Churchill's Folly

by Rogers, Anthony; Jellicoe, Lord;

  The precise location of the Buffs was still unknown and Tarleton did not want to risk travelling at night in unfamiliar terrain. He therefore dispatched a search patrol under Lieutenant J.A. Myers, who returned at around 10.00 p.m. He brought with him a written message from the Buffs second-in-command, Major D.B. Pyke: The Buffs, together with all other troops in the locality, had been ordered south to Meraviglia, and Pyke was en route with a rear party to the San Giovanni area. To Tarleton’s surprise, Pyke made no mention of the arrival and role of the Royal West Kents. Tarleton, of course, had not received word that Brigadier Tilney had revised his decision to send the battalion north. Tarleton decided to stay where he was until daybreak, unaware, as was Iggulden, that the outcome of the battle had already been decided.

  The situation was no less confusing for those further south. Earlier in the day, Lieutenant Clifford Clark and his party had rounded up many who were fleeing from Meraviglia. Shortly afterwards, Clark was contacted by an officer with orders from Tilney for all troops to RV at the Anchor, preparatory to launching a counter-attack to recapture Meraviglia. Clark therefore withdrew his force from San Giovanni. Each man took only his personal weapon and ammunition, leaving behind all six Vickers machine guns (the bolts of which were buried) and any excess kit. Few doubted they would be back. After a slow and hazardous journey under continual air attack, Clark reached the outskirts of Lakki. A patrol was sent to reconnoitre the Anchor, and the remaining troops were deployed under cover while Clark continued to the port headquarters to enquire about the situation:

  The H.Q., which was an Italian one, and in which we had one room, was deep underground. I had to push my way through hundreds of Italian soldiers, all scared out of their wits and cringing against the walls and on the floors, before I got to it. I found one British Staff Officer with some Italian Officers of high rank poring over maps and interrogating a German prisoner who had just been brought in. I reported that I had the equivalent of one complete Company of British troops outside. What was the position and where could I get instruction? The Staff Officer was about as helpful and useful as a cold in the head. He said he was completely out of touch; thought the Anchor was already held by the enemy, and suggested I went back to Giovanni. He finished up by saying “You do what you think best old chap”!! When I suggested the “possibility” of using the Italian soldiery, they looked as if they thought I was off my head. I went, treading hard on quite a few of the bodies sleeping on the floor as I forced my way out!!!

  Things were pretty warm again overhead as I made my way back to where I had left the chaps. The recce patrol was back, having been shot up by automatics – the Anchor was held!!

  On the way down I had picked up Colour Sgt. Hayward, Cpl. Hunt and Pte. Thompson, all of the 2nd Bn. Their news was bad; the battalion had “bought it” good and proper. [Lieutenants] Vic Hewett, John Browne and Lieut. Johns had been killed, and a whole string badly wounded from the officers alone. They joined my party.

  It was now getting dark, and I finally decided to move the Company back to Giovanni and to occupy our old positions. We moved off. I pulled in every odd man I saw and went into every air raid shelter en route and dug out any British soldier, unless wounded … Any who weren’t “keen” on coming, luckily there were few, I put with my reliable men, who had orders what to do “if”!

  When we had gone about a third of the way we had a false alarm. What we thought was a German force turned out to be an R. A. officer and a party of his men who had destroyed their Bofors and were heading for Porto Lago. I explained the position to him and suggested that he joined me. He and his men agreed eagerly, and we moved off stronger still. We must have been about 150, with a lot of automatics with us. My idea, which I told the officers and passed on to the men, was to hold Giovanni until the morning, and then launch an attack, under cover of our six Vickers, along the ridge in an attempt to recapture Meraviglia …

  We were about half way back when an L.R.D.G. runner dashed up to us and said:- “The Brigadier capitulated at 1600 [sic] hrs.”26

  After having been evacuated from Meraviglia, Capitano Cacciatori had to endure a painful journey by stretcher to Lakki:

  En route, we were machine-gunned by a bomber that descended over us, but my orderly shielded me with his body. When we reached the Anchor, a German officer ordered us to stop. By the way the Germans were walking about, as if they owned the place, I realised that something awful had happened up top. The officer scrutinised me and I expected to be shot. He asked my orderly if I was the one in command of Mount Meraviglia.

  We are done for, I thought. Another sailor understood and nodded. The expression of the blond officer hardened; he obviously wanted to vindicate the deaths of so many of his soldiers, but a sense of honour prevailed and he walked away. At the infirmary, I was suddenly aware of a pain even more severe than my wound: could it be that the fighting had ceased on the mountain and throughout Leros?27

  Tilney had returned to Meraviglia and the disappointing news that the expected 160 reinforcements from Lakki had failed to materialise. An officer was therefore sent to hasten the arrival of the Buffs’ advance company. Like so many others, the message never reached its destination. At the same time, word was received from GHQ that the Aegean was to be evacuated the following night. Further details were to follow, but if there was a follow-up signal, it was sent too late to have any effect. (Earlier in the day, the navy had, in fact, received instructions to collect all small craft at Turk Buku under the orders of HMS Fury – which had arrived in the area with Exmoor and the Polish Krakowiak – in preparation for a possible evacuation of Leros.) Prendergast was dispatched to Lakki to fetch whoever he could for a counter attack. He left just in time. Mortar, machine-gun and small-arms fire intensified as the enemy launched the final assault on Meraviglia. It became impossible to leave Fortress Headquarters by the east exit. Before long, troops from III./1.Rgt. “Brandenburg” were also covering the west side. Among those inside the HQ tunnel was Lieutenant E.A.I. Crowder, RNR:

  The Brigadier … told me that I would be sent on an important mission to try and get to Colonel Tarlton [sic: Lieutenant Colonel Iggulden] of the Buffs, who was supposed to be concentrating on Meraviglio [sic] from the north. I said that it was not much my line of country but I would do my best to get through and asked him for some advice as to route, and started for the western entrance of Battle Headquarters. I was stopped there by the soldiers defending same and told I could not possibly get out as a machine-gun had been so placed as to cover the entrance. I told the Brigadier this and said the chances of his message getting through seemed pretty small, but I would have a shot. He said “No, no, wait till I see just what is happening” …28

  Tilney described what happened next:

  Somewhat incredulous, I went to investigate. I went far enough out of the Western exit to draw M.G. fire onto my raised helmet. I endeavoured to look over the entrance to the summit towards the East. As I did so, I saw a German standing over the top of me and Col. Douglas Brown [Commander Royal Artillery] who had followed. The German missed with both automatic and grenade, but neither of us quite knew why. The Eastern exit was also under heavy M.G. fire and being on the enemy side it was to be assumed that it too was closely guarded. I knew the enemy were on the top by the exit to the O.P., for part of the M.G. fire was coming from there on my recce of the Western exit. Moreover, the O.P. would be bound to have communicated with H.Qs if the enemy had not been there. The H.Qs appeared completely trapped. The Germans commanded the exits as men on a rabbit shoot stand over a warren.29

  Crowder again takes up the story:

  He [Tilney] came back to me and said “It’s all up, chaps. I am glad I did not send you out, Crowder, or you would be dead now”. He asked for anyone who could speak German and gave orders for a white flag to be shown at the OP. One O.R. was found to speak with the Germans, but unfortunately was shot and wounded in the chest before he made them understand.

  34. When a final understanding
was reached, we were allowed to come out without incident, except that one German soldier took Colonel Wadilove’s [sic: Colonel M. C. Waddilove] watch. The Brigadier, when he arrived outside, asked to speak to the Senior Officer; he then said “I am the Commander of the Island, and to avoid further bloodshed, I surrender the Island. Tell your General I wish facilities to tell my Senior Officers the battle is over and to stop fighting and march the men in.”30

  The time was 4.30 p.m. Meraviglia had been overrun by units of II./Gren.Rgt.65, II./Gren.Rgt.16 and III./1.Rgt. “Brandenburg” – the latter under Oberleutnant Max Wandrey following the wounding earlier in the day of the Bataillon Kommandeur, Hauptmann Gustav Froböse. Major Jellicoe arrived soon after to find Tilney in discussion with a German officer. The brigadier apologised for the situation in which the SBS commander found himself and then informed him about Lieutenant Phipps:

  ‘Incidentally, your friend, Alan Phipps is missing and I don’t know whether there’s any chance of finding out what’s happened to him.’ I turned to the German … and explained the situation. I said I’d like to look for him and he said, ‘Fine, if you give me your parole’. He was very correct. I suppose I must have spent the best part of an hour looking for Alan Phipps but I couldn’t find him. I found four or five quite badly wounded people. I was glad I had morphine on me and I was able to inject them, including one or two Germans, and then went back and surrendered my parole. Then we were all marched down to the little port on the west of the island.31

  The task now facing the Germans was how to convince the garrison that the battle was over. A bizarre situation unfolded as British officers and their captors travelled together in jeeps to locate the many scattered units still holding out. Disbelieving troops were informed of Tilney’s decision, and ordered to lay down their arms. The brigadier and Captain Edmund Baker were escorted by two German officers, including Hauptmann Heinrich Michael, OC 6./Gren.Rgt.16, and driven to Lakki to co-ordinate the surrender with Contrammiraglio Luigi Mascherpa. Signals were also sent advising Italian and British Command Headquarters of events. Generalleutnant Müller was at sea en route to Leros when news of the surrender reached him. Initially, he was dubious, failing to understand how a commander could continue to influence his forces when he was prisoner of war. Müller landed at Castello di Bronzi at 9.30 p.m. and was assured by Major von Saldern personally that the garrison had indeed capitulated.

  During the final phase of the battle, the Royal Air Force had continued to operate out of sight to those on the ground. Beaufighters of 603 Squadron on an offensive sweep in the Leros area attacked two Arado seaplanes, claiming one as destroyed and the other damaged. At 1.20 p.m., seven Beaufighters of 47 Squadron and one of 603 Squadron struck at enemy shipping 3 miles west of Kalymnos. Seven Arado 196s, four Ju 88s and four Bf 109s provided air cover for the convoy, which consisted of a Siebel ferry (SF 105) and two landing craft en route from Amorgos to Kalymnos. Before the Germans could react, the Beaufighters swept in at low level, using their cannon fire with deadly effect. The Siebel ferry was hit and blew up, leaving only burning wreckage and two columns of black smoke. Messerschmitt Bf 109s of J.G.27 engaged the Beaufighters and at least three 47 Squadron machines failed to return with the loss of five of the six aircrew.32

  During the day, up to ninety-six badly wounded from Leros were transferred from MMS 103 to the destroyers Penn and Aldenham at Turk Buku for onward passage to Cyprus. That evening, both ships sailed with instructions to bombard enemy positions in the centre of Leros before leaving the area to rendezvous with Blencathra and Rockwood. When under way, Lieutenant Commander James Swain on board Penn was handed a signal from Fortress Headquarters:

  Island surrendered. Stop bombardment, assurance has been given German convoy expected this evening not to be attacked.33

  The message had been sent in clear. Swain called Leros and asked for a code word, but received no reply. Swain requested instructions, and was ordered to cancel the bombardment and to bombard Kos roads instead.

  Lieutenant Crowder’s last task as Captain Baker’s Staff Operations officer was to ensure the Royal Navy was aware of the situation:

  Sometime earlier, a message had been sent by Captain Baker, asking for destroyers to bombard again that night; it was not known whether this had got through or not, so he stationed me with a lamp and one signalman on the top of the mountain, in case he could not broadcast a message through the Italian W/T to which he was taken in a Jeep with the General [sic: Brigadier Tilney]. I saw nothing of the destroyers, but the Hun evinced great respect for the previous bombardment, and would not let me leave the mountain for a long time after they were expected, for fear they might after all come.34

  That night, patrols were maintained by MTBs in a fruitless effort to intercept further invasion craft. It was far too late. After being subjected to an ineffectual glide bomb attack, the boats withdrew to Pharlah Bay. After the battle, the senior officer 10th MTB Flotilla, Lieutenant Commander Christian Evensen noted:

  It must be admitted that the enemy are masters of the art of secreting their ships at night; the nature of the AEGEAN Islands assisting them tremendously. Sweeps were carried out at only a few yards off shore in the endeavour to locate them, but never during the whole of the invasion of LEROS was a torpedo target sighted.35

  13

  Escape

  As a result of the confusion surrounding events at Meraviglia on Tuesday morning (16th), Second Lieutenant Pav Pavlides had wasted no time in initiating a withdrawal from Leros of LRDG personnel. After joining in the premature evacuation from Meraviglia, he encountered the group medical officer, Captain Dick Lawson, and Major L. Bindon Blood of the Royal Irish Fusiliers. He advised both to head for an RV on the west side of Lakki (probably Scrofe).1 In company with a Rhodesian, Les Berry, Pavlides made his way to Scumbarda where, at 12.40 p.m., he contacted Second Lieutenant Frank White and persuaded him to prepare to pull out the New Zealanders of ‘A’ Squadron LRDG. White sent one of his men, Private Lennox, to ensure that two boats were still at a hidden location below Scumbarda, warning him that the observation post (OP) was to be evacuated at 5.15 p.m. Berry and five others left to find Lawson, with instructions to RV off the coast between 7.30 p.m. and 8.00 p.m. Efforts were made to contact Lieutenant Folland (LRDG) at his OP on Marcello, following which all wireless sets and other equipment were destroyed. Because the LRDG lacked the means or the knowledge to deactivate the battery guns, they were left intact. At 5.00 p.m., Observation Post Number 4 at Scumbarda closed down and Lieutenants White and Pavlides and the four remaining LRDG set off towards Serocampo Bay, where Pavlides had a boat prepared for departure. The group arrived an hour and a half later to find a 12ft rowing boat into which they clambered, and headed for the bay entrance. There appeared to be complete disorder ashore, with much shooting by Italians at Serocampo, and Bren gun fire in the direction of Lakki. For ten long minutes a searchlight at Diapori Point played on the boat as its six occupants attempted to make the RV with Lawson. When no other boats were seen, the party continued north, past Pega and towards Turkey.

  After parting company with Colonel Guy Prendergast in the morning, Lieutenant Peter Mold reached San Giovanni and met Captain Dick Croucher on his way with a party from Lakki. Following the example of the Royal West Kents, some of whom were encountered nearby, the officers agreed to attempt to link up with friendly forces further north. Due to the ongoing bombing and strafing, the party continued in two less conspicuous groups, with Mold’s consisting of a Lieutenant Bell and an OR. At about 2.00 p.m., Mold met some SBS signallers who had arrived the night before and whose wireless sets had been delivered to Meraviglia. With the senior man, Sergeant F. Cartlidge, Mold set off in search of the equipment, only to be prevented by enemy fire from reaching their destination. They returned to Lieutenant Bell’s position, where they also found a very tired Captain Mike Rochford who had arrived from Meraviglia. In time-honoured fashion, it was announced to be ‘brew time’, and while enjoying tea the men maintai
ned watch on Meraviglia. After a while, the occupants of Brigade Headquarters were observed through binoculars emerging with their hands up, and individuals were seen fleeing with Germans in pursuit. The first evaders to arrive confirmed that Fortress Headquarters had been overrun, although Mold was as yet unaware that Tilney had surrendered his entire command. He therefore withdrew two Vickers machine guns from San Giovanni, gathered all the stragglers in the area – about fifty men – and prepared to make a stand on a hill between San Giovanni and Patella, in the area where Croucher was assumed to be. Mold went ahead and found Captain Lawson awaiting the return of Signalman King (presumably the runner encountered earlier by Lieutenant Clifford Clark), who had gone with Captains Croucher and Ron Tinker in search of Colonel Prendergast:

  He [Signalman King] returned some minutes later with the truly astonishing news that the surrender had been agreed upon at approx 1630 hrs – roughly at the time we saw the 40 bodies coming out of the [headquarters] “tunnel”.

  We got all the chaps together round a well and told them to have a good drink – fill their water-bottles – get something to eat and have a rest. We gathered the officers together, approx six, and mutually decided to try and get the chaps away by splitting up in small parties each under an officer.

  To add to the confusion Jerry decided to drop AP [anti-personnel] bombs in our area but fortunately not near enough to do any real harm. We decided to make for the sea side of the Patella feature and moved off at 10 minute intervals.2

  Unaware of developments, Prendergast was still on his way to Lakki to collect reinforcements to help with the defence of Meraviglia, when a jeep approached with Tilney, Captain Edmund Baker and their German escort. A bemused Prendergast was informed of events, whereupon the vehicle continued on its way. Eventually, he encountered Croucher and Tinker, and learned that the remainder of the LRDG Headquarters personnel were en route to the escape RV at Scrofe.