbids this in the interest of strict impartiality. In any case, argues Benatar, even the knowledge of probability does not affect his argument since every life must face some measure of harm and it is only a question of facing more or less. Hence concludes Benatar, ‘it is always irrational to prefer to come into existence. Rational impartial parties would choose not to exist’( 182).
The Moral Obligation of Non-procreation and the Right of Reproduction: Clearly the moral obligation of not bringing new people into existence goes against the conventional wisdom that having children and ‘founding a family’ is a good thing. It also goes against what has been recognized in the UN Charter as a basic human right (102n). How can a fundamental human right be immoral? Can Benatar’s viewpoint be reconciled with the right of reproduction recognized by the UN Charter of Rights? Benatar believes that it can be. For what the UN Charter does is to proclaim the right to reproduce. It does not preclude choice, i.e. the right not to reproduce. However the fact that something is legal does not preclude it from being immoral. For example in South Africa racial discrimination was enshrined in law but it was clearly an immoral act. During the heyday of slavery the institution was legal and affirmed the right of slave owners over their chattel. Clearly it was an immoral institution. Historically there are many instances of forms of behavior being considered immoral and/or illegal which were later deemed not to be so, e.g. homosexuality. The formal right of procreation could be enshrined in law but the act of procreation could be deemed immoral from the viewpoint of existence that Benatar holds (102-3, 111), . Benatar makes it clear that he is not advocating a state ban on reproduction or any such intrusion into the freedom of citizens and state suppression of rights. But he insists on the moral duty not to procreate as a voluntary act on the part of would be procreators. It is in the nature of a moral commandment, viz. that ‘thou shall not inflict pain and suffering on a sentient being by bringing it into existence’.
Seen somewhat differently there might be a conflict of rights involved here. Against the so-called reproductive rights of adults we need to consider the right of the putative individual, i.e. the right of the unborn, not to be brought into existence. A common basis for denying such a right is the argument that ‘prior to procreation that person does not exist and thus there can be no bearer of the right not to be created’ ( 53). Benatar thinks this may be an unduly narrow view of rights. For if one could be harmed by being brought into existence, then there could be a right of protection against such harm even if it is a ’right that has a bearer only in the breach’ (53). Benatar’s focus is on the duty not to procreate but he believes there could be a case for recognizing the right of the unborn to be spared procreation. The application of the principle of maximin to elucidate the preference of the unborn (see above) can be seen as an indirect recognition of such a right. But he does not follow this line of argument any further.
In sum, the interest of the parents and others who favor procreation appears to be in conflict with the interest of the putative child in not being brought into existence. True, for humans the desire to reproduce, implanted by nature, is presumably a strong one and reproductive right affirms this basic human trait. However it ignores the other side of this right, viz. the putative violation of the right and the resulting plight of the child which follows from the satisfaction of this urge.
Benatar’s View of Existence and the Pollyanna Principle: Benatar’s view of existence as something that inflicts serious harm on sentient beings is clearly in conflict with the positive view of existence that the vast majority of people hold. A part, if not a good part, of this discrepancy can be explained by what Benatar calls the Pollyanna principle. Put simply it is a bias towards optimism, a tendency to put a positive spin on life and one’s experiences. In Benatar’s words ‘If coming into existence is as great a harm as I have suggested and if that is a heavy psychological burden to bear then it is quite possible that we could be engaged in a mass self deception about how wonderful things are for us’ (100). In other words we resort to a form of false consciousness about the nature of existence.
A number of factors seem to be at work here – some biological and others socio-cultural. Optimism is in line with evolutionary success and survival. Thus ‘hope springs eternal in human breast’. Pessimism, on the other hand, is likely to result in a tendency to withdraw from the struggle for existence, even an inclination towards suicide or at least a refusal to procreate. Conventional wisdom instills in us the virtues of a positive attitude towards life. Homilies such as ‘look at the bright side of things’, ‘get on with it’, ‘no use complaining’, ‘be thankful for your blessings’, are a small, if rather crude, sample of the repertoire of statements in this vein. And indeed if one is brought into existence to play the game of life o
ne needs every encouragement and motivation to take the game seriously and to try to play it well according to the rules.
The Pollyanna principle shows itself at work in a variety of ways, preeminently in the positive self-assessment of one’s quality of life. Thus when asked to recall events from their lives people recall far greater number of positive than negative experiences ( 65). This reflects how we distort the judgment of how well our life has gone5. Projections about the future also tend to exaggerate how good things would be. Similarly self-assessments of current well-being also show a marked positive bias. Thus an overwhelming majority of people claim to be ‘pretty happy’ or ‘very happy’ (66). Within any given country the poor are almost as happy as the rich. Benatar points out that a well-known psychological phenomenon that contributes to the positive bias is what can be called accommodation, adaptation or habituation (cf. Zapffe above). Thus if our condition gets worse we express dissatisfaction. But with time we tend to adapt to the situation and lower our expectations. Finally there is an important aspect of self-assessment of well-being that can go unnoticed. It is the comparative or relative nature of our judgment. It is not about how well things are in themselves or how well they have gone with oneself. It is rather how well they are in comparison with others6. One of the implications is that those negative features that are shared by everybody else may be ignored in our self-assessment. These include the frustrations, inconveniences and disappointments experienced in everyday living (72).
Assessment of the Quality of Life: For a more systematic approach to the assessment of quality of life Benatar examines three types of theories concerned with the issue: Hedonistic theories which focus on the balance of pain and pleasure in a life, or more precisely negative and positive mental states associated with these; Desire-fulfillment theories which consider the extent to which our desires are fulfilled; thirdly, Objective list theories which judge lives in terms of the presence of good and bad things, things that these theories consider significant irrespective of whether they bring pleasure or pain. Benatar draws our attention to various shortcomings of these theories and the resulting assessment of the quality of life and argues that, in any case, none of these succeed in convincing us that existence does not involve significant harm ( 69-70).
For example with regard to the Objective list theories Benatar finds that they are constructed from a relativistic or humanitarian perspective rather than sub specie aeternitatis. Thus they are more useful in comparing one life with another, e.g. in terms of creativity, freedom, deep personal relations, having children etc. What the theory does not tell us is how good human life per se is. Objective list theories of course differ with regard to the items they include in their list as of value for individuals to possess or enjoy. An important item missing from these lists is that of a meaningful life. The desire that life should have a ‘meaning’ going beyond simply existence and reproduction seems essential for most human beings. But looking at life sub specie aeternitatis it is clear that conscious life which is ‘a blip on the radar of cosmic time is laden with suffering – suffering that is directed to no end other than its own perpetuation’ (83). Seen in this wider perspective life has no meaning.
We should note that Benatar does not mention religious belief in this context. Undoubtedly that is one of the sources of meaning ( ‘anchoring’ according to Zapffe) for many people and is likely to be one of the values on some objective list theories. The omission of religion seems to suggest that Benatar considers it as a form of false consciousness or bad faith rather than an objective basis which could provide meaning sub specie aeternitatis. He notes that people try to find a meaning to their lives from a humanist perspective, e.g. service to others, realization of some personal goal, creative endeavor and the like. But it would be much better, argues Benatar, if life in general had some meaning independently of a human perspective, i.e. if it mattered from a transcendental perspective. Since there is no such meaning and yet human beings yearn for such a meaning this void becomes a perennial source of anguish of conscious existence adding to other forms of suffering (82-6). The reader will note here the similarity to the main issue raised by Zapffe (see above).
Benatar comes to the conclusion that none of the three theories concerned with quality of life can make a case for existence being superior to non-existence. While they may be useful, up to a point, in comparing the quality of individual lives with one another they do not address the problem of existence from an absolute or universal, as distinct from a relativistic and humanitarian, perspective. The case for not inflicting the considerable amount of harm that every life must suffer remains strong.
Sufferings, Human and Animal: In further support of his view of existence Benatar provides a harrowing account of human suffering through the ages. These include natural disasters, famines, wars, diseases and epidemics as well as privately and publically inflicted cruelty, torture, rape, murder and other forms of killings. Thus according to one estimate, during 1900-1988, some 170 million ( and possibly as many as 360 million) helpless citizens as well as foreigners were the victims of all kinds of brutalities and killings perpetrated by their governments !(91). The 20th century was the bloodiest on record in terms of wars. Conflict-related deaths numbered 110 million compared with 19 million in the 19th and 7million in the 18th century. There are of course many other forms of pain and suffering inflicted by humans individually on each other, ranging from assaults to murder (91).
If we add to human suffering what billions of animals go through, the suffering inflicted on them by humans – for eating, experiments or other uses – and by other animals we see the vast world of suffering that existence involves. It is a condition we choose to ignore and desensitize ourselves to. Optimists and ‘cheerful procreators’ try to put a positive gloss on the human situation. But in view of the ‘amount of unequivocal suffering the world contains’ they appear to be on very weak ground (89).
Suicide and existence: Benatar’s line of thinking on suicide is altogether different from those of Schopenhauer and Hartmann (see Ch.2 above). Although in common with these philosophers he too is against suicide, as a way out of existence, his reasoning is very different. But let us start on a personal note. Some of Benatar’s critics have made an ad hominem attack on him arguing that if things are really as bad as he thinks they are why is he still with us? Why not ‘put an end to things now?’ (Belshaw 2007). Indirectly then Benatar stands accused of hypocrisy in spite of his logical and quite reasonable objection to suicide as a solution. Indeed Schopenhauer also faced the accusation, directly or indirectly, that his own practice belied his preaching. While his ideal for salvation was the abnegation of the will and asceticism his own will to live remained strong, he craved recognition and he was no ascetic7. He was known to have enjoyed dining well regularly at a good local inn.
Benatar, it is true, believes existence to be a serious harm. But he does not believe suicide to be the solution. His focus of attention is on future lives rather than present ones. Indeed an important feature of Benatar’s philosophy is the distinction between starting new lives and continuing present lives. For him the road to liberation from existence is anti-natalism: to eschew procreation and spare new lives the pain and suffering that they must undergo. But those who exist already are in a quite different situation. Growing into adulthood they have developed strong interests in continuing to exist. Harms or conditions that make life not worth continuing must be sufficiently severe to defeat those interests. These include personal, emotional and social relationships which involve family and friends. Suicide will cause a great deal of pain and suffering for the bereaved. To quote Benatar, it can have a ‘profound negative impact on the lives of those close to one’ (220). And although the deceased himself is beyond the reach of pain and suffering the bereaved suffer harm. Thus existence is a form of trap. It shows how glib it is to argue that those who are not pleased with existence can simply put an end to their own life. Clearly it is not as simple as that. For qui
te apart from other things, once a life is started an irrational attachment to existence is implanted within it thus erecting a major obstacle to suicide. As an old lady, a character in Voltaire’s Candide, expresses it, ‘ A hundred times I wished to kill myself, but my love of life persisted. This ridiculous weakness is perhaps one of the most fatal of our faults. For what could be more stupid than to go on carrying a burden that we always long to lay down? To loathe, yet cling to existence?’ (quoted in Benatar 2006, 219-20).
Suicide raises another important issue. It differs from procreation in a crucial respect. The latter involves making decisions for others, the unborn, beings who cannot make the judgment whether to come into existence or not for themselves. Suicide, on the other hand, involves a decision made by an adult about his own life. And for Benatar, there can be no objection in principle to an adult, responsible for his own acts, deciding to end his life. Nonetheless the web of human relationships, consideration for others, and many other vested interests make suicide problematic from a practical as well as a moral standpoint. No such problem arises with abstaining from procreation. And the pain caused by childlessness to oneself and others is undoubtedly ‘mild in comparison’ to that caused by suicide (220). In other words, suicide is an attempt to seek a cure to a condition through a form of violence to oneself and others whereas Benatar advocates prevention which involves no violence. Not bringing new beings to life is a gentle and morally acceptable way to non-existence. Non-procreation is an act of altruism which prevents harm to others whereas suicide is an act of egoism which causes harm to others and to oneself. This is a crucial distinction.