No Place for Chivalry

by Alastair Goodrum

  While training with the Defiants continued it fell to the Hurricanes to achieve the first real success at night. At this point, too, for the squadron and indeed the RAF in general, it seemed to mark a turning point in this phase of the night air campaign.

  During a break in the awful January weather, that had curtailed operations by both attacker and defender alike, the first tangible success occurred when 151 Squadron launched four Hurricanes on January 15/16, namely Flt Lt Blair in P3813, Plt Off Irving Smith in V7222, Plt Off Richard Stevens in V6934 and Flt Lt Desmond McMullen in V7496. The squadron diarist began the entry for the day with: “Tonight we experienced our first success as night fighters.”

  The Luftwaffe was out in force between the Thames and Yorkshire. At 21.00 hours Des McMullen was patrolling a beat from The Wash to Cromer and Winterton at altitudes between 14,000 and 20,000 feet, logging this sortie as a ‘freelance’ rather than a Fighter Night patrol, the former type covering a more loose geographic area. Craning his neck to scan the sky he was quite astonished to find a Junkers Ju88 flying almost alongside, slightly below him. McMullen promptly attacked it, moving his fire from its left quarter across to the right. Closing to seventy-five yards, he saw his de Wilde ammunition bursting on the enemy’s wings and centre section – stopping the rear gunner’s fire – as it dived steeply to sea level where, in the vicinity of Cromer, he lost sight of it heading out to sea at wave-top height.

  Next off was Kenneth Blair who spotted a Ju88 high over south Lincolnshire. His own freelance combat report conveys the flavour of the difficulties these pilots endured on high-level interceptions in those days.

  Blair lifted Hurricane P3813 off Wittering’s runway at 22.23 hours and headed for the patrol line covering most of the Norfolk coast between RAF Sutton Bridge, Sheringham and on to Winterton, near Great Yarmouth. Reaching the end of the beat at Winterton, ground control gave him a heading to take him back to Sutton Bridge. Taking a final look round as he turned for home, he spotted what he called “a smoke trail a long way behind me and very high.” At this point he was at about 10,000 feet altitude when he turned onto an intercepting course. Blair reported:

  I started to climb towards it but when it was level with me I was still 7,000 feet too low – so I pulled the plug on the engine [emergency boost] and climbed from dead behind – still gaining nothing at all. I increased the engine revs to 2,800 and began to catch up.

  It took Blair until he reached the vicinity of Spalding before he could get into a firing position.

  At 600 yards range I could clearly see the two trails from the engines [condensation trails?] and when I got to 400 yards I identified the aircraft as a Ju88. At 200 yards I opened fire while closing to 150 yards and after five short bursts of gunfire, flames came from the port side and black smoke from the port engine. Oil hitting my windscreen made it difficult to see the target so I fired nearly all my ammunition at the flames. These flames began to increase and more smoke and oil came from the port engine but at no time was there any return fire from the rear gunner.

  Flt Lt Blair continued:

  At the time I began the attack, 22.50 hours, I was at 27,000 feet and greatly affected by the severe cold, so having finished off my ammunition I decided to lose altitude and watch the E/A from below. Shortly afterwards, as far as I could see, the flames went out and the Ju88 itself began to lose height. As soon as it came lower, the smoke trail stopped and losing sight of it near Grantham, I returned to base where I landed at 00.09 hours.

  Blair also commented that if he had been flying anything other than a Hurricane – or a Spitfire – it would have been impossible to reach the enemy aircraft and even then his own Hurricane controls froze up. Flt Lt Blair claimed a damaged but although it was changed later to a probable, post-war research of Luftwaffe quartermaster returns (monthly reports on aircraft on strength) is unfortunately unable to corroborate either of the claims made by Flt Lts McMullen or Blair.

  There was no doubt, however, about the two kills – the first for himself and the squadron in its night role – made on this same night by a third 151 pilot, the legendary Plt Off Richard Playne Stevens, who demonstrated his lethal potential during his own Fighter Night patrol. Wittering control sent him via the eastern approaches to London where, at 01.35 he shot down a Do17Z-2, 5K+DM, wk nr 3456 of II/KG3 near Brentwood. After tracking all the way back to Wittering to refuel and rearm, he took off again for the same area, this time on a freelance sortie and at 04.53 shot down Heinkel He111, A1+JK, wk nr 3638 of I/KG53, near Canvey Island, both aircraft being confirmed kills. Apart from appreciating the normal hazards associated with flying by night – such as navigation and actually spotting a target – one can begin to glean an indication of the personal qualities required as well as the physical difficulties under which such solo night sorties were made. Richard Stevens reported his first interception began at 20,000 feet altitude and increased to 30,000 feet while the second engagement was fought at around 19,000 feet. In addition Stevens used the normal reflector gunsight fully dimmed for the first combat but when he fired his first burst, vibration from the guns turned the sight light-source out so he had to revert to the external bead foresight, which he also used during the second engagement. Furthermore two of the Hurricane’s eight guns would not fire during the second combat. Upon his return Richard Stevens was magnanimous enough to praise his colleagues on the ground, writing in his combat report: “I consider Wittering control very instrumental in the success of these interceptions.”

  On the night’s down side, at 06:00 Sqn Ldr Adams ran out of fuel during one of the final patrols and had to bale out of his Hurricane. In doing so he was injured when his leg struck the tailplane. He was carted off to Stamford hospital for treatment but did not miss much as bad weather for the rest of the month prevented the squadron doing any operational flying.

  On January 30, 151 Squadron was reorganised into three flights, two of Defiants and one of Hurricanes, the objective being – according to the ORB – “to prove the Hurricane is a better night fighter than the Defiant.” As will be seen, that aim was never achieved and even the most biased person would consider the real outcome an honourable draw.

  From the beginning of February, 151 Squadron mounted night patrols with both Hurricanes and Defiants and the latter achieved success early in the month when, during a Fighter Night patrol on the evening of February 4, pilot Sgt Henry Bodien and Sgt D E O Jonas (air gunner) in Defiant N3387 intercepted a Dornier Do17.

  Waiting at readiness, at 20.30 hours Bodien was given the order to ‘scramble’ by Wittering control and soon had the Defiant climbing hard into a clear moonlit sky towards Birmingham. By the time they reached 12,000 feet altitude showers of incendiaries could be seen in the distance falling to the south of the city, but despite several changes of course no interceptions were made. Bodien was told to return to Wittering and orbit base where he was then given a possible target north-east of the airfield at ten miles range. Settling on that course and losing height a little Sgt Bodien, now flying at 10,000 feet altitude, spotted an aircraft in front of him heading in the opposite direction. While keeping the pale yellow glow of the target’s exhaust flames in sight Bodien hauled the Defiant round in a tight left-hand turn and came in from slightly below the other aeroplane. At 200 yards range he and Jonas agreed it was a Dornier Do17Z. Matching the Dornier’s speed of 130mph Bodien eased out to its starboard beam and Sgt Jonas, aiming at the centre-section between the wings, opened fire on the unsuspecting enemy with a two-second burst from his four machine guns at less than seventy yards range. The Dornier pilot reacted like a startled rabbit, breaking upwards and left to get away from his attacker. Bodien clung to him in the climbing turn and when the target levelled out he found himself ideally positioned just ten yards below the Dornier’s starboard wing tip and twenty-five yards out. At point blank range Sgt Jonas let fly with another three-second burst from his turret guns into the Dornier’s fuselage and wing and again it turned away – but this time gentl
y and with flames licking from its belly. It had been hit fatally and the turn tightened into a spiral until it crashed into the ground, exploding at Cawthwick Lodge, Weldon, (near Corby) at 21.45 hours.

  Bodien and Jonas’s victim was found to be a Dornier Do17Z-3, wk nr 2907, U5+AR from III/KG2 whose pilot, Oblt H Krisch and his crew, Uffz Kliem and Fws Bahr and Uehlemann, died in the wreckage. They were believed to be part of a raid on Derby. It took only 750 rounds of ball and armour-piercing .303 ammunition to despatch this bomber, and South African Henry Bodien had now begun to carve out his own reputation as a distinguished night fighter pilot. We will hear more of him later.

  In its new role as a night fighter, the oft-maligned Boulton Paul Defiant will feature regularly in this story from now on and will be seen to be a very effective weapon, so it is appropriate at this point to put in a few explanatory words on its behalf. According to one former Defiant pilot, Peter Montgomery, it handled:

  . . . much like the Hurricane, except that the effect of its turret weighing three-quarters of a ton considerably reduced its rate of roll! In straight and level flight the aeroplane was given to shuddering somewhat when the gunner rotated the turret guns from side to side, which could be a bit disconcerting until the pilot got used to it. This effect was caused by the gun barrels and associated movements of the turret fairing, disturbing air flowing over the tail surfaces. Space for the gunner in the turret was very tight so instead of a seat or chest-type parachute, most Defiant gunners wore a combined denim smock and parachute called a ‘parasuit’. The parachute canopy was packed in a large, slim pouch to form a two-inch thick padded back cushion and by all accounts was most efficient in allowing a rapid exit from the turret when needed.

  In fact it can be argued that, during 1941, the Defiant actually came into its own as a night fighter/bomber-destroyer and the flexibility of its turret guns – not least with their upward-firing capability – made it ideal for that role. Later in the war an upward-firing arrangement, code-named ‘schrage-musik’, would be adopted by the Luftwaffe to devastating effect against RAF bombers. Peter Montgomery summed it up thus:

  In the darkness the Defiant could approach unseen beneath a Heinkel or Dornier and, using a wing or engine nacelle of the bomber as cover against the eyes of the German gunners, close in to ‘formate’ on the enemy in his blind spot. From this position the four .303 Brownings of the turret, each fed with 600 rounds per gun, could pour up to 2,400 rounds at the rate of 4,800 per minute into the target as the gunner fired up and across in a no-deflection, point-blank shot.

  Some historians are at odds with Air Intelligence records over the actual location of the crash of Junkers Ju88A-5, 0580, V4+AT. Leutnant Heinz Gibbens and his crew from III/KG1 went missing in action on the night of February 9/10 and this Ju88 appears to be the only aircraft shot down that night. From his combat report, it seems highly probable that Sgt Alan Wagner of 151 Squadron, flying a Hurricane, was responsible for Gibbens’ demise near RAF Mildenhall rather than in the Birmingham area as some have suggested. An extract from Wagner’s combat report reads as follows.

  Type of Enemy Aircraft: Unidentified

  Time Attack was delivered: About 03.10

  Place Attack was delivered: Near Mildenhall

  Enemy Casualties: One damaged

  Sgt Wagner took off from Wittering in a Hurricane at 02.20 (on the 10th). He was ordered onto a course of 140°, later amended to 120°, with instructions to intercept enemy aircraft at 3,000 feet travelling south-east. A little later he was ordered to increase speed, as the E/A was a short distance ahead. Soon after this when he was at 3,000 feet he observed twin exhaust flames below him on his starboard side. The target was travelling at about 200mph on a 140° course, and losing height. Alan Wagner ‘pulled the plug’, closed to fifty yards and fired a two-second burst from directly astern and aiming between the exhaust flames. A nearly full moon gave good visibility but 8/10ths cloud at 1,500 feet partly obscured it so identification was impossible against the dark background and with the altitude then being a mere fifty feet. Sgt Wagner pulled up immediately to avoid collision and turned in a tight circle. He did not sight the other aircraft again but noticed a number of burning fragments on the ground covering a wide area. There was no return fire, no searchlights and no AA fire and he landed back at Wittering at 03.25 hours.

  Wagner fired 550 rounds at his target and was clearly experienced enough not to rely on his reflector sight at night, as it was noted that he used the bead foresight with tape stuck on his windscreen as a backsight. Wagner’s two courses would put him in the vicinity of Mildenhall at least and, while Lt Gibbens’ objective was Birmingham, it is quite feasible that his route either to or from Birmingham could have brought him close to Wagner’s, too. In fact since Wagner states his target was heading south-east this suggests the target was returning to its base. Another interesting point is that anti-aircraft defences in the Birmingham area submitted claims for destroying three bombers during this raid. It might be considered curious that Wagner’s target was “at 3,000 feet and losing height” and at the time he opened fire it was “then only fifty feet” which is hardly a healthy altitude at which to cross England! Is it possible, then, that Gibbens’ Ju88 was hit by AA over Birmingham and may have been credited to them, but he was actually struggling to get back to base and losing the battle to keep airborne when the coup-de-grâce was delivered by Sgt Wagner?

  For the remainder of February there was little flying due to ‘duff’ weather but a break in the gloom on the 23rd/24th brought a few enemy aircraft over the region. 151 put up some night patrols, including Sgt James Hopewell in Defiant N3388 but he ran out of fuel over Norfolk and although he managed to bale out safely, his air gunner Sgt Jack Wallace died when his parachute became snagged by the tailplane as the aircraft crashed near RAF Watton. Another Defiant crew, Sgt Percy Copeland, (having converted from Hurricanes) and his air gunner Sgt Lynas, in N1794, intercepted a Heinkel He111 but lost sight of it before it could be engaged. Two nights later Sgt Copeland’s luck was no better when, this time in Defiant N3317, he intercepted a Ju88, but the turret guns jammed and the Junkers got clean away. The squadron’s run of bad luck continued with the loss of a Defiant crew in the late afternoon of March 4, not far from the airfield. Piloted by Fg Off Peter Gordon-Dean, he and his air gunner Sgt George Worledge died when their Defiant N1794 crashed at Ketton, near Stamford, as a result of a section of wing covering peeling off while the aircraft was in a steep dive. This aeroplane had had a new clear vision panel fitted and was being air-tested when the accident happened.

  As the weather improved in March, the Luftwaffe made more frequent night incursions into the region’s airspace, mainly bombers on the way to, or from, juicier industrial targets, but also in the form of intruder missions nosing around the large quantity of airfields in the region. This increased activity caused six of 151 Squadron’s Hurricanes to be detached from Wittering to RAF Digby early in the month for Fighter Night ops and is evidence that detachments of fighter aircraft were being moved around like pawns in a chess game. Squadron pilots also ranged far and wide during these night patrols, so that squadron combats – and not just 151 Squadron – are actually recorded as occurring across a large segment of England between London and Manchester, The Wash and the West Midlands. The weather was sufficiently improved on the night of March 10/11 to bring a force of Luftwaffe bombers out in strength to attack Plymouth. Roaming further north, in the clear moonlit sky over the East Midlands, were about eight intruder aircraft. For the crew of one of these, Luftwaffe intruder expert Oblt Kurt Herrmann, Uffz Engelbert Böttner and Fw Wilhelm Rüppel, it would be their last night as free men. Flying in Junkers Ju88C, wk nr 0343, R4+CH, of I/NJG2, their belly-landing just before midnight on the 10th, although causing considerable damage to the starboard wing and centre section and fuselage, brought the first example of a relatively intact night fighter to fall in this country. An official intelligence report at the time classified this aircraft as an A-
5, which is incorrect since – in view of the engines being identified as Jumo211B – it was actually a C-2. In general terms the A-series was the bomber version and the C-series was the solid-nose night fighter development. The following extract from the Intelligence examination report gives a useful description of the sort of armament carried by these intruders.

  One belt-fed MG151 [a 15mm cannon that occasionally supplanted the drum-fed MG FF 20mm cannon on some aircraft] was installed below three MG17 [7.92mm] machine guns, all belt-fed by lengthy and apparently complicated ammunition tracks. All four weapons are fixed to fire forwards through a cowling covering what would normally be the bomb-aimer position. They are all fired by one press-button on the pilot’s control column. There is an 11mm-thick armour bulkhead in the nose immediately in front of the ammunition containers and the pilot’s feet. This bulkhead is slotted to allow the gun barrels to pass through. The ammunition feed for the three MG17s is taken from two containers fitted between the pilot’s legs [!] and one container on the aft starboard side of the cabin. Bullet-proof glass is fitted in front of the pilot’s gunsight and the pilot’s seat is armoured. For defence, one MG17 [7.92mm] hand-operated machine gun was found in the lower rear-gunner position and one MG15 [7.92mm] in the top rear-gunner position; both magazine-fed. Positions for three crew only.