Antony and Cleopatra

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  Cleopatra contributed a vast sum of money to fund the war. Plutarch says it amounted to 20,000 talents, twice the sum her father had promised to Gabinius in 55 BC. Like the rest of the east, her kingdom was squeezed to support Antony’s war effort. In addition she contributed 200 vessels to the fleet of 500 warships and some 300 merchantmen that her lover was assembling. Some of the warships were large, built in the grand tradition of the Ptolemaic navy, and it is probable that many of the merchant vessels were large grain ships. It was the biggest fleet her kingdom had formed for several generations – the ships used against Caesar in the Alexandrian War were smaller, more suitable for the confined fighting within the harbours and less numerous. Cleopatra does seem to have provided crews as well as the ships themselves, but how many of these men came from Egypt – or her wider realm – is unclear. She paid them, but many seem to have been recruited by press gangs from anywhere they could be found.3

  Willingly contributing ships and money to back her lover, Cleopatra was already benefiting from Antony’s gratitude as he seized statues and other artworks from temples and presented them to her. One of Octavian’s allies accused him of presenting her with 200,000 scrolls from the Library at Pergamum. The story may be an invention, or at least the number exaggerated, although her family’s longstanding appetite for acquiring new volumes for Alexandria’s Library was well known.4

  After Samos, the couple went to Athens and were there at the latest by the early summer. If Cleopatra really did accompany her father into exile, then she had been to the city before, more than twenty years earlier, but this was certainly her first visit as an adult. Antony’s longest visit in recent years had been the months spent there with Octavia, when the Athenians had taken care to honour both the triumvir and his wife. Now, they were equally eager to secure his favour by honouring his mistress. Her statue dressed in the robes of Isis – or perhaps a statue of the goddess deliberately made to resemble the queen’s features – was set up by the city. Cleopatra responded by staging and paying for some of the round of musical and dramatic performances that were ordered here as on Samos. A formal delegation of the leaders of the city, including Antony himself who had been made an honorary citizen, came to the house she occupied, where he made a speech listing the special privileges the council had granted her.

  Ahenobarbus and Sosius had probably joined Antony before he left Asia Minor. Other news from Rome continued to reach him. In Athens he finally decided to divorce Octavia, a clear indication that he felt the breach with her brother was serious and perhaps irreconcilable. Graffiti appeared on one of Antony’s statues — ‘Octavia and Athena to Antony: take your things and go!’, referring to his earlier sacred marriage to the goddess of the city. The first phrase was in Greek, the second the traditional Latin formula of divorce — res tuas tibi habe — which rather suggests that the wag was one of his Roman followers.5

  We do not know whether now or at some earlier stage Antony and Cleopatra contracted a formal marriage. This would not have been legal under Roman law, unless he had granted her citizenship. None of the main narrative sources claims that the couple did marry, although Plutarch could be taken to imply this. The poet Virgil, writing not too many years after their death, does make outraged mention of Antony’s ‘Egyptian wife’, but otherwise the claim is only made in much later, and generally unreliable, sources. It is difficult to believe that Octavian would not have flung the charge against him if any form of wedding had taken place. We cannot be sure, which makes the ambiguity of Antony’s own words — uxor mea est, ‘Is she my wife?’ or ‘She is my wife’— all the more frustrating. The debate is often complicated by modern attitudes to marriage and partnerships. The truth is that we simply do not know what either Antony or Cleopatra thought about such things, and what they did or did not do.6

  What we do know is that Cleopatra accompanied Antony, and from the beginning it seems to have been accepted that she would stay with him even if, or when, war broke out. Other client monarchs were also with him and if they did not contribute as much money or as many ships to the war effort, several brought strong contingents of troops. Polemo had been left to watch the frontier with Parthia, for Antony had stationed very few of his own troops to guard against any renewal of war in that theatre. Herod was sent to deal with the king of the Nabataean Arabs, whose loyalty was in question and who had stopped paying the rent for the lands leased from Cleopatra. She also sent one of her own Greek officers, presumably with a force of mercenaries, to co-operate with the Judaean king, but the campaign achieved little. It was claimed that she simply wanted Herod out of the way and less able to win Antony’s favour.7

  The other rulers to serve with Antony were all male and most would lead their soldiers in person. Cleopatra was Antony’s lover and spent far more time close beside him, both when he conducted official business and when he relaxed and celebrated. She received public honours far greater than any awarded to the other kings and clearly possessed greater influence over him. Domitius Ahenobarbus was the only Roman in Antony’s entourage who refused to address her as ‘Queen’, still less as ‘Queen of Kings’, and instead called her by name. He was not the only one who was unhappy with her very public presence, which did so much to aid Octavian’s propaganda campaign focusing on her control of Antony. In 32 BC there were still a number of senators in Italy who remained sympathetic. Antony was generous with money to reinforce their loyalty and win more adherents, but his close association with the queen was politically disastrous.8

  Plutarch tells us that a senator called Geminius – perhaps Caius Geminius – travelled from Italy to see Antony, probably during the months Antony spent at Athens. Cleopatra is supposed to have distrusted him, suspecting that he hoped to reconcile Antony to Octavia. She arranged for him to be seated at feasts away from her lover and that the senator should be made the butt of some of the jokes and pranks common at the court. Geminius remained patient and finally was asked to present his case during one banquet. Claiming that it would be better to wait until everyone was fully sober, he nevertheless said that the most important message was that Antony must send the queen away. The triumvir flew into a rage and Cleopatra was delighted, supposedly saying that it was good that Geminius had admitted the truth without the need for torture –something to which a senator should never be subject. Geminius left and the queen remained at her lover’s side. Whether or not the story is true, it reflects the growing disquiet of many of Antony’s men. Monarchs were acceptable only if they were clearly subordinate.9

  Some of his Roman followers spoke up in favour of the queen’s continued presence. Canidius argued that Cleopatra was one of the most able and experienced monarchs in all the eastern Mediterranean. She had contributed so much to the campaign, and it would be dangerous for the morale of the naval contingent she had supplied if their queen was sent away. Plutarch claims that he was bribed and the papyrus recording the tax exemptions granted to him do testify to Cleopatra’s generosity. Perhaps he was also inclined to adopt a different stance to Ahenobarbus and others out of sheer competitiveness. Yet it is quite possible that he genuinely believed the queen’s presence to be a good thing, whether in its own right or because of the influence she had on Antony.

  Most modern scholars have been inclined to agree with Canidius’ claim that Cleopatra needed to remain to foster the morale of the sailors in her warships. Given that many of these seem to have been reluctant conscripts, this is highly unlikely. Even less probable is the idea that she inspired the many recruits from the Hellenistic provinces included amongst the legions and fleet, and that these men were somehow fighting against the Romans. An oracle foretelling the conquest of Rome by the east is the only evidence cited in support of this claim, but there is no good reason to date the document to this period. That many provincials hated the Romans is unsurprising. Roman imperialism was brutal, the decisions of the Roman authorities often arbitrary and many of their governors savage in their exploitation of conquered and allied peoples. Antony
was more tactful in his respect for Greek sensibilities, but was no less exploitative, especially as he prepared for the confrontation with Octavian. He did not offer an alternative to Roman rule, merely a slightly softer version. The conflict was a Roman civil war. Only Octavian tried to portray it as a struggle between east and west.10

  Antony wanted Cleopatra beside him. Her money and her ships were of great use, but his need for her companionship was greater still. Antony enjoyed luxury, something his lover was good at providing in inventive ways, and needed affection and flattery, at which she excelled. She made him feel better and either this blinded him to just how politically damaging her presence was or persuaded him that this price was worth paying. Philippi was now ten years ago and since then his only major operation had ended in disaster. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Antony had lost much of his confidence and assurance on the retreat from Media. Perhaps he no longer believed that he could function without Cleopatra staying close to him.

  She may well have sensed this and felt that it was not safe to let him go to war on his own. Cleopatra had become ruler of an expanded realm through Antony’s generosity. If he lost the war, then she too might lose all that she had gained. To this end she committed the resources of her kingdom to support him. It was understandable if she also wanted to be close at hand, to help secure victory in any other way that she could, if only through advising Antony. Cleopatra had very little military experience, but it is not clear that she realised this and may have felt that at least she could help her lover to be decisive and resolute in prosecuting the war. Perhaps she did help in the planning, for moving and feeding such a large army and fleet was a major project.

  There was another reason for her presence. Tension had been high between Octavian and Antony on several occasions in the past and yet they had pulled back from the brink of war and come to a settlement. This might well happen again, and if it did, then Cleopatra needed to make sure that her own interests were secure. She did not wish to become an acceptable loss, permitting Antony to return peacefully to Rome and the heart of the Republic. Whether or not such a fear was realistic, it was entirely understandable.11

  Politics mingled with passion. Both Antony and Cleopatra were ambitious, and neither had survived the dangerous worlds of the Ptolemaic court and Rome’s fractured Republic without a strong streak of ruthless self-interest. For a combination of reasons he wanted her beside him and she also felt that this was important. The decision played into Octavian’s hand, as he whipped up fervour against the foreign queen and her Roman puppet who threatened Italy itself. By the late summer he was ready. Reviving – or quite possibly inventing – an archaic ritual, he acted as a fetial priest and presided over a sacrifice in the Temple of Bellona, the war god. Taking a spear dipped in the blood of a sacrificial animal, Octavian hurled it into a patch of earth symbolically representing Egypt. War had been declared by the Roman Republic against Cleopatra. Nothing was said of Antony, although everyone knew that the real fight was actually against him, and that the former allies were fighting for supremacy.12

  [XXVIII]

  ACTIUM

  Neither side was ready to fight and, apart from that, it was late in the campaigning season. Antony was subsequently criticised for not invading Italy immediately, for Octavian had not gathered all of his forces and was facing opposition as he introduced extraordinary taxes to raise money for the war. Although Octavian had plenty of soldiers, and a fleet experienced and confident after the defeat of Sextus Pompey, he was very short of funds. He was not yet ready for war, but nor could he afford to let the conflict last too long. As usual, both sides were promising generous bonuses to their legionaries. Antony minted a series of coins showing a war galley on the face, with the eagle and two signa standards on the reverse and listing the name of one of the units in his army.1

  The combination of warship and army standards emphasised that this war would be fought on both land and sea. Antony had added three more legions to the sixteen brought by Canidius, but even our sources suggest that these formations were below strength. In addition, he had allied foot soldiers, some of them armed with bows, slings and other missiles, and a strong force of cavalry. Plutarch claims that he had altogether 100,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. Octavian had a similar force of cavalry and some 80,000 infantry. Some of his legions remained to garrison the provinces and Antony had also left a smaller proportion of his own troops behind, including a force of four legions to defend Cyrenaica. Plutarch credited Octavian with only 250 warships, but other sources suggest that the figure was larger and he may have had nearer 400.

  The figures given for the totals of warships may well be accurate, but as usual the figures for the armies look suspiciously like rounded up totals based on a number of legions assumed to be at full theoretical strength. The totals are probably too large. Nevertheless, the armies were clearly very big by Roman standards, even if most of the legions were substantially under strength. It is quite possible that as many soldiers were involved in this campaign as had fought in the rival armies at Philippi. Both in 31 BC and at Philippi the opposing commanders relied more on numbers than subtlety. From the beginning they faced serious logistical challenges, as they operated at the upper limit of force size feasible for the Romans’ military and logistic systems.2

  It did not help that the military and naval forces were unbalanced. The oared warships employed by both sides carried exceptionally large crews in proportion to their size, since their main motive power came from the teams of rowers. A quinquereme (‘five’) carried 280 rowers and twenty deck crew. (Most warships had three banks of oars. They were named after the team of rowers needed to operate one set of three oars. Therefore a ‘five’ had a team of five men, two sitting at the highest bench wielding one oar, two more on the middle bench to use the middle oar, and finally one sitting on the lowest bench to row the lowest oar. A ‘five’ was a standard warship, but bigger vessels, such as ‘sixes’, ‘eights’ and ‘tens’ were also in use.) There was very little space to carry food and water even to feed this crew. If battle was expected the larger warships could take on board 100 or so soldiers for a short period – ideally, just the day of battle itself. They could not carry this many men for any distance, and certainly not with the food, tents and other equipment they would need to operate. There was absolutely no question of their carrying significant numbers of cavalry mounts and pack and baggage animals.3

  Antony had 300 transport ships. These had to bring regular convoys of grain and other food, much of it travelling from Egypt to Greece, for it was impossible in the long term to supply so many soldiers and sailors from locally available stocks. Some of the ships, especially the larger vessels, would always be needed for this task. That left even fewer to transport soldiers, animals, short-term reserves of food and fodder, and equipment. Antony could not hope to carry his entire army in a single convoy, and probably it would require several. It certainly seems to have taken a while to ferry the legions across the Aegean in the spring and summer of 32 BC. Any invasion of Italy would have to take place in several stages and this would make it more difficult for his warships to protect the convoys. The vagaries of the weather added another uncertainty. Any vessels lost to enemy action or storm would not be available for future convoys, in addition to the actual losses of men and matériel killed or captured with them.4

  It was late in the summer of 32 BC before Antony’s forces had concentrated on the western coast of Greece, and he and Cleopatra took up residence at Patrae on the Gulf of Corinth. The weather in the autumn and winter months was less likely to be good and that argued against an immediate attack. In addition, the east coast of Italy has few natural ports and past experience had shown that it was difficult to take Brundisium or Tarentum. Antony decided against an immediate invasion. He was not in a rush, unlike Octavian whose finances were stretched almost to breaking point.

  Apart from better weather, the difficulties of transporting and landing an army in Italy would be j
ust as serious when the spring arrived. By the end of the year it was clear that he planned to let Octavian come to him. Antony would wait in Greece, hoping to harry the enemy’s convoys as they crossed the Adriatic. We do not have a figure for the merchant vessels available to Octavian, but it is probable that he faced similar problems to Antony and would not be able to carry his army across at once. At least in the beginning, the advantage ought to be with Antony, whose forces should significantly outnumber the enemy. There was also a political element. Invading Italy with Cleopatra at his side would alienate any potential supporters there.

  Modern scholars have generally applauded Antony’s plan as sensible and the only practical option. Yet it is worth remembering that this was the same strategy adopted unsuccessfully by Pompey in 48 BC and Brutus and Cassius in 42 BC. On both of those occasions, the defenders had enjoyed a greater naval superiority than Antony now possessed and yet this had failed to prevent the attacker from landing sufficient troops to prevail — if narrowly in 48 BC. Sulla had won a civil war from Greece, but only by using it as a base from which to invade Italy. Defensive strategies did not work well in Rome’s civil wars, for they immediately handed the initiative over to the enemy. It created an impression of passivity and weakness, which made it unlikely to convince waverers to join. Once again, Antony was losing the political battle.5

  There were also practical difficulties in implementing such a strategy. The coastline of Greece offers abundant natural harbours and is dotted with islands, many of which were potential landing bases. Geography encouraged Antony to spread his forces out to cover as wide an area as possible. The constant problem of feeding the sailors, soldiers and animals over winter also made it desirable to disperse them. Antony spread his ships and land forces from Methone in the south of the Peloponnese to the island of Corcyra in the north. Further north, he stationed no significant forces on the coast of Epirus. Probably the largest concentration of ships was at Actium, where the Gulf of Ambracia offered an extensive natural harbour. Substantial stores were massed there to supply these squadrons and the position was fortified. High towers, probably containing artillery, guarded the mouth of the bay.6