Churchill's Folly

by Rogers, Anthony; Jellicoe, Lord;

  For some, the sight of the departing vessels was altogether too much. Flying Officer B.W. Purcell had been employed on flying control duties with 243 Wing when he found himself in an unfamiliar and, one suspects, unwelcome role as an infantryman:

  I was ordered to look after a small party of men, & we established ourselves in a trench to give if possible all aid & covering fire to the Durham Light Infantry as they retired, in effect however this was not practical as the German tactics were to push back the troops by Stuka dive bombers, & then their snipers would advance until the position was secure for a general advance, The Stuka bombing was intense and between 1600–1645 I obtained permission to retire, I split up my party half to a trench with the D.L.I, & the remainder by a farm yard just outside the town, we were gradually driven back & I was attracted to shooting from the beach, there several of our own soldiers were firing rifles trying to attract the attention of the R.A.F. H.S.L [High Speed Launch] & seaplane tender who were evacuating, also there were two L.C.T.s & one schooner, it looked like a general evacuation, I semaphored the launches but they cannot have seen me, men were trying to paddle out on doors, pieces of wood etc, I tried it myself & found it impossible, I ordered the men if they were leaving the island to bury their rifles in the sand, & take the bolts with them, I also ordered them to try & make the harbour & escape if possible in a small boat & some of them managed this.18

  II./Gren.Rgt.16 had met with a varying degree of success. After forging ahead, 8. Kompanie took the first battery at Platani during the afternoon. However, south of the town the three remaining Kompanien continued to face tough resistance. As 6./Gren.Rgt.16 assembled for a renewed attack, three Stukas were directed with signal flares to where opposing forces could be seen in an olive grove about 200 yards away. The aircraft jettisoned all their bombs on to the target. Immediately after the last bomb bursts, the Kompanie dashed to the edge of the olive grove. The defenders held fast. I. Zug broke left in an effort to avoid their fire, and those in III. Zug were obliged to take cover behind a wall, before continuing at a crawl. In an attempt to outflank the position, III. Zug was directed left into a ravine. The Kompanie then continued along the ravine for 300 yards to within 100 yards or so of a water reservoir – and another camp, the entrance of which was protected by bunkers and fortified towers.

  Shortly before nightfall the Grenadiere launched one more attack against two prepared positions 80 yards to their front and right, and a third little more than 50 yards left. II. and IV. Zug were tasked with securing the left and right flanks respectively, and I. Zug was ordered to cover the front and right. III. Zug was nominated for the assault. Just before Zero Hour, the Kompanie assembly area was mortared, resulting in such heavy casualties among I. and II. Zug that III. Zug had to be reassigned to fill the gaps in case there was a follow-up by infantry. No such attack materialised, allowing wounded to be recovered and evacuated to the rear. Before the survivors could mount a renewed offensive they were pre-empted by a sudden withdrawal by their adversaries from the olive grove. Taking full advantage of this unexpected development, the Germans inflicted heavy casualties among those fleeing. With the enemy threat removed from their right flank, further Kompanie attacks were postponed until the following day. Nighttime positions were allocated, and reconnaissance patrols sent out to establish contact with 5. and 7. Kompanie. At Platani, all the gun positions were taken by early evening. Fighting continued in the town, but by 8.30 p.m. 8. Kompanie was able to link up with II. Gren.Rgt.65.

  That evening, Kirby called for an orders group for 7.00 p.m. Five officers gathered near Paleologou Square in Kos and orders had just started when the place was shaken by the impact of two mortar bombs. The CO was hit by shrapnel in the face and left knee; OC HQ Company, Major K.M.W. Leather, was severely wounded in the left arm; OC ‘B’ Company, Captain J.E. Stafford, sustained shrapnel wounds to the right thigh, and the Quartermaster, Captain Frederick H. Bush, received fatal back injuries. All were rushed to the civil hospital. Having once again reassumed command, Major Vaux was told by Colonel Kenyon to prepare for the possible arrival of British paratroopers and an infantry battalion. It was therefore proposed to withdraw to the hills south-east of the town to await reinforcements.

  The British began their withdrawal shortly before midnight, covered by part of the Anti-Tank Platoon and two platoons of ‘C’ Company under Captain F.W. Armitage. Each group of twenty or so passed through Kos to a rendezvous at Due Melini where Regimental Sergeant Major G. Flannigan was waiting with a resupply of food and ammunition. The men continued for nearly 2 miles to a road junction, before finally turning south towards Simpetro (Sympetres) heights. The ultimate objective was Asfendiu, where it was hoped to obtain a re-supply at an Italian food dump.

  In Kos town, Flying Officer Purcell had teamed up with a Flight Lieutenant. In a commandeered rowing boat and using two pieces of wood as oars, they paddled for an hour and a half before the shrapnel-damaged boat finally sank. With no other choice, the two men swam the remaining distance to Turkey.

  The next day, Kampfgruppe Müller continued in its efforts to secure the three objectives: Kos town and port, the south-east region, and Antimachia aerodrome. Apparently unaware that the British had abandoned their positions, at 8.00 a.m. the Luftwaffe resumed its attacks, with Stukas concentrating on Kos, and heavy bombers pounding gun batteries south-east of the town. The positions which had held up much of II./Gren.Rgt.16 were also designated as a priority artillery target. With 3. and 4./Art.Rgt.22 providing fire support, II./Gren.Rgt.65 and II. Gren.Rgt.16 launched a lightning assault, and by 9.00 a.m. had seized the town and nearby Lambi airfield. Among those captured were Kirby and an Oberst (colonel) in command of the Italians (presumably Colonnello Felice Leggio). II./Gren.Rgt.65 cleared the area north of the town as far as the coast without encountering hardly any resistance. After regrouping, II./Gren.Rgt.16 pushed east along the British path of retreat towards Forbici Point. The Germans were delayed by Italians near Cape Foca (probably in the area of Point 260/Crotiri) and by the British rear-guard, whose troops had withdrawn at 4.00 a.m. However, by about 6.00 p.m. II./Gren.Rgt.16 was able to report that the coastal strip was clear as far as Cape Foca.

  During the British retreat, many were overwhelmed by the overnight trek and arduous ascent. Men who had fought bravely the previous day now seemed only too happy to be taken prisoner, as Oberfeldwebel Walter Lünsmann of 6./Gren.Rgt.16 recalled:

  We had reached Kos town.

  Now we received orders to comb through the mountains above the town.

  I suffered from malaria and was hardly able to go on. I sat down on a rock. Suddenly, something flashed in front of me – about 30 metres away.

  Shooting from the hip with my M.P., I moved towards that point.

  There were about 40 English soldiers in a firing trench. They had attached a white flag to a rifle and were surrendering.19

  Colonel Kenyon had joined a group led by an officer in the Durham Light Infantry:

  As soon as we reached the southern slopes of SIMPETRO and TRUZZULI, I saw numerous parties emerging ahead and making off westwards. These parties were made up of the poorer elements of the garrison; many men had thrown off equipment and arms. Fatigue was telling, and in the absence of effective junior leadership, the men were gradually heading downhill. I was not disturbed by this, as our future task would clearly suffer from the inclusion of unsuitable troops in our force.20

  When Kenyon dropped behind to locate other groups he became separated, and for a while attracted the attention of a sniper:

  By about 1700 hrs, moving in and out among the hill tops, I was approaching ASCENDIU [sic: ASFENDIU]. The sniper had left me, and everything was quiet. I was able to locate myself accurately from my view of the winding road leading up to ASCENDIU. I therefore decided it was time to leave the high ground and start for ASCENDIU. The ground was precipitous in places, and I was not sorry on rounding a corner to find a group of ITALIANS sitting about. As I was negotiating for a guide to take
me on, I was gripped from behind and found myself literally in the hands of a GERMAN sentry who had been sitting amongst the ITALIANS whose surrender he had accepted.21

  In the south-west, 9. Kompanie of III./Gren.Rgt.440 had been left to secure the northern beachhead while 11. Kompanie advanced overnight to Point 145. In the morning, contact was established with a Fallschirmjäger reconnaissance patrol in Antimachia village and Kampfgruppe Kuhlmann came under the orders of Hauptmann Erwin Dörr, CO of III./Gren.Rgt.440. Hauptmann Kuhlmann and his Küstenjäger were tasked with holding the aerodrome, while III./Gren.Rgt.440 (less 9. Kompanie), together with the Fällschirmjäger and supported by heavy weapons of II./Gren.Rgt.16 and 3./Fla.Btl.22, advanced south-west towards Kefalos. This was defended by around 200 men under Tenente Francesco Di Giovanni of 10o reggimento di fanteria. Progress was delayed by fighting in the hills 1¼ miles north-east of the town, but by 2.00 p.m. Kefalos was in German hands. The entire south-western region was cleared by nightfall.

  The previous day, Captain Clark of MI14 had supervised the departure from Cardamena of several boats before order seems to have turned to chaos, with British, South Africans and Italians seizing whichever vessel they could. The CO of 7 (SAAF) Sqaudron, Major Cornelius van Vliet, was among those who got away. To deal with the exodus, a motorised Zug of II./Gren.Rgt.65 was dispatched with heavy weapons to clear the coastal area. According to Müller:

  This resulted in the capture and disarming of several hundred English who had planned to escape from Cardamena in fishing boats.22

  After joining the flight from the Antimachia area, RAF Flight Sergeant R.S. Taylor had sought overnight refuge in an orchard near Cardamena. He awoke at dawn on the 4th:

  M.E.109s flew directly over us and one M.E.110 just scraped the top of the trees where we were hiding. We then saw 2 M.E.109’s carrying one big bomb each fly down the beach from the direction of the hills towards Cardemena [sic] … Soon after Stukas came and dive bombed the orchard, this raid lasted about 5 minutes. We were taking shelter behind a wall and men and women were running about with children all around us. There was a few minutes pause when a bigger number of Stukas came and dropped a lot of bombs on the same target but we had split up to find better shelter this time. This heavy raid lasted about 15 minutes and bombs were bursting all around us. The air was filled with sand which smelt foul and I stumbled through it and then ran for the shelter of the hills. Bullets were flying about, some I could hear whistling close by, but keeping to the trees I got to the bottom of the hills. The peasants gave me water and an Italian water bottle.23

  Equipped with the rubber inner tube from a car tyre, Taylor moved into the hills with the intention of making for the beach and swimming to Turkey. Before he could put his plan into action, he witnessed the mayhem on Cardamena Plain. He could not fail to notice the devastating effects of one gun in particular:

  I could see it flash when it fired and shells burst at the bottom of the hills amongst men under trees with white flags. Then it fired at Italians about 100 yards from me who were making a raft and they ran. Men were running along the hillside above me and machine gun bullets whistled above my head. About 10 minutes after dark all went quiet and I lay down under a big rock to sleep. I awoke later with the sound of aircraft flying about and saw flares up and down the beach. I decided not to try to swim with the rubber tube.24

  On 6 October, Kampgruppe Müller signalled Heeresgruppe E:

  Mopping up of the island continued. Day passed quietly. Number of prisoners has increased to 886 English including 46 officers, 3000 Italians. 89 Italian officers shot.25

  Among those executed in compliance with the Führer’s directive was Colonnello Felice Leggio. For the Italians, Kos was the latest in a series of defeats. For their new allies, the British, it was a minor disaster. Müller records that his Battle Group ultimately took prisoner 3,145 ‘Badoglio Italians’ and 1,388 British together with forty guns ranging from 7.5 to 14.9cm, sixteen anti-aircraft guns (2 to 4 cm), one LCT, twelve fishing boats, a luxury yacht (for the personal use of the Generalleutnant) eleven intact aircraft and enough infantry weapons for 5,000 men, in addition to vast stocks of ammunition, petrol and provisions. German losses amounted to fourteen or fifteen dead and at least seventy wounded (it is not stated whether these figures include five killed and eighteen wounded during naval operations on 3 October).

  Isolated parties of Allied soldiers and airmen remained in hiding on Kos long after the fighting had ended. At the end of the first day of the island battle, Captain J.H. Thorpe, CSM W. Carr and Private Proudlock of the Durham Light Infantry had travelled by jeep towards Cardamena. After halting for the night, they reached the town outskirts in the morning of Monday, 4 October. They found some forty stragglers including four officers of the Royal Artillery who had been dissuaded by attacking Stukas from proceeding further. Captain Thorpe and his two comrades continued on their way, heading for the foothills north of Cardamena before eventually reaching the heights overlooking Asfendiu. During the next few days they were reliant on Greeks whose selflessness would have cost them dearly if discovered by the Germans. It was a familiar story all over the island.

  Another party managed to escape under fortuitous circumstances when, during the night of 3–4 October, Wing Commander R.C. Love led the men to a rendezvous (RV) on the south coast:

  About an hour before dawn, we detected a small boat lying off shore within about a hundred yards of our position. We watched very carefully and detected a number of men coming ashore on what appeared to be some form of raft. We were very doubtful as to whether the party was British or German and after considering the problem for a while, I decided to approach one man who appeared to be standing as sentry on the beach. I discovered that it was a small detachment of S.B.S. under Captain Milner-Barrie [Walter Milner Barry]. He told me that he had been sent to discover the situation on Cos and to carry out some demolitions if possible.26

  Love and his party were taken to Turkey in the tiny caique, LS 2. Milner Barry remained to arrange the evacuation of other evaders. In a letter dated 19 November 1943, and which later formed the basis of an official report, Milner Barry described the SBS operation:

  On the night of the 3rd 4th Oct I was sent into Cos with a party of 1 other officer and 12 ORs incl. 3 signallers to do a bit of sabotage of planes vehicles etc if fighting was still going on. If resistance was over I was told to get out as soon as I could, and also warned that I’d very likely get involved with evacuation work. I had an arrangement with Lt. Macleod [sic: Lieutenant Alexander McLeod, RNVR] of L.S.2 that he would call for me at the same or a neighbouring beach on the night of the 7th 8th Oct.

  We were landed just before dawn on the 4th and there was only time to find a hide up in a wadi before dawn, especially as the L.R.D.G wireless set with me which I’d been told required 3 men to carry about, in practice required 7 ie 3 for the set and apparatus and 2 to each battery – incredible but true. That day we spent in the wadi with chaps in the hills observing. The Germans had finished with ANTIMACHIA aerodrome which the RAF told us would be out of action for at least a week, and proceeded to flatten CARDAMENAS Apart from this there was sporadic firing from the direction of Cos. During the day we contacted a few RAF personnel and Italians began to filter into the wadi from the direction of CARDAMENAS. One of my men mysteriously disappeared. He’d gone up the mountain on observing duties and was never seen again in spite of a thorough search. Then in the late afternoon German lorried infantry appeared and began driving across the plain from Cardamenas towards the wadi. Italians began to swarm into the wadi at both ends and run screaming about the beaches. The Germans chivvied them a bit with mortar fire and we thought we’d better get out while the going was good. I intended to whistle up a boat to take the RAF and ourselves off that night if possible, but tho. the bloody thing would receive, it wouldn’t transmit for some reason. We moved off East down the coast for I should think a couple of miles and there found some rafts which the Italians had built and afterwar
ds, very sensibly in the event, abandoned. Here I gave everybody the chance of trying to get out by raft if they liked and all except one or two RAF who couldn’t swim said they would. It seemed to me that with the Germans holding the heights and apparently intending to drive along the coast and comb the wadis we were bound to be caught. Left to ourselves we’d have stood a fair chance but with the wadis full of hysterical Italians who wouldn’t leave us we shouldn’t have been able to conceal ourselves.

  In the end about a dozen put to sea in rafts including 1 Canadian Squadron Leader lying on a log – I think in private life he was a log roller in the St Lawrence – The raft I was on rode very low in the water and I was sitting nearly up to my neck but in spite of this we made good progress for a couple of miles. Then we got into a current and drifted East and the raft got more and more water logged. It became evident after some 3 hours paddling that the thing was hopeless so we turned round and tried to paddle back but the bloody raft wouldn’t move that way either so there was nothing for it but to swim abandoning revolver glasses torch and anything heavy. Fortunately tho. I kept my boots on. The swim took about 2 hours and I landed on a beach close to a water hole a great piece of luck and found a cave for the night together with 3 other men I collected. The next day 5th Oct I collected some more of my men and some RAF and we got in touch with some Greek shepherds who gave us food and information. A search of the wadi we’d embarked from showed that our hidden packs had been removed – presumably the Italians.27