1938: Hitler's Gamble

by MacDonogh, Giles

  Göring spent five hours alone with Hitler at the Berghof on the last day of the month. The upshot was a message sent in a roundabout way to the US State Department, transmitted via Göring’s chief economic advisor, Helmut Wohltat, and Edgar Mowrer of the Chicago Daily News. A highly placed gentleman in Berlin wished to know whether, if Germany were to lose another war, Britain and America would combine to prevent France from imposing an even more draconian peace. It was Göring’s first peace feeler: there would be more in 1939.23

  The Czech crisis was now causing international concern. The French called the Czechs to order. In some circles in Britain the mood was shifting from appeasement to confrontation. In the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart felt that the moment had come to strike. On 7 August he wrote a memorandum calling for an emergency Cabinet meeting to discuss Czechoslovakia. Alternatively there could be a suggestion that Parliament was to be recalled. The intelligence he was receiving from Germany showed that an invasion was imminent. To prevent the mistakes committed by the British government in the weeks prior to the First World War, the Prime Minister needed to make a crystal-clear statement of intent, otherwise Europe would plunge into war. His plea fell on deaf ears.24 In early August, Vansittart sent an emissary to the resister Goerdeler, who reported back that Hitler was mad and his successes had made him believe he was God. The only man with any influence on him was Himmler. Meanwhile Germany was heading for bankruptcy, as they could no longer afford their rearmament programme.

  Trouble was brewing elsewhere. Corder Catchpool had been in the former German town of Memel in Lithuania, and visited the German political prisoners in the gaols. Germany had been hoping to take Memel back when the bad relations between the Warsaw and Kovno governments degenerated into war. Catchpool sent Vansittart a report, claiming that there had been an improvement in the position, but he thought that the German Memelländer might well want more: ‘probably Anschluss’, excited by the ‘tireless propaganda of the Nazi Party, which here as elsewhere is determined to prevent the consolidation of any position won by a foreign country at Germany’s expense as a result of the war’.25

  Both before and after war broke out in September 1939, the British government was visited by a number of unaccredited emissaries: men and women generally representing the Opposition, who nevertheless left the British government in a state of perplexity as to what they actually wanted. Possibly the confusion resulted from a lack of desire to learn or listen. One of these emissaries was Kleist-Schmenzin, who had made no bones about his feelings about Hitler, and had seen the insides of the Führer’s prisons. His usefulness to the Opposition was severely limited, as he was watched as soon as he left his Pomeranian estate. Already in May Canaris and Oster had made Kleist aware of the situation: Hitler was extremely vulnerable if he wanted to make war on the Czechs. A few hours later Kleist relayed this to Ian Colvin, the News Chronicle’s man in Berlin. Colvin needed to tell the British that they had to stand firm and not waver when it came to German demands.26

  Kleist met Beck at the beginning of August and reported Beck’s message back to Colvin: ‘Through yielding to Hitler . . . the British government will lose its two main allies here, the German General Staff and the German people. If you can bring me positive proof from London that the British will make war if we invade Czechoslovakia I will make an end of this regime.’ Kleist wanted to know what the proof was. ‘An open pledge to assist Czechoslovakia in the event of war.’27

  On 16 August Henderson let Whitehall know that Kleist was coming to London. Detailed plans were drawn up and Kleist arrived the next day. He was armed with a false passport obtained for him by Canaris and had been escorted to his Ju 52 at Tempelhof Airport by his cousin, General Ewald von Kleist. The next day Beck resigned. In London Kleist met Halifax’s friend Lord Lloyd, chairman of the British Council, and explained that Britain needed to take a firm stand and the Opposition would remove Hitler. Kleist told him that all the German generals were opposed to the invasion. Lloyd took the story to Halifax and Kleist then had a meeting with Vansittart.

  Once again Vansittart missed the point: Kleist was in favour of a territorial link between Pomerania and East Prussia. This was not currently a Nazi cause, but it had always been a German national one, ever since the land between the two provinces was taken away at Versailles to give the Poles a path to the sea. Kleist had no truck with Hitler’s claims to the Sudetenland, however, and thought that Prussia and Austria had nothing in common: Hitler was ‘revenge for Königgrätz’.i Hitler was not asking for the Corridor, and that would take the wind out of his sails. Deny him Sudetenland, but make the much more popular move of altering the Polish frontier.28 Goerdeler had burned his boats with Vansittart by supporting the cause of the Sudeten Germans who wanted to be part of the Reich. The Corridor was a cause close to Kleist’s heart: he was a Pomeranian landowner after all.ii

  Kleist’s next appointment was with Churchill at Chartwell. Later Churchill forwarded an account of their talk to the Foreign Office. Kleist told Churchill the generals needed encouragement, but once again Kleist insisted on the Corridor. Churchill thought the idea of the restoration of prewar German borders inopportune but nonetheless wrote Kleist a letter of support to show his German friends, which went to Berlin in the diplomatic bag. Kleist passed it on to Canaris and the German Foreign Office edited it for internal use. It spoke of the inevitability of war, a war in which Germany would be ‘utterly and terribly defeated’.29

  Chamberlain obstinately maintained that there was no opposition in Germany. In a note handwritten to Halifax about Kleist he made his now infamous disparaging remark that compared the anti-Nazis with the Jacobites at the court of Louis XIV: ‘We must discount a good deal of what he said.’30 Kleist went back to Germany on 24 August and duly reported to Canaris.

  Two days later Sir Nevile Henderson was summoned back to London for a meeting. He conferred with Chamberlain, Halifax, Sir Horace Wilson and Vansittart. It was now that Henderson suggested direct talks between Chamberlain and Hitler. Germany was to be admonished, but Chamberlain was for a softly-softly approach, the one he demonstrated at Berchtesgaden, Bad Godesberg and Munich.

  The Opposition was increasingly worried. On the 27th the Sudeten leader Karl Hermann Frank told the General Staff officer Helmuth Groscurth what he had probably gleaned from Henlein: that Hitler was bent on war, and that he had heaped insult on Beneš, saying that he wanted to catch him alive and hang him in person.31 Hitler boasted that Britain would stay neutral. Meanwhile the younger of the two Kordt brothers, Erich, had been working on the French journalist Pierre Maillaud in an attempt to influence French policy, while in Moscow he was in contact with the ambassador Werner von der Schulenburg’s private secretary, Hans von Herwarth, who was leaking information to the diplomatic community in the Soviet capital. Wilhelmstrasse officials like Kordt, Albrecht von Kessel and Edward von Selzam did their best to influence foreign diplomats, but their efforts were dismissed by Sir Nevile Henderson – and probably many others – as ‘a lot of treason’.32 Many believed siding with this strange array of upper-class emissaries, many of whom were asking for large-scale territorial adjustments, was risky. Hitler was the bulwark against bolshevism, and the removal of the bulwark might mean civil war and a victory by the left.

  THE KENDRICK AFFAIR

  The Abwehr (military intelligence) had penetrated the British Secret Service and broken some of its ciphers. The journalist Ian Colvin heard it from Fabian von Schlabrendorff. One of Schlabrendorff’s friends had suggested working with British intelligence to bring down Hitler. Canaris thought it unwise:

  I must warn you against the British Secret Service . . . for several reasons. Should you work for them it will probably be brought to my notice, as I think I have penetrated it here and there. They will want to send messages about you in cipher and from time to time we can break a cipher. Your names would appear in files and registers. That is bad, too. It would be difficult to overlook such activities in the long run. It
has also been my experience that the Secret Service will requite you badly – if it is a matter of money, let me tell you, they do not reward services well, and if they have the least suspicion, they will not hesitate to betray you to me or to my colleagues of the Reich Security Service.33

  On 17 August Thomas Kendrick, head of Vienna Station MI6, was arrested. A small diplomatic crisis ensued. The British ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, told the Foreign Office in London that Kendrick was a Passport Control Officer and not a diplomat, and therefore possessed no immunity from arrest.34 It appears that Kendrick had been betrayed by Siegfried or ‘Fred’ Richter,iii his office manager, who had doubled up as the verger in the Anglican Church since 1924. Richter was born in Vienna, but hailed from Rechnitz in Burgenland, which was Hungarian at the time. His father was a Jewish horsetrader, but his mother, Anna Schwach, may have been Catholic. He had gone to Britain as a stable lad in 1900, and met his Irish wife Maud Dollery there before returning to Vienna in 1912. He managed stables for the Schlesingers – rich Jews – and later for Graf Reventlow in Berlin.

  British nationality acquired by his marriage had not prevented him from serving as a soldier-servant in the Imperial army in the Great War. He later possessed an Austrian passport as well, although the outgoing British ambassador, Selby, issued him with another British one in March 1938. Richter had had a chequered career since the war: he had been an interpreter and had an unsuccessful knitwear business. Soon after the Anschluss, he was formally engaged as a ‘marshal’ in the British Passport Office working for Kendrick. He had been casually employed by Kendrick for some time, running errands for the legation and the consulate. He earned 290 RM from both jobs and gave his wife 7 RM daily for the housekeeping. At the time of his arrest he owed the German state 600 RM in tax arrears.

  Introduction fees greatly supplemented his income. The Gestapo estimated that he was earning anything up to 100 RM a day, probably by bringing in Jews for baptism. He may have had agents working for him too, such as Edmund Pollitzer. There was a considerable amount of money burning holes in the pockets of his various suits. Once, in a tram, he pressed a wad of cash on his sister-in-law, telling her that he did not wish to be caught with so much on him.35

  During the Abyssinian War, Kendrick had asked Richter if he knew of anyone who could go to Italy to report on the Italian Navy. Richter knew of a Korvettenkapitän von Gatterer from his time in the Reparations Commission. Gatterer refused but suggested the secretary of the Navy League, Rudolf Koren. Koren went to Italy to spy for Kendrick with Richter acting as intermediary. Richter tried to introduce other potential agents to Kendrick, but he was not interested until Richter, in May 1937, met Karl Tucek, a Communist ex-foreman with Böhm, an engineering firm specializing in compressed-air and other machines. After being laid off he had turned inventor, fashioning a machine that he believed would be of interest to a foreign firm. Richter saw possibilities and asked for an introduction fee. He was even more interested when he learned that Tucek had been in the Austrian Navy and was terribly short of money. He told Tucek he could find him some if he would go to Italy and ‘have a look around’.

  In his testimony Tucek said he realized immediately that he was being asked to spy on the Italians and refused: it was too dangerous and his Italian was not good enough. Richter then suggested Germany. Tucek again refused. Richter found him a job with a German firm but he was still short of money and complained to Richter. In January 1938 he said he was ready to take up Richter’s suggestion. Richter then went to Kendrick and described Tucek as a former naval engineer of great potential. Kendrick became interested when he saw some of Tucek’s drawings. When Richter told Tucek that he was going to meet the head of the British Secret Service, Tucek provided him with his service record and asked him to tell Kendrick that he had a friend working in the Schicau Yard in Elbing who could employ him as a mechanic. Kendrick promptly asked for clearance from London.

  Once this was granted, Kendrick arranged to meet Tucek in his flat with Richter. He said he would buy his patent for 1,000 Schillings if he would do a job for him. He then produced a questionnaire to be completed in Elbing. The answers he required concerned U-boat production, and the possible power and speeds of the submarines. Richter told Tucek he had to learn the questions and return the document to him. He then gave him a third-class train ticket. Tucek could explain his absence in Elbing by the need to sell his invention to the firm of Knorr-Bremse. He was also issued with a letter of credit and 500 Schillings in cash to add to the advance of 200 he had already received.

  Tucek returned from Elbing on 20 March. Some big changes had taken place in Austria in his absence. Two days later Richter and Tucek met in the Mondl pub in the Favoritenstrasse where Tucek lived. It was agreed that he would deliver the questionnaire to the British consulate the following morning. Tucek countered that he was now a German citizen and that on German soil he could neither make the drawings nor hand over the material. He would only do that on neutral soil. He wanted to see an MI6 man in Switzerland. He refused to modify his stance despite Richter giving him another 100 Schillings. Richter asked him to meet him at the Anglican Church at four. When Tucek arrived Richter locked the door and took him into the vestry. Once again Tucek refused to hand over the plans, merely indicating which questions he could now answer: precise information about submarine production in Elbing, Königsberg and Danzig, where the submarines were built, in what number and their speeds. He proved obdurate, and added that ‘he could give no details to a non-expert’ and that he needed to talk to an expert in Switzerland.36

  Kendrick once again asked London to advise. Meanwhile, Tucek took to dropping in to the consulate, as he was anxious to go to Switzerland. He told Richter that he had the chance of getting a job in Wilhelmshaven and wanted to know if this was of interest to British intelligence. Richter relayed this to Kendrick and on 4 April was able to inform Tucek that he was about to get a letter from England, from a firm that was interested in his invention. It would instruct him to visit an address in Switzerland. On receipt he was to visit the fiscal authorities and ask for permission to go, and then to come to the consulate to receive more money for the journey. From 11 to 27 April, Richter and Tucek were in almost daily contact. The letter was still not there on the 27th. Richter told Tucek that he would have several thousand Schillings if he were ready to spill the beans in Vienna. Tucek once again refused and asked to see Kendrick.

  Finally Kendrick received a telegram. Tucek was to travel to the Berner Hof in Interlaken where a British agent would be waiting for him. He was to have 600 Schillings in expenses and hand over the information to an Englishman called Mr Brandon.iv Richter issued him with a third-class return ticket to Zurich. He had to buy his own to Interlaken because it was not to be clear what his ultimate destination was. Richter gave Tucek postal vouchers to the value of 150 Swiss Francs. He was told that Brandon would give him more in Interlaken.

  Tucek’s meeting with Brandon took place in Interlaken on 28 May. Tucek was as good as his word and told him everything he had learned in Elbing, Königsberg and Danzig. Tucek could answer all Brandon’s prepared questions on the spot. Brandon therefore gave him 150 Swiss Francs and asked him what sort of expenses he might need for Wilhelmshaven for four to eight weeks. Tucek named a figure of 400 RM. Brandon thought there would be no problem obtaining that and told him he would have the money by 1 June at the latest.

  Tucek returned to Vienna on 29 May and reported to the consulate on the 31st. There he told Richter that he was happy with the way things had gone in Switzerland. Kendrick gave Richter 600 RM to hand over to Tucek together with the message that the man in Switzerland was fully satisfied with the information provided. Tucek supposed that the real mission was to find out about the ships with tonnages in excess of 35,000. Kendrick said that 440 RM was for expenses, the rest for him, and there would be a bonus as soon as he had taken the new information to Switzerland after his return from Interlaken. Tucek found a job in Wilhelmshaven and left on 12
June. While he was away Richter took his wife 50 RM. From 9 to 31 July Tucek was on holiday in Vienna and had frequent meetings with Richter. Kendrick sent word that he would receive 600 RM monthly now, as an employee of SIS. Richter promptly deducted the 50 RM he had lent Frau Tucek.

  Tucek told Richter of the things he had seen in Wilhelmshaven. He had a pass that allowed him access to the dockyards. He was working in the submarine and torpedo-boat yards as a technician. He said he wanted to see Brandon again in Switzerland, but Richter said he would need more information first, which meant going back to Wilhelmshaven. He was given another 800 RM in travel expenses and instructions, which he was to conceal immediately. They asked him to find out more about the battleship Scharnhorst. Tucek had to provide details of its capacity and speed as well as its fuel consumption at different speeds. He also needed to bring back similar information about the Tirpitz, which was under construction. British intelligence wanted to know how it was laid out, its horsepower, speed and fuel capacity, its strength and armour, both below and above deck, and the construction of the keel. Richter and Tucek met for the last time on 17 July, just before Tucek left for Wilhelmshaven.

  It appears Tucek was a double agent working for the SD. Once he had mustered enough evidence to destroy the MI6 Vienna station he filed his report.

  Richter might have had an inkling that things would not turn out well, and in August he made arrangements to leave for England. He was arrested on the 13th on the Elisabethpromenade together with Maud and his daughter Gretl. He had just locked up at the British consulate and had on him an envelope containing 1,000 RM. It was marked Capt. Kendrick, Brit. Passport Office. This was initially thought to be composed of Jewish bribes.