Beyond NJ 9842
Page 21
As we sat down to record the interview, I worked through the usual questions about the threat posed by terrorists, the fragile peace in the Kashmir Valley and the deployment along the LoC. But, I was actually itching to seek his answer on the Siachen issue. Finally I asked him: What is it that the Indian Army is concerned about with respect to Siachen? His answer, later circulated widely, put paid to any hopes Pakistan may have had in India agreeing to demilitarise the Siachen glacier area.
Gen Parnaik said:
You see, to understand Siachen, I think one needs to be geographically oriented to the region. And let me simply put it, because I’m telling you without a map, that the Siachen glacier is bounded on the west by the Saltoro Range, which is a very high range and to the east by the Karakoram Range and the Nubra River. So, per se the Siachen glacier is a sort of an iced river, which flows in between them. The Saltoro Range, actually provides domination of the entire area…There is a strategic implication of the Saltoro Range, and the implication is you have the Pakistanis sitting in the northern areas, which we keep saying is illegally occupied, it’s Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Now out of the other areas that they have occupied, they have illegally ceded the Shaksgam Valley to the Chinese. Shaksgam Valley lies to the north of the glacier. And if Saltoro Range was held by the (Pakistanis), it practically enables them to bridge the Aksai Chin and northern areas gap, which is with China, and also exercise complete control over the Karakoram Pass. Therefore, strategically, it is an important area. And we feel, by holding these areas, we would effectively deny approaches to Kargil and Leh. Now, in security parlance, for the country it is of strategic importance. That is one reason. The second reason is that we have had a number of rounds of talks on this. A large number of solutions have been offered. One of the biggest issues that has not been resolved yet is that we insist that for anything to happen in Siachen, the Pakistanis must first accept the actual line of ground position, and delineate the line along the positions that are being held by the troops today, both theirs and ours, as is, where is. They do not seem to be amenable to this sort of a thing. They continue to say that we should go back to 1971 and 1953, when this whole area was not demarcated, so you should vacate it. Don’t forget, Kargil happened because of Siachen… If you peruse their own records, which are now public, one of the major objectives of what they did in Kargil was to force us to vacate the Siachen glacier. Now, if that is their intent and that is their credibility, it is up to you to judge whether we should be really vacating the glacier or not.
As a follow up, my next question was: Does the government understand these strategic implications?
Gen Parnaik said emphatically: See, the offer that was made by the Pakistan Army Chief, probably in the wake of the tragedy that took place in Gayari. If they find it difficult (to remain there), they are most welcome to withdraw to safe places. And let me assure you, the Indian Army has no evil designs to set across for those areas and capture those territories. This aspect is also well known to our leaders. So that is where it rests.”
In one short, swift answer, Gen Parnaik had demolished the case that was sought to be built by Gen Kayani that both India and Pakistan need to withdraw from Siachen! He was only reiterating what successive Army Chiefs and Northern Army Commanders have stated.
Over the past three decades, the Indian Army ably supported by the Indian Air Force has mastered the treacherous mountains, and has evolved a high altitude doctrine that is the envy of the world. In the process, the Indian military has shed blood, made enormous sacrifices and braved the elements. No wonder, the military leadership has told the political executive time and again that it is against any withdrawal from the Saltoro ridge and Siachen glacier.
As we have seen, at the heart of the problem is the interpretation of the 1949 Karachi and 1972 Simla agreements by both sides. During both these negotiations, India and Pakistan demarcated their borders only up to Point NJ 9842. This includes the 772 km Ceasefire Line in 1949, now known as the LoC or Line-of-Control. It was stated in the agreements that the border would run “thence north” from map grid reference NJ 9842.
The Cease-Fire Agreement was signed in Karachi by top military representatives of India and Pakistan and the UN Military Observer Group. The purpose of the Karachi meeting (July 18 to 27) was to establish “a ceasefire line in the State of J&K” in pursuance of Part I of the key UN resolution of 13 August, 1948 that prescribed a ceasefire.
Present at the Karachi Conference were members of the Truce Committee of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, Hernando Semper of Colombia (Chairman), William L.S. Williams (U.S), Lt-Gen Maurice Delvoie, Military Adviser; and Miguel A. Martin (Legal Adviser). Pakistan was represented by Maj. Gen W.J. Cawthorn, Maj. GenNazir Ahmad, Brigadier Sher Khan and a couple of observers.
Representing India were Lt. Gen S.M Shrinagesh, Maj. Gen K.S. Thimayya and Brigadier Sam Manekshaw, with H.M Patel and Vishnu Sahay as observers.
The Karachi Agreement delineated the entire CFL, demarcating over 740 km on the ground. With the CFL increasingly running through high mountains and glaciated areas as it traversed north, it often followed a directional path in the absence of clear landmarks. Thus, finally, “Chalunka (on the Shyok River), Khor, thence North to the glaciers,” passing through grid reference NJ 9842. The segment beyond NJ 9842 was by mutual agreement not demarcated on the ground, being a highly elevated, glaciated, unexplored and unpopulated region that had not witnessed any fighting. A plebiscite was soon to follow and the matter, it was assumed, would then be settled.
The delineation of the northern-most segment of the CFL was, however, unambiguous: NJ 9842, “thence north to the glaciers”. If every one of 30 or more earlier directional commands were meticulously followed in tracing the CFL, there was no reason whatsoever for any departure from this norm in the case of the very last command. “Thence north”, could only mean due north to wherever the boundary of J&K state lay. The very next section crucially directed that “the ceasefire line described above” be drawn “so as to eliminate any no man’s land”. Therefore, the Line, whether delineated or demarcated could in no way be left hanging in the air.
The Cease Fire Line was ratified by both sides. Twenty-three years later, it was revalidated as the Line of Control by the Suchetgarh Agreement of December 1972, in the wake of the Shimla Agreement between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Both sides also agreed with the LoC, and the military gains made by either side in J&K in the 1971 war. Thus, in the Kargil-Siachen sector, all territorial gains went entirely to India which acquired the Turtuk salient comprising five villages ( Chalunka, Thang, Tyakshi, Pharol and Turtok) just south and west of NJ 9842. This modest but important military acquisition, provided India an additional territorial bulwark against hostile cartographic or physical claims on Siachen.
While India interprets this to mean due north (along the ridge line, as is the international convention), leading to the northern tip of the Saltoro ridge known as Indira Col, Pakistan claims that the line should run northeast towards the Karakoram Pass which leads into Tibet.
As many officers who have served on the glacier and in the Northern Command have pointed out time and again, occupation of the Saltoro and Siachen provides a buffer for Ladakh and in military parlance, the much needed depth for important mountain passes that are gateways to Ladakh and onto Kashmir.
There are however, a number of ‘experts’ who argue that it is futile to hold on to the positions on the Saltoro ridgeline, because they are important only tactically and have no strategic significance. As one Indian Army officer has written: “They are obviously unaware of the prevailing conditions in Siachen. If ever there was a tactical gain that was instrumental in providing exponential dividend to a strategic cause, this is the one.”
Through innovation, hard work and sustained efforts to improve the situation, the Indian Army has established such a strong, and controlling position that it enjoys overwhelming operational and psychological superiority i
n Siachen. It would be folly to give up the advantage.
Self-proclaimed analysts have put forward arguments in favour of demilitarising Siachen citing the high human and material costs that the Indian military has to pay. Let us examine the costs. Between 1984 and 2007, Parliament was told that 884 Indian soldiers were killed and 13,022 wounded. That makes it an average of 38 dead in a year and 550 plus wounded. But, the figures don’t reflect the fact that since the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan went into effect in 2003, battle casualties are down to zero. Even weather casualties are now down to a single digit on an average, in a year. This is a sea change from the first two decades of the conflict when weather and battle casualties both were high.
Financially, India has reportedly spent over Rs 8,000 crores since 1984 on Operation Meghdoot. The recurring costs today are pegged at about Rs 365 crores. This is no financial burden for a military that has an annual budget of Rs 2, 24,000 crore or about US 38 billion dollars (2014).
Infrastructure in the Siachen sector has developed over the years. Pipelines for kerosene and water have been laid, and better facilities have been organised in every sphere of activity. Therefore, the expenditure incurred now is more in the form of maintenance and regular improvements. Over the years, improvements in living conditions, health facilities and communications have reduced the attrition rate significantly. Today, financial and human costs for Operation Meghdoot are sustainable.
So why is there fresh clamour for demilitarising Siachen? More importantly, can it be done? Several experts have weighed in on the issue, and as in every other issue concerning India and Pakistan, opinion is divided right down the middle.
De-militarisation by itself is a process that consists of several logical steps: ceasefire, authentication, demarcation, withdrawal, redeployment and verification. This concept, everyone agrees, is the best possible solution. So why is there no forward movement?
The primary cause of disconnect is the sequence of the process of demilitarisation. India insists on authentication of current troops’ position as the first step. The Pakistanis want Indian troops to withdraw to pre-1972 positions before any further discussions can take place.
Then there is the question of trust.
What if the agreement is flouted and positions occupied by the Pakistan Army? The level of mistrust between India and Pakistan in general, and the Indian and Pakistani Security Forces in particular is deep-rooted, and cannot be overturned so easily.
Yet there are many ‘peaceniks’ who propose a unilateral withdrawal from Siachen, among them military officers who professed to be hawks while in service, but who turned doves when out of it.
Several diplomats and analysts have said India must recognise Pakistan’s compulsions and offer a face-saving formula, so that the agreement on Siachen does not look like a defeat for the Pakistani Army. This is utter nonsense. If Pakistan wants demilitarisation of Saltoro-Siachen, it must first accept the fact that Pakistani Army troops are NOWHERE NEAR THE SIACHEN GLACIER.
More pragmatic military leaders like Lt Gen Nanavatty have suggested a practical formula. He says: “India’s approach towards a final settlement should be based on demilitarisation of the limited and well-defined mutually agreed prescribed area.” Essential steps for this, he says, begin with a political agreement followed by a formal ceasefire, delimitation, demarcation, disengagement, redeployment and verification.
The bottom-line, according to General Nanavatty, is that any peaceful resolution of Indo-Pakistan disputes is possible only when the two countries cease to view each other as military adversaries.
Officially too, India and Pakistan continue to hold dialogue over Siachen. Between 1986 and 2012, 13 rounds of talks have been held. Twice, past reports suggest, both countries came close to an agreement, but political considerations rather than military compulsions prevented any final breakthrough. As Gen Raghavan said a decade ago: “The assumption that demilitarisation is being hampered by military obduracy is, of course a misplaced one. The record of negotiations (between 1986 and 2003) on Siachen is evidence enough of the political problems in bringing about demilitarisation.”
Not much has changed since then.
After the last round (held in Rawalpindi in June 2012), the bland joint statement at the end of the two day talks shows how little progress has been made on the Siachen issue. The statement said:
•The Defence Secretary level talks between Pakistan and India on Siachen were held at the Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi from 11 – 12 June 2012. The Pakistan delegation was headed by Ms. Nargis Sethi, Secretary Defence. The Indian delegation was headed by Mr. Shashi Kant Sharma, Defence Secretary of India.
•The Defence Secretary of India called on the Minister for Defence Syed Naveed Qamar.
•The talks were held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. Both sides reaffirmed their resolve to make serious, sustained and result oriented efforts for seeking an amicable resolution of Siachen. It was agreed to continue dialogue on Siachen in keeping with the desire of the leaders of both countries for early resolution of all outstanding issues. Both sides acknowledged that the ceasefire was holding since 2003.
•It was agreed that the next round of talks on Siachen will be held in New Delhi on mutually convenient dates, to be fixed through diplomatic channels.
The civilian leadership in India has so far backed the military’s stand despite Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s avowed wish to make Siachen a “mountain of peace.” However, giving up a dominant military position on Siachen without iron-clad guarantees would be a fool’s errand, especially in view of the enormous sacrifices and hardships that Indian soldiers have braved in these past three decades to defend Siachen and keep the Indian flag flying.
Note: 4-5 companies make one battalion.
Commanders:
Siachen Brigade
BRIG VN CHANNA, AVSM, VSM**
Commander, 26 Sector, Nov 82 to Oct 84
(Retd as Brig)
BRIG JAL MASTER, PVSM, VSM
01 Mar 85 to 26 Feb 87
(Retd as Brig)
BRIG CS NUGYAL, UYSM
27 Feb 87 to 17 Oct 88
(Retd as Maj Gen)
BRIG RK Nanavatty, UYSM
18 Oct 88 to 22 Nov 90
(Retd as Lt Gen)
BRIG AB MASIH, UYSM
23 Nov 90 to 26 Dec 91
(Retd as Lt Gen)
BRIG VK JETLEY, UYSM
27 Dec 91 to 13 Oct 93
(Retd as Lt Gen)
BRIG TEJ PATHAK, YSM**
14 Oct 93 to 25 Dec 95
(Retd as Lt Gen)
BRIG KS RANDHIR SINGH, UYSM, SM
26 Dec 95 to 09 Dec 97
(Retd as Maj Gen)
BRIG PC KATOCH, UYSM, SC
10 Dec 97 to 23 Dec 99
(Retd as Lt Gen)
BRIG RS JAMWAL
24 DEC 99 TO 14 OCT 2000
(Retd as Lt Gen)
BRIG ASHOK DUGGAL, YSM, VSM
31 Oct 00 to 19 Oct 01
(Retd as Maj Gen)
BRIG S K SINGH
20 Oct 01 to 03 Sep 03
(Retd as Lt Gen)
BRIG HPS BEDI
04 Sep 03 to 28 Mar 05
(Retd as Brig)
BRIG OM PRAKASH, SM
29 Mar 05 to 09 Dec 06
(Serving Lt Gen)
BRIG KG KRISHNA, VSM
10 DEC 06 TO 12 JUN 08
(Serving Maj Gen)
BRIG AVINASH SINGH
13 JUN 08 TO 08 NOV 09
(Serving Maj Gen)
BRIG PARAMJIT SINGH, SM
09 NOV 09 TO 23 FEB 11
(Serving Brig)
BRIG RS BHADAURIA
22 FEB 11 TO 01 MAY 11
(Serving Brig)
BRIG SK RAO
02 MAY 11 TO 31 OCT 12
(Serving Brig)
BRIG KP SINGH
01 NOV 12 -Till date
(Present Commander)
Glossary
&nb
sp; ADIZ
: Air Defence Information Zone
Ali Brangsa
: Temporary camp
AMC
: Army Medical Corps
CAS
: Chief of Air Staff
CFL
: Ceasefire Line, the line between India and Pakistan in J&K between 1949-1972
CO
: Commanding Officer
COAS
: Chief of the Army Staff
Depsang
: Flat Open space
DGMI
: Director General Military Intelligence
DGMO
: Director General Military Operations
HACO
: High Altitude Cerebral Oedema
HAPO
: High Altitude Pulmonary Oedema
HAWS
: India’s High Altitude Warfare School
Hepter, Chopper
: Helicopters