we enlist images that present a general view or summation of the matter
with which we are dealing; likenesses of words are established when the
record of each single noun or word is kept by an image.’ Yet this
technique which Tullius speaks of does not seem to be a useful skill
but more of an impediment to remembering, for two reasons. Of which
one is that there will be as many images according to his method as there
are matters and words. Therefore their multitude would confound the
memory. The second reason is because metaphors represent things less
well than do the words themselves. If therefore we should refer the literal
content in our material and words to images, as he teaches, we will be less
quick to remember. For he thus teaches us to have recourse to images:
‘ [if] the prosecutor has said that the defendent killed a man by poison,
has charged that the motive for the crime was an inheritance, and
declared that there are many witnesses and accessories to this act,’ we
place in our memory ‘‘a sick man in bed, who is a figure of the deceased,
and we place the defendant standing by the bed, holding in his right
hand a cup, in his left hand tablets, and a physician standing upright
holding the testicles of a ram,’’ so that certainly in the cup should be the
memory-cue of the poison which he drank, and in the tablets should be
the memory-cue of the will which he signed, and in the physician may be
figured the accusor and by the testicles the witnesses and accessories, and
by the ram the defense against the matter being ajudicated. The same
method is observed regarding images for words. But what is literal would
affect someone more easily than what is non-literal, and so literal words
will stimulate the memory more than metaphorical ones.
17. Moreover, Tullius himself says that ‘‘when we wish to represent by
images the likenesses of words, we shall be undertaking a greater task
and exercising our ingenuity the more; this we ought to effect in the
following way.’’ Suppose we wish to recollect these words: ‘‘Now their
revenge at home [domi ultionem]’’ or ‘‘their home-coming [domum
itionem]’’ (which is better) ‘‘the kings, sons of Atreus, prepare [Iam
domum itionem reges Atridae parent].’’ In a background we must place
Domitius, raising hands to heaven, while he is whipped with thongs by
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the Marcian kings; this will be ‘‘now the kings their revenge at home’’.
In the next place, Aesop and Cimber preparing wandering Iphigenia;
this will be ‘‘Atridae making ready.’’ That is, we should imagine some-
one who is beaten with sharp thongs by the Marcian kings, that is the
sons of Mars, who aid Mars the god of war, for his own exile or for
revenge, and because he who prepares himself for something wanders
about, we represent wandering Iphigenia preparing Aesop and Cimber
[sic].6 These indeed are metaphorical words and obscure things not
easy to remember.
18. Finally, let us inquire concerning those rules which Tullius gives for
gathering images in such background-places. Indeed Tullius says that
‘‘the backgrounds are very much like wax tablets or papyrus, the images
like the letters, the arrangement and disposition of the images like the
script, and the delivery is like the reading.’’ This does not seem possible.
For letters are few in number compared to the number of word-
elements, and, according to their diverse arrangements, they express
whatever may be needed for speaking, as Democritus said happens in
tragedies and comedies; but it would be necessary to have a great many
images or they could not express the content in its literal kind.
19. If it is said definitely that a few images are enough, this indeed will be
contrary to Tullius, because it appears from the above examples that it
is necessary to have one’s own likenesses of things.
20. Next after Tullius has taught what kinds of places we ought to employ,
in a similar way he teaches what sorts of images we must seek out, that
is, ‘‘we should set up the mental images of our likenesses to be as
striking as possible, though not multiform or diffuse and changeable
in nature, but we shall select images that are doing something; if we
attribute to them exceptional beauty or singular ugliness; if we dress
some of them with crowns or purple cloaks so that the likeness may be
more distinct to us; or if we somehow disfigure them as by introducing
one stained with blood or soiled with mud or smeared with red paint,
so that their form is more striking, or by assigning comic effects to our
images. For that too will ensure that we are able to remember more
easily.’’ From this it appears that it is not sufficient to have a limited
number of images, so that according to their diverse arrangement each
single one expresses a meaning to us, but we must have many, and
these will not be less difficult to recall than the matters or universals
themselves. Therefore the rules of Tullius are useless.
21. Moreover indeed, Tullius himself says regarding our images, in order
that we may recollect by means of them, we require two kinds, that is in
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353
disciplined study we constitute for ourselves images both spaced apart
at intervals and strange, ones which are almost marvels. And he touches
on the reason for each of these conditions, saying of the first thus: ‘‘But
such an arrangement of images succeeds only if we use our notation to
stimulate the natural memory, so that we first go over a given verse
twice or three times and then represent the words by means of images.’’
Likewise, in the same place: ‘‘art will supplement nature; for neither by
itself will be strong enough, though we must note that theory and
technique are much the more reliable.’’ He also touches on the reason
for the second condition, saying: ‘‘Now nature herself teaches us what
we should do. When we see in everyday life things that are petty,
ordinary, and common, we generally fail to remember them, because
the mind is not being stirred by anything novel or marvellous. But if we
see or hear something either incredibly decent or base in human beings,
also unheard of, great, incredible, dangerous, that we are likely to
remember for a long time.’’7
Likewise in the same place: ‘‘things which are immediate to our eye or
ear we commonly forget; incidents of our childhood we often remember
best, nor could this be so for any other reason than that ordinary things
easily slip from the memory while the striking and novel stay longer in the
mind.’’ Again, in the same place: ‘‘Thus nature shows that she is not
aroused by the common, ordinary event, but is moved by a new or striking
occurence. Let art, then, imitate nature, find what she descries, and follow
where she directs. For in invention nature is never last, education never
first; rather the beginnings of things arise from natural talent, and the ends
are reached by discipline.’’
From all these quotati
ons it appears that for the artificial memory
disciplined study is required in images and contents and words and
much else besides, so that our images may be rare and conspicuous, and
thus it seems that these may not be predetermined images which we
employ for remembering all sorts of things, as we employ letters for
signifying every sort of thing in writing. If because of this it is said that
the images ought to be as numerous as the matters and words, Tullius says the
contrary about what is good for memory, in the same book just before the
end: ‘‘I know that most of the Greeks who have written on the memory
have taken the course of listing images that correspond to a great many
words, so that persons who wished to learn these images by heart would
have them ready without expending effort on a search for them. I dis-
approve of their method on several grounds.’’ And he puts forth in general
six reasons why what they say is wrong. Of which the first is thus stated by
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Tullius: ‘‘first, among the immemorable [sic for innumerabile] multitude of
words it is ridiculous to collect images [mille omitted]. How meager is the
value these can have when out of the infinite store of words we shall need to
remember different ones [second aliud modo omitted]?’’ The second reason
is ‘‘why do we wish to rob anyone of his initiative, so that, to save him from
making any search himself, we deliver to him everything searched out and
ready?’’ The third is because ‘‘one person is more struck by one likeness,
and another by another. Often in fact when we declare that some one form
resembles another, we fail to receive universal assent, because things seem
different to different persons; the same is true with respect to images, one
that is well defined to us appears relatively inconspicuous to others; every-
body, therefore, should in equipping himself with images suit his own
convenience.’’ The fourth reason is because ‘‘it is the instructor’s duty to
teach the proper method of search in each case, and, for the sake of greater
clarity, to add in illustration some one or two examples of its kind, but not
all, as for instance, when I discuss how to find an introduction, I give a
method of search and do not write out a thousand kinds of Introductions.
The same procedure I believe should be followed with respect to images.’’
The fifth cause is because since memory is of two kinds, that is of things
and of words, ‘‘lest we make memorizing too difficult, we should be
content with memory for things,’’ lest the number of words overwhelm
what is memorized. The sixth and final reason is that we do not have
training in memorizing-for-words unless it makes our res more readily
memorable, indeed, ‘‘that by such training memory for things is confirmed
in us, which alone principally is of practical use. In every discipline artistic
theory is of little avail without unremitting exercise, but especially for
memorizing theory is valueless unless made good by industry, devotion,
toil, and care.’’
SOLUTIO: We say that art of memory is best which Tullius teaches,
above all with respect to those things-for-remembering which pertain to
how we live and to justice, and these memories chiefly relate to ethics and
rhetoric because, since the action of human life consists in particular events,
it is necessary that this art be within the soul through corporeal images; in
these images however it will not remain except within the memory.
Whence we say that among all those things which point towards ethical
wisdom, the most necessary is trained memory, because from past events
we are guided in the present and the future, and not from the converse.
Indeed that necessity be in trained memory to the highest degree, Tullius
proves by this argument, saying: ‘‘While an engrossing preoccupation may
often distract us from our other pursuits, from memorizing nothing
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355
whatever can divert us. Indeed there is never a moment when we do not
wish to commit something to memory, and we wish it most of all when our
attention is held by business of special importance. So, since a ready
memory is a useful thing, you see clearly with what great pains you must
strive to acquire so useful a faculty, so that you will be able to judge having
learned its utility.’’ Therefore we say with Tullius that the kind of memoria
which relates to human life and justice is two-fold, that is, natural and
trained or ‘‘artificial.’’ That is natural which by virtue of its talent for
inventing things remembers easily something it knew or did at an earlier
time. The ‘‘artificial’’ however is one which is made from an orderly
arrangement of images and places, and, as in everything else art and virtue
are a perfection of natural talent, so also in this. What is natural is
completed by training. This however should be noted, that in all these
matters I have been discussing, the word memoria is used instead of
reminiscencia, for the reason determined above.
1. We reply to that which was questioned in the first place, by saying that
Tullius defines ‘‘natural memory’’ as a power perfected by a natural
habit and not an absolute power of the soul. Those people are called
naturally good at remembering who have that ability either completely
or mostly by nature, which others have by exercise of the art of
memory, just as philosophers have said with regard to the divine
intelligence, which knows all things by its very nature. And this kind
of talented memory is with regard to its own disposition very well able
to be compartmentalized and divided up exhaustively [condividi], in
that it is itself a trainable power.
2. To the next I respond, because the word memoria is used in place of
reminiscencia, likewise the condition beneficial for it accords more
with what is beneficial for mental ingenuity than for the memorative
power, in the way that reminiscence uses rational method and ingen-
uity in proceeding from one or many definite principles accepted in
advance. And so this objection is not tenable.
3. I reply to the next, especially as it is most often the case that memoria is
used in place of reminiscencia by Tullius, that since there is no recol-
lection without memory, what is good for memory works also for
recollection.
4. Replying to the next, that memory can be thought of in two ways, that is
in respect to its objects or the psychological condition [habitus] left by
these objects, and thus it is true that all memory is generated by inductive
reasoning. But ready aptitude for memory-work is observed both in the
action of memorizing and in retaining things-to-be-remembered, and
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thus remembering is like a certain category of that art which is called the art
of remembering, and thus it is generated not so much from inductive
reasoning but by the many rules of organization for doing it. There are
however these two in general for doing it, that is, an induction on the bas
is
of one’s memorial images, and a rule based on an organizational starting-
point, from which the memory begins to proceed rationally in its action of
remembering. As I said in the question ‘‘Concerning recollection’’ [De
homine, Q. 41] recollection starts its procedure from a beginning deter-
mined by something acquired before or in respect to something forgotten.
Whence it is necessary that within the soul there be something out of which
it proceeds and something in terms of which it progresses. What it proceeds
from is the starting-point, which Tullius calls rules. What it progresses in
terms of are images, which are like letters within the soul, as Tullius says.
5. From this appears the solution to the next objection, which is that a
rule is not useful in memory work.
6. I reply to the next, that a rule is generated out of the materials of
memory on the basis of the things-worth-remembering from among
those we acquired earlier, but it aids in the same activity, insofar as in
the act of remembering it goes over the very same thing-worth-
remembering, and thus nothing prevents memory from engendering
something that previously was produced in itself.
As something closely connected to this, let us inquire concerning the
rules which Tullius taught, in saying that these are the best, as he
himself says, and one of them is accepted as a starting-principle, in
terms of which first of all a matter [res] worthy-of-remembering moves
along in the process of recollection, because, as Boethius says, every
particular thing is created or has being in some place. But ‘‘place’’
[locus] is construed by Tullius here as that which the soul itself makes
for storing-up images, and this also follows because, since reminis-
cence has no store-house except only the memory, and reminiscence is
part of the rational soul, it is necessary that something which exists as
part of reason be stored-up in corporeal images. Since however, some-
thing which exists as part of reason cannot, by means of its own nature,
exist in corporeal images, it is necessary that it exist there in them
through likeness and translation and metaphor, as, for example, for
‘‘joy’’ the most similar mental ‘‘place’’ [locus] is a cloister garth, and for
‘‘feebleness’’ an infirmary or hospice and for ‘‘justice’’ a courtroom, and
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