Churchill's Folly

by Rogers, Anthony; Jellicoe, Lord;

  The laborious rescue operation continued until:

  We had got off twelve men. I went back on board to look for the boatswain and machinist, as somebody must have steered the boat. Suddenly, the boat shifted and I only just managed to jump ashore. The boat reared steeply and disappeared beneath the sea. How many more men were still on board, I don’t know.6

  The fighting on Leros could be ruthless. But there was also respect between adversaries. Soon after dawn on 15 November, eight LRDG, including Signalman H.P. du Toit from Rhodesia, were returning from a night reconnaissance to their Meraviglia Headquarters, when a dive-bombing attack by Ju 87s caused the men to take cover. Afterwards, it was decided to split up and cover the remaining distance individually. It was then noticed that one of their number was missing. Signalman Clifford H. Whitehead was found, all but buried in a slit trench close to a bomb crater, and brought to a medical officer who pronounced him dead. Du Toit attended to his fallen comrade, choosing to lay Whitehead in the same trench in which he had been found. With the body on a nearby stretcher, du Toit was preparing the grave when a Stuka reappeared and dived towards him. Du Toit continued with the burial. At the last moment the pilot evidently realised what was taking place. He pulled up without strafing or bombing, circled several times before dipping the aircraft wings in salute, and left.7

  During the night, Brigadier Tilney had revealed his intentions for the 15th: to annihilate enemy forces in the Rachi–San Quaranta area, and thereafter to concentrate the defence in the area of Meraviglia. The final plan would not be decided until later in the day, but essentially called for a two-phase attack involving the newly-arrived ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies of the Royal West Kents (the latter having disembarked shortly before dawn). Firstly, ‘A’ Company was to pass through the King’s Own on Searchlight Hill, with the unenviable task of securing Rachi Ridge from the centre to the northern limits of Point 100. The King’s Own were to follow up and occupy the ridge from the centre, back to Searchlight Hill. On successful completion of the first phase, ‘D’ Company of the Buffs with ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents were to advance southward to San Quaranta and San Nicola, and drive the enemy towards ‘C’ Company of the Royal West Kents. The latter was to proceed north-west on a one-company front, with its right flank on the coast road and its left on the eastern slopes of Rachi, and secure Santa Marina and Point 36.

  At about 6.30 a.m., Lieutenant Colonel B.D. Tarleton, commanding the Royal West Kents, arrived by jeep at Fortress Headquarters with his ‘R’ Group and a Liaison Officer for a briefing by Tilney. Tarleton could hardly have welcomed having to send his men into the fray so soon after their arrival, or be pleased to learn that during the attack ‘A’ Company was to be directed by the brigadier from his vantage point atop Meraviglia. He would surely have been even less impressed had he known about the previous day’s failed attempt to secure Point 100. Nor was he told that because of the already overloaded wireless net, communication between Fortress Headquarters and ‘A’ Company was to be by runner. After discussing with Tilney the role of ‘C’ Company, Tarleton returned to his men at the Anchor to brief Major M.R. Read, OC ‘C’ Company. He was accompanied by Colonel Guy Prendergast, officer commanding Raiding Forces Aegean, who pointed out key features along the way.8

  When Major Robert Butler rejoined his men, he issued a warning order for the company attack and then accompanied the first platoon aboard the only available lorry to the Forming-up Point (FUP), just west of Charing Cross. The remainder of the company followed on foot. As Zero Hour approached, a delay provided more time for the platoon commanders and Company Sergeant Major, Warrant Officer (WOII) Frederick C. Spooner, to view the ground over which the attack was to take place. Previously, Butler had also studied the terrain:

  Although bodies are normally recovered during the night, there were still a few khaki-clad ones around to be seen through my binoculars that morning, which did not do much for my appetite.9

  Nor, no doubt, did the news that ‘A’ Company was to attack without artillery cover. Tilney would later provide an explanation for this extraordinary decision:

  R.A. and medium machine guns were to stand by to support this attack by observation; no preparatory fire plan was possible due to the somewhat confused situation prevailing on the ridge at this time.10

  Even as the British finalised their battle preparations, another offensive was underway as Kampfgruppe Dörr and the Küstenjäger made a renewed effort to take Pandeli Castle. It failed due to a concerted effort by the guns on and around Mounts Vigla, Meraviglia and della Palma. At 8.30 a.m., ‘A’ Company crossed its attack start line, just as Tarleton together with his ‘R’ Group and Prendergast, was was reporting back to Tilney. As usual, Ju 87 Stukas were over Leros, with Meraviglia and the Charing Cross area the targets of dive-bombing attacks. From 9.00 a.m. these attacks intensified, causing casualties at Charing Cross among personnel of Battalion Headquarters of the Royal West Kents. In addition, Meraviglia was constantly swept with machine-gun and cannon fire. And for a while, German mortars on Point 100 fell around the area of Brigade Headquarters. From the northern slopes of Meraviglia, the Faughs responded with machine guns and mortars – although from their present location the latter were unable to reach Point 100. The 25-pounder field guns added to the destruction, concentrating in particular on PL 211. The entire area was a deafening, smoke covered and dust-filled killing ground; a terrifying ordeal for troops on either side. Trenches became potential death-traps, with direct hits resulting in losses among 7./Gren.Rgt.16. Fahnenjunker-Feldwebel Jürgen Bernhagen waited for hours in a narrow, deep trench:

  We were constantly fired on. Our Stukas supported the battle on the ground, but from up there, the crews could not always distinguish friend from foe. So 3 Stukas came down on us. We could see them releasing the bombs above our heads. They went off near the trench we were in. Dirt flew up up around us. We immediately fired white flares: this is us here. The Stukas understood, but so did the enemy. And so we continued to be under artillery fire from nearby hill positions. One hit in the trench caused a lot of damage; all others came down on the ground in front or behind us. 14 casualties. I could not find my kit again. Shortly beforehand I had crawled around a corner in the trench. I cannot remember why I had gone there.11

  It was, of course, worse for ‘A’ Company in the open. As soon as the leading platoons were past Searchlight Hill they were bombed by Stukas and subjected to sniper and mortar fire and Lieutenant H.D.T. Groom and six men were wounded. The remainder pressed on, straight into automatic fire from Point 100 and P.L. 211. With the King’s Own and the Faughs providing fire support, small groups of men moved from cover to cover as they fought their way to within 50 yards of the German positions, before withdrawing to reorganise in dead ground south-east of Searchlight Hill. There were four dead, among them Lieutenant Victor H. Hewett and WOII Frederick Spooner. Two officers and approximately twenty ORs were wounded. In the confusion, Major Butler found himself alone on Rachi for much of the morning. When he withdrew in order to rejoin his company, he was shot in the wrist. Undeterred, Butler immediately formulated a plan for a second attempt to take the enemy positions.

  Due to communication problems, a runner had in the meantime been sent from the Royal West Kents Battalion Headquarters with a reminder for ‘C’ Company not to attack until ordered. The runner returned to report that Major Read had acted on his initiative and, contrary to orders, was already occupying Santa Marina. Among those thrown into the fray after having just arrived on the island was Lieutenant John B. Browne, officer commanding 15 Platoon:

  We spent all morning struggling along the road, widely dispersed and often having to lie in the ditch at the roadside while the planes went over. It was a fine day and the countryside appeared peaceful. At this stage it was hard to grasp that this was real – no mere repeat of the innumerable exercises that had been our daily routine for months past.

  When we reached our forming-up area we seemed to spend an int
erminable time awaiting further orders. Now there was more shouting going on, but it was very difficult to tell where it came from. In our necessarily dispersed space it was difficult to keep everybody in touch. The platoon wanted to know what was happening, but I had nothing to tell them. Air attacks continued. Usually air raids have a definite beginning and end, signalled by the sound of the siren. But these went on remorselessly all day. Usually too there is some prospect of effective opposition; but here there was no hope of any aircraft coming to our defence, and what was left of the Italian AA batteries could do very little. Our troops were too tired to be either excited or frightened. One soldier (Pte. F. White) was wounded.12

  When he was informed of the progress made by Major Read, the brigadier sent word that ‘C’ Company was to halt its advance immediately. He then decided to proceed with the rest of his plan, regardless as to whether or not Point 100 could be taken. While Tilney was giving his orders, a message arrived informing him of the failed attack by ‘A’ Company, with a request by Butler for close mortar support and smoke from the 25-pounders for a renewed effort at 2.30 p.m. This was agreed.

  With a stream of constant interruptions, the ‘O’ Group dragged on for two hours. As a newcomer to the chaos and confusion that was Leros, Tarleton was able to observe events from a unique perspective. He had been shipped from a comparatively tranquil setting and pitched into a desperate battle, the organisation of which hardly filled him with confidence. Outside, gunfire and explosions could clearly be heard, as in the cramped and overcrowded confines of the Headquarters tunnel the ‘O’ Group continued. By the time is was over,Tilney had altered the objective of ‘C’ Company: with instructions to take not just Point 36, but to push on to the road junction of San Nicola and Villa Belleni. Supporting fire was to be provided by mortars and medium machine guns of the Faughs and all available coastal batteries and 25-pounders. The new CO of the Faughs, Major Shephard, was tasked with organising a composite company to be sent to Santa Marina to follow ‘C’ Company and mop up pockets of resistance. Shephard was doubtful whether he could find sufficient men in the time available. Tarleton, too, expressed misgivings, arguing that the forces available were hardly sufficient for the task ahead. Tilney concurred, but nonetheless was determined to proceed with the attack. H-Hour was fixed for 3.00 p.m.

  At 1.15 p.m., Tarleton left by jeep with his ‘R’ Group to find ‘C’ Company. It was a perilous journey. Stukas circled menacingly, before swooping to release their bombs over Meraviglia. Tarleton’s driver momentarily lost control and the vehicle careered off the road and became stuck. In desperation, the group took another jeep parked nearby and drove off, followed by a stream of oaths and several shots from its enraged owner. The runner from Fortress Headquarters had not yet arrived when Tarleton reached ‘C’ Company’s location south of Platanos. With fifteen minutes to spare, the CO was able to prevent Major Read from moving against Point 36 – and into supporting fire scheduled for the same time. When Read called off his proposed attack it was already 2.45 p.m. – with no sign of the Faughs. Reluctantly, Tarleton postponed H-Hour until 3.30 p.m., too late for the attacking troops to benefit from the pre-arranged fire plan. Two separate messages were sent by runner to notify Meraviglia of the change, but in the event only one got through later that afternoon.

  The second attack along Rachi went in at 2.25 p.m. Following the same route as before, it was made by two composite platoons led by Major Butler and the company 2 i/c, Captain William Grimshaw, who was the only other effective officer. All available light machine guns were grouped alongside Searchlight Hill under the wounded Lieutenant Groom and an officer of the King’s Own. Smoke was laid over the enemy positions, with mortar support provided by a detachment of the Faughs. The enemy responded with automatic and mortar fire, and the King’s Own officer with Lieutenant Groom’s party was killed almost immediately. The attack had already commenced when two sections of 14 Platoon arrived in the Searchlight Hill area, having gone astray while moving up for the assault on Point 36. In the mistaken belief that they had been sent as reinforcements, Lieutenant Groom directed the soldiers forward against Point 100.

  By this time, all that could be mustered of the Faughs to support the attack by ‘C’ Company of the Royal West Kents were approximately sixty men who remained from ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies and 17 Platoon of ‘D’ Company. Ten minutes before H-Hour, two officers and nineteen men arrived (probably Captain J.W. Salter and Lieutenant J. Duffy with ‘B’ Company) and informed Tarleton that a similar number were also on the way. The commanding officer of the Royal West Kents was appalled by what he saw: the Faughs were exhausted, the expression on each face reflecting the strain of three and a half days of fighting. They were given their orders during an ongoing aerial bombardment. At 3.25 p.m., Brigadier Tilney appeared and demanded to know what the delay was. The attack began five minutes later.

  On the right was 13 Platoon, with the Faughs behind. To compensate for the two sections fighting on Rachi, a patrol team from Company Headquarters and one section from the reserve platoon of ‘C’ Company were attached to 14 Platoon on the left. 15 Platoon (less one section) was reserve, followed closely by the battalion ‘R’ Group, comprising four ORs and two officers including Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton. Major Read and a runner were positioned between the two forward platoons, with the company 2 i/c Captain E.E. Newbald, and Company Headquarters behind. The advance began as intended, but for 14 Platoon again moving too far west and ending up on Searchlight Hill. However, this time the men were led from the area and out of the battle by the platoon commander, Lieutenant Richard Norris. Lower down, Major Read was seriously wounded after being shot in the shoulder. Command of the company passed to Captain Newbald. Lieutenant Jode of 13 Platoon was also wounded, whereupon Sergeant Wallington assumed command and took charge of clearing Krithoni. The area was covered by German machine gunners and riflemen on high ground, and snipers concentrated on individual soldiers who dashed from cover to cover as they swept through the village. A soldier never knew when he was safe: in the open there was an awful sensation that at any moment one might be caught in the cross hairs of a sniper scope, while each and every house and villa was a potential enemy strongpoint. Whenever they advanced, the troops were harrassed by Stukas, whose pilots were directed by spotters firing red signal lights. As they pressed forward, the British came across large swastika flags laid out as indication markers by an enemy wary of being misidentified by their own aircraft.

  Meanwhile, Lieutenant Ted Johnson, commanding ‘C’ Company of the Faughs, had reached Platanos with no more than sixteen men. His friend, Lieutenant Austin Ardill, provided a cursory briefing. Johnson was told to watch for a combination of Verey lights, which would be his cue to follow up the line of advance, taking care of enemy resistance along the way. Due to arriving late, however, he was left in ignorance of their actual objectives:

  As we waited on what could be loosely called a Start Line there was an air attack taking place on the steep slopes of Meraviglia immediately to our left. The noise of it made even shouted orders unheard by a man five paces away. The Véry signal was eventually seen and off we went …

  My right hand section was stopped almost immediately by enemy who had allowed the West Kents to pass over them. But my centre section with Sergeant Wallace made uninterrupted progress up the line of advance and CQMS O’Neill with the left hand section also made good progress for about two hundred yards when he came under fire from a house ahead. We could not afford the luxury of a company HQ and so I was located with this left flank section. Because of the noise I was unable to check Wallace’s advance and lost all contact with him …

  Because of the close nature of the undergrowth and rocks my visibility was not more than fifteen yards. Unable either to see or hear my middle section I left Colour Sergeant O’Neill to extricate himself from his pinned down position and went in search of Sergeant Wallace who I had last seen going well up front. I failed to find him and, as might be expected failed
to find my left flank section when I returned to their last known position.13

  Owing to the limited view of the terrain ahead, ‘C’ Company Headquarters of the Royal West Kents had pressed on until it was roughly in line with 13 Platoon south-east of Point 36. The battalion ‘R’ Group, having been joined by a small party of the Faughs, was established on a sunken road some 300 yards short of the main objective; 15 Platoon had swung left, level with the lead formations. At about 4.15 p.m., Lieutenant John Browne was tasked with seizing Point 36. Using the cover afforded by the sunken road, his platoon hastened to the left flank of 13 Platoon. As related by Browne:

  My platoon (15) was the only one still reasonably intact, and the CO., who was following close behind, ordered us to go ahead and take Pt. 36. We joined forces with what was left of 13 platoon and moved towards Pt. 36, which was really a ridge, running up from the sea across the line of our advance, effectively obscuring all that lay beyond it. As we crossed the ridge with the sun behind us, many Germans were taken by surprise, and came out of their trenches with their hands raised. With the sun in their eyes they probably thought there were more of us than was actually the case.14

  Colonel Tarleton was treated to the satisfying spectacle of the enemy surrendering, clearly silhouetted against the evening sky. He was quickly disappointed, however. Browne’s account continues: