Churchill's Folly
Page 30
In the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) a Geschwader (the nearest Royal Air Force equivalent being group) was the largest formation with a nominal fixed strength. Normally confined to one role, a Geschwader usually comprised three (but sometimes more) Gruppen. Each Gruppe (roughly comparable to a RAF wing) tended to include a Stab (staff) flight with three or four aircraft and three Staffeln (similar to RAF squadrons) each with about twelve machines. However, as with RAF squadrons, the number of aircraft on strength varied considerably. Luftwaffe units were commonly designated by an abbreviation of the unit type prefixed by Stab, the Gruppe (in Roman numerals), or the Staffel (in Arabic numerals), e.g. III./Jagdgeschwader 27 (III./J.G.27), i.e. 3rd Gruppe (wing) of 27th Jagdgeschwader (fighter group).
Appendix 2
Time Zones
Between September and November 1943, Allied forces in the Aegean operated under various time zones including Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and Time Zones A, B and C. A (-1) was local time and one hour ahead of GMT; B (-2) and C (-3) were two and three hours ahead of GMT. The Germans kept to the equivalent of Time Zone B until 2.00 a.m. on 4 October, when their forces in and around Kos switched to Time Zone A. The British, on the other hand, displayed a curious tendency during September and October to deviate between the four time zones, although on Kos units appear to have adhered mainly to Time Zone C. By November, the British were at last all operating under Time Zone B. For consistency, a universal system has been adopted for use throughout this book. Accordingly, Time Zone C (-3) is used wherever possible up to 31 October 1943 and Time Zone B (-2) thereafter.
Appendix 3
Italian Batteries – Leros
Name
Armament
Location
Ducci
4 x 152/50, 1 x 120/45
Point 155/Cazzuni
Ciano
4 x 152/40
Point 320/Clidi
San Giorgio
3 x 152/40, 1 x 102/35
Point 334/Scumbarda
Farinata
4 x 120/45
Point 256/Marcello
Lago
4 x 120/45
Point 180/Appetici
P.L. 306
6 x 102/35, 2 x 76/40
Mount Vigla
P.L. 388
4 x 102/35
Point 149/Diapori
P.L. 227
4 x 102/35
Lakki Point
P.L. 211
4 x 102/35
Rachi
P.L. 127
6 x 90/53
Point 204/Meraviglia
P.L. 221*
4 x 76/40
Point 248/Mount Patella
P.L. 899
4 x 76/50
Point 48/Vaies Point
P.L. 690
2 x 76/50
Castello di Bronzi
P.L. 508
2 x 76/50
Mount Crumidi
P.L. 262
6 x 76/40
Point 334/Scumbarda
P.L. 248
6 x 76/40
Mount Della Palma
P.L. 281
6 x 76/40
Point 74/Diapori
P.L. 113
4 x 76/40
Point 226/Zuncona
P.L. 906
4 x 76/40
Point 284/Muplogurna
P.L. 989
4 x 76/40
Cape Timari
P.L. 888
4 x 76/40
Point 61/Blefuti
P.L. 749
4 x 76/40
Arcangelo (islet)
P.L. 250
3 x 76/40
Cazzuni Point
P.L. 432
3 x 76/40
Point 81/La Madonna
P.L. 763 Alinda
2 x 76/40
Rachi
P.L. 763 Rachi
2 x 76/40
Rachi
* F.A.M.–D.I.C.A.T. (Fronte à Mare – Difesa Contraerea Territoriale). Main armament thought to be as stated (plus two 37/54 twin guns).
Batteries had either a coastal defence, anti-aircraft or dual-role capability.
Appendix 4
Recommendation for Award to Sottonenente di artiglieria Ferrucio Pizzigoni
Confidential.
2nd Lieut. PETSIGONNE – The Alpine Regt. – serving with the Italian Marines – Pt. 320 – LEROS.
At the approach of enemy shipping from the North East on [date missing] Nov. 1943 2nd Lieut Petsigonne showed considerable skill – having taken over command of the Marine battery on Pt 320. His guns being responsible for the sinking of at least two of the enemy landing craft before they could reach the island.
During the approach of the enemy to PV [sic] 320 he personally – with the assistance of one marine maintained and fired his one remaining gun – successfully repulsing attempts to land barges in the North of Leros.
When his ammunition in the local (No. 2 Gun) magazine was exhausted he personally – under enemy machine gun fire – carried shells from the main magazine until assisted by British troops.
On the near approach of the enemy he organised the carrying forward of the Seotti Fascisti [sic] gun so that this could bring fire on the approaching enemy. This gun immediately became the target for mortar and rifle fire but he continued to fire until the gun was wrecked by the enemy.
2nd Lieut. Petsigonne then taking with him an Italian machine gun and ammunition advanced to the cave to the West. His gun was heard in action up to 14.00 hours when his position was overrun and captured by the enemy.
No remains of 2nd Lieut Petsigonne being found in the cave when the position was retaken – it is concluded that he was captured.
Throughout the battle 2nd Lieut Petsigonne had shown great courage and complete disregard of danger.
I have the honour to recommend 2nd Lieut Petsigonne for conspicuous skill and bravery in the face of the enemy on Point 320 Leros on the 10th [sic] November 1943.
[signed] J. R. Olivey. Capt. L.R.D.G.
Appendix 5
Letter of Condolence to Family of Unteroffizier Andreas Hutter from his Commanding Officer
Copy
Auer Oblt.
Staffelkapitän 6. Staffel
Command Post, 1.12.1943
My Dear Hutter Family!
On 13.11.1943, your son, Unteroffizier Andreas Hutter, did not return from a combat mission to the Aegean island of Leros and has since been missing. During its approach to the island in order to drop paratroopers, the aeroplane carrying your son was attacked by enemy fire along with all the other machines. The machine with your son was hit in the rudder and flew over the island and after 2km had to make an emergency landing on the sea. Both the crew and the paratroopers, who had not been dropped, had to leave the aircraft to either swim to safety or try to reach land with the rubber dinghy. This happened at around 5.30 in the morning; the machine flew separately, as did all the others, after your son had also taken part in the first joint mission to Leros on 12.11. 3 men from his crew swam for 1½ hours before reaching dry land and returned to their Staffel after the Island surrendered. My immediately launched investigations only revealed that your son Andreas was swimming in the water near the dinghy, which could not be inflated due, presumably, to bullet damage. Uffz. Langos, who belonged to the same crew, called out to your son to try to swim back to shore. However, the survivors were separated by high seas, with the aeroplane sinking soon after. When 3 men reached the shore after 1½ hours, they remained there for another 3 hours to wait for their other comrades. Your son Andreas, as well as Uffz. Meyendicks from the same crew have not been seen on the island and have been missing ever since.
I am writing these painful words with a heavy heart, my dear Hutter family, but send you all our wishes, that your son might have been rescued and might have been taken prisoner. I will personally inform you forthwith, if I hear any further news.
With Uffz. Hutter, the Staffel is losing an honest, very decent soldier and comrade, who
has proved himself as a courageous and brave soldier on 64 combat sorties. I have recommended your son for the silver Frontflugspange [combat flight clasp] and the EK II. Klasse [Iron Cross 2nd Class] and I will forward these decorations to you as soon as they arrive. Your son’s possessions will be dispatched to you today. Your local Armed Forces welfare office will be delighted to assist you with any advice and counselling you might require.
If your son has fallen to the enemy and has met his fate as a soldier, I would hope – my dear Hutter family – that you would draw comfort in this difficult time in knowing that he has given his life for the greater good and continuance of the people, the Führer and the Fatherland.
My sincere condolences and best wishes
Yours
Auer
Appendix 6
Letter Home from Lieutenant Colonel M. French
12 Oct. 43
2. The Royal Irish
Fusiliers
M.E.F.
My own Di,
It looks just possible, my sweetheart, that we may be in for a sticky time for the next day or two and I am seizing an opportunity to get a letter away to you.
If anything should happen to me, remember that our separation is only temporary. Thank God you have the two pussies [children] and Di, my darling, don’t hesitate to marry again if you meet the right chap because I couldn’t bear to think of you alone. Mother will help you (if my pessimistic outlook turns out to be true which it probably will not!) more than anyone.
It is cruelly hard that we should have been four and a half years apart, but the remaining separation will only be like a continuation of this and I will be close to you, dearest Di – always.
What fun it will be to read and tear this letter up ‘one day’. Be happy, my darling. It may be hard at first but it will pass and then you will know that death cannot separate us.
What a gloomy letter! You say you will be all right financially. I wish you would be better off but you are so good at managing that you should be able to make do – you and the pussies. I am glad they have not seen me for so long and are so young. You having them makes me so much happier about you.
We are all in good heart and if it becomes necessary will go on in good heart to face whatever may be before us. You have been the sweetest possible wife that any man could have. Oh how fortunate I have been in my womenfolk! No more now, my darling. I will cable if the situation changes. I am not able to do so now.
I love you, my precious Di, and our love will never end. Whatever happens, one way or the other, this is NOT good-bye but merely till we meet again.
God bless and care for you and ours always. Kiss the pussies.
With the dearest love
I can offer to anyone
Maurice
Appendix 7
Letter from Vice Admiral A.U. Willis to Lieutenant Commander J.H. Swain, RN
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL.
Office of Commander-in-Chief, Levant.
27th December, 1943.
Levant 00230/6.
THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
H.M.S. PENN.
(Through Captain (D), 14th Destroyer Flotilla).
With reference to your No. 1671/21 of 19th November 1943, I consider that with one exception, the operations described were well carried out by the Force under your command and that valuable assistance was rendered to the garrison of LEROS.
2. The exception was that you did not immediately leave PHARLAN BAY on receipt of the first enemy report of landing craft East of LEROS on the night of 15th/16th November in accordance with the instructions contained in my signal 15 1527.
3. It is true that these two enemy reports were both an hour old when they reached you, but even so there was a good chance that you could intercept before the enemy craft reached LEROS, or at any rate that you could have interfered with the landing operations which would have been nearly as good.
4. The decision to keep your force at anchor that night was based on the experience of the night before when it appeared that enemy landing craft were able by reports from their continuous night air reconnaissance, to evade your patrol. As however, no reports were received of any enemy reinforcements reaching the island that night, the presence of your force in the area appears to have persuaded the enemy landing craft to return whence they came, which in itself must have been of great assistance to the garrison.
5. In these circumstances, you should have acted on your instructions and proceeded to try and intercept. Had you succeeded the effect in the battle raging in LEROS which you knew from my signal 15 1955 was very critical, might have been considerable.
6. I consider therefore that your appreciation of this situation was faulty and that you committed an error of judgement at a very critical time.
(sgd) A.U. WILLIS
VICE ADMIRAL.
Appendix 8
Correspondence Relating to the Death of Lieutenant A. Phipps, RN
Subject:-
Casualties, Officers.
Lt Alan Phipps RN.
To:- HV. Markham Esq.
Admiralty CW Branch
(Officers Casualties)
Queen Anne’s Mansions
London SW1.
I, the undersigned would like to make the following statement regarding the death of the a/m Royal Naval Officer, whilst performing duties ashore on the Aegean Isle of Leros on Nov 16th 1943.
After conversation with the Officer’s widow, Mrs Alan Phipps of 10c Hyde Park Mansions, London. It appears that Lt Phipps is still posted as missing.
I can confirm that this Officer died in action on the last day of battle on Leros, at some time between 1000 hrs and 1700 hrs. Nov 16th 1943.
I was assisting this Officer and two others to retake and defend a gun-position on the slopes of the Island HQ Mount at about 1000 hrs. Shortly after the site had been taken, Lt Phipps was hit above the waist, apparently in neck and chest, by rifle fire from the enemy. He fell to the ground inside and close to the parapet.
Owing to accurate enemy mortar, grenade & sniper fire, the site had to be evacuated.
After capitulation the site was revisited later the same day at about 1700 hrs, conducted by an enemy guard for express purpose of ascertaining the condition of this Naval Officer and another unknown Army Officer. Both Officers had been dead for a considerable time.
I should like to comment on the outstanding bravery of this Officer, who initiated and led the attack on the position advancing across open ground exposed to fire. It was due to his leadership only that the position was retaken. His actions in this area prevented the enemy from further advance until much later in the day. At one stage in the fighting when the supply of grenades had been exhausted, he stood at the parapet hurling rocks upon the advancing enemy below.
Two other Officers known to have witnessed Lt Alan Phipps brave actions are Lt/Col Ritchie of a Scottish Regt of Infantry, and Capt Ramsey R. Sigs at the time Sigs Officer to 234 Inf Bde.
12th Aug 1945
“UPLANDS” 20 PRIEST HILL. CAV. READING.
E. B. Horton
Lt R. Sigs.
H. & A. 218/44
21st August 1945.
The Secretary of the Admiralty desires to acknowledge Lieutenant Horton’s letter of 12th August 1945 and to thank him for the information contained therein concerning Lieutenant Alan Phipps, R.N.
The services of this gallant officer were most carefully considered for recognition, and he was awarded a Posthumous Mention in Despatches, by His Majesty’s gracious command. A copy of the relevant Gazette is attached.
As Lieutenant Horton is probably aware, this is the highest honour, except the Victoria Cross, which may be given to Officers and Men who are killed in action for services in the action in which they lost their lives.
Lieutenant E.B. Horton,
Uplands,
20, Priest Hill,
Cav.
Reading.
Notes
TNA: The National Archives (formerly The Public
Record Office), Kew, England.
IWM: Imperial War Museum, London.
Chapter 1: Italy and the Aegean
1 Aegean place names can be spelt in a number of ways and sometimes differ altogether according to source. For the purpose of this work, a modern Anglicised version has been adopted.
2 The Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance essentially committed Britain and France to go to the aid of Turkey in the event of hostilities as a consequence of aggression by a European Power, and called for collaboration in the event of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area. Turkey joined the Allies towards the end of the war in Europe, but until that time exercised caution by playing to both sides, not least by allowing British warships and small craft to seek refuge in Turkish waters. The Kriegsmarine appears not to have taken such liberties, but did make use of the Bosphorous.
3 See Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s message to President Franklin D. Roosevelt of 7 October 1943, pp.82–3
4 Operations in the Dodecanese Islands: September – November 1943. TNA: AIR 41/53, p.2.