Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews

by Peter Longerich

  Political Commissars’ as ‘the originators of barbarian Asiatic methods of com-

  bat’, 165 and the ‘Guidelines for the Conduct of troops in Russia’ had read, ‘the Asiatic soldiers of the Red Army in particular are inscrutable, incalculable,

  guileful, and unfeeling’. 166 Behind the National Socialist stereotype of the ‘Asiatic’

  enemy was the image that large sections of the originally Slavic peasant population

  had been extirpated by the Soviet regime whilst, as a result of ‘intermingling’ with

  Asiatic or Mongolian races, the remainder of the population represented a

  worthless but latently dangerous ‘sub-humanity’ that ‘the Jews’ dominated with

  the help of Bolshevist ideology. The danger supposedly emanating from this

  conglomerate was elucidated by Himmler speaking in July 1941 to soldiers from

  the Waffen-SS. According to Himmler, in the East ‘the same struggle against the

  same sub-human peoples, the same inferior races’ that have sometimes gone

  ‘under the name of the Huns, at others . . . under the name of Magyars, or under

  the name of Tartars, or under the names of Ghenghis Khan and the Mongols’. 167

  The murder of ‘Asiatic’ people in the Soviet Union is one of the chapters in the

  history of the Nazi regime’s policies of racial annihilation that have yet to be

  written. Only a few isolated examples are currently available. The systematic

  murder of ‘Asiatic’-looking people by the Einsatzkommandos can be documented

  from the civilian prisoner camp in Minsk that had been set up by the Wehrmacht

  in 1941, in which almost the entire non-Jewish male population of military age

  had been imprisoned. 168 The ‘Asiatics’ were viewed there with the same suspicion and treated in the same undiscriminating manner as ‘Bolshevist functionaries,

  agents, criminals’. 169 They were shot because their external appearance made them appear to be ‘elements of inferior value with a predominantly Asiatic

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  Mass Executions in Occupied Soviet Zones, 1941

  look’. 170 The same blanket justification was given by Einsatzgruppe B, for example, when they shot 83 men from the civilian camp in Mogilev on 15 October 1941.

  These were said to be ‘racially inferior elements with an Asiatic look’ that ‘it would

  not be responsible to allow to remain behind the lines any further’. 171

  Gypsies living in the Soviet Union also fell victim to the Nazis’ policies of racial

  annihilation, although they were not pursued with anything like the same merci-

  less determination as the Jews. This was the case in 1941 and also for later periods.

  Einsatzkommandos were shooting small groups of Gypsies on their advance in

  summer and autumn 1941: Einsatzkommando 3 did so on 22 August, and Ein-

  satzkommando 8 in the second half of September. 172 The group staff of Einsatzgruppe C reported in September that during the previous days ‘6 asocial elements

  (Gypsies) and 55 Jews had been dealt with’, amongst others, and Sonder-

  kommando 6 reported in October that it had apprehended a ‘band of Gypsies’

  and executed 32 people. 173 The next evidence of the murder of Gypsies is for spring 1942, when large numbers were killed. 174

  The Participation of the Wehrmacht in the Murders

  It has already become clear as this part has progressed that the Wehrmacht

  actively supported many of the ‘operations’ of the Einsatzgruppen and other SS

  and police units. This prompts the question of how far the Wehrmacht itself

  played an active and material role in the annihilation of the Jewish population of

  the Soviet Union. 175 Numerous appeals from officers in the higher echelons of the Wehrmacht show quite distinctly that the ideological war of annihilation against

  the ‘Jewish-Bolshevist complex’ was waged with the same intensity within the

  ranks of the Wehrmacht itself as in the guidelines and orders issued by the

  leadership at the beginning of the war.

  According to an order for Panzer Group 4 of 2 May, the war that was by then

  imminent was to be ‘the age-old battle of the Teutons versus the Slavs, the defence

  of European culture in the face of a Muscovite-Asiatic deluge, resistance to the

  onslaught of Jewish Bolshevism’. Every act in battle was to be ‘motivated by an

  iron will to achieve the total, merciless annihilation of the enemy’, and there

  should be in particular ‘no quarter given to the proponents of today’s Russian

  Bolshevist system’. 176 The Commander of the 6th Army, Walther von Reichenau, spoke in an order dated 10 August of the ‘necessary execution of criminal,

  Bolshevist, and mainly Jewish elements’ that would have to be carried out by

  the organs of the Reichsführer SS. 177 The Commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, described ‘Jewry’ in an order of 20 November as ‘the middle-man

  between the enemy at our backs and the remains of the Red Army that are still

  fighting on and the red leaders’. 178 The Commander of the 17th Army, Karl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, gave an order on 30 July not to take indiscriminate

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  reprisal measures against the civilian population but—if the deed could not be

  pinned on to the Ukrainians—to concentrate on ‘Jewish and Communist inhab-

  itants’, amongst whom the ‘Jewish Komsomol members’ in particular were to be

  ‘regarded as perpetrators of sabotage and responsible for forming young people

  into gangs’. 179

  What effect did orders and guidelines such as these have on the conduct of the

  troops? This part has already demonstrated a high degree of cooperation between

  the Wehrmacht on the one hand and the Police and the SS on the other. It was not

  merely the case that the Wehrmacht was informed in full detail about the

  shootings perpetrated by the SS and Police formations, as can be shown from

  the reports reaching intelligence officers. 180 In addition, units of the Wehrmacht supported mass shootings by the Police and the SS in a variety of ways, such as

  providing transport and munitions, for example. 181 Members of the Wehrmacht took part directly in these ‘operations’, either sealing off the areas in which they

  took place or joining the firing squads themselves. 182 Christian Gerlach has provided a number of examples that prove how, during the conquest of Belarus

  in the summer of 1941, front-line troops made attacks on Jews that sometimes

  involved carrying out shootings. 183

  Troop leaders sometimes evidently had some difficulty in keeping their soldiers’

  participation in such executions within the bounds of ‘due order’. The fact that the

  willing participation of soldiers in executions was repeatedly forbidden is an

  indication of how volunteering in this manner was not merely confined to isolated

  instances. 184 The same analysis can be made of the numerous orders that were issued by various Wehrmacht formations in the early months of the Russian

  campaign that forbade the participation of soldiers in pogroms, looting, arbitrary

  shootings, and other attacks on the Jewish civilian population. 185 That such attacks were part of the everyday reality of war can be demonstrated with a large number

  of individual examples. 186

  The role of the Wehrmacht in the annihilation of the Jewish civilian population

  was by no means exhausted by instances of excess such as those, or by isolated

  examples of support for the SS and Police during executions. Agencies and units


  of the Wehrmacht, and in particular military intelligence, the security divisions,

  the Secret Field Police, and the military police as well as local or field command

  posts, did in fact cooperate so closely with the SS and the Police that one can

  legitimately speak in this context of a systematic cooperation and division of

  labour. ‘Suspect’ civilians—mostly Jews—were routinely handed over to the SD; 187

  as the next section will show, the Wehrmacht delivered Jewish prisoners of war

  and others defined by racist or political criteria, to the SS; Einsatzkommandos and

  police units were requested by offices of the Wehrmacht for ‘cleansing’ or ‘pacifi-

  cation operations’, or for ‘collective reprisal measures’; 188 intelligence officers, the military police and the Secret Field Police made themselves available for

  ‘operations’. 189 In putting anti-Jewish measures such as registration, marking out, 244

  Mass Executions in Occupied Soviet Zones, 1941

  and ghettoization into place, local command posts created the structural conditions

  for the murder of the Jews. In particular, it can be proved that large-scale murder

  ‘operations’ in the military zone of occupation were set up and carried out by the

  relevant local or field command posts of the Wehrmacht in close consultation with

  SS and Police units. 190 There is some evidence that the military occupation authorities showed a similar degree of cooperation in this respect as the civilian authorities

  in the areas further to the west. 191

  The role of the Wehrmacht in the annihilation of the Jewish civilian population

  of the Soviet Union was not limited to the ideological indoctrination of the troops

  and direct support for ‘operations’ carried out by the SD and the Police. Substan-

  tial formations from the Eastern Army took part directly in the mass murder of

  Jews within the broader context of large-scale operations. We have already seen

  that Police Battalion 11 under the 707th Division carried out a ‘cleansing oper-

  ation’ in Belarus with the support of the Secret Field Police and the Division’s

  Company of Engineers that claimed several thousand Jews as its victims. The

  orders of the 707th Division, which are preserved in the State Archive in Minsk,

  demonstrate that this was not an operation initiated by the SS or Police in which

  the Wehrmacht merely played a supporting role. This ‘operation’ was part of a

  comprehensive approach to annihilation in which the Division played a decisive

  role.

  On 16 October, thus immediately after the end of the ‘major campaign’ in the

  area around Smilovichi in Rudensk, the Divisional Commander ordered an

  increased deployment of patrols by his formation and noted, ‘as far as these

  patrols are concerned, we have to ensure that the Jews are well and truly removed

  from the villages. We are continually finding that they are the only support that

  the partisans have for surviving now and over the winter. Their annihilation must

  therefore be carried out uncompromisingly.’192

  In his report for the period between 11 October and 10 November, the

  Divisional Commander (who also had the title ‘Commandant in Belarus’)

  noted, ‘it has been observed that the Jews often leave their homes and move out

  into the countryside, probably southwards, in an attempt to escape the operations

  targeted at them. Because they persist in making common cause with the Com-

  munists and partisans, this alien element will be completely eradicated. The

  operations that have been carried out so far took place in the east of the district

  rather than in the old Soviet border areas and on the stretch of railway between

  Minsk and Brest-Litovsk. And in addition, in the area under the Commandant in

  Belarus the Jews in the countryside will be assembled in ghettos in the larger

  towns.’193

  An officer of the War Economy and Armaments Department, who was in

  Minsk on 25 October 1941 for a meeting, passed on in his report the following

  suggestion from the First Officer of the General Staff of the Division to his office:

  ‘All Jews and other disruptive elements should be replaced by specialist workers

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  from amongst the prisoners of war.’ For the ‘security formations’ deployed in

  Belarus ‘the only appropriate instructions are those associated with the worlds of

  Karl May and Edgar Wallace’ is how the First Officer [Ia] of the Division

  characterized the mood prevailing in his unit. 194

  An order to the 707th Division from 24 November is quite unambiguous in this

  respect: ‘As previous orders have already indicated, the Jews must disappear from

  the flat lands and the Gypsies must also be destroyed. The implementation of

  large-scale anti-Jewish operations is not the task of units from this Division. These

  will be carried out by civilian or police authorities, where appropriate on the

  instructions of the Commandant in Belarus if he has the necessary units at his

  disposal, or if there are reasons of security or collective measures at issue. Where

  small or moderate-sized groups of Jews are encountered in the countryside they

  can either be dealt with at once or brought together in ghettos in the larger towns

  that have been identified for this purpose where they will then be handed over to

  the civilian authorities or the SD. Whenever operations of any size are carried out

  the civilian authorities are to be informed in advance.’195

  In his report for November, the First Officer of the Division wrote, ‘The

  measures instigated against the Jews as supporters of Bolshevism and leaders of

  the partisan movement have had noticeable success. We will continue to gather

  them together in ghettos and liquidate Jews found guilty of partisan activity and

  rabble-rousing and thereby best promote the pacification of the countryside.’196

  This meant therefore that the ‘cleansing’ of the ‘flat lands’ that Reichskommissar

  Lohse had already ordered in his ‘guidelines’ for handling the Jewish question on

  18 August was a task apportioned between the civilian administration, the Police

  and SS, and the Wehrmacht. 197 The Wehrmacht combed the ‘flat lands’ and

  ‘cleansed’ them of Jews and Gypsies, which is to say that it liquidated them or

  transferred them to ghettos. Larger-scale ‘operations’ were not the responsibility

  of the Division but fell to the Police; more substantial ‘operations’ like this could

  also be carried out by the Division if it had appropriate units at its disposal or if

  there were particular military grounds for doing so, such as ‘reasons of security’ or

  ‘collective measures’.

  The unit commanders of the 707th Division therefore had fairly broad room for

  manoeuvre within the scope of these orders. If they encountered Jews in a given

  town they had three possibilities if they decided not to leave the whole matter to

  the Police: they could take action against the Jews they encountered either ‘for

  reasons of security’, or using the pretext of collective reprisal measures, or within

  the context of general instructions for ‘cleansing’ the territory. In the matter of

  whether the Jews thus encountered should be ‘dealt with’ by the Division itself or

&
nbsp; handed over for imprisonment in a ghetto the unit leaders of the 707th Division

  also had plenty of freedom for manoeuvre.

  Whether the operations of the 707th Division aimed at ‘cleansing the flat lands’

  were one component in a programme of annihilation carried out by the other

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  security divisions of the army cannot be stated with complete confidence on the

  basis of documentary material currently available. There is, however, an indica-

  tion that the procedures of the 707th Division were by no means to be attributed to

  an isolated initiative on the part of a single Divisional Commander. As early as

  August 1941, a Regimental Commander in the 221st Security Division had made

  his assessment of the situation known to his superiors and it conforms to the

  pattern of the activities of the 707th: ‘The Jewish question must be solved in a

  radical manner. I suggest the confinement of all the Jews living in the countryside

  in assembly camps and work camps under guard. Suspect elements must be

  removed. ’198 The 354th Infantry Regiment also took part in the massacres carried out by Einsatzkommando 8 that ensured that the area around Krupka in Belarus

  was rendered ‘free of Jews’. 199

  There is in addition much evidence that units from the Wehrmacht were taking

  measures against the Jewish civilian population as part of anti-partisan or reprisal

  ‘operations’ in accordance with the distorted image they had been fed of the

  ‘Jewish-Bolshevist complex’. How widespread this practice was—whether it is true

  that the Wehrmacht was generally a participant in the genocide and acting on the

  pretext of a war against partisans or of collective reprisals—cannot be established

  with certainty on the basis of research carried out so far. 200 There is significant evidence that, as the conduct of the war by the military became increasingly brutal

  overall, there was less and less differentiation between different sections of the

  population. 201

  Although there is considerable evidence to suggest that the Eastern Army was

  implicated in the annihilation of the Jewish civilian population—right down to

  large-scale ‘cleansing operations’—it would in my view be inaccurate and in-