Churchill's Folly

by Rogers, Anthony; Jellicoe, Lord;

  I knew something of CAMPIONI’s record and personality, and formed the opinion, to which I still adhere, that in a difficult position, he was playing an in and out game, and halting between two policies. I was in some doubts as to whether the best course would be to compromise him thoroughly with the BRITISH, and so cut off his chances of making terms with the GERMANS, and increasing the fighting spirit.

  He then intimated that I must really be off, as he was expecting some GERMAN officers at once, with whom he was going to “temporise”. He refused my suggestion that I should wait to hear the result of his Conference. He ordered an M.A.S. to take me to CASTELROSSO [Kastellorizo], and I was disguised in a long black cloak, and taken from the Palace to the port. By this time I was convinced that he was intending to capitulate, and that his main preoccupation was to get rid of me before the GERMANS learn of my presence, and insisted on his handing me over.

  18. At the harbour I was entertained to a good and much needed English breakfast by my former contact, who now spoke much more frankly. He said the General had always wanted to surrender, but that there was considerable opposition from some of his officers. He said the troops were not good, and were shockingly led. For himself, he was going to set up in a small fort, and kill as many GERMANS as he could. My own view was that we could do nothing to influence the general situation, but that we might save something out of the wreck. I told him, therefore, that it was his duty to arrange the total evacuation or destruction of all craft in the harbour, and said that we should welcome him and the Naval craft particularly at CASTELROSSO or LEROS. He promised to do all he could; some craft appeared later at CASTELROSSO, and I believe more at LEROS.

  19. A further message then came from the palace ordering me off at once, and I went in an M.A.S. which was later retained and did good service …

  21. I wrote my report on the way back to CASTELROSSO, and an hour or two after its despatch, we got news of the ITALIAN capitulation.12

  That day, Sturmdivision Rhodos, numbering approximately 7,500 men, seized control of Rhodes and took prisoner 35,000–40,000 Italians, thus ending British hopes of an assisted take-over. Rhodes had been the first Accolade objective and involved considerable forces. Indeed, the very success of Aegean operations was dependant on acquiring the island, as explained by Colonel Kenyon:

  It is significant that every plan, no matter how much the expected military opposition was written down, contemplated the capture of RHODES as a preliminary to any extension to the north; and that every plan was profoundly influenced by the necessity of capturing at the earliest stage a number of Advanced Landing Grounds, and by the great difficulties to be overcome if this was to be possible.13

  It therefore became necessary for the British to revise their planning and strategy. Future operations were to be on a reduced scale and, as it was essential to act quickly, they had to be improvised. German resources in the Aegean had been stretched by their deployments in Rhodes and Crete. It seemed possible that by a rapid move the Middle East forces might obtain control elsewhere in the region, and by doing so detract from recent enemy successes, enhance British prestige throughout the Middle East and act as a diversion for operations in Italy. In spite of the reluctance of Eisenhower to divert resources, there was hope in the British camp that, even with the limited means at their disposal, the occupation of other islands such as Kos, Leros and Samos could still succeed. The number of German aircraft in Greece and Crete did not yet represent a serious threat, and with British fighters operating from Kos the possibility of major German seaborne or airborne operations seemed slight.14 It was thought that with Italian co-operation British forces might maintain themselves in Kos and Leros until an attack could be launched on Rhodes from the Middle East. The task of reinforcement and supply was to fall largely on the Royal Navy.15

  On Friday, 10 September, Lieutenant Colonel David Pawson of MO4 (SOE) led a pre-emptive Anglo-Greek mission to Samos, and shortly afterwards established contact with local guerrillas and the Italian commander, Generale Mario Soldarelli. Four days later he was joined by Major General Allan Arnold (military attaché in Ankara) who had been dispatched to foster Italo-Greek relations in order to form a united front against the Germans. In the meantime, Pawson’s ad hoc mission had also paid a visit to Leros to guarantee the support of the Italian command there.

  During the night of 12–13 September, Lieutenant Commander Ramseyer in ML 349 conveyed Major Sutherland and about ten of his men from ‘S’ Detachment to Kos. Major Jellicoe aboard the requisitioned Italian MS 12 accompanied the party to Kos and then proceeded to Leros.

  The same day, Generale Soldarelli received a message from Leros stating that a German mission wished to land there. Due primarily to the intervention of Lieutenant Colonel Pawson, a reply was sent ordering Leros not to co-operate. In fact, the enemy intended to occupy the island on the 14th, but because of insufficient air support postponed the operation for another day. German plans were disrupted by the timely arrival of Major Jellicoe:

  Landing in front of the Governor’s Palace, I was immediately escorted in to see him. Admiral Mascherpa appeared friendly and co-operative but I was displeased to find Col Fanetza, who had flown up from CASTELROSSO the day before, at his elbow as I was very doubtful about his attitude and anyhow found him disagreeable. The Admiral reassured me as to his intentions and was most helpful in arranging facilities for our comfort, and convenience. I sent a brief sitrep off to CAIRO and to Col Turnbull and then, leaving Lt Gross and Lt MacKenzie to enquire into the details of the Italian Naval and Military dispositions, went off with the Admiral in his car to look over the island with a view to locating a possible DZ. Having discovered this we returned for a sort of banquet which had been prepared for us at the Officers’ Mess.

  Leaving Lts Gross and MacKenzie behind with Sgt Kesterton and taking with me all the available intelligence, and having paid my respects to the Admiral, I then boarded a motor launch which took us over to the seaplane base. A Cant had been placed at my disposal for the return journey to CASTELROSSO and we were back well before dark. I reported to Col Turnbull, informed him of the not unsatisfactory situation at LEROS and then slept very soundly for 14 hours.16

  Major David L. Lloyd Owen and Y1 Patrol of the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) landed at Leros early in the morning of 15 September with the task of forming a mobile reserve for the Italians. It was also already too late for an unopposed take-over by the Germans of the nearby island of Kos.

  Kos is centrally located among the Dodecanese and lies at the entrance to the Gulf of Kos. It is approximately 26.3 miles long with a width varying between 1.3 miles and 6.3 miles. There is a rugged southern coastline with a hill range extending from Cape Foca in the east, west to Pili and beyond, with Mount Dicheo the highest peak at 2,775ft. A series of lesser hills continues to the western end of the island. In the main, the precipitous southern slopes are rocky and barren, whereas the slightly gentler northern face descends to pine forests and a cultivated heartland. Sandy beaches abound and there are extensive salt flats on the northern coast at Lambi and Tingachi. The capital and main harbour is Kos, situated at the extreme eastern end of the island. Then, as now, a main road ran the length of the fertile coastal plain connecting Kos town with Cefalo (Kefalos) in the west.

  By mid-September, 216 Group had assembled twenty (later increased to twenty-two) DC-3 Douglas Dakotas for Operation Accolade. These included eight paratroop aircraft, which, together with 120 men of ‘A’ Company, 11th Battalion The Parachute Regiment, were detached for training at Ramat David, near Haifa in Palestine. On 14 September, six Dakotas were ordered to Nicosia in Cyprus, from where a drop on Kos was scheduled to take place that night. The same morning a Beaufighter of 46 Squadron piloted by Squadron Leader W.A. Cuddie became the first Allied aircraft to land at Antimachia aerodrome, where it offloaded a RAF wireless team. Beaufighters and Dakotas continued to arrive throughout the day.17

  That evening, Lieutenant Colonel R.M.C. Thomas, commanding 1
1th Battalion Parachute Regiment, together with an Advance Headquarters and ‘A’ Company under Major D.A. Gilchrist boarded the six Dakotas at Nicosia and squeezed into the tiny inward-facing seats along the walls of the narrow fuselage. Much of their equipment was packed into thirty-six bomb-rack containers, but each man was weighed down with a bulky parachute pack, which made it impossible to sit comfortably for any length of time. The aircraft took off at two-minute intervals and were airborne by 10.41 p.m. During their three-hour flight the aircraft flew below 3,000ft along Turkey’s mountainous coastline in order to avoid detection by enemy radar. As they neared Kos, the pilots maintained a drop height of 500ft above sea level. The first machine reached the drop zone at 1.45 a.m. The paratroopers stood at ‘Action Stations’, facing aft and with their parachute static lines secured to an overhead steel cable. A dispatcher stood and watched the signal lamps above the open door in the port side of the fuselage. Final safety checks were carried out: helmet straps fastened, parachute harness, equipment and static line all secure. Airspeed was reduced to facilitate the men’s exit. From the lead aircraft a red signal light was fired, which was duly answered from the ground by a green. With seconds to go, the captain gave the order ‘Red light on’, and the co-pilot flipped a switch on a facing panel. Above the doorway a red lamp snapped on. The dispatcher shouted, ‘Stand in the door!’ and the number one stepped towards the opening. Moments later, the captain ordered ‘Green light on’, the co-pilot activated the green lamp and the first paratrooper leapt out into the night air.

  As always, there was a fleeting moment when everything seemed to be frozen in time, yet paradoxically there was an acute sensation of falling, an awareness of hurtling along an invisible slide that was the aircraft’s slipstream. Then a sharp tug as the attached static line released the parachute and the canopy deployed with an audible snap. The sudden decrease in acceleration jerked the paratrooper upright, knocking the breath from his body. Most tend to jump with their eyes instinctively shut tight, and only open them at this stage: a glance upward to check that the canopy had opened fully (if not, there was little time to rectify any problems); a quick look around to check that the airspace was clear (it was a fine, clear night with a full moon); steer away from any parachutes in the immediate area and prepare for the anticipated landing. It is a curious fact that night jumps tend to produce gentler landings than those by day. One cannot see the ‘ground rush’ and is generally more relaxed at the moment of ground contact. The drop by ‘A’ Company some 1½ miles north-west of Kos town was no exception, and only two men were slightly injured. All aircraft returned safely and were back at Nicosia by 4.39 a.m.

  Once on the ground, the paratroopers retrieved arms and equipment from their containers before gathering at a roadside rendezvous. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas was met by Major Sutherland according to plan, and after being briefed on the local situation arranged for his men to be deployed on Antimachia aerodrome.18

  On 15 September, Lieutenant Colonel R.F. Kirby of 1st Battalion The Durham Light Infantry was air-landed with the advance element of his command. Lieutenant General Anderson also arrived and instructed Ramseyer to take Sutherland and his SBS to Samos. Anderson followed the next day (16th) and continued with Ramseyer to Leros. On the 17th, ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies of 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers with a communication party, base personnel and stores reached Leros on board the British destroyers Hurworth and Croome. Shortly afterwards, Ramseyer and Anderson returned to Kos where the former joined ML 354 and a detachment of SBS under Captain J.M. ‘Jock’ Lapraik who had been ordered to Symi, which was secured in the early hours of the 18th. According to Ramseyer:

  I decided to fill in the night by occupying Simi [Symi]. The M.L. had no previous experience in this type of work and the waters were new to the Commanding Officer. At dusk we sailed South after embarking S.B.S. and their equipment.19

  On or about 17 September, Lieutenant Colonel Pawson’s mission left Samos for Ikaria on board MAS 522. Acting on orders of the boat commander, the crew disarmed and apprehended the team, which included Major Michael W. Parish of MI9 (who was shot and wounded) and Pliarhos A. Levidis of the Elliniko Vassiliko Naftiko (Hellenic Royal Navy). An Italian pro-Badoglio officer was taken prisoner. It was a minor embarrassment in an otherwise successful operation.

  On Kos, Anderson caught up with Colonel Kenyon, and after the pair had discussed the general situation the latter was appointed to command all troops on the island, with Major C.F. Blagden in charge of Civil Affairs. Anderson and Ramseyer left for Cairo on the 18th and the next day Kenyon set to work reorganising the island defences. By this time reinforcements, including ‘B’ Company 2nd Battalion Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment, had arrived at Kastellorizo. The remainder of the Royal West Kents were deployed later in the month to garrison the island of Samos (a platoon subsequently occupied neighbouring Ikaria), while the LRDG set up base at Kalymnos and sent patrols as far west as the Cyclades. Meanwhile, at Nicosia, an Advanced Air Defence Headquarters was established as a forward co-ordinating authority for offensive air operations in the Aegean and for fighter protection of shipping in the Levant.20

  Churchill had bargained that even without Rhodes the rest of the Dodecanese could be taken. So far, his gamble looked like paying off. But it was a dangerous game in which the players constantly raised the stakes. According to British Intelligence, by 19 September Axis forces occupied Thasos, Samothraki, Limnos, Lesbos, Chios, islands in the Sporades and the Cyclades, Kasos, Karpathos, Kythira and Antikythira as well as Crete and Rhodes.

  3

  Reinforcements

  September 1943

  In the wake of the Armistice, Italians were divided in their loyalties. Those who displayed a willingness to change sides ran a terrible risk. On 11 September, Adolf Hitler issued a directive outlining the fate of ‘all Italian units which have allowed their weapons to fall into the hands of the insurgents or even collaborated with the insurgents’. Officers were ‘to be shot in accordance with martial law’ and their men ‘transported directly to the east … and placed at the disposal of Quartermaster General, Army General Staff for employment.’1

  Two days later, at Kefallonia in the Ionian Islands, Italian coastal batteries opened fire on two approaching German landing craft, sinking one and damaging the other. It was the beginning of a battle that would result in the deaths of many of the 12,000 officers and men who formed the island garrison. Besides those killed in action, thousands were executed or perished en route to labour camps after their transport ships were lost to mines. Kefallonia was the worst massacre of pro-Badoglio Italians, but it was not unique. Italian officers would also be executed at other distant outposts, notably Kos.

  Men and materiel began to arrive by air at Kos as soon as Antimachia was secured. By the 17th, the paratroopers and Durham Light Infantry had been joined by army gunners (although their 40mm Bofors were still en route by sea), a detachment of 2909 Squadron RAF Regiment (equipped with 20mm Hispano cannon), RAF signallers and radar technicians as well as the first personnel and Spitfire Vs of 7 Squadron (South African Air Force, SAAF). Previously, the air defence had been reliant on a handful of assorted Italian fighters commanded by Sottotenente Giuseppe Morganti, of 396a Squadriglia.

  Events were marred by the loss of the senior RAF officer on Kos, Group Captain Harry Wheeler. He was fatally injured in a car accident on the 15th and superseded by the commanding officer (CO) of 7 Squadron (SAAF), Major Cornelius van Vliet. Two days later there was an untoward incident when two aircraft on their way back to Ramat David were slightly damaged by Turkish light AA.

  On the 18th, Wing Commander R.C. Love arrived to take charge of 243 (Fighter) Wing, which had been formed at Antimachia. Headquarters was situated within a few hundred yards of the landing ground, and airfield personnel set up camp in a nearby wadi, with a cookhouse and a water point but little else in the way of home comforts.

  The Allies suffered their first major loss at sea on 14 September w
hen the Greek submarine Katsonis was rammed and sunk by UJ 2101 north of Triceri Strait. At least fourteen of her crew were taken prisoner. In the race to occupy the islands, both sides risked their naval forces to ferry troops and provisions. While en route from Piraeus to Rhodes on 17 September, a convoy consisting of the submarine-hunter UJ 2104 and the steamers Pluto and Paul was attacked south of Naxos by eight Beaufighters of 237 Wing operating from Limassol. Of three Beaufighters damaged by Flak, two crash-landed on returning to base (one with a dead navigator). In turn, at least one escorting Arado seaplane was shot down.2 In the early hours of the 18th, the convoy came under fire from shore batteries on Astipalaea before being attacked by HM destroyers, Faulknor and Eclipse and the Greek Vasilissa [Queen] Olga. The damaged escort vessel reached Astipalaea and foundered off the east coast at the islet of Glino where her crew was apprehended by the Italian garrison. Originally the Norwegian whaler Darvik, UJ 2104 had been taken over by the British as HMS Kos before falling into enemy hands at Crete. She was the sole surviving vessel from the convoy. When initial reports mistakenly indicated that Astipalaea had been invaded, three Italian torpedo boats were sent on a fact-finding mission. (Two were subsequently written off in an air attack and the third was damaged and beached.) The true nature of the situation was then realised and that evening ML 355 conveyed four patrols of ‘B’ Squadron LRDG from Leros to Astipalaea. There, Major David Lloyd Owen took charge of several German officers (including a war correspondent) and returned with them to Leros. The remaining prisoners were evacuated in two batches during the next few days.3