Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas

by Han Fook Kwang

  A whole set of political principles and socialist beliefs have often been summed up in the PAP phrase, “a more just and equal society”. By this, the PAP does not mean that all men are equal and will be rewarded equally. Men are not born equal in either physical or mental capacity. But a socialist believes that society as a whole will benefit, and there will be more happiness for more people if all are given equal opportunities for education and advancement regardless of class or property. It therefore follows that even under the new social order there will be some men who are more successful than others, but with this fundamental distinction, that they have become more successful after free and equal competition and effort.

  The revolution began before the PAP was ever thought of, but the PAP hopes to endure to see this revolution through to its fulfilment.

  It is by now generally accepted that a revolution has taken place and is still taking place throughout Asia, and that Malaya and Singapore are a part of this revolution. The revolution began before the PAP was ever thought of, but the PAP hopes to endure to see this revolution through to its fulfilment. Last year, before we assumed power, we expounded the theme of the social revolution. It is useful briefly to summarise what is meant by the social revolution in the context of Singapore in the immediate future.

  The term “revolution” connotes a sudden and far-reaching change, a major break in the continuity of development, and the qualifying adjective “social” denotes the emphasis we give to this aspect of the revolution. A recasting of the social order is a far more important characteristic of a revolution than a change in the political situation by the use of violence. A revolution occurs when the ruling class cannot, and the ruled class will not, continue the old system. And so in the proper sense of the word, the former colonial empires in Asia have all undergone a revolution. The upper class of the colonial society could not, and the lower class would not, continue the old colonial system, and so a sudden and far-reaching change has overtaken the social orders of these countries. But this is only the first stage of a revolution, a continuous and continuing process of change, the end result of which is very far from settled, and only brief glimpses are possible of the shape of things to come.

  The PAP is basically a revolutionary and not a reformist movement, and the social and economic forces which threw the PAP into power have not altered. Although it is not practical or possible to have a profound change of social organisation by a major shift in the relations between social classes because of the entrepôt island economy of Singapore, it is nevertheless important to remember that the have-nots, who form the mass of the workers – the underprivileged, the underemployed and the unemployed, are seeking a change in their position in society. A government of Singapore which represents these urges cannot modify its social programme or political principles without forfeiting the trust and confidence that have been placed upon it by the underprivileged. Such a government can trim its economic programme to fit into the limitations of an entrepôt island economy only if a strenuous effort is made to redress the economic balance by a redistribution of social and economic benefits.

  For some time before a revolution, the ruling class finds itself in a position of a minority, isolated from the rest of society. If the British colonial government had persisted in maintaining its domination, then the machinery of the state would have given way and there might well have been a complete breakdown by a concerted attack of revolutionary forces from the ground. We have been saved this inconvenience by Britain’s policy of withdrawal from positions of open colonial rule in Asia.

  After the last elections, the political system was changed, and power passed from the last legitimate colonial government to the first representative government of the people, and thus the gulf between the rulers and ruled is for the time being bridged. It is important that, if the gulf is not to reappear, the government’s social and political policies must reflect the sentiments and attitudes of the revolutionary mass from whence it draws its strength. But at the same time a revolutionary government which attempts in Singapore to upset the structure of the island entrepôt economy will only bring deprivations upon the people and disaster upon itself. So the art of government in Singapore, through this phase of its history, can be summed up in two guiding principles: first, to work to the best advantage the present entrepôt economy whilst slowly encouraging industrial expansion, partly through government capital but largely through private investment; and second, to satisfy the revolutionary urge of the mass of the people for a fundamental change in the relationship between social classes, and this in spite of the fact that there can be no fundamental change in the immediate future in the economic base of the society. An orthodox Marxist will say that is an impossible task. The business of the PAP, as a democratic socialist party, is to show that, difficult and delicate a task though it may be, it can be done. However, in the long run, it is inevitable that the economic base itself will be transformed.

  Those who feared disastrous changes in the economic system with the advent of a PAP government, but who are now agreeably surprised that the world has not collapsed, should remember that our political opponents were frequently not truthful.

  Those who feared disastrous changes in the economic system with the advent of a PAP government, but who are now agreeably surprised that the world has not collapsed, should remember that our political opponents were frequently not truthful. Never at any time did we consider, or pretend, that drastic changes in economic relationships were possible in our given set of political circumstances. It is not for lack of revolutionary purpose that we have not made more drastic changes in the relationships of the social classes. It is more the appreciation of the limitations of the Singapore situation which has predetermined our line of policy and action. Basically we are not reformists. We do not believe that changes in the social order can be accomplished through the alteration of some particular institution, activity or condition.

  But, revolution aside, the first business of a government is to govern firmly and wisely in the interests of the whole community. And the interests of the whole community in our entrepôt situation require the active participation and cooperation of the managerial and professional elite. We understand how you came to be leaders of trade and commerce, or captains of industry, or distinguished yourselves in the professions. We also understand that the incentives were material ones. And since it is our desire to see that the system continues to operate effectively and efficiently, it must necessarily follow that we are prepared to allow the old incentives to continue.

  The problem of the government is how best to utilise the existing social order to produce the maximum results, and the only intervention envisaged in the next four years is a redistribution of the results of the fruits of the economy. At the end of our tenure of office, it is our intention that there should be more equality of opportunity for education and advancement. To fulfil this intention will require a tremendous expenditure of the national revenue on education, expenditure which cannot be made unless there is an expansion of the whole economy. And if there is one overriding problem which we must resolve, it is that of creating sufficient expansion in the economy: (1) to provide the jobs for a growing population, and (2) to provide the revenue to educate the younger half of that growing population.

  The curious position now is that a socialist government is entrusted with the responsibility for industrial expansion and development in what is still essentially a free enterprise and capitalist system. To the extent that you help the expansion of that system, you will have the support of the government. And the message that I would like to leave with you this evening is this: regardless of our differing political beliefs, we have enough common ground, albeit for different reasons, in desiring a rapid economic and industrial development in the immediate future. For this phase of our social revolution, the better business you do, the more things you buy and sell to and from Singapore, the more shops and factories that you open, the happier we are. Where we might n
ot be in agreement is the way in which we hope to spread the benefits of prosperity. But so long as your activity not only assures your own prosperity but the prosperity of the whole community, you will find the apparatus of the government willing and ready to assist you in your enterprise.

  Being competitive, equipping the population with the right skills, identifying niche industries for the economy: these are questions Lee thought about early on in Singapore’s progress up the industrialisation ladder. In this speech to Singapore Polytechnic students on January 5, 1972, he dwelt on the skill level required in a modern economy.

  Endless arguments over how many engineers to produce

  They did not produce engineers, technicians who could have run the Volta High Dam for them.

  I think the lesson for us has already been learned dramatically in the last few years: over 30,000 redundancies in the British bases and those who found jobs were people who were skilled technicians or otherwise useful production digits. Those who did not get jobs were the clerks, the storekeepers and the unskilled. Recently, the Singapore Traction Company had a traumatic ending and the lesson was again learned. Those who were skilled, those who drove the buses, could get jobs. But right up till now, there are nearly a thousand people who were clerks, timekeepers, storekeepers still waiting for suitable appointments.

  But I do not want to leave you with the impression that development means that you become a skilled technician or an industrial worker. It depends upon your country’s level of development and the planning and programme with which a government, given that kind of society, can take its people forward to the next phase.

  I think what is universally true of most new countries is that they inherited a system of education, which very often was carried on unthinkingly by indigenous independent governments for five, ten years with very serious repercussions for their own development and resulting in unemployment.

  You find countries like Ghana, for instance, which in West Africa has been exposed to contacts with the West for several centuries. Before the British, there were the Danes and the early slave traders. They are people who have acquired quite a degree of sophistication, the ones on the coast as distinct from the ones in the hinterland. And the British have produced among them Greek scholars, Latin scholars. The Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana was a Greek and Latin scholar. But they did not produce engineers, technicians who could have run the Volta High Dam for them. Or perhaps more relevant, they did not produce good scientists in agriculture, in fertilisers, in how to make their economy move from a relatively simple agricultural pastoral base into something more productive.

  It is no use, if you are a less developed country, to decide that you are going to compete in the leading sectors which the Japanese decided are leading sectors.

  At the other end of the scale are India and Pakistan – highly developed educational sectors, universities well-endowed and prepared. They got into a position where they were producing unemployed engineers because the economic development was not keeping pace with the engineers they were producing – the net result being, their doctors migrated. As British doctors migrated to America for better jobs, Indians and Pakistanis filled British hospitals.

  And the lesson is that everybody has got to take a hardheaded look at his own position, decide in the context of his own base, the potential that it has, what is the next step forward. And for us the most important single thing is, of course, the development of our human resources, exploiting our strategic location which makes possible certain industries.

  I often read in the newspapers – “leading sectors”. And you ask an economist or an adviser to a bank, “Tell me what is going to be the leading sector. The sectors which are going to be the ones which will provide you with the most advanced progress in the next few years.” He says, “Well, that is the whole secret. If you can identify the leading sectors then you are a success.” And the Japanese did exactly that. Every few years, they decide which are the sectors they are going to concentrate on. And they threw all their resources into capturing a commanding position in that sector. Probably in the early ’60s, they decided that transistors, cameras were leading sectors – great growth potential for export. And they had a group of men in their Ministry for Economic Development and Trade who explored the world markets, did their sums properly and decided that these were the areas of great potential growth for exports and these were the specific fields in which they would allocate their zaibatsus (their big combines), and they spread out the attacks – you will do radios, you will do cameras, you will do communications equipment, and so on. And by the early, middle ’60s, they must have decided that small cars was going to be a leading sector, together with colour television. And they poured in a great deal of money, resources. Net result – they captured the small car market not only in America but in countries like Switzerland and the whole of Southeast Asia. So too with colour television.

  It is no use, if you are a less developed country, to decide that you are going to compete in the leading sectors which the Japanese decided are leading sectors. Because that is not your level of economic growth and you have not got those skills. You have not reached that point where you can compete against them.

  If you ask me what are our leading sectors I would be hard put to tell you, because apart from a few obvious ones – ship-repairing, oil exploration, rigging equipment, servicing of aircraft – there are few other areas which we think we should make a break in. And therefore, if it were possible, we should be training our boys and girls in school, in either secondary technical schools or vocational institutes, and preparing them for the kinds of jobs that will be available in industry, either in the polytechnic or in the university. But often it is wiser not to say what you think are the leading sectors until they have arrived, until you have succeeded.

  I would say, broadly, all those items of manufacture which contain a very high added skill value which, for instance, would be the case in a small country like Switzerland. But with this one differential – that the Swiss have to reach the sea through long and difficult rail and road journeys, whereas we have got the sea right on our doorstep. But with that variation, that differential, all the things which they can do and which their high labour cost now makes them less competitive. They will either have to farm out – export – their factories to countries like Singapore where our population can be trained to acquire the skills to produce the same finished products of quality in a minimum of time, to retain their markets whilst they move on to a higher stage, or they will lose out. So you can go through the whole of the export market of the Swiss. Or if you like, take the Swiss and the West Germans together and see which items would be suitable for us. But even after we are fairly confident that certain areas are likely to develop, like lenses, cameras, geodetic instruments for survey, photo-grammatic instruments – a great deal of skilled labour, which means from very low value raw material you introduce machines and labour and skills, to produce something of high added quality, you then work backwards and say, “What do you train our students to do?” But even when you have done that, you are still not in a position to say, “Well, we shall train these students, say, 50 per cent or 30 per cent of our students, in the working of quartz and crystals.” Because there are open market forces, international trade factors which decide whether or not we will be able to expand in those sectors. Therefore, it means that you have got to give your students a broad base – basic disciplines – and leave the specialisation really at a very much later stage and possibly even on the factory floor. This means added cost in education.

  By way of illustration, I asked for some figures from the Education Ministry, and they said to train an ordinary academic secondary school student costs us $300 per year, per student. If you send that student into a secondary technical stream, that means he goes twice a week to some vocational centre where he learns to do technical drawing and metalwork, woodwork and so on, the cost goes up to about $420. You send that student to a vocationa
l institute, his cost is $800 a year, which is more than twice that of the ordinary secondary academic school student because of the benches he requires, the space he occupies, the equipment that he must be supplied with. And you can, of course, take this on to tertiary institutions and, broadly speaking, we are subsidising the cost of an engineering student, the subsidy per year is between $4,000 and $5,000, and the subsidy on the polytechnic student is anywhere between $2,000 and $3,000 a year.

  How many engineers do you produce for a certain number of skilled workers and technicians? We have had endless arguments on the matter.

  Therefore, we are presented with a very difficult problem of priorities. How many engineers do you produce for a certain number of skilled workers and technicians? We have had endless arguments on the matter. If you follow the American system then you produce probably one engineer for every two technicians, which is what they do in America. And the engineers do the jobs of the technicians. They are more highly paid. Or you take the British system where there is a clear demarcation between the pragmatic trained technician and the engineer who is the theorist-cum-pragmatist, and the ratio works out to about 8 to 1.

  Well, for the time being, we have decided, not because we are convinced that the British system is right but because of the economics of it, that it is probably more sensible for us to produce more technicians than engineers. And as we progress, we will have to review this. In five years, we make a review and another ten years, we make a second review. And the guiding factors will be what is the best possible way, given our peculiar, almost unique circumstances, to mobilise our manpower and train them.

  And for the time being, as far as we can project figures and the investment rates and export opportunities into the next five years, we simply cannot produce either enough engineers or enough technicians. Because we are unable not only to expand rapidly enough the training facilities that we have, also because there is a limit to how fast you can upgrade the skills of your population. And there is a final limit, however good your educational system, just to what levels you can go by training, teaching, jacking up standards, which means a large input of foreign management personnel, engineers and probably experienced technicians to make up, and also probably immigrant skilled workers.