Fall and Rise
Page 59
38. CAPPS: Four Flights Monograph, p. 70.
39. threat to air travel: Four Flights Monograph, pp. 70–79.
40. sixty-four hijackings: Four Flights Monograph, p. 58.
41. stricter airport security rules: Four Flights Monograph, p. 71.
42. Swiss Army knives: Four Flights Monograph, p. 5.
43. carry box cutters: 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 16, “Outline of the 9/11 Plot,” p. 9.
44. “common sense”: Four Flights Monograph, pp. 73–74.
45. thirty-three such marshals: Four Flights Monograph, p. 80.
46. “Terrorism can occur”: Four Flights Monograph, p. 63.
47. a strange interaction: FBI interview with Lynn Howland, October 13, 2001.
48. “No, I just brought”: Ibid.
49. asked a gate agent: FBI interview with Salvatore Misuraca, September 11, 2001; FBI interview with Philip Depasquale, September 17, 2001; FBI memorandum on Atta’s suitcases, February 10, 2004. Also, Commission staff memorandum for the record, Boston, MA, Summary, February 2, 2004, p. 10.
50. handwritten instruction letter: FBI document, “Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” February 29, 2004, p. 69. https://vault.fbi.gov/9-11%20Commission%20Report/9-11-fbi-report-2004-02(feb). This document describes it as a four-page letter.
51. videotaped lessons: FBI memorandum on Atta’s suitcases, February 10, 2004.
52. Already seated: Four Flights Monograph, p. 6.
53. Shortly after: This time, from the Four Flights Monograph, p. 6, is considered approximate. It is the same time, 7:40 a.m., given for when Flight 11 pushed back from the gate, p. 7.
54. 158 passengers: Four Flights Monograph, p. 6.
55. walked aboard: Interview with Michael Woodward, February 2, 2017.
56. “Type A-plus”: “Portraits of Grief: They liked her style,” New York Times, December 9, 2001; Sam Trapani, “Seasons in the Sun: Remember Karen Martin of Danvers,” Danvers Herald, September 8, 2011.
57. petite and patient: “Portraits of Grief: Taking Time to Relax,” New York Times, September 9, 2002.
58. Runway 4R: National Transportation Safety Board Flight Path Study, American Airlines Flight 11, February 19, 2002, p/ 1. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB196/doc01.pdf. Hereafter: NTSB Flight 11.
59. 7:59 a.m.: Four Flights Monograph, p. 7.
60. forty-five hundred: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 29.
61. nineteen times: NTSB Flight 11, pp. 5–6. Also see Four Flights Monograph, p. 7.
62. smell of fresh-brewed coffee: Interview with Peg Ogonowski Hatch, January 24, 2017, who by her estimates worked as a flight attendant on Flight 11 hundreds of times. She said coffee would have been brewing during the first fifteen minutes of the flight, even if service had not yet begun.
63. “silver service”: Interview with Peg Ogonowski, January 24, 2017.
64. Sixteen seconds later: NTSB Flight 11, p. 6.
65. nineteen years: Peter Zalewski interview with 9/11 Commission staff, September 23, 2003, p. 3. Hereafter: Zalewski, 9/11 Commission.
66. 260 other controllers: Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama that Unfolded in the Skies over America on 9/11 (New York: Free Press, 2011), p. 6. Hereafter: Spencer, Touching History. The full name of Boston Center is Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center.
67. he wondered: Tom Brokaw, “The Skies Over America,” NBC News, September 9, 2006. www.nbcnews.com/id/14754701/ns/dateline_nbc/t/skies-over-america/#.WKI-jmQrJPM. Hereafter: NBC Skies Report.
68. collision course: Zalewski, 9/11 Commission.
69. “He’s NORDO”: NBC Skies Report.
70. happened often enough: Zalewski, 9/11 Commission.
71. “American Eleven, Boston”: NTSB Flight 11, p. 6. Radio transmissions and time stamps between Zalewski and Flight 11 come from this source.
72. brief, unknown sound: “FAA Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events, September 11, 2001.” Radio communication timeline dated September 17, 2001. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa7.pdf.
73. at 8:21 a.m.: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 18.
74. said quietly: Zalewski 9/11 Commission interview and NBC Skies Report.
75. “Absolutely not”: Spencer, Touching History, p. 13.
76. declaring a hijacking: 9/11 Commission interview with Terry Biggio, September 23, 2003.
Chapter 3: “A Beautiful Day to Fly”
1. As they ate: Interview with Lee and Eunice Hanson, February 22, 2017.
2. flight path: See NTSB Flight Path Study, United Flight 175, p. 3. The plane flew roughly over Sharon, Connecticut, then crossed over the New York border, where its pilots made the requested turn away from American Flight 11.
3. Saracini: Unbylined story, “9/11 Widow Recalls Last Words With Pilot Husband, ‘I love you,’” CBS, September 11, 2013.
4. Michael Horrocks: Schuyler Knopf, “C of C Athlete Lost Her Dad, A Co-Pilot, During 9/11,” The Post and Courier, September 7, 2010.
5. something nagged: As explained later in the chapter, pilots Saracini and Horrocks later said they heard a suspicious transmission “on our departure out of Boston” but purposely waited until 8:41:33 a.m. to report it to air traffic control.
6. fifty-six passengers: Four Flights Monograph, p. 19.
7. David Brandhorst: 9/11 Memorial Blog. www.911memorial.org/blog/honoring-life-david-reed-gamboa-brandhorst.
8. Daniel Brandhorst: Unbylined story, “Daniel Brandhorst,” Los Angeles Times, September 18, 2001.
9. smuggled aboard: Interview with Ron Clifford, February 9, 2017.
10. Reverend Francis Grogan: “Portraits of Grief: Rev. Francis Grogan,” New York Times, December 27, 2001.
11. Garnet “Ace” Bailey . . . Mark Bavis: Kevin Paul Dupont, “Widow Still Holds Ace in Her Hand,” Boston Globe, September 11, 2011; “Portraits of Grief: Ace of ‘Bailey-Baisse,’” New York Times, November 25, 2001.
12. eleven hours: Bailey earned 633 penalty minutes in the regular season, plus 28 minutes during playoffs, in his NHL career, according to the Internet Hockey Database, www.hockeydb.com/ihdb/stats/pdisplay.php?pid=169.
13. fear of flying: Jackie L. Larson, “‘Ace’ Bailey, Gretzky’s Friend and Mentor, Among the 9/11 Dead,” Edmonton Sun, September 10, 2011.
14. Touri Bolourchi: Unbylined story, “Muslim-American Family Mourns Loss of Loved One,” CNN, September 18, 2001.
15. Michael Tarrou . . . Amy King: Lizbeth Hall, “Living Memorial to 9/11 Victims,” Hartford Courant, August 23, 2002.
16. Alfred Marchand: Heather Clark, “Religious Faith Helps Family Cope with 9/11,” The Associated Press, December 17, 2001.
17. Robert Fangman: “Portraits of Grief: Robert Fangman,” New York Times, November 18, 2001.
18. “I have a ten-year plan”: Interviews with Andrea LeBlanc, January 31 and February 1, 2017. Information on Robert LeBlanc also comes from an archive of remembrances and readings from a memorial service held at the University of New Hampshire on September 21, 2001.
19. almost missed the exit: Carolyn LeBlanc comments at memorial service, September 21, 2001.
20. before they saw stars: Reminiscence of Alan Sweeney, posted on Boston University 9/11 Memorial website, September 17, 2001. “I remember his eyes, because I was an offensive back and we . . . met quite often at the line of scrimmage.”
21. F-14 fighter jets: FBI interview with Louise Sweeney, March 25, 2004.
22. top of his class: FBI interview with Louise Sweeney, March 25, 2004.
23. “heart of a warrior”: FBI interview with Louise Sweeney, March 25, 2004.
24. “That’s the kind of guy”: Interview with Julie Sweeney Roth, February 3, 2017.
25. “You celebrate life”: Interview with Julie Sweeney Roth, February 3, 2017.
26. bought a multitool: Four Flights Monograph, p. 17.
27. commercial pilot certificate: Staff Memo No. 4, p. 5.
28. “cousin”: Kate Zernike and Don Van
Natta Jr., “The Plot: Hijackers’ Meticulous Strategy of Brains, Muscle and Practice,” New York Times, November 4, 2001.
29. two short-bladed knives: Four Flights Monograph, p. 17.
30. final confirmation: Four Flights Monograph, p. 18. Although it is unknown who placed the call to Atta, the timing and the location of the pay phone, combined with al-Shehhi’s relationship with Atta and his status as leader of the Flight 175 hijackers, led authorities to believe the caller was most likely al-Shehhi. The exact content of the call is unknown.
31. overbearing fragrance: 9/11 Commission staff memorandum for the record, Boston, MA, Summary, February 2, 2004, p. 8.
32. fifteen-cent tip: Ibid.
33. seemed confused: Four Flights Monograph, p. 17. Also FBI interviews with Gail Jawahir, Sept. 21, 2001, and September 28, 2001.
34. additional security screenings: Four Flights Monograph, p. 18.
Chapter 4: “I think We’re Being Hijacked”
1. in the tail: FBI interview with American flight service manager Nancy Wyatt, September 15, 2001.
2. The call: Betty Ong’s phone call was a pivotal initial piece of evidence in the hijacking of Flight 11. It is detailed in numerous official reports, including the 9/11 Commission Report and the Four Flights Monograph, pp. 8–10. For a transcript with audio, see: www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/08/nyregion/911-tapes.html?_r=0.
3. “I think we’re being hijacked”: FBI interview with Vanessa Minter, September 12, 2001.
4. a wonderful job: 9/11 Commission interview with Craig Marquis and others, November 19, 2003.
5. “pray for us”: FBI interview with Winston Courtney Sadler, September 12, 2001.
6. No one . . . relayed information: 9/11 Commission interview with Craig Marquis and others, November 19, 2003.
7. almost spitting: 9/11 Commission Staff Visit to Boston Center, New England Region, FAA, p. 6.
8. “We have some planes”: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 19. The version of the Atta quote used here is from the Full Audio Transcript published in 2011 by the Rutgers University Law Review, at http://www.rutgerslawreview.com/2011/full-audio-transcript/, which corrected, clarified, or reinterpreted earlier transcriptions of key FAA and other recorded communications on 9/11. (The 9/11 Commission transcribed this passage, in part, “Just stay quiet, and you’ll be OK.”) It bears mentioning that 911 Commission investigator Miles Kara does not subscribe to the belief that Atta mistakenly keyed the mic and “accidentally” broadcast his message beyond the confines of Flight 11. Rather, Kara maintains that Atta was, in part, attempting to sow confusion within the FAA. He also suggests that Atta was delivering a message to his collaborator pilot on United Flight 175, Marwan al-Shehhi. In Kara’s view, explained more deeply at his oredigger61.org website, the hijackings were more sophisticated than many observers believe, and the terrorists would have known that passengers likely could monitor cockpit communications on Channel 9 of United’s onboard entertainment system. Because both American Flight 11 and United Flight 175 departed on cross-country routes from Boston at nearly the same time, Kara explains, the terrorists could feel confident that the two cockpits would be using the same radio frequency during the first minutes after takeoff. Under that scenario, Atta’s “We have some planes” remark could be viewed as a signal to Marwan al-Shehhi that their plan was working and that the United Flight 175 group should execute its piece of the attack. Although it is unknown whether al-Shehhi heard Atta’s comment or was listening to Channel 9, Kara considers it likely. One piece of evidence he cites is the fact that al-Shehhi waited to initiate the hijacking until after Flight 175 had crossed into the airspace of a different air traffic control center. Kara believes that al-Shehhi knew the crossover took place because he heard the legitimate United Flight 175 pilots say so. If that was the case, Kara maintains, al-Shehhi also would have heard the earlier transmissions from Atta that were picked up in the cockpit of United Flight 175 and reported later to air traffic control. Separately, John Farmer, senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, raised questions to the author about whether the sequence of the hijackings, in which two United flights were hijacked after American flights, might have been influenced by the terrorists’ hope to use United Channel 9 to gather real-time intelligence on the other hijackings.
9. screamed for his supervisor: Zalewski, 9/11 Commission, pp. 3–4.
10. verge of panic: During his interview with 9/11 Commission staff, Zalewski said he “freaked out” on Jones. He also said other controllers looked at him as if he were crazy, and was “shouting and screaming.”
11. Flight 11 had been hijacked: Four Flights Monograph, p. 11.
12. terror: Zalewski 9/11 Commission interview and NBC Skies Report.
13. set pattern: Anti-hijacking training for flight crews was laid out in the Air Carrier Standard Security Program. See: “The Four Flights, Staff Memo No. 4,” http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_4.pdf. Hereafter: Staff Memo No. 4.
14. dedicated messaging system: Four Flights Monograph, pp. 8–10.
15. calling card: Interview with Mike Low, January 18, 2017.
16. third try: Four Flights Monograph, p. 10.
17. “What, what, what?”: 9/11 Commission interview with Michael Woodward, January 25, 2004, p. 2.
18. At 8:29 a.m.: NTSB Flight 11, p. 3.
19. fell silent: Zalewski, 9/11 Commission, p. 6.
20. take too long: Four Flights Monograph, p. 12; 9/11 Commission interview with Terry Biggio, September 23, 2003.
21. correct protocol: The issue of FAA notification of the military is discussed at length in Spencer, Touching History, p. 22.
22. transponder turned off: Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes: 9/11 and the U.S. Air Force, Monograph published by the Air Force History and Museums Program, Washington, D.C., 2011.
23. called the Otis Air National Guard base: Four Flights Monograph, p. 13; 102nd Fighter Wing Historian’s Report for September 11, 2001, by TSgt. Bruce Vittner.
24. first direct notification: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 20. Four Flights Monograph, p. 13.
25. “[W]e have a problem here”: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 20.
26. “needed in Ops, pronto”: Interview with Kevin Nasypany, March 20, 2017. Also transcript from Voice Recorder, September 11, 2001, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome, New York. Quotes from NEADS tapes also derive from the Full Audio Transcript created by the Rutgers Law Review, at http://www.rutgerslawreview.com/2011/full-audio-transcript/. The actions and statements of Major Kevin “Nasty” Nasypany have been detailed elsewhere, including the impressive “9-11 Revisited” blog maintained by former 9/11 Commission investigator Miles Kara, at www.oredigger61.org. Also see Spencer, Touching History; Michael Bronner, “9/11 Live: The Norad Tapes,” Vanity Fair, August 2006; Priscilla D. Jones, The First 109 Minutes: 9/11 and the U.S. Air Force, a monograph published in 2011 by the Air Force History and Museums Program; and 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17. A great deal of research has explored the faulty timelines of military response to 9/11 provided in the initial days, months, and even years after the attacks. One clear conclusion is that Nasypany acted with extraordinary grace under pressure and played no role in the erroneous reports. This account relies on the generally accepted timeline that emerged after release of the 9/11 Commission report, relying also on interviews with Nasypany, the transcripts of the NORAD tapes, and the work of Farmer, Kara, Bronner, Spencer, Summers, and Swan and many others. Among the most significant conclusions was that initial claims by Vice President Dick Cheney and others about a hot pursuit of a hijacked plane by fighter jets with shoot-to-kill orders was not supported by the evidence. Earlier research and the 9/11 Commission also demonstrated falsehoods or errors in claims by the military and the FAA about situational awareness. These issues are examined in depth by Farmer, Summers, and Swan and others.
27. Nasypany thought: Interview with Kevin Nasypany, March 20, 2017; Michael Bronner, “9/11 Live: The Norad Tapes,
” Vanity Fair, August 2006.
28. “another hour”: Michael Bronner, “9/11 Live: The Norad Tapes,” Vanity Fair, August 2006.
29. weren’t a top priority: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 17: “NORAD perceived the dominant threat to be from cruise missiles.”
30. “on the shitter”: Transcript from Voice Recorder, September 11, 2001, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome, New York.
31. locker room: Matt Viser, “Two Pilots Revisit Their 9/11,” Boston Globe, September 11, 2005.
32. fourteen years old: Matt Viser, “Two Pilots Revisit Their 9/11,” Boston Globe, September 11, 2005.