Appendix B
A LB E R T U S M A G N US : D E B O N O , T R AC T AT US IV,
Q U A E S T I O II ‘‘D E P A R T I B U S P R U D E N T I A E ’’ 1
Next, the properties of prudence are investigated. And we follow the three
categories of three philosophers, namely Tullius [Cicero], Macrobius, and
Aristotle.
First Tullius says at the end of his First Rhetoric [De inventione]: ‘‘there
are three parts to prudence: memory, intelligence, foresight.’’ Macrobius,
however, says in his Commentary on the Dream of Scipio: ‘‘the knowledge of
prudence lies in intellect, circumspection, foresight, a willingness to learn,
and caution.’’ And Aristotle at the end of the first Book of his Ethics says
that the intellectual virtues are prudence [sapientia], phron¯esis, 2 and intelli-
gence [intelligentia].
3
A R T I C L E O N E : W H A T M E M O R I A M I G H T B E
Let us inquire first concerning the word memoria, which Tullius only men-
tions. And we will inquire in two ways, namely concerning what it might be in
itself, and concerning the art of memory which Tullius teaches. First therefore
let us examine what memory is. Tullius says that ‘ memory is the faculty by
which the mind recalls things that were in the past’’ [De invent. II. 53, 160].
1. But it seems that according to this definition memory would not be a
part of prudence. Memory, by means of which what has happened is
recalled, is a function of the soul and not a characteristic capable of being
developed by education and training [habitus], as is demonstrated in the
questions De anima [Albertus Magnus, De homine, Q. 40, a. 1]; every
part of prudence, however, is a matter of learning [habitus]; therefore
memory is not a part of prudence.
2. Also, it was asserted above, that memory is a part of the sensory soul and
not of the rational per se; prudence however is per se in the rational soul;
therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
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3. Moreover, to recollect things that have occurred is the action of a
cognitive power; prudence, however, is a characteristic of ethical judg-
ments [moralium]; therefore again memory is not a part of the virtue of
prudence.
4. Likewise everything is directed and guided by something which is or can
be; nothing of what has been, insofar as it has been, is or can be;
therefore no direction is possible from past things, insofar as they are
past. Whence this final conclusion follows, thus: all prudence is guided
by present things, those things which are, or by future ones, those which
can be; therefore no memory is a part of prudence.
5. Moreover, the recollection of something which happened comes
about either by means of reason proceeding from a definite principle,
or only by means of the forms of sense-objects. If it comes about in
the first way, then to recall something past will be an act of remi-
niscence and not of memory, as appears from what was demon-
strated earlier in my tract De anima [Albertus, De homine, Q. 41,
a.1]. If however, it is by the second method, then the action of memory
will not accord with the rational soul, and thus it will not be a part of
prudence.
But on the contrary: Prudence is the knowledge of the good and evil of
actions; this knowledge, moreover, is greatly aided by events that have
already happened, because by means of the past it will know in what way it
should manage itself in the future; therefore memory should be a part of
prudence.
Likewise, in a certain decretal, Pope [Gregory IX] says: ‘‘From your past
life we separate out what we should anticipate concerning the future.’’
[Greg. IX, Decret. 2.23.6 i. f.] So memories of the past direct us regarding
the future; therefore, memory is a part of prudence. Likewise the
Philosopher says that ‘‘an intellectual power stands in need of experience
and time.’’ [Eth. Nic., I, i, 1103a, 16–17] The Philosopher says elsewhere in
the beginning of Metaphysics: ‘‘memory creates experience among men;
many memories of the same thing make effective the power of a single
experience’’ [Meta., I.i, 980b, 20 – 981a, 1]. Therefore it seems that memory
should be generative of prudence and a part of it.
SOLUTIO: We say that memory is a part of prudence, insofar as
memory comes under the definition of reminiscence. When prudence
distinguishes those things by which it is assisted from those by which it is
impeded in its work, it is necessary for it to proceed by a process of inquiry,
and thus necessary for it to progress from a pre-determined starting-point,
and through intermediate probabilities to arrive at a working hypothesis;
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347
and likewise since prudence proceeds from things that happened in the
past, it uses memory, insofar as it is a function of reminiscence.
1. We reply therefore, that to recollect [repetere] things which are past
comes about in two ways, that is from our natural predisposition, and
this sort of recollection is only a psychological potential and imperfect in
that it has no habitual method whence it might proceed. And there is
recollection from trained habit, by which the past is recalled, whenever
one wishes to recollect. And this can be a part of cognitive training [in
habitu cognitivo], and then it is theoretical, or it can be part of moral
training [in habitu morali], and then it is practical and is the virtue
pertaining to prudence.
2. Replying to the next that memoria, insofar as it mixes itself up with
reminiscence, belongs more to the rational soul than to the sensible soul,
because reminiscence is as it were a kind of logical reasoning [syllogismus],
as the Philosopher says, and so then memoria is a habit of the rational soul.
3. Replying to the next, that memory has two functions, that is, it is a
condition for what we know rationally [habitus cognitivorum], and a
condition for making ethical judgments [habitus moralium], and here it
is discussed as a condition of making moral judgments, as I said.
4. Replying to the next, that the past so far as it is past brings nothing to
our guidance in the present or the future. But memory takes in an event
that is past as though it stayed ever-present in the soul as an idea and as
an emotional effect on us, and so this event can be very effective for
providing for the future. Moreover, I say ‘‘to stay in the soul as an idea,’’
meaning an idea of good and evil, and ‘‘as an effect,’’ meaning how
much it affected positively or harmed those performing it.
5. Replying to the next, that memoria is understood by Tullius as the
trained habit and not as the psychological faculty. However, ‘‘habit’’
does not fall under the heading of reminiscence so much as it does of
memory, and so it is more readily discussed as memory than as remi-
niscence. Both memory and reminiscence indeed proceed from past
events when they are past. But a past event when past creates no habitual
effect except in memory, and so it is calle
d memoria by Tullius. There
are those, nonetheless, who say along with John Damascene and
Gregory Nazianzus, that memory is the accumulation both of sensible
objects and of intellectual ones, and so they say there are two faculties of
memory, that is, one of the sensible soul and the other of the rational.
But this is not said in the natural philosophy which Aristotle taught, or
the other following him. What indeed appears to us concerning this
matter can be expressly discovered in our treatise De anima.
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A R T I C L E T W O : C O N C E R N I N G T H E A R T O F M E M O R Y
Secondly, let us inquire concerning the art of memory which Tullius treats
in his Second Rhetoric, at the end of Book III.
Let us determine what ‘‘artificial’’ memory might be. For Tullius divided
the memory into natural and artificial, and he said our native memory was
‘‘something which is imbedded in our minds, born simultaneously with
thought.’’ And he says artificial memory is that ‘‘strengthened by a kind of
inductive reasoning [inductio quaedam] and a system of rules.’’4
1. But it seems this is not so at all, because what he calls ‘‘natural memory’’
is either the activity of the soul, which is memory, or a particular
habitualized action, by which this power is made fully effective. If it is
the first sort of thing, then he speaks nonsense, because a power of the
soul cannot be classified together with some one habitual characteristic
and above all of the very same power. But the artificial memory is a habit
and it cannot be a habit except of a power, which is memory. If it is the
second sort of thing, then it would not seem to be of our nature, because
habitualized training in remembering things is not inborn in us.
2. Moreover, what he says – that [memoria is] ‘‘what is imbedded in our
minds, born simultaneously with thought’’ – seems to be opposite to
what is good for our native memory. I showed indeed, in my treatise
De anima [De homine, Q. 40, a. 3] that the best conditions for memory
are cold and dry, whence we say the melancholics are the best at
remembering. But the worst condition for thought lies in cold and
dry, because thinking [cogitatio] is the repeated working-over [coagitatio]
and running back and forth [discursus] of reason on the objects of
memory [memorabilia], and for the operation of reason warmth and
pliability or dampness work better. For what is warm moves vigorously
and what is damp best responds to all movements. Therefore the best
condition for natural memory is not generated together with thought.
3. Moreover, we should inquire concerning what this same person
[Tullius] says about the artificial memory, that analogous argumenta-
tion [inductio] and a system of rules strengthen it, because these
proceed from some reasoned principle by analogy or example or
enthymeme or syllogism, when none of these is proper to memory
but more to reminiscence, as Aristotle says in his book De memoria et
reminiscentia.
4. Moreover, it should be asked what is the difference between an
induction and a general rule. An inductive argument comes about
when entirely from single cases a universal principle is inferred, and in
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349
such a case a whole memory is generated as much of the natural as of
the artificial. For the Philosopher says that out of many things,
regarding which an example [instantia] is not already inventoried in
the mind, memoria is created by the experience of the intellect. Thus
the whole memory is made by the experience of generalizing from
single cases [ab inductione experimento] among those things we have
taken in [acceptorum]; thus this is not specific to the artificial memory.
5. Moreover, it appears from this that he should be wrong when he says
memoria is made from a system of rules when induction suffices.
6. Likewise, a system of rules is a logic of universal principles; but a universal
is generated by memory, as the Philosopher says; therefore what is
generated by memory generates memory, which is impossible. Therefore
Tullius says wrongly that memoria is created by a system of rules.
7. In connection with this latter point, we should inquire concerning the
rules, which he teaches, that are attendant on this artificial memory.
He says indeed that among them it is necessary above all to pay
attention to those on which it is based: ‘‘the artificial memory consists
of backgrounds and images.’’ And he defines what he calls back-
grounds thus: ‘ By backgrounds [loci] I mean such scenes as are
naturally or artificially set off on a diminished scale, complete, in a
visually striking manner, so that we can grasp and embrace them easily
by the natural memory – for example, a house, an intercolumnar
space, a recess, an arch, or the like. An image is, as it were, a figure,
mark, or portrait of a thing we wish to remember, such as the general
class [genus] of horse, lion, eagle’’ and by this method it is sought. So
when time is said to be more of the essence of memory than space, as
something which falls within its very definition, why does not Tullius
say that time is as necessary to pay attention to as place is? 5
8. Likewise, a background represented ‘‘on a diminished scale’’ is a
truncated and mutilated place; ‘‘completely’’ represented however is
a background equivalent to the thing itself. Therefore it seems that
‘‘diminished in scale’’ and ‘‘complete’’ are contradictory with regard to
the same object of memory, and thus by saying one thing about
something the other will be false.
9. Moreover, to represent ‘‘in a strikingly visual manner’’ does not seem
suitable for the background of all memory-objects, because not every
sort of object-for-remembering is made in a visually marked place.
10. Moreover, what is a memory-place set off ‘‘naturally’’ and one ‘‘com-
pletely artificial?’’ These indeed ought to be defined but Tullius does
not do so, either earlier or later.
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11. Further, let us inquire concerning the rules which he makes to be
observed about background-places and there are five in general. The
first of them is that ‘‘it will be more advantageous to obtain places in a
deserted than in a populous region, because the crowding and passing
to and fro of people confuse and weaken the impress of images, while
solitude keeps their outlines sharp.’’ The second is that ‘‘places differing
in form and nature must be secured, so that, thus distinguished, they
may be clearly visible; for if a person has adopted many intercolumnar
spaces, their resemblance to one another will so confuse him that he will
no longer know what he set in each background.’’ The third is that ‘‘the
places ought to be of moderate size and medium extent, for when
excessively large they render the images vague, and when too small
often seem incapable of receiving an arrangement of images.’’ The
f
ourth is that ‘‘the places ought to be neither too bright nor too dim,
so that the images may not grow obscure in shadows nor be dazzling
from brilliant light.’’ The fifth is that ‘‘the interval between the places
should be of moderate extent, approximately thirty feet; for like an
external glance [aspectus], so the inner glance of thought [cogitatio]
works less well when you have moved too near or too far away.’’
12. So, let us inquire concerning these background-places.It seems indeed
at first when he speaks concerning the faculty of reminiscence, that
physical places are of no value for that which reminiscence deduces by a
rational method. But physical backgrounds, at least ones of this sort,
are in the image-making faculty.
13. Further, I held in my tract De anima, in the question ‘‘On memoria,’’
that memory indeed retains for the soul not so much the images of
sense objects but the impressions [intentiones] received from these
images. Therefore it seems that images of physical places would not
be especially valuable, but he ought to teach an art such that we may
arrive at the concepts abstracted from them.
14. Likewise, to imagine is from imaginatio, which according to the
Philosopher is the treasury of forms, and therefore is also called (vis)
formalis. Thus it seems that these things are more of imaginatio than of
memoria.
15. Further it seems that he has taught incompletely the rules for the
backgrounds in which the images of things to be remembered are
deposited, because many other things are useful as places for remem-
bering besides those he defined: solitude, distinctness, intervals neither
too great nor too small. Many people indeed remember sometimes by
the opposite characteristics of places. Further, this same Tullius himself
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351
adds a little further on: ‘‘if we are not content with our ready-made
supply of backgrounds,we may create a region for ourselves and obtain
a most serviceable distribution of appropriate backgrounds.’’
16. Additionally to this, let us inquire further concerning the images gath-
ered in the places we spoke of. Tullius says indeed that in two ways we
must hold likenesses for remembering, one way according to things, the
other according to words. ‘ Likenesses of things [rerum] are formed when
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