No Place for Chivalry

by Alastair Goodrum

  Modifications to the Blenheims, to make them a little more war-like, kept filtering through and in July all squadron aircraft were fitted with selfsealing fuel tanks. A Fraser Nash gun mounting, consisting of two Browning .303 machine guns located in the hatch just forward of the gun turret, was fitted to one aircraft as a trial and two other aircraft were fitted with armour plating to protect the turret gunner. It was intended to modify all squadron aircraft in the near future.

  Towards the end of July the squadron spread its wings on the operational patrol side by detaching two aircraft to RAF Ternhill every evening to add their weight to the air defence of the Merseyside area. Although sector boundaries would be redrawn from the beginning of 1941, at this time Digby’s sector – in common with Wittering, Kirton in Lindsey and Church Fenton sectors – ran across the width of England with, in Digby’s case, Ternhill more or less at its north-western corner. Patrols from Ternhill were actually controlled from Digby sector ops room and upon completion the Blenheims either landed back at Ternhill if they were on duty next night or made their way back to Wellingore if they were to be relieved. There was little success to record from these sorties but the most significant fact was that many of the Blenheim aircraft sent on these detachments were equipped with early production AI Mk III sets.

  A so-called ‘friendly-fire’ incident involving the squadron occurred at the end of July, illustrating how fraught with danger night interceptions could be in those days. Plt Off Richard Rhodes and his air gunner Sgt Service were on a Red Line patrol just before midnight of July 31 when Rhodes saw an aircraft with its navigation light on. Reporting this to Digby control he was told to investigate and followed it as it climbed away. At 7,000 feet altitude the navigation lights went off and the Blenheim crew believed that the silhouette was that of an enemy aircraft. Digby control advised them there were no friendlies in the area and told Rhodes to open fire. The target went down in flames but was subsequently found to be an RAF Fairey Battle.

  During August there were an increasing number of references to ‘special equipment’, for example on August 12/13 when Sqn Ldr Widdows, with air gunner Fg Off Charles Bell and AC2 Bill Wilson as AI operator, took Blenheim L1472 to Ternhill but, as the ORB mentions, “the special equipment in the aircraft did not pick up any contacts during the patrol.”

  Charles Widdows was always at the forefront of the action and when he was not flying a Blenheim he was, as often as not, out hunting the enemy alone in a Hurricane, often carrying out freelance patrols on consecutive nights and sometimes more than one sortie in a night. This enthusiasm and tenacity can be seen in one of his sorties on the night of August 29/30. He left Digby in a Hurricane at 04.50 on the 30th to intercept a raider that was travelling east from the Mersey area. Climbing to 10,000 feet over base, Digby control vectored him onto a bandit in the vicinity of Newark. Widdows never actually found the bandit, which was plotted going south-east until it reached Bedford, where it then turned north-east and crossed the coast at Cromer. Sqn Ldr Widdows chased the enemy aircraft on various vectors from control and at one time actually over-ran it. He crossed the coast behind the target and although out of touch by R/T, continued the blind chase for several miles out to sea before, with petrol running low, he finally gave up and returned to R/T range, whereupon control ordered him to refuel at RAF Coltishall and then return to Digby.

  By the end of August 1940 the squadron had on charge nine Blenheims equipped with ‘special equipment’ (AI Mk III) sets and their crews were practising hard to achieve night operational status. These Blenheims were L1290, L1292, L1324, L1330, L1472, L6637, L7135, L7153 and L8661. Appearing amongst the crew names was that of a certain Pilot Officer John Randall Daniel Braham. On August 17, Plt Off Braham carried out his first ‘RDF’ trial, an uneventful 21/2-hour patrol off the Lincolnshire coast to get experience with the new AI equipment. Better known in RAF circles as ‘Bob’, Braham had been with the squadron since December 1938 and was destined to become one of the RAF’s top-scoring night fighter aces and one of its most highly decorated airmen.

  Different coloured flares distinguished the individual blue, green, red, yellow or white patrol lines and in his memoirs Braham described these patrol lines thus:

  We had no airborne radar and there was then only the most primitive form of ground control. Our night patrols consisted chiefly of flying over groups of flares set out in various patterns on the ground. Flares were laid out in a particular pattern and repeated every few miles over a distance of twenty to thirty miles to form a visible patrol line. From these lines we could be directed to some point in space in an attempt to intercept the enemy. It was a hit and miss affair, dependent on there being little or no cloud so that the fighter crew could see the flares from 10,000 feet or more. At other times we worked with the searchlights.

  But 29 Squadron’s first confirmed ‘kill’ went to Pilot Officer Richard Rhodes and air gunner Sgt William Gregory in L6741, a non-AI Blenheim, while they were detached to Ternhill. Taking off at 01.32 on August 18 to patrol what was called the ‘Mersey Blue Line’, Rhodes was vectored on to a bandit and at 02.28, about fifteen miles south-west of Chester, he spotted what appeared to be a light on the rear part of the fuselage of an aircraft. Flying towards the target, he identified it as a Heinkel but it took him no less than two hours of chase before he could bring the Blenheim into range. By this time, having flown south at first, the enemy aircraft turned east and was making for the Lincolnshire coast, but Rhodes stuck doggedly to his quarry and finally came within firing range about twenty-five miles off Spurn Point. He was in no mind to let the enemy off the hook after such a long chase and opened fire at 400 yards range, expending all the ammunition in his five front guns. Now this would normally be regarded as a pretty optimistic range but his fire on this occasion was sufficient to slow down the enemy aircraft and it began to circle and lose height. Seizing the initiative, Rhodes brought the Blenheim up on its starboard side to allow his gunner to bring the turret Vickers K machine gun to bear and Sgt Gregory promptly emptied a whole drum of .303 rounds (97) into the bandit. The target continued to lose altitude until eventually Gregory saw it settle gently on the sea about ten miles west of Cromer Knoll. Sgt Bill ‘Sticks’ Gregory later retrained as a radio/observer (Rad/Obs or RO) and subsequently teamed up with Bob Braham to forge one of the most successful night fighter crews in the RAF.

  Although ultimately successful, this combat is yet another classic illustration of the relatively poor performance of the Blenheim for the task it was assigned to. In addition, this incident gives an idea of the difficulties of research that can be encountered when trying to find that elusive thing called ‘the truth’. For example, one version of post-war research suggests Rhodes’ victim was a Junkers Ju88 intruder aircraft from II/NJG1, briefed to intrude over The Wash, and crewed by Ofw Fritz Zenkel (pilot), Fw Gustav Schramm (radio) and Gefr Hans Roth (flight engineer), all of whom were posted as missing. It was said to have been shot down off Spurn Head at 03.00, on August 17. However, this information is at odds with 29 Squadron’s ORB in which the Rhodes incident is clearly timed and dated August 18. With take-off from Ternhill stated as 01.32 hours, the squadron ORB records the initial contact time as 02.28 to the south-west of Chester – a long way from The Wash – and the length of chase as nearly two hours, putting the time of combat at almost 04.30 when the enemy aircraft crashed off the north Norfolk coast. According to aviation historian John Foreman, intruder unit II/NJG1 did indeed operate Ju88s – and Fw Schramm was among its aircrew at that time – over England in July and August 1940, before it was reorganised to create NJG2 in September 1940. However, Foreman admits he cannot find confirmation of the date 17/8/40 in official Luftwaffe loss records. Another historian, Simon Parry, on the other hand bases his version of events on the PRO data, adding that NJG1 had just begun operations from Schipol/Amsterdam airfield at the time and that this particular Junkers Ju88C-2 was the unit’s first operational loss. Another key point he raises is that NJG1’
s early sorties were not to the patrol areas in Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and Norfolk (known as Raum A, B and C) that were created later as NJG1/NJG2’s operational expertise developed. This may account for the assumption that Schramm’s objective that night would have been to one of those later-designated patrol areas. ‘Overnight’ times, too, can often lead to a misinterpretation of the relevant date and that may be so in this case.

  Just to confuse matters even more, some books, magazines and internet sites have been found that credit Bob Braham with shooting down the first enemy aircraft for both 29 Squadron and himself, into the Humber on the night of August 24/25 1940. One source states the victim was a Heinkel He111 of III/KG55, while another has AC2 Jacobson as his AI operator that night. No Luftwaffe losses are recorded near the Humber and KG55 archives record only one loss that night, a Heinkel shot down off Hastings and credited to Flt Lt Sanders of 615 Squadron. Furthermore, for reasons explained below, the reference to AC2 Jacobson in this context cannot possibly be correct either.

  In conclusion, then, these anomalies are highlighted here not as criticism but simply to demonstrate that the task of any researcher – all striving for that tantalising thing called ‘accuracy’ – faced with such a mass of information relating to this violent period, can be quite difficult.

  August 19 saw Sgt Victor Skillen and Flt Sgt Wellesley Munn each taking up an aircraft for AI experience, while Bob Braham carried out that night’s operational Blue Line patrol in a non-AI Blenheim. He reported considerable enemy activity with incendiaries dropping in the Grimsby area and even spotted two E/A as searchlights flicked over them, but they couldn’t be intercepted as the searchlights were unable to track them due to cloud.

  A similar chase to that of Plt Off Rhodes took place on August 20, when Flt Lt Jack Adams and air gunner Plt Off Lionel Watson were on a Digby Blue Line patrol. Airborne at 02.17 hours they were vectored to intercept a raid and at 03.10 hours Adams spotted a bandit flying south. Once again the enemy was careless because Flt Lt Adams could see a light in the rear gunner position and was able to follow its gleam. Even so it took him fifty minutes to gain on the bandit and then he was only able to do so because the target inexplicably circled when it reached the coast. So far had the Blenheim travelled that the ‘coast’ in this case was in fact near the Isle of Wight! No wonder that it was, by that time, out of R/T contact and right off Digby’s plotting table. Adams fired a long burst at the target from the front guns but unfortunately it made a diving turn and was out of sight before it could be re-engaged.

  Bob Braham opened his own score on the night of 24/25 August 1940. With Sgt Wilsden as air gunner the pair left Wellingore at 23.20 hours in non-AI L1463 to patrol the Digby Yellow Line. After a couple of hours Digby control vectored Braham towards the Humber and at 8,000 feet altitude in good visibility he saw what he thought was a Heinkel or Dornier caught in a searchlight beam. Despite the bomber twisting and turning to escape the glare, Braham came in behind it and fired four long bursts from the front guns at 500 down to 100 yards range while Wilsden got in two good bursts from his turret gun at close range. With smoke and sparks issuing from it, the enemy aircraft lost height. Braham and Wilsden didn’t see the bomber crash but Humber searchlight units reported seeing an aircraft on fire, coming down in the sea immediately after the combat. While the squadron diarist confidently recorded that it: “… confirms that Plt Off Braham destroyed the enemy aircraft… ”, his combat report claim for a ‘destroyed’ was actually amended to a ‘probable’. However, a Heinkel He111 of III/KG55 is believed to have crashed in the Humber that night and it may well have been the bomber claimed by Braham and Wilsden.

  Reflecting the general feeling of frustration, Flt Lt Alex Campbell complained after another patrol on the 23/24th, that even with AI equipment, getting a contact was one thing (which was indeed being achieved) but holding it was very difficult owing to the Blenheim’s lack of overtaking speed. As the squadron still retained a few Hurricane fighters on strength, Flt Lt Adams at least used the benefit of rank to organise the occasional freelance Hurricane sortie to relieve some of his frustration. On September 3, for example, he patrolled the Skegness area waiting for inbound raiders but although the Hun was out so was Adams’ luck.

  Tragedy struck the squadron on the evening of August 25. Pilot Officer Richard Rhodes, of whom we heard earlier, was ordered off on a dusk patrol along Digby’s Blue Line that ran southwards to The Wash. Taking off at 21.00 hours in L1330, with Sgt Ronald Gouldstone as air gunner and AC2 Norman Jacobson as special equipment operator, Rhodes had reached The Wash and reported to his controller that he was investigating a “light in the sky”. That was at 21.52 hours and was the last message received from the aircraft, which did not return to base. Later, reports from a searchlight unit suggested there might have been an air combat in the vicinity of Wainfleet. At dawn next day, Alex Campbell made a recce of The Wash out as far as the Inner Dowsing Light but could find no sign of the missing aircraft. Then the squadron’s worst fears were confirmed when, on the 27th the skipper of HM Trawler Alfredian reported recovering the body of AC2 Jacobson from the sea near Inner Dowsing. Aircraftman Jacobson was buried at sea that same day and his wallet and papers were returned to the CO of 29 Squadron when the trawler docked. The body of Sgt Gouldstone was found on the beach at Gibraltar Point near Skegness on September 5, but of Pilot Officer Rhodes no trace was found. An assumption was made that the Blenheim had got the worst of an engagement with an enemy aircraft. Pilot and gunner were both nineteen, while Norman Jacobson at eighteen is believed to be the youngest airman to die in the Battle of Britain. He had only joined the squadron that morning.

  In common with many of its contemporaries, for 29 Squadron September 1940 saw the beginning of a gradual change. The Luftwaffe night blitz on Britain began in earnest while, in equipment terms at least, RAF night fighter squadrons saw signs of an improvement. There were still regular detachments of aircraft to Ternhill and others to Wittering and still a frustrating lack of effective combats in the Blenheims but, on September 2, the first sign of what the future held arrived in the pugnacious shape of Bristol Beaufighter R2072, sent to the squadron for evaluation.

  Designed to meet a perceived need for a long-range heavy fighter, the Beaufighter first flew in July 1939, but it was as a night fighter that it found the first of its many roles in RAF service. Early in 1940, before he took over control of Fighter Command, Air Vice-Marshal Sholto Douglas chaired what was known as the Night Interception Committee and had this to say about it.

  Dowding made it clearly understood that he preferred the idea of a powerful radar-equipped, twin-engine night fighter with a pilot and navigator: the former concentrating on flying the aircraft and the latter on controlling the interception through the use of his radar set and he [Dowding] had pinned his faith on the new Beaufighter. The idea of this special night fighter and crew had appealed to me from the beginning.

  September proved to be a busy month and Sqn Ldr Widdows drove himself as hard as anyone. At 22.10 hours on September 17 he took off on a freelance patrol in a Hurricane and immediately spotted incendiary bombs dropping south of Cranwell. Looking around for signs of a bandit without success he headed further south to investigate some searchlight concentrations, but was warned to keep a sharp lookout for friendly aircraft. Turning north again, suddenly he passed beneath an aircraft that had eluded the searchlights. Quickly confirming with ground control that no friendlies were in the vicinity he made a tight turn to attack but misjudging his position, he again flew underneath his target, which confirmed its credentials by firing at him as he passed. When he hauled the Hurricane round for a third try the enemy had made good his escape and despite further searching, Sqn Ldr Widdows could not re-establish contact, so he returned to Digby.

  Later that same night he went out on patrol again, this time in the Beaufighter, but his luck was still out and no enemy aircraft were sighted. Although several patrols were flown over The Wash area that night by 29 Squadr
on Blenheims detached to Wittering, they too had no success. For example, Plt Off Roy Davies and air gunner Sgt Edwin Jones chased a bandit for over half an hour by following vectors from control and searchlight beams, but frustratingly, even though bomb explosions were spotted from time to time, no E/A was sighted. The same thing happened again to this pair on September 23, when there was much AA gunfire, searchlight activity and bomb dropping but still no contact with the enemy.

  There was still some daylight left when Charles Widdows and his air gunner Plt Off Lionel Watson took Beaufighter R2072 up in the evening of the 18th as one of the Ternhill detachment. They were ordered off at 20.50 to patrol Hoylake at 17,000 feet but despite seeing anti-aircraft fire in the distance, no bomb bursts were observed. As darkness fell this situation changed and although the Beaufighter crew could now see bombs dropping on Liverpool, they were ordered to leave the area clear for AA guns. This did not please Sqn Ldr Widdows at all and he remarked later that as there was a little light left he felt sure he could have “done something if I was allowed to go in.”

  The two Beaufighters evaluated by 29 Squadron appear to have been popular aircraft with those who flew them. Although no formal speed test was made, the Beaufighter appears easily able to hold on to a Hurricane and it was considered not much more difficult to fly at night than a Blenheim – in fact it was thought generally more pleasant to fly at night due to its superior manoeuvrability. Pilots commented that the short nose made approach and landing seem rather strange but the view, although better than a Blenheim, was still somewhat restricted by the thickness of the windscreen supports. Neither of the two Beaufighters initially issued to 29 Squadron were fitted with AI apparatus so the crews had no opportunity to test the performance of the latest AI Mk IV that was to be installed for squadron service.